LING CHUN LUNG v. MESSRS RAYMOND LAM & ASSOCIATES SOLICITORS (A FIRM)

HCMP 651/2025

[2026] HKCFI 463

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 651 OF 2025

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  This is an appeal by the Plaintiff against the decision of Master Phoebe Man made on 15 October 2025 in which the learned Master dismissed the Originating Summons with costs.

2.  In order to understand the dispute, it is necessary to set out the relevant background facts.

A.   THE RELEVANT BACKGROUND

3.  In July 2020, the Plaintiff suffered injuries in a road traffic accident.  He engaged the Defendant as his solicitors in relation to his intended claim.  For that purpose, the Defendant liaised with the insurer on behalf of the Plaintiff.  

4.  On 26 March 2021, the Plaintiff signed a Chinese document prepared by the Defendant (“the Chinese Document”).  There was no agreed English translation of the Chinese Document.  I set out below my understanding of the key matters set out in the Chinese Document. 

(1)  The Plaintiff decided not to accept the offer to settle the dispute with the counterparty of the accident (“the Counterparty”)  for HK$50,000.

(2)  The Plaintiff would instruct the Defendant to indicate his willingness to accept a net payment of HK$150,000 (including interest but excluding legal costs)  from the Counterparty as the final compensation amount in respect of the accident.

(3)  The Defendant would obtain its own costs from the Counterparty and such costs would not be deducted from the net compensation payment to be received by the Plaintiff.

(4)  The Plaintiff acknowledged that the costs would be borne partly by the Counterparty and partly by the Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff agreed to pay costs to the Defendant insofar as such costs would not be recoverable from the Counterparty (“Irrecoverable Costs”).  The Plaintiff further agreed that the Irrecoverable Costs could be deducted from the compensation payment from the Counterparty.  However, in doing so, the Plaintiff would in any event receive a sum of HK$150,000.

(5)  The Plaintiff understood that it was possible for him to receive an amount higher than HK$150,000.

5.  The Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the Chinese Document.  In late April 2021, the Plaintiff received a cheque for HK$150,000 from the Defendant.

6.  According to the Plaintiff, in late 2022, he received an anonymous parcel containing certain documents relating to the services carried out by the Defendant.  One of the documents was a “claims discharge form” dated 29 March 2021 (“the Discharge Form”)  purportedly signed by the Plaintiff.  The Discharge Form, amongst other things, stated that the Plaintiff had accepted a settlement sum of HK$320,000 “in full and final settlement of [his] claim for damages, costs and disbursements” against the Counterparty arising out of the accident.  The Plaintiff claims that he had never signed the Discharge Form and never knew that the settlement figure was HK$320,000.  For present purposes, it is unnecessary to go into the provenance of the anonymous parcel or the identity of the sender.

7.  On 2 April 2025, upon request, the Defendant provided to the Plaintiff a copy of the Defendant’s bill dated 30 April 2021 for HK$170,000 (“the Bill”). According to the Defendant, the Bill was handed over to the Plaintiff a few days after 30 April 2021 by one of the Defendant’s former employees who handled the Plaintiff’s intended claim.  The Plaintiff, however, denies this, and claims that he was not contemporaneously given a copy of the Bill.

8.  On 29 April 2025, the Originating Summons was issued by the Plaintiff to seek to refer the Bill to the taxing master to be taxed under s.67 of the Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap 159)  (“LPO”). 

B.  THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE

9.  The Plaintiff submits that his case falls within s.67(1)  of the LPO and that the court should order the Bill to be taxed.

10.  Section 67 of the LPO relevantly provides as follows:

“(1)  On the application, made within 1 month of the delivery of a solicitor’s bill or a foreign lawyer’s bill, of the party chargeable therewith the Court shall, without requiring any sum to be paid into court, order that the bill shall be taxed and that no action shall be commenced thereon until the taxation is completed.

(2)  If no such application is made with in the period mentioned in subsection (1), then, on the application of the solicitor or the foreign lawyer, or of the party chargeable with the bill, the Court may, upon such terms, if any, as it thinks fit (not being terms as to the costs of the taxation), order –

(a)  that the bill shall be taxed;

(b)  that, until the taxation is completed, no action shall be commenced on the bill, and any action already commenced be stayed:

Provided that –

(i)  if 12 months have expired from the delivery of the bill, or if the bill has been paid, or if a verdict has been obtained or a writ of inquiry executed in an action for the recovery of the costs covered thereby, no order shall be made on the application of the party chargeable with the bill except in special circumstances and, if an order is made, it may contain such terms as regards the costs of the taxation as the Court may think fit;

(ii)  if the bill has been paid, no order under this subsection shall be made where the application for the order is made after the expiration of 12 months from the date of payment of the bill.”

11.  The Plaintiff appears to suggest that because he was only provided a copy of the Bill on 2 April 2025, he is now entitled to make an application under s.67(1)  of the LPO to have the Bill taxed.

