香港特別行政區 訴 陳炳威

HCMA351/2008

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

刑事上訴司法管轄權

定罪上訴

案件編號 ：裁判法院上訴案件2008年第351號

(原九龍城裁判法院傳票2007年第30180號)

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判 案 書

1. 上訴人在聆訊後被裁定一項不小心駕駛罪名成立，被判罰款$1,900。他現不服定罪，提出上訴。

2. 根據控方案情，控方第一證人看見前方的行車燈號已由綠燈轉為黃燈，他把輕型貨車停在停車線的前方約兩秒鐘後，尾隨由上訴人所駕駛的中型貨車因煞掣不及，車頭撞向控方證人輕型貨車的車尾。

3. 上訴人選擇不作供及不傳召辯方證人。

上訴理由

4. 上訴理由，現綜合概述如下：

(1)     裁判官指出，上訴人沒有在第一時間對到場的警員道出與他其後會面紀錄中開脫部份相符的辯解，不賦予上訴人混雜陳述中開脫部份任何比重時，等同剝奪了上訴人保持緘默的權利，犯了法律上的錯誤。裁判官完全忽略了根據證供，上訴人在意外後已即時向第一證人提出，是第一證人在綠色燈號時停車，這點實與他其後會面紀錄的開脫部份相符；

(2)     控辯雙方不爭的事實可支持上述辯解部份，這些事實雖可支持第一證人的證供，但亦同樣可支持辯方所指，第一證人是看錯燈號突然煞車導致意外的說法，裁判官錯誤以不利上訴人的可能性，作出不利上訴人的推論；

(3)     裁判官在評估第一證人證供的可信性時，沒有充份考慮其證供前後不符之處，錯誤地認定為上述瑕疵不足以影響其整體證供的可信性；及

(4)     定罪不安全及不穩妥。

答辯人回應

5. 答辯人指 :

(1)     裁判官已全面考慮整體證供，對上訴人的會面紀錄作出分析，在上訴人不作供的情況下，裁判官有權不賦予上訴人會面紀錄中辯白部份任何比重。即使裁判官忽略了上訴人在意外後質疑第一證人在綠色燈號時突然停車的即時反應，上訴人從沒向到場的警員道出這點是不爭的事實。裁判官並沒有以此作為對上訴人作出不利推測之事實基礎，亦並沒有剝奪上訴人保持緘默的權利。

(2)     根據控辯雙方承認的事實，第一證人的車輛駛超越停車綫時，行車燈號可以是亮着綠、黄或紅色燈號。裁判官正確指出，這部份的事實須與其他控辯雙方承認的事實一併閱讀和理解，不宜斷章取義。她在分析所有證供後，絕對有權作出攝影機不一定在第一證人的車輛超越停車綫時會拍攝到其車衝紅燈的裁斷。事實上，第一證人看錯燈號一點，純屬辯方向第一證人指出的說法而已，在上訴人不作供的情況下，實缺乏證據支持。

(3)     至於上訴人大律師所指，控方證人證言前後不符之處，已被裁判官充份考慮。裁判官在裁斷陳述書已詳細分析證供，並詳列接納控方證供的理由，此乃事實的裁斷。

(4)     答辯人指，即使控方證人看錯燈號突然停車，後車司機亦有責任保持合理停車距離，令他有足夠時間停車，避免發生意外。答辯人指定罪並無不穩妥之處。

裁決

6. 裁判上訴是以「重審」方式，依據在原審裁判官席前的證供證據進行：參看案例周紹斌(譯音)訴香港特別行政區[1]。裁判官就事實之裁斷，處於較上訴法庭按照書面謄本進行聆訊有優勢的位置。因為他目睹證人作供的神態舉止，絕對可以就那一方是可信的證人一點作出裁決。證人的可信性及可靠性，純在原審裁判官決定的範疇內。除非該裁斷是極度剛愎武斷或有違邏輯或內在或然性，又或原審裁判官在處理證供時，就重要事項作出錯^誤引述、或有遺漏、或不曾作考慮分析、又或審訊過程中程序出錯，引致定罪不安穩，上訴法庭才會干預。

