TKY v. YSGA

FCMC 2208/2023

(formerly FCMC 903/2022)

[2025] HKFC 94

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 2208 OF 2023

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DECISION
( Legal Costs Provision)

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1.  This is the rehearing of the Petitioner’s (“Wife”) legal costs provisions application (“LCP”) pursuant to the Court of Appeal’s judgment dated 31 December 2024 (“Judgment”). See: [2025] 1 HKLRD 977.

Background

2.  The background of the case has been succinctly summarized in the Judgment. See: §§ 7-16 of the Judgment.

3.  This was a short marriage of 4 years. They have 2 daughters, aged 6 and 5. The parties are in their early 40s. The Wife is a certified accountant and worked as a partner of an international accounting firm. The Respondent (“Husband”) set up a real estate consultancy company, AREC, and was involved in a number of companies in different capacities, including as a director and/or shareholder.

4.  The Wife now wishes to sought the following amount to be paid by the Husband as her legal costs provisions:

a. From 31 January 2022 to 31 October 2022, a sum of HK$158,800 per month, totalling HK$1,588,000, payable in a lump sum or by 10 instalments in a sum of HK$158,800 per month;

b. From 1 November 2022 to 28 February 2025, a sum of HK$4,285,664 (to cover the legal expenses incurred backdated to 1 November 2022) payable in a lump sum or by 10 instalments of HK$428,566.40 per month or by a longer instalment plan as the Court deems appropriate;

c. From the date of the court decision, a sum of HK$270,000 payable by 10 instalments of HK$27,000 per month.

5.  According to the Wife’s 9^th affirmation filed on 28 March 2025, she now said a sum of HK$270,000 would be incurred up to and including FDR.

The applicable legal principles

6.  The position in law is neatly summarized in the Judgment as follows:

17. The court’s power to order periodical payments for maintenance for children, including interim maintenance, is under section 5 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 (“MPPO”) whereas the court’s power to order maintenance pending suit for a spouse is under section 3 of the MPPO.

18. Section 7 of MPPO sets out those matters which the court is obliged to have regard to in exercising its powers to make orders under sections 4, 5 and 6, with section 7(2) applies in particular to section 5. However, section 7 does not apply to section 3, which provides that the court may make such order for maintenance pending suit for a party to the marriage as the court thinks reasonable, subject only to the term which will end on the determination of the suit, namely upon the making of a decree absolute in the case of a divorce, and thereafter, the power of the court to order periodical payments for a party to the marriage under section 4 of MPPO.

19. The guiding legal principles in relation to maintenance pending suit for a spouse under section 3 of MPPO have been set out in HJFG v KCY (Maintenance Pending Suit) [2012] HKFLR 27. It is not necessary to repeat them here, save to highlight Hartmann JA’s observation that the principles that have emerged over time to guide judges in matters of interim maintenance have been fashioned in the main to ensure fairness[7]. His Lordship also referred to TL v ML & Ors (Ancillary Relief: Claim against Assets of Extended Family)[8], which held that where the affidavit or Form E disclosure by the payer was obviously deficient, the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about the payer’s ability to pay, and the court would not be confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources and in such a situation, the court should err in favour of the payee. Further, in determining what is or is not reasonable, some analysis is always required, which can be conducted on a “broad-brush” basis.

20. As seen in HJFG, it is no longer disputed that section 3 of MPPO is wide enough to empower the Court to include an element towards a party’s legal costs in an order for maintenance pending suit[9]. It was also pointed out that the principles articulated by Wilson LJ in Currey v Currey [2007] 1 FLR 946 should in future be adopted as providing prudent guidance to both judges and practitioners in Hong Kong, although section 3 still requires the court to be satisfied that any contribution towards the applicant’s on-going legal costs is reasonable[10]. It was further held that any provision for legal fees should initially be made until the FDR in the interests of finding a settlement at that hearing.[11] We will return to the principles in Currey v Currey in the latter part of this judgment.

21. Suffice to say at this stage, although the considerations for an application for legal costs provision may be different from those for an interim maintenance application for children, they are both interim in nature and in determining what is reasonable or fair on a “broad brush” basis, the court should adopt a holistic approach that have regard to all the circumstances of the case , particularly where the interim maintenance order for the children will have an impact on a spouse’s available cash and his/her ability to meet his/her own legal costs.

