AMER SPORTS CANADA INC AND ANOTHER v. PERFECT SUPPLY CHAIN CO LTD AND OTHERS

HCIP 50/2025

[2026] HKCFI 4025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROCEEDINGS NO 50 OF 2025

________________________

BETWEEN

________________________

________________________

DECISION

________________________

Introduction

1.  In this Action, Ps’ claim against Ds is for copyright infringement, trademark infringement and passing off.

2.  There are four summonses calling for my determination. First, by Ps’ summons dated 19 November 2025 (“the Default Judgment Summons”), Ps seek an order that the Defence filed by D1 on 4 November 2025 (“the Defence”) be struck out and default judgment be entered against D1 by reason of its alleged breach of an unless order dated 21 October 2025 (“the Unless Order”). Second, by Ps’ summons dated 25 November 2025 (“the Specific Discovery Summons”), Ps seek specific discovery against D1 in respect of a licence agreement between D1 and PT ATX ASIA SPORTS PRODUCT (“ATX ID”) pursuant to O.24 r.10, Rules of the High Court (“RHC”).

3.  Just two days before the substantive hearing of the Default Judgment Summons and the Specific Discovery Summons, D1 took out two summonses additionally. By summons dated 14 May 2026 (“the Relief from Sanction Summons”), D1 applies for leave to make an application for relief from sanction in the Unless Order, to reinstate the Defence and an extension of time to comply with paragraph 2 of the Order of Lok J dated 23 September 2025 (“the 23/9/2025 Order”) pursuant to O.2 r.5, RHC.

4.  By another summons dated 15 May 2026 (“the New Affirmation Summons”), D1 applies for leave to be granted for its filing of the 2^nd Affirmation of Ng Tsz Nok dated 14 May 2026 (“the Ng 2^nd”).

5.  At the hearing, Mr Wong appeared for P and Mr Ng together with Ms Yeung appeared for D1.

6.  Mr Wong indicated that Ps would agree to the admission of the Ng 2^nd despite its lateness and the costs of the New Affirmation Summons should be in the cause of the Specific Discovery Summons.

Ps’ Claim

7.  A brief introduction of Ps’ claim is necessary for the comprehension of their respective applications. The following summary of Ps’ case is largely taken from Mr Wong’s skeleton submissions.

8.  Ps claim to be the owner of the well-known brands “ARC’TERYX”, “” (the “Bird Logo”) and “始祖鳥” (collectively “Ps’ Marks”). P1 is also the owner of the copyright subsisting in the Bird Logo allegedly.

9.  Ps claim to have at all material times enjoyed substantial goodwill in respect of Ps’ Marks around the world, including in particular in Hong Kong, Mainland China, Singapore and Malaysia (the “Relevant Territories”).

10.  D1, D2 and D3 (collectively “Ds”) are not in any way related to Ps. D1 is a limited company incorporated in Hong Kong. At the material times, D2 was D1’s sole director (until the commencement of this Action) and shareholder. Ps allege that D2 is the alter ego of D1 and/or the mastermind behind all the infringing activities complained of in this Action.

11.  The core complaint of Ps is that Ds have used D1 as a vehicle to apply for and/or register marks identical and/or deceptively similar to Ps’ Marks (the “Infringing Marks”) in Singapore and Malaysia. They have further set up or caused to be set up domains targeting the public in Singapore and Malaysia (<arcteryx.com.sg> and <arcteryx.my> – the “Infringing Domains”). The Infringing Marks were displayed throughout the websites operated under the Infringing Domains, and photos of sporting goods bearing the Infringing Marks (the “Infringing Products”) also appeared extensively in the said websites. The websites are operated and/or intended to be operated by D1.

12.  Ps say that by setting up the websites under the Infringing Domains featuring the Infringing Marks, and by applying to register the Infringing Marks in Singapore and Malaysia, Ds have evinced an intention to market the Infringing Products in those countries.