7. 上訴人大律師指裁判官在法律觀點上犯錯，包括錯誤地不賦予上訴人混雜陳述中辯白部份任何的比重，及基於對事實的誤解，錯誤地把上訴人保持緘默的權利，用作置他於不利處境的用途，與HKSAR v. Lee Fuk Hing(李福興)(譯音)，FACC7/2004案的法律原則背道而馳。上訴人大律師續指，第一證人就當時交通燈的燈號的證供前後不一，而控辯雙方承認的事實亦不屬結論性，故不能支持第一證人的證供，因此，既然當時交通燈的燈號證據上有疑點，定罪並不安穩。

8. 上訴人大律師所提出的上訴理據，全是建基於他把本案之關鍵爭拗事宜，理解及定位為第一控方證人是否在綠色交通燈號時突然停車，引致尾隨的上訴人煞掣不及。

9. 根據「道路使用者守則」，當駕駛者駛近交通燈的路口，綠燈並非等同前路暢通無阻、駕駛者可在任何情況下前駛的指標，駕駛者仍須考慮當時環境和情況 ：

「除非你肯定車輛可以毫無障礙地安全駛過路口，否則，就算綠燈亮着，仍不可向前駛。」

10. 根據「道路使用者守則」的「駕駛速度」章 ：

「應與前車保持足夠行車距離，若前車突然慢駛或停下來時，本身的車輛也能安全停下…

如路面濕滑…，就應與前車保持更遠的距離。…

與前車保持所需的停車距離，是安全的做法，不過，如果市區内交通繁忙，行車緩慢，就不一定可以這樣做。因此，駕駛人須視乎情況，隨機應變，無論如何，如果與前車的距離短於停車距離，便有發生意外的危險…與前車的距離，絕不能短過思考距離。」

又 :

「如路面濕滑，煞車距離要作兩倍計算。」

11. 裁判官在裁斷陳述書正確指出 ：

「…. 本案中不受爭議是：在關鍵時刻，上訴人一直尾隨第一控方證人，東行左2線的交通流量車多繁忙，路面濕滑。在兩車碰撞前，LT1838已經停頓；這亦符合上訴人在控方證物P-3中所言：在LT1838停車後，LF7613才撞向LT1838的車尾。在LT1838停車時，前方交通暢通（參閱：控方證物P-3第3頁中第10項和第11項問答）。….」

她續指 ：

「案發時，路面濕滑，路面多車暢順，LF7613是一輛中型貨車，在煞車時、LF7613所需要的時間和距離相比一般私家車所需要的自然要多得多，上訴人除了需要確保與LT1838車尾之間保持一段安全的車距外，也需倍外警惕、留心前方交通，以便當遇有或前車緊急煞車、或前方交通出現異樣時，他能有足夠的應變空間與時間。」

12. Scott v. Warren [1974]RTR 104一案中的上訴人尾隨前車，但前車緊急煞車，上訴人煞掣不及導致碰撞。上訴庭引用並確認Brown & Lynn v. Western S M T Co. Ltd [1945] SC 31如下 :

“The distance which should separate two vehicles traveling one behind the other must depend upon many variable factors – their speed, the nature of the locality, the other traffic present or to be expected, the opportunity available to the following driver of commanding a view ahead of the leading vehicle, the distance within which the following vehicle can be pulled up, and many other things.  The following driver is, in my view, bound, so far as reasonably possible, to take up such a position, and to drive in such a fashion, as will enable him to deal successfully with all traffic exigencies reasonably to be anticipated: but whether he has fulfilled this duty must in every case be a question of fact, just as it is a question of fact whether, on any emergency disclosing itself, the following driver acted with the alertness, skill and judgment reasonably to be expected in the circumstances.”

13. 上訴庭亦引用了Lord Stevenson的dissenting judgment如下 ：

“…A motor driver constantly has to face unexpected situations.  If he drives with care he will be alert to meet them and take all reasonable precautions to do so.”