7.  The Court of Appeal in WW v LLN formerly known as LSM [2020] 2 HKLRD 487 at §20, where it was stated inter alia as follows:

(1) In order to obtain litigation funding, the burden is on an applicant to demonstrate that she [or he] cannot reasonably procure legal representation by any other means. This includes showing that she [or he] cannot secure publicly funded legal help at a level of expertise apt to the proceedings. To the extent that she [or he] has assets, the applicant has to demonstrate that they cannot reasonably be deployed, either directly or as the means of raising a loan to fund legal services ...(emphasizes added)

(2) The subject matter of the proceedings and the reasonableness of the applicant’s stance in the proceedings will always be relevant.

8.  In making an application for litigation funding, the applicant should provide some breakdown of the anticipated costs to support the application. Hartmann JA explained the rationale for this requirement in HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95 at §78:

Section 3 of the Ordinance, of course, still required the Judge to be satisfied that any contribution towards the wife’s ongoing legal costs was reasonable. That meant that he had to be able to conduct some analysis of the nature and extent and purpose of the contributions sought. On the part of the wife, that required some breakdown of her anticipated costs.

Discussion

9.  According to the Wife’s 9^th affirmation, she emphasizes that due to her impecuniosity, she is unable to pay for her legal costs. The Wife further says her recent loan applications were rejected by the banks.

The parties’ financial position

10.  Based on the updated Form Es filed by the Wife on 9 September 2024 and the Husband on 10 September 2024, the parties each claimed to have negative assets.

11.  In their first Form E, the Wife claimed that she earned HK$160,000 per month and the Husband claimed that he earned HK$19,570 per month. By their updated Form Es, the Wife claims that her monthly salary was reduced to HK$115,000 from September 2024 onwards, while the Husband is earning a monthly income of HK$21,248.

12.  The only liquid assets available to both parties are their respective income and savings in bank accounts. According to their updated Form Es, the Wife had HK$34,721.37 and the Husband had HK$57,257.04.

13.  In short, both parties claim they do not have sufficient means to support themselves and the children.

The scope of the LCP

14.  The Wife’s LCP summons was filed on 28 November 2022 under the previous action FCMC 903/2022. The children’s matter was concluded on 20 October 2023 whereby the court made no order as to costs. Despite the children’s matter has already been concluded, the costs incurred for the children’s matter continues to be included in the LCP application.

15.  In my view, the Wife seeks to recover costs incurred for the concluded children’s matter, is an attempt to walk through the back door of the system for a costs order against the Husband. If the Wife’s LCP application in respect of the concluded children’s matter is to be allowed, it would represent a subversion of the exclusivity of the costs order made by the court on 20 October 2023.

16.  It is trite that the court will not award historic unpaid costs unless the court is satisfied that without such payments the Wife will not reasonably be able to obtain appropriate legal services in the future. See: Rubin v Rubin [2014] 1 WLR 3289 at §13.

17.  The Wife has assured her solicitors that she would prioritize repaying outstanding legal fees if she receives any capital at the conclusion of the ancillary relief proceedings.

18.  According to paragraph 4.4 of the Wife’s 12^th affirmation, she said:

In fact, WL has never expressly told me why they agreed to represent me despite my substantial outstanding fees and I am not in a position to speculate the reasons behind. Nevertheless, I believe that if I am unable to settle WL’s legal costs in the near future, WL would cease my legal representation at any time.

19.  In the circumstances, save and except the Wife’s “believe”, there is no evidence to suggest that the Wife’s solicitors ever inform the Wife that they would down tools unless they are paid outstanding costs as well as being funded for the future.

Lack of clarity of the anticipated legal costs

20.  The Wife sets out the breakdown of the anticipated legal costs in paragraph 44 of her 5^th affirmation and paragraph 91 of her 9^th affirmation. Ms Yu, counsel for the Wife also provided an updated legal costs budget attached to her written submissions.

21.  At the hearing, I requested Ms Yu to provide a breakdown of legal costs solely for financial matters for reference. It turns out the total legal costs solely for financial matters would be HK$1,646,278.

22.  Ms Booth, counsel for the Husband submits that looking at the Wife’s updated legal costs budget and considering the actual work done by the Wife’s legal representatives so far, the amount of legal costs for financial matters is around HK$752,800.

23.  The Wife was not able to offer an explanation for the differences.

24.  I find the Wife’s calculation of her legal costs “confusing”. There is no reason why the total legal costs charged and to be charged by the Wife’s legal representatives for financial matters cannot be matched with the legal costs budget as affirmed by the Wife.