13.  As shown in the Infringing Products, they were manufactured in Mainland China.

14.  Ps further allege that Ds have also, either by themselves or through their affiliated entities, approached Ps’ suppliers in Hong Kong, the Mainland and Taiwan and requested information regarding Ps’ products and for the supply of parts in relation to the Infringing Products under the misrepresentation (whether expressly or implicitly) that they are related to Ps. Some of Ps’ suppliers have been deceived and even had meeting with them.

15.  On the other hand, D1’s position is that it is the legitimate trade mark holder of the “ARC’TERYX”, “” mark (including but not limited to Trade Mark No. IDM000731237 for “”, No. IDM000731218 for “”, No. IDM001244245 for “” and No. IDM001194408 for “”) in Indonesia (collectively “D1’s Indonesian Marks”).

16.  It is clear that Ps’ Marks and D1’s Indonesian Marks are identical or near identical.

The discovery order and the unless order

17.  On 13 June 2025, Ps commenced this Action by issuing the Writ herein and making an ex parte application to Lok J. Their application was granted and an order was made against D1 that, among other things, D1 be restrained, whether acting by itself, D2, D3, from assigning or transferring any of the trade mark applications or registrations involving P’s Marks in Singapore and Malaysia in its name (“the Injunction”).

18.  On 20 June 2025, Lok J continued the Injunction until trial and, in addition, granted another injunction against D1. The judge further made a disclosure order against D1 and D1 was ordered to make an affirmation to make disclosure (“the 1^st Disclosure Order”) in its absence. However, no deadline was fixed for the compliance with the 1^st Disclosure Order.

19.  D1 did not comply with the 1^st Disclosure Order. As a result, Lok J made an identical disclosure order against D1 (“the Disclosure Order”) in paragraph 2 of the 23/9/2025 Order against D1 and D1 was required to make disclosures of information within 6 categories by affidavit/affirmations with appropriate exhibits to be filed by 7 October 2025.

20.  The disclosure obligations of D1 under the Disclosure Order are set out as follows:

“The 1^st Defendant shall do or perform the acts required to be done or performed by it under Paragraph 3 of the 20 June Order within fourteen (14) days from the date hereof, namely that, by 7 October 2025, the 1^st Defendant shall, by its director, make, file, and serve an affidavit or affirmation setting forth the full names, contact details and addresses of all persons, firms and/or companies: -

(a) which person or entity is the “Registrant” of the domain <arcteryx.my>;

(b) which person or entity within the Relevant Territories (as defined in paragraph 2 of the 20 June Order) has manufactured products bearing the Infringing Work (as defined in paragraph 2(a) of the 20 June Order);

(c) to whom any of the Defendants and/or their affiliated entities/agents have supplied, provided, sold, distributed and/or offered to sell, supply, provide or distribute in the Relevant Territories the Infringing Products (as defined in paragraph 2(b) of the 20 June Order);

(d) from whom any of the Defendants and/or their affiliated entities/agents have received orders or expression of interest to order or expression of interest to sell on behalf of any of the Defendants the Infringing Products within the Relevant Territories;

(e) by/from whom any of the Defendants and/or their affiliated entities/agents have imported, been offered, supplied, provided, sold, distributed and/or offered to supply, provide, distribute and/or sell, the Infringing Products within the Relevant Territories; and

(f) which person or entity any of the Defendants and/or their affiliated entities/agents have approached or inquired in the Relevant Territories in relation to the supply of the Infringing Products or any parts thereof;

and exhibit to such affidavit or affirmation copies of all relevant documents, including documents showing such full names and contact details, contracts, purchase orders, order forms, sales confirmations, invoices, faxes, letters, emails, notes, receipts, shipping documents, import/ export documents, orders, and, any correspondence and other documents thereof in the possession, power, custody or control of any of the Defendants, regardless of its format or medium of storage.”

21.  In the 23/9/2025 Order, Lok J also ordered that D1 do make costs payment in the respective sums of HK$300,000 and HK$1,040 forthwith (“the Costs Orders”).