上訴庭續指：

“Although that is a dissenting judgment, it does not seem to me to differ from the test laid down by the Lord Justice-Clerk, except to recognise that a driver cannot simply plead in defence of his action in colliding with the preceding vehicle, that the preceding vehicle made an emergency stop.  There are emergency stops no doubt, and emergency stops.  The matter is one of degree in every case…”

14. 該案的上訴人作供稱 :

“When he applied his brakes violently in order to avoid a collision, his wheels had locked, and he had skidded on the road for some 10 to 12 feet.  No such marks were reported by the police at the time, but the defendant gave evidence that he had seen marks he attributed to the locking of his wheels.  Furthermore, it seems to have been argued by the defendant that, had his wheels not locked, he would have been able to have stopped before he collided with the van, and he did not know why his wheels had locked because there was no mechanical defect in his vehicle; but he suggested that there was oil on the road due to the proximity of a garage.  He did not examine the road at all for the presence of oil, it was merely a theory put forward by the defendant why his wheels had locked, it being his contention that if the wheels had not locked he would not have collided with the van.”

15. 本案的上訴人選擇不作供，裁判官已提醒自己不應因上訴人行使其權利而對他作出任何不利的推論，然而，上訴人此舉乃表示他並沒有提供來證供反駁、削弱或解釋控方所提出的證據。辯方大律師向控方證人所指出辯方對事發經過的說法，除非得控證人確認，否則，該些指稱本身，並不成為本案的證供。

16. 事實上，根據R. v. Chong Kin Cheung,CACC196/1995，上訴庭指 ：

“      As was his right, the applicant chose not to give evidence.  This does not advance the case against him but compelling inferences may remain unanswered and it is not the judge’s task when considering the facts put before him to imagine possible defences of which there is no evidence.  By the same token it is not his task- nor that of a jury – to speculate upon the absence of possible evidence.  His duty was to try the case just on the evidence before him.”

17. 本席在HKSAR v. Chan Hung Kwan, HCMA667/2006說 ：

“…. Despite the fact that counsel had taken nearly every point, he did not do the most sensible thing our adversarial system calls for: to call his client into the witness box to rebut the prima facie case which undoubtedly existed. Of course in some cases, the Prosecution case alone may contain the seeds of their own destruction.  But common sense and experience tells one that those are extremely rare and the present case is certainly not one of those.”

18. 故此，即使前車司機在綠燈突然煞車一點屬實，本案實缺乏證供顯示，上訴人作為一個尾隨的司機，如何在當時的環境中已作出合理及適當的小心、有經驗及有判斷力的反應，但仍不能避免碰撞發生。事實上，在市區内駕駛司機為了避開行人、動物、或因應其他突如其來的情況須突然停車，並非不常見，屬合理可預期的突發情況。尾隨的司機，應可預期前車突然煞停的突發情況，及時停車避免碰撞，這與不切實際地把理智謹慎司機之標準，提升至完美無瑕的準則不能相提並論。

19. 暫委法官賴盤德在HKSAR v. Richard Mark Scotford, HCMA638/2006一案中說 ：

“      One of the problems that laymen have understanding in prosecutions for careless driving is that the court is bound to focus on the driving of the defendant before it at trial and answer the question the law demands of it: have the prosecution proved that the driving fell below the required standard?  Even if the accident which gave rise to the prosecution revealed that the other driver was at fault as well, that provides no defence … So I even it I say to you, ‘All those points you made against him, you have established them; you have made them,’ it does not provide you with a defence if, in fact, you too were driving carelessly.”

在本案的事實層面上，即使第一證人確如辯方所指在綠色燈號突然煞車，這亦不自動成為上訴人作為尾隨司機不小心駕駛的辯解理由。因此，上訴人大律師所提的全部上訴理據均只屬學術性而已，本席不打算在此逐一處理。

20. 本案可供定罪之證供充份，定罪並無不穩妥，維持原判，上訴駁回。