25.  This cast serious doubts on the reliability of the legal costs budget submitted by the Wife. It is very difficult for the court to consider the reasonableness of the Wife’s request and make an assessment.

The Wife does not have any assets that she could reasonable deploy?

26.  In the updated Form E, the Wife did not disclose the value of her personal belongings. On 4 March 2025, I gave directions on the selection of the single joint expert witness in respect of the Wife’s handbags and diamond ring. The Husband complains that the Wife was uncooperative in giving instructions to the single joint expert. The Wife on the other hand claims that she could not afford to pay HK$10,000 as her contribution to the single joint expert report.

27.  In the absence of single joint expert report, the Husband submits that the Wife has valuables (wine collection, diamond ring and seven luxury handbags), which in total should worth HK$1,011,857.

28.  The Wife says her wine collection does not have any resale value, however in order to save costs, on 1 April 2025, her solicitors informed the Husband’s solicitors that for the purpose of FDR, she was prepared to agree the value of the wine worth HK$153,527.

29.  On 12 May 2025, the Wife’s solicitors further informed the Husband’s solicitors that for the purpose of FDR, she was prepared to accept that the value of her wine worth HK$214,857.80.

30.  The Wife further says she had attempted to put one of her seven luxury handbags which she purchased from Christie’s for sale. She was told by the second-hand shop that there was issue of the authenticity of that handbag.

31.  In the hearing, Ms. Yu confirmed that the Wife would accept HK$214,857.80 as the value of her wine collection. The Wife contends that in order to maintain her standard of living, she should not be asked to dispose of her personal valuables.

32.  It is trite that the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage is one of the factors to be considered in financial matters, however when a marriage breaks down and the parties begin to live in two separate households it is not possible, generally speaking, to maintain the same standard of living as before. There has to be, of necessity, some form of adjustment. This case is no exception.

33.  I do not consider handbags and wine collection are personal necessities. I accept that while it may take the Wife some time to liquidate her personal belongings, yet these assets cannot be discounted or ignored when considering the Wife’s ability to raise funds for litigation. See: LM v FW, [2024] HKFC 41 at §73.

34.  According to the Wife’s solicitors’ letter dated 26 February 2025, the Wife claimed that the value of the diamond ring is HK$130,000 and her seven luxury handbags worth HK$186,000. According to the Wife’s case, including her wine collection worth HK$214,857.80, at least she would have HK$530,857.80 worth personal valuables at her disposal.

35.  In my view the Wife did not pass the first hurdle of the Currey v Currey, i.e. she has no assets or none that can reasonably be deployed. See: Currey v Currey (No.2) [2007] 2 Costs LR 227 at §§19-20.

36.  Further, according to the Wife’s 9^th and 12^th affirmations, she was able to borrow HK$500,000 from her friend, HK$350,000 from her cousin and her mother. In the circumstances, while the Wife may have difficulties in obtaining loans from banks, yet she was able to borrow money from her friends.

The Wife’s failure to give full and frank disclosure of her financial position?

37.  The Husband submits that the Wife’s financial disclosure to date was deficient and the court should not be confined to the Wife's "mere say-so" as to the extent of her income and resources.

38.  The Husband asserts that the Wife’s had failed to explain the significant deposits received by her. The Husband drew the court’s attention to the following facts:

(1) the Wife alleged that she gave her parents HK$20,000 per month, yet for the period between November 2023 to July 2024, the Wife’s mother gave the Wife a total sum of HK$442,300 and for the period between October 2024 and December 2024, the Wife’s mother gave her the total sum of HK$95,000;

(2) the Wife has received a total sum of HK$1,632,800 between September 2023 to March 2025;

(3) the only explanation offered by the Wife to the above sums was “it is very difficult for me to trace back the nature and origin of each and every deposit – there are just too many in’s and out’s”; and

(4) while the Wife claims that she has to service debt each month, she says she was able to repay most of the smaller sums borrowed from friends without providing details of the lenders and the nature of the loans.

39.  Ms Booth further submits that the Wife has failed to submit her Tax Demand Notes to substantiate her claim for tax expenses.

40.  I agree with the Husband’s submission that the Wife’s explanation is a complete non-answer. Bearing in mind the Wife is a certified accountant, she should be sensitive to numbers. Further, the transactions in question are recent transactions. I find it hard to believe that the Wife could not recall any of the transactions involved.