22.  By summons dated 8 October 2025 (“the Time Summons”), D1 applied for an extension of time to comply with the Disclosure Order and to file its Defence and Counterclaim, if any.

23.  By summons dated 16 October 2025 (“the Unless Order Summons”), in view of D1’s non-compliance with the Disclosure Order and the Costs Orders, Ps applied for an unless order to compel D1 to “fully comply with” the Disclosure Order and the Costs Orders by 24 October 2025.

24.  Lok J heard the Time Summons and the Unless Order Summons together on 21 October 2025. On the same day, Lok J granted Ps’ application partially and made an order against D1 (“the 21/10/2025 Order”). Paragraph 1 of the 21/10/2025 Order is the Unless Order in respect of the Disclosure Order (but not the Costs Orders) and it is in the following term:

“Unless the 1^st Defendant fully complies with the Disclosure Order by 4:00 pm on 28 October 2025, the 1^st Defendant be debarred from defending Plaintiff’s’ claims falling a defence and the Plaintiffs be at liberty to enter default judgment against the 1^st Defendant.”

25.  Paragraph 2 of the 21/10/2025 Order is another unless order and it provides that in the case of D1’s compliance with the Unless Order, unless D1 does file and serve the Defence and Counterclaim (if any) by 4:00 pm on 4 November 2025, D1 be debarred from defending Ps’ claims and Ps be at liberty to enter default judgment against D1.

26.  Purportedly in compliance with the Unless Order, D1 filed an 2^nd Affirmation of Adam Indah (“the Indah 2^nd”) on 27 October 2025.

27.  In the Indah 2^nd, Ms Indah set out the particulars of registration of the domain <arcteryx.my> pursuant to the first demand in the Disclosure Order.

28.  Ms Indah deposed to the fact that D1 authorised KUNSHAN GEM GARMENT CO., LTD (“KUNSHAN”) which is located in the Mainland to manufacture certain garment samples bearing D1’s Indonesian Marks for 1 month until 30 June 2024. Ms Indah has exhibited a copy of the Certificate of Authorization issued to KUNSHAN by D1.

29.  Further, Ms Indah disclosed that D1 has licenced the full use of D1’s Indonesian Marks to ATX ID in Indonesia.

30.  However, as regards the remaining demands, Mr Indah did not give any particulars and information on the ground that allegedly D1 has not committed any acts, carried out any business, taken part in any activities and dealt with/in any infringing products described therein.

31.  In compliance with paragraph 2 of the 21/10/2025 Order, D1 filed its Defence on 4 November 2025.

The Default Judgment Summons and related issues

32.  I shall first dispose of the Default Judgment Summons.

33.  Ps’ position is that the purported disclosure in the Indah 2^nd is inadequate and the blanket denial of D1 of its infringing activities is not genuine and D1 clearly refuses to provide such particulars and information. On this basis, Ps say that D1 has failed to fully comply with the Disclosure Order in breach of the Unless Order.

34.  Thus, they apply for default judgment against D1 as the specified sanction under the Unless Order. Paragraph 1 of the Default Judgment Summons reads,

“The Defence filed by the 1^st Defendant herein on 4 November 2025 be struck out, and default judgement as per the terms in Annex A hereto be entered into against the 1^st Defendant.”

35.  The primary contention of D1 is that the Unless Order is merely a time order and hence D1 has complied with the Unless Order by the disclosure in the 2^nd Indah in good faith despite its alleged inadequacies. D1 further complains about the undue broadness and the ambiguous of the Disclosure Order. These complaints are irrelevant for the present purposes in my view.

36.  On the other hand, Mr Wong argues that the Unless Order is not a time order and the disclosure was not made in good faith.

37.  To assist this court to resolve this dispute, Mr Ng helpfully draws to my attention the decision of DHCJ Keith Yeung SC (as Yeung JA then was) in Silver Universe Investments Limited v China Times Securities Limited & Ors [2019] HKCFI 834[1], the facts of which bear a certain degree of resemblance to the present case.