C.  MY VIEW

12.  For the reasons that I am about to give, the Plaintiff’s position is misconceived.

13.  The Plaintiff’s position is that s.67(1)  of the LPO is engaged so that he has an unconditional right to have the Bill taxed.  However, s.67(1)  is engaged only if the application is “made within 1 month of the delivery of a solicitor’s bill”.  In the present case, there is a dispute of fact between the parties. The Plaintiff says he was only provided with a copy of the Bill on 2 April 2025, whereas the Defendant says that the Bill was handed to the Plaintiff a few days after the Bill was issued on 30 April 2021.  I am unable to resolve this factual dispute in this appeal.  More importantly, the Plaintiff knew about the existence of this factual dispute before the Originating Summons was issued.  On 8 April 2025, the Defendant informed the Plaintiff’s solicitors that the Bill was handed to the Plaintiff by an ex-employee of the Defendant contemporaneously, and pointed out that there was a factual dispute.  Yet, the Plaintiff proceeded to issue the Originating Summons herein on 29 April 2025.

14.  In these circumstances, I cannot see how the Plaintiff has demonstrated to my satisfaction that the present application was made within 1 month of the delivery of the Bill.

15.  The Plaintiff submits that the court should not dismiss the Originating Summons and should instead give directions, such as ordering the deponents to attend court for cross-examination, or to convert the Originating Summons into a writ action.  Leaving aside the fact that the Plaintiff never asked for such directions prior to the hearing before the learned Master, I disagree that the court should consider making such further directions at this stage.  As Mr Wong accepts on behalf of the Plaintiff, s.67 of the LPO is a summary procedure.  Mr Wong also accepts that it is for his client to bring himself within s.67(1), which is the statutory regime that the Plaintiff now seeks to rely on.  In my view, it is incorrect for the Plaintiff to commence the summary procedure under s.67(1)  of the LPO when he knew that the court would be faced with factual disputes.  It does not seem logical that the court should give directions for the resolution of factual disputes, or to convert the matter into a mini-trial, when trying to determine whether the statutory summary procedure is engaged. 

16.  In any event, it is common ground that no payment was ever required to be made by the Plaintiff under the Bill.  Accordingly, irrespective of the operation of the statutory scheme under s.67 of the LPO, and in the light of the Chinese Document which the Plaintiff accepts that he signed, it is not clear what benefit the Plaintiff will derive from having the Bill taxed by a taxing master now. 

17.  It seems to me that the Plaintiff’s grievances are two-fold.  First, he claims that he was not told about the final settlement sum of $320,000 and believes that someone forged his signature on the Discharge Form.  He also believes that he was never provided with the Bill in 2021.  However, neither the present application under s.67 of the LPO, nor the Originating Summons taken out by the Plaintiff, is the proper channel to ventilate the Plaintiff’s grievances. 

18.  For the sake of completeness, I should mention that I disagree with the Defendant’s submission that the present case falls within s.56 of the LPO.

(1)  S.56 is concerned with an agreement for remuneration for non-contentious business.  Under the LPO, “non-contentious” business includes “any business connected with sales, purchases, leases, mortgages and other matters of conveyancing”. 

(2)  The Defendant submits that no court proceedings were commenced and the services carried out for the Plaintiff were therefore non-contentious business for the purpose of the LPO. 

(3)  I do not believe it is appropriate to draw such a bright-line distinction.  In Re Solicitor (Taxation of Costs) [1955] 2 QB 252, Denning LJ rejected the invitation to draw a clear line to distinguish between “contentious business” and “non-contentious business” by referring to the issue of the writ or other originating process in the courts of law.  At p 269, his Lordship said:

“It seems to me that if a clear line is to be drawn there is only one possible place for it, namely, the issue of the writ or other originating process in the courts of law. All business before that date could be said to be non-contentious, and all business afterwards to be contentious. It would be very convenient if we could draw that line, but I do not think that we are at liberty to do so, for the simple reason that it is not the line drawn by Parliament. The statutory distinction depends on the nature of the business—contentious or non-contentious—not on the time at which it is done.”

(4)  This passage was cited by the Court of Appeal in South Horizons International Petroleum Ltd v Crump & Co [2002] 2 HKLRD 187 at [28].  At [33], Mayo VP said that an important distinction would lie in whether legal proceedings were in contemplation.

(5)  On the available evidence in the present case, it appears to be common ground that Plaintiff was contemplating litigation against the Counterparty.  In his first affirmation, the Plaintiff said that he “engaged the Defendant for its services in relation to [his] intended personal injuries claim arising out of the Accident”.  This was acknowledged in the Defendant’s affirmation.  In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff’s engagement of the Defendant was a “non-contentious” business.

19.  For the above reasons, the Plaintiff has not established that s.67(1)  of the LPO is engaged.  The Originating Summons was therefore rightly dismissed by the learned Master.

D.  DISPOSITION

20.  I dismiss the Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal dated 16 October 2025.

21.  I will now hear the parties on costs.

[Submissions on costs]

22.  I order that the costs of and occasioned by the Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal dated 16 October 2025 are to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant to be summarily assessed. 

[Submissions on summary assessment]

23.  Adopting a broad-brush approach, I summarily assess the Defendant’s costs at HK$230,000.