41.  Overall, I find the Wife’s evidence on the material aspects of the case is self-contradictory.

42.  I also find that there was a lack of full and frank disclosure on the Wife’s part. The Wife has failed to produce any evidence that would shed light on her actual amount of tax payments. The Wife offered no explanation as to why she was not able to produce the Tax Demand Notes.

43.  In my view, it would be impossible not to conclude that the Wife was committed to hiding her assets and coming up with farcical reasons of why she was not able to comply with her full and frank disclosure obligations.

The Wife had exaggerated her expenses?

44.  The Husband considered the Wife’s expenses were exaggerated and unreasonable. He gave the following examples:

(1) In the Wife’s lasts Form E filed on 9 September 2024, she claims that a total sum of HK$13,000 was spent on holidays, yet in §38 of her 12^th affirmation filed on 8 May 2025 states: “ever since these divorce proceedings commenced in 2022, aside from trips to Taiwan to visit my maternal grandmother and relatives from time to time, I have not been able to bring the Children on a single vacation”;

(2) The Wife claims a monthly sum of HK$26,000 as car expenses, when the Husband is already paying for the vehicle insurance and government license fees. The car expense claims therefore confines to gasoline and tickets;

(3) The Court of Appeal found that according to the Wife’s final tax position for 2020/2021, her monthly tax liability should only be about HK$368. See: §46 of the Judgment. The Wife obviously has overstated her monthly tax expense; and

(4) The Wife failed to give full and frank disclosure as she only produced Tax Returns instead of Tax Demand Notes which are the direct evidence of tax payable.

45.  According to the Wife’s latest Form E filed on 9 September 2024 and her 12^th affirmation, her monthly personal expenses were HK$273,500 (excluding mortgage payment which was paid by the Husband).

46.  I consider some of the items claimed by the Wife were excessive and downward adjustments should be made to reflect the reasonableness of the amount. For the purpose of this rehearing, I will not re-assess the children expenses as the interim maintenance order had been made on 7 September 2023 which was not the subject of the rehearing.

47.  The Wife’s income was reduced from September 2024, however her estimated tax payment is stated as HK$15,000 per month in her latest Form E. This is inconceivable as a large part of her salary is treated as rent refunds by her employer. The tax expense appears to have been overstated again.

48.  The breakdown of which is as follows:

	Wife’s position (HK$)	Husband’s position (HK$)	Court’s Decision (HK$)
General
Rent	62,000	35,000	50,000 of which 16,666 being the Wife’s share
Utilities (electricity, gas, rates, telephone & water)	8,000	3,000	5,000 of which 1,666 being the Wife’s share
Food	20,000	7,000	10,000 of which HK$3,333 being the Wife’s share
Household expenses	12,000	1,000	5,000 of which 1,666 being the Wife’s share
Car expenses	26,000	2,000, as the Wife only pays for gas/tickets	4,000 of which 1,333 being the Wife’s share
Domestic helpers	7,500	5,000	6,226 (4,990 be the salary and 1,236 being the food allowance) of which 2,075 being the Wife’s share
Sub-total	135,500		26,739
Personal
Meals out of home	10,000	2,000	6,000
Transport	6,000	1,000	3,000
Clothing/Shoes	15,000	1,000	5,000
Personal grooming (including haircut and cosmetics)	4,000	1,000	2,000
Entertainment/presents	5,000	1,000	3,000
Holiday	8,000	1,000	3,000
Medical/Dental	3,000	500	1,000
Tax	15,000	0	3,200, as the Wife failed to produce her Tax Demand Notes, doing the best I can based on her Tax Returns, I have adjusted the tax expense required.
Insurance premia	2,000	1,600	2,000
Contribution to parents	20,000		I will exclude contribution to parents. It is filial piety for children to support their parents, but they cannot be regarded as necessary personal expenses in ancillary relief proceedings and force the other party to share the responsibility of supporting their parents. Further, there is evidence before the court that the Wife’s mother has the ability to lend money to her.
Others (specify) Loan repayments to repay credit card loans and personal loans	50,000		50,000
Sub-total	138,000		78,200
Total amount of the Wife’s personal expense:	273,500		104,939

49.  The Wife is earning a monthly income of HK$115,000. Based on the above assessment, the Wife has financial means to pay for her expenses. I would just make a further point. As the Wife’s monthly income was reduced from September 2024 onwards, her tax liability should be further reduced in 2025.