38.  In Silver Universe, the deputy judge dealt with a non-compliance summons based on the purported non-compliance with a disclosure order and a subsequent unless order. The disclosure order was granted by a judge in aid of a proprietary/Mareva injunction in an inter partes application. The unless order was later made by a master on the application of the relevant defendant for an extension of time to comply with the disclosure order.

39.  The relevant defendant filed an affirmation to comply with the unless order and the disclosure order. The plaintiff found the disclosure to be inadequate.

40.  By the non-compliance summons, the plaintiff alleged the relevant defendant was in breach of both the unless order and the disclosure order. For the former, the plaintiff asked for the specified sanction for the default in the unless order, i.e., payment of its legal costs up to a certain date. For the latter, the plaintiff asked for a further unless order to compel its compliance.

41.  The learned deputy judge first dealt with the alleged breach of the unless order. The relevant questions were what the default event of the unless order was, whether there had been any breach and if so whether the specified sanction should take effect.

42.  The learned deputy judge referred to Top Point Ltd v K & L Gates (unreported, HCA1088/2011, 13.9.2016) in which Lok J reviewed a number of authorities involving disputes arising from alleged non-compliance with unless orders. At §34, Lok J said this,

“… it is clear that an unless order even requiring specific discovery of certain kinds of documents should be construed as a time order, and the issue will therefore turn upon whether the deadline has been met and not on the adequacy of compliance, unless it can be said that the compliance is not made in good faith or illusory.” (emphasis added by the learned deputy judge)

43.  The observation of Lok J was referred to with approval by Kwan JA in Bruce James Stinson v Gu Ming Gao [2018] HKCA 10. At §50, Kwan JA said this,

“Realkredit Danmark, Ka Wah Bank Ltd and Top Point Ltd are all concerned with the test for establishing whether there has been compliance with an unless order for discovery. In that kind of situation, the court is concerned that before the drastic consequence of an unless order is visited upon the offending party, it must be sure there has been a failure to comply with the order in question. And it was held in Top Point Ltd that the issue of default of an unless order will turn upon whether the deadline has been met and not on the adequacy of compliance, unless it can be said that the compliance is not made in good faith or is illusory.”

44.  Lastly, the learned deputy judge cited with approval the following summary of the relevant principles in Civil Procedure in Hong Kong, 6^th ed, at [12-176]:

“In case the party subject to the unless order has purportedly complied with it before the deadline but the other party takes the view that this is not a true compliance, then inevitably the dispute has to be resolved by the court upon application by summons. In that situation, the first and most basic question is: What is the default event specified in the order and whether there is non-compliance? For example, if the unless order requires the defendant to file further and better particulars by a certain time, the court would need to first construe whether the order is a time order requiring the defendant to file a reply to the request for further and better particulars by the deadline or whether the order requires the defendant to provide all the particulars requested by the plaintiff before the deadline. In the former case, there is no breach of the unless order so long as the defendant has filed within time a document made in good faith and which can fairly be treated as a reply to the request for further and better particulars. In the latter case, there is a breach unless each request for particulars has been substantially met. In general, the court would require that the unless order must be stated in sufficiently exact terms so as to make clear what the party ordered must do in order to comply with it, though the court may also look at the history of the proceedings to decide whether the party ordered would have any doubt as to what needs to be done under the unless order. In the absence of clear wording to the contrary, the general position is that the unless order should be construed as a time order, and the issue will therefore turn upon whether the deadline has been met, and not on the adequacy of compliance, unless it can be said that the compliance is not made in good faith or is illusory.” (emphasis added by the learned deputy judge)

45.  The learned deputy judge then concluded that in the absence of clear wording or history of the proceedings suggesting the contrary, the general position is that an unless order should be construed as a time order, so that a qualitative analysis of the adequacy of the step undertaken is in general not necessary.

