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CACV 123/2026, [2026] HKCA 730
On Appeal From [2026] HKCFI 698
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 123 OF 2026
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1279/2025)
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| RE: |
DO MINH VUONG |
Applicant |
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| Before: |
Hon Barma JA and Leung J in Court |
| Date of Hearing: |
1 April 2026 |
| Date of Judgment: |
22 April 2026 |
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon Leung J (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 4 February 2026[1] (“the Leave Decision”) refusing to extend time for the applicant to apply for leave to apply for judicial review (and dismissing the leave application). The intended judicial review was that of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 23 October 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”) whereby the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 18 June 2024 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim was dismissed.
2. The applicant is a Vietnamese national. His personal background, basis of claim and the Board’s reasons were set out in the Board’s Decision[2] as well as the Leave Decision at [4] and [8]-[10]. They will not be repeated.
3. The applicant did not request for an oral hearing of the leave application. After considering the documents filed by the applicant, the Judge dismissed the application for the reasons stated at [13]-[18] of the Leave Decision.
Appeal to this Court
4. In his Notice of Appeal dated 12 February 2026, the applicant stated that as he and his creditor have not “arranged for a repayment of the debt”, his life would be “seriously threatened”, should he be refouled to Vietnam. Further, it would not be feasible for him to internally relocate in Vietnam to avoid the pursuit of the creditor as there would be many difficulties and obstacles faced by him in a new location. He complained that the Immigration Department did not consider [his] human rights under various statutes and international instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but without identifying the provisions.
5. In his written submission dated 3 March 2026, the applicant advanced 5 grounds of appeal, effectively criticising the Board’s assessment of the evidence and factual findings. In essence, he argues that the Board erred in concluding that (i) the creditors did not inflict “serious bodily harm” upon him; (ii) he did not know much about the background of his creditors; (iii) the creditors were unconnected to State actors; (iv) there was state protection available to him (by the Board’s reliance on unreliable Country of Origin Information and e-newspapers); (v) that the harm suffered by him at the hands of the creditors did not reach the required minimum level of severity; and (vi) it was viable for him to internally relocate in Vietnam in order to minimise the risk of harm (if any).
6. We heard the appeal on 1 April 2026, at which the applicant appeared in person with the assistance of a Vietnamese/English interpreter. At the hearing, the applicant confirmed that he had nothing to add to his written submission.
Discussion
7. The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non‑refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.
8. The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review. Nor is an appeal the occasion for regurgitating arguments advanced and rejected by the judge or for running arguments which could and should have been raised but were not raised before the judge. In the determination of an appeal, the Court of Appeal focuses on the decision of the judge and the Court will only reverse that decision if an appellant could demonstrate that the judge made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before the judge or was otherwise plainly wrong.
9. In his Notice of Appeal, the applicant criticised the adjudicator/the Board but failed to identify any error on the part of the Judge in the Leave Decision, and thus failing to raise any viable ground of appeal. General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].
10. In any event, the assessment of evidence, Country of Origin information, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director. The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there is an error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022 at [13].
11. The applicant did categorize the Board’s Decision as procedurally unfair, illegal and irrational. However, in considering the applicant’s claim that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by a moneylender, his creditor, for the failure to repay his debts, the Board found material inconsistencies and contradictions in crucial parts of his evidence, such as evidence on the circumstances in which he took out the loan from the moneylender (see Board’s Decision, [72]-[73]) and on how his business (for which he took out the loan) failed (see Board’s Decision, [78]-[82]). Whilst the Board appeared to have accepted the applicant’s claim that he was on one occasion attacked by the creditor, it noted that the applicant was not required to receive medical treatment or hospitalisation, and it concluded that his injuries or ill-treatment suffered did not attain the required minimum level of severity (see Board’s Decision, [83]-[87]). The Board found the applicant to be evasive at the hearing before the Board as well as inconsistent in his evidence. Hence its conclusion that the applicant was an incredible witness, and its rejection of the material bases of his claims (see Board’s Decision, [138] and [195]-[200]). The Board was of the view that in any event adequate state protection and suitable options of internal relocation were available to the applicant in order to minimise the risks of harm, if any.
12. These were factual findings open to the Board on the evidence, and were sufficiently canvassed and considered by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [11]-[18]. We see no basis to interfere.
13. The applicant apparently did not raise in Form 86 or his supporting affirmation in the hearing before the Judge all the complaints against the Board. They were either not before the Judge or formulated with the level of detail as raised only now in his written submission before this Court. There is no reason why the applicant should be permitted to raise those new or now formulated grounds for the first time on appeal.
14. In any event, we see no merit in the applicant’s complaint as regards the Board’s alleged failure to draw his attention to certain factual issues, including the occasion where he was assaulted by the creditor, and its alleged failure to afford him the opportunity to address it in evidence or submissions (see applicant’s written submissions, p.5, Ground 4). The applicant appeared at the hearing before the Board, and it was clear that he was asked, and was given the opportunity to respond to, relevant questions from the Board on the material issues before it (see Board’s Decision, [54]). We have scrutinised the Board’s Decision and we see no basis for intervention.
15. The applicant has accordingly failed to demonstrate how the Board had acted unlawfully or procedurally unfairly in reaching its decision, or how such decision could be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable.
16. The applicant advanced no viable grounds of appeal against the Leave Decision. There is also no merit in the appeal. We dismiss the appeal accordingly.
(Aarif Barma)
Justice of Appeal
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(Simon Leung)
Judge of the Court
of First Instance
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The applicant appeared in person
[1] [2026] HKCFI 698
[2] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2025/HCAL001279_2025_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
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