50.  Even taking the Wife’s case to its highest, she is indeed in financial difficulties, the court would also need to consider the Husband’s financial means and ability to pay.

The Husband’s financial means

51.  The Husband is currently paying for the children’s monthly school fees of HK$42,000 per month, and HK$28,000 as monthly interim maintenance. The above sum exceeds the Husband’s monthly income of HK$21,248. The Husband has to borrow money from his parents to meet the payments.

52.  Ms Yu submits that in assessing the Husband’s financial means, the court should take into account of the Husband’s income, his ability to borrow from his parents, the Husband’s interest in the sale proceeds of Greenview Property and the Husband’s earning capacity.

53.  The Wife emphasizes that the Husband had received funds from his parents all along, hence the Husband should be able to continue to receive financial assistance from his parents going forward.

54.  Ms Yu goes on to argue that despite the sale proceeds of the Greenview Property had already been distributed by the Wife’s cousin to the Husband and the Husband’s mother separately, she asserts that HK$10,000,000 distributed to the Husband’s mother in fact belongs to the Husband.

55.  She invites the court to consider the principles of presumption of advancement that the Husband’s mother held HK$10,000,000 on trust for the Husband.

56.  Ms Booth contends that the Wife has no basis to allege that the Husband’s mother held HK$10,000,000 on trust for the Husband. The sale proceeds of Greenview Property were distributed to the Husband and the Husband’s mother by the Wife’s cousin. If HK$10,000,000 indeed belonged to the family or the Husband instead of the Husband’s mother, why would the Wife’s cousin distribute the sum to the Husband’s mother.

57.  Ms Booth further argues that no application has been taken out by the Wife to dispute the beneficial ownership of any asset, there is no legal basis for the Wife to allege the Husband’s mother was to hold HK$10,000,000 on trust for the Husband.

58.  The Wife’s bare assertion is not sufficient for the court to conclude that there is any trust arrangement as between the Husband and his mother. The alleged sum of HK$10,000,000 will not be taken as the Husband’s assets.

59.  Further, I find that many of the submissions came close to those that might be made at the conclusion of the ancillary relief trial, when the court is being asked to make findings of fact in relation to the computation exercise. I do not consider that these submissions are needed at this interim stage.

Financial resources from the Husband’s parents

60.  The Wife urges the court to look to the Husband’s parents’ financial resources to pay for the Wife’s LCP.

61.  The Court of Appeal had made the following observations in their Judgment:

66. … At the outset, we note that H’s parents’ wealth appeared to have assumed such importance and have been, what H described, a “recurring theme” in these proceedings. W’s 2nd affirmation, for example, had devoted quite some paragraphs (see [9] to [18]) to describing the financial means of H’s parents, their shareholdings in various companies and their interests in certain landed properties. However, no matter how wealthy H’s parents are, and whether H is the intended successor of his parents and their businesses (H and his sister being the only children of their parents), there has to be sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that the wealth will come to H in the foreseeable future, and/or that H will be entitled to a share of the parents’ assets and businesses in the foreseeable future. … (emphasizes added)

62.  In WC v HC [2022] 4 WLR 65 Peel J had addressed the topic of inter vivos subvention as follows:

23. I addressed this topic in M v M [2020] EWFC 41 where I said as follows:

“65. Should a court inquire into the willingness of the wider family to assist one or both spouses?

66. To my mind there are 2 main categories of cases:

(i) Where a spouse has an interest in an asset together with other family members, and the court frames its order so as to "judiciously encourage" the other family members to assist in extraction by the spouse of value referable to his or her interest. The court should not cross the boundary of improper pressure in so doing. This is the so-called Thomas v Thomas doctrine (Thomas v Thomas [1995] 2 FLR 668). Importantly, it applies when the spouse has an actual interest in an asset shared with third parties (e.g. family) but is confronted by liquidity difficulties.

(ii) Where family members, who are gratuitous donors, are willing to make funds available by gift or loan to the relevant spouse. In this instance, the spouse has no legal or beneficial interest; it is a pure act of generosity for a person under no obligation to do so.

68. [In respect of the second category] I apply the following principles:

(i) The starting point is that there is absolutely no obligation on a third-party family member to provide funds from his or her personal resources. As Holman J vividly said in Luckwell v Limata [2014] EWHC 502 at para 6: "I wish to stress with the utmost clarity that neither the wife's father nor her mother are under the slightest legal obligation whatsoever to pay a single penny to, or for, their daughter, nor their grandchildren, nor, still less, their son-in-law." This statement is wholly consistent with law and fairness. The court's function is to distribute the parties' resources, not the resources of wider families; see paras 66 and 67 of Alireza v Radwan [2017] EWCA Civ 1545.