46.  With these principles in mind, I proceed to determine the true nature of the Unless Order.

47.  In the 2^nd Affirmation of Law Yuen Shan (“the Law 2^nd”), Ps explained the background facts leading to the grant of the Unless Order. It was made upon Ps’ application by the Unless Order Summons in light of the persistent failure of D1 to make any disclosure pursuant to the Disclosure Order and any payment pursuant to the Costs Order.

48.  After hearing the submissions of counsel on both sides, Lok J acceded to Ps’ application and made the Unless Order. The phrase “fully complies” in the Unless Order Summons was adopted in the Unless Order.

49.  As with the unless order in Silver Universe, from the linguistic point of view, there is no express or clear wording requiring the Disclosure Order to be complied with in the qualitative sense in the Unless Order.

50.  Mr Wong places some emphasis on the phrase “fully complies” and submits that this suggests that full compliance with the Disclosure Order should mean that the disclosure to be made by D1 must be adequate.

51.  I am not convinced by this submission.

52.  As explained above, D1 was required by the Disclosure Order to make disclosure relating to 6 different matters. D1 had not previously filed any affirmation to make disclosure pursuant to the Disclosure Order before Ps took out the Unless Order Summons.

53.  On the other hand, D1 did not make any costs payment under the Costs Order.

54.  Against this background, Ps applied for an unless order to compel D1 to “fully” comply with both the Disclosure Order and the Costs Orders. Absent any disclosure previously made by D1, Ps could not and did not complain about any inadequate disclosure and thus press for complete disclosure.

55.  In my view, the phrase “fully complies” does not really lend support to Ps’ contention that the disclosure to be made by the deadline must be qualitatively adequate.

56.  It should be noted that the Unless Order was made on the Time Summons as well. In Silver Universe, the learned deputy judge considered this a factor pointing to the conclusion that the unless order was a time order. Likewise, I agree that the focus of the Unless Order should be on the time when D1 must comply with the Disclose Order and not the quality of the disclosure in relation to the 6 categories of particulars and information to be made.

57.  Mr Wong submits that the Disclosure Order is a Norwich Pharmacal type except that D1 itself is an infringer. Ps are in genuine need of the disclosure in the Disclosure Order to enforce their intellectual property rights against other infringers and to curb further infringing activities. Mr Wong says that this makes the Disclosure Order differ from those disclosure orders in the cases cited by Mr Ng including Silver Universe.

58.  I am unable to accept this submission. I cannot see why a disclosure order should be made if there is neither necessity nor utility. Every disclosure order should have a real and serious purpose to serve. Take the disclosure order in Silver Universe as an example, the disclosure order certainly was of importance and the plaintiff required it to trace its own properties to ensure complete recovery.

59.  I do appreciate the importance of the Disclosure Order but this, per se, cannot alter its nature as a time order.

60.  Lastly, in the 8^th Affirmation of Law Yuen Shan dated 31 March 2026 (“the Law 8^th”), Ms Law who is an assistant solicitor of Deacons acting for Ps made a transcript of the audio-recording of what Lok J said immediately before making the Unless Order. The judge stressed the importance of the Disclosure Order to Ps and he was most concerned about D1’s delay in the compliance with the Disclosure Order. The judge frowned upon D1’s lack of concrete reasons for the delay but the extension was granted at last. The judge did not mention the phrase “fully complies” orally. Nor did he say anything about the quality of disclosure to be given though obviously it must be made in good faith.

61.  In the premises, I conclude that, on a true and proper construction, in light of its express terms and in the context of all the relevant background and circumstances, the Unless Order should be a time order and the default event was any failure on the part of D1 to file and serve an affirmation to make the disclosure in the Disclosure Order on or before 28 October 2025.

62.  The Indah 2^nd was filed in good time and the deadline in the Unless Order was duly met. I find that D1 did not breach the Unless Order.

63.  There is no allegation in the Law 8^th that the compliance by way of the Indah 2^nd was not made in good faith or was illusory.

64.  Mr Wong in his reply written submissions leaves no stone unturned to point out the inadequacies of the disclosure in the Indah 2^nd and submits that the compliance could not be made in good faith.