(ii) That said, on occasions wider family members may show themselves prepared to assist, willingly and under no pressure from the court to do so. Two distinct scenarios spring to mind;

(a) Whether a spouse's family will be likely, if requested, to come to his or her aid in meeting specific needs personal to the spouse in question and;

(b) Whether a spouse's family will be likely, if requested, to come to his or her aid in making a payment to the other spouse to assist in bringing financial remedy proceedings to a conclusion.

(iii) The first scenario is not uncommon. If means are available, the wider family, although under no legal obligation to do so, may willingly help with buying a house or meeting income needs if the alternative is homelessness and penury. But the evidence of willingness to do so must be clear. Mere speculation, or optimistic assumption, is insufficient. (emphasizes added)

(iv) The second scenario is rarer, for obvious reasons, although it can unlock cases and bring about settlement. For example, the family of a spouse may offer to pay the receiving spouse a lump sum to avoid sale of the marital home. Again, in my judgment, there must be clear evidence to justify such a finding. Speculation and optimistic assumption will not suffice.

(v) The court should not place pressure on the third party who is perfectly entitled to decline to provide support. As Deputy High Court Judge Nicholas Mostyn QC (as he was then) said in TL v ML [2005] EWHC 2860 at para 101:

"The correct view must be this. If the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that an outsider will provide money to meet an award that a party cannot meet from his absolute property then the court can, if it is fair to do so, make an award on that footing. But if it is clear that the outsider, being a person who has only historically supplied bounty, will not, reasonably or unreasonably, come to the aid of the payer then there is precious little the court can do about it."

The judge was there addressing the second of my suggested two scenarios, but in my view his remarks apply with equal force to the first scenario.

(vi) In either scenario, where the evidence shows, to the requisite standard of proof, that third party family members will likely provide financial support to one or other of the spouses, that, in my judgment, constitutes a resource that a court is entitled to take into account. To do otherwise would be artificial. As to the sort of evidence which the court will evaluate when deciding upon the likelihood of future assistance:

(a) Usually, the court will look to see whether bounty has been provided in the past, in what quantity and over what amounts of time, as evidence of a pattern.

(b) Additionally, the court can look at specific offers of long-term future financial support made to a spouse before or after marital breakdown.

(c) Offers of interim provision to tide the spouse over with assistance towards legal fees and income needs during the period of litigation will be of very limited evidential relevance to the question of whether long-term future support will be forthcoming. Usually, such payments are transitory in nature, designed to assist the recipient spouse with the demands of the litigation.

(d) Absent clear evidence establishing (i) a track record of historic payment and/or (ii) reliable representations of future subvention, the court will be hard pressed to be satisfied of this class of resource.”

See also KEWS v NCHC [2013] 2 HKLRD 314, §§ 33-36, 49

63.  While the Husband’s parents did lend him money for the purpose of paying children’s expenses, however, their assistance appears to be on an interim basis rather than on a long term and recurring basis. Leave was given to the Husband to file his mother’s affirmation at the hearing.

64.  According to the Husband’s mother affirmation dated 17 April 2025, she said since 14 September 2023, she and the Husband’s father had made it clear that they would not lend any money to the Husband if such money were to be given to the Wife.

65.  Further, there is no evidence to suggest that there is an inheritance certainty on the Husband’s part.

Earning capacity of the Husband

66.  The Wife relies on the previous findings of His Honour Judge CK Chan who took the view that the Husband could have an average monthly income of HK$85,000.

67.  In my view, this is neither here nor there as regards the issues before me. Both parties received good education and both of them should have a positive career prospect. However, in light of the current global economic situation, and the fact that the Husband has a lower earning capacity than the Wife all along, I do not find this line of argument offer any assistance to the Wife’s case.

Conclusion

68.  For the above reasons, I find that the Wife’s application must be dismissed.

Costs

69.  Costs should follow the event. Costs of this application, including the costs of the Court of Appeal hearing be paid by the Wife to the Husband, with certificate for counsel, summarily assessed at HK$700,000.

Conclusions

70.  I make the following order:

1. The Wife’s application for legal costs provision be dismissed; and

2. The Wife do pay the Husband’s costs of this application, with certificate for counsel, summarily assessed at HK$700,000.