65.  I am not convinced by his submissions. My view is that Ps are unable to discharge the burden to prove bad faith on the part of D1 by their severe criticisms of the deficiency of the disclosure made in the Indah 2^nd.

66.  To conclude, in the absence of any breach of the Unless Order, there is simply no basis to impose the specified sanction on D1 and there is no ground to strike the Defence out. I can find no merit in the Default Judgment Summons.

67.  Unlike Silver Universe, Ps do not seek to enforce the Disclosure Order by the Default Judgment Summons. Despite the forceful submissions made by Mr Wong on the inadequacies of the disclosure in the Indah 2^nd, I do not think I should make any order to compel D1 to make an affirmation to make further disclosure absent a proper application on the part of Ps.

68.  Should Ps deem D1’s disclosure in the Indah 2^nd insufficient, Ps may take steps to enforce the Disclosure Order. If D1 shares Ps’ view, it may consider providing further disclosure on its own initiative without waiting for any enforcement action and it will bear the consequences if it does not. In fact, D1 ask for further time to comply with the Disclosure Order in the Relief from Sanction Summons.

69.  In light of my conclusion on the Default Judgment Summons, the Relief from Sanction Summons is inapplicable. The specified sanction will not be invoked and there is no need for any relief therefrom and any reinstatement of the Defence.

The Specific Discovery Summons

70.  Ps’ application for specific discovery is based on the following two paragraphs in the Defence:

“§10: … It is averred that the 1^st Defendant, being the registered proprietor of the approved Indonesia Marks, is entitled, at its sole discretion and without further consent or authorization, to grant licences or otherwise permit the use of the Indonesia Marks to any third party in accordance with Indonesian Laws. The grant of a licence to ATX ID was a lawful exercise of such rights.

§14… It is averred that the 1^st Defendant has granted ATX ID a licence to permit the usage of the Indonesia Marks in Indonesia. All uses of the Indonesia Marks by ATX ID, including the operation of its Bali Store for its products that have been and are being marketed, promoted, offered for sale and/or sold using, bearing, under and/or by reference to the Indonesia Marks are properly authorised, lawful and in full compliance with the Indonesian Laws.”

71.  By reason of D1’s reference to a licence which it has granted to ATX ID to use the D1’s Indonesian Marks in its Defence (“the Indonesian Licence Agreement”), Ps ask for specific discovery of the same.

72.  From the information obtained by Ps in their proceedings against D1 in Indonesia, Ps claim that the Indonesian Licence Agreement is in writing and is dated 12 October 2024. This is not disputed by D1.

73.  It should be a straightforward application and Ps are clearly entitled to specific discovery of the Indonesian Licence Agreement. Indeed, in the Ng 2^nd, Mr Ng who is an assistant solicitor acting for D1 indicated that D1 does not object to the disclosure of the Indonesian Licence Agreement.

74.  However, the purported disclosure of the Indonesian Licence Agreement by way of the 4^th Affirmation of Adam Indah dated 24 February 2026 (“the Indah 4^th”) led to a skirmish between the parties.

75.  Simply stated, in response to the Specific Discovery Summons, D1 filed the Indah 4^th and exhibited thereto purportedly a copy of the Indonesian Licence Agreement but it was dated 23 August 2024 (“the August Agreement”).

76.  According to the Law 8^th, Ps asked to inspect the original copy of the August Agreement on 17 March 2026. However, they were provided with a copy which was plainly different from the August Agreement. Ms Law made a forensic analysis of the two agreements and pointed out all their differences.

77.  By the Ng 2^nd, D1 gave an explanation for the differences between the August Agreement exhibited to the Indah 4^th and the copy subsequently inspected by Ps. It was further explained that the Indonesian Licence Agreement is merely another version of the August Agreement reformatted in compliance with the Indonesian Laws and regulatory requirements and for recordal purposes.

78.  I do not believe that for the determination of the Specific Discovery Summons, it is necessary for me to resolve all these differences between the parties and decide on the validity of the reasons given by D1. It suffices to note that D1 now agrees to make the discovery pursuant to the Specific Discovery Summons.

79.  At the hearing, I raised my concern about the propriety of specific discovery application in the event that the Default Judgment Summons is allowed. I invited the parties to lodge further written submissions to assist me on this. Given my refusal to enter judgment against D1, the issue is only academic and I do not need to deal with the same.

Conclusion and orders

80.  For the reasons given, I conclude that D1 did not breach the Unless Order and the Default Judgment Summons must be dismissed.

81.  It follows that D1 needs no relief from the sanction specified in the Unless Order. The Relief from Sanction Summons should be accordingly dismissed.

82.  The Specific Discovery Summons is allowed and I order that D1 do within 7 days from the date of this Decision serve a true copy of the Indonesian Licence Agreement on Ps’ solicitors and verify such a true copy by filing and serving an affirmation to be made by D1’s director or authorised representative.

83.  As agreed by the parties, I allow the New Affirmation Summons and grant retrospective leave to D1 to file the Ng 2^nd and service of the same be dispensed with.

84.  There is no reason why costs should not follow the event in respect of the Default Judgment Summons, the Relief from Sanction Summons and the Specific Discovery Summons.

85.  For the Default Judgment Summons, Ps should have treated the Unless Order as a time order and however dissatisfied with the disclosure in the Indah 2^nd they were, Ps should have accepted the compliance of D1 with the Unless Order and should not have sought the imposition of the specified sanction on D1. Ps should pay D1’s costs of the Default Judgment Summons.

86.  For the Relief from Sanction Summons, the application was made as a fallback and in response to the Default Judgment Summons. It was not supported by any affirmation. This Summons was not seriously argued too. Little costs should have been incurred by this Summons to Ps in the circumstances. D1, nevertheless, should pay such costs to Ps.

87.  For the Specific Discovery Summons, D1’s belated acceptance of its obligation to disclose the Indonesian Licence Agreement could not absolve itself from its liability to pay costs to Ps. D1 should have agreed to make disclosure as soon as Ps made the request by correspondence in my view. Further, it was reasonable for Ps to have doubts about the August Agreement and to refuse to accept it to be the one pleaded in the Defence. D1 should pay Ps their costs of and occasioned by the Specific Discovery Summons including the costs of the New Affirmation Summons.

88.  I believe that summary assessment is in the interests of the parties. Pursuant to my direction given at the hearing, the parties have lodged their respective statements of costs.

89.  For D1’s costs of the Default Judgment Summons, in my view the application entailed primarily legal arguments. With the engagement of Mr Ng (of counsel), whose fee is reasonable, I believe that Ps’ solicitors could spend substantially lesser hours on this application. I allow 4 hours of Mr Chan’s charge and 5 hours of Mr Ng’s charge totalling HK$33,200. I further allow HK$1,500 as charges for manual work. For counsel fee, I allow HK$120,000. The grand total is HK$154,700.

90.  For Ps’ costs of the Specific Discovery Summons and the New Affirmation Summons, it is a simple application and the answer is in the pleading. D1 complicated the matter by the disclosure of the August Agreement and purportedly another version of it. Regrettably, this incurred unnecessary legal costs.

91.  Mr Wong’s charge is reasonable and I allow HK$98,000. For the professional work of Ps’ solicitors, I allow HK$51,600 in total (2 hours of Ms Zheng, 4 hours of Ms Siew and 6 hours of Ms Law). I further allow HK$3,000 for the manual work done. I do not allow the disbursement of Ps’ Indonesian lawyers as I fail to see the necessity of their engagement for the purpose of the Specific Discovery Summons.

92.  Hence, my assessment of Ps’ costs of the Specific Discovery Summons and the New Affirmation Summons stands at HK$152,600.

93.  All the foregoing costs orders including the summary assessments are made on a nisi basis.

94.  Lastly, I thank Mr Wong, Mr Ng and Ms Yeung for their able assistance.