ILYAS JOHN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 144/2020

[2025] HKCFI 4411

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 144 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  By my decision dated 3 June 2025, I refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “TCAB”) dated 6 January 2020 which refused the Applicant’s non-refoulement protection claim.

2.  By a summons issued on 23 June 2025, the Applicant seeks extension of time to appeal against my above decision. As the 14-day appeal period under O.53, r.3(4) of the RHC expired on 17 June 2025, the Applicant is out of time in his intended appeal by about a week.

3.  The applicable principles are trite: the court shall have regard to (a) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if extension of time were granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226 and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346).

4.  The delay in the present case was not lengthy and it was asserted in the summons that the Applicant did not receive any letter from the Court “on time”. However, while exhibiting a letter from the Court dated 3 June 2025 enclosing the decision, there is no evidence whatsoever as to the time of receipt of the letter in the supporting affidavit. The fact that the letter came to be exhibited must mean that the Applicant had in fact received it at the stated address, hence it befalls the Applicant to explain why he did not receive it “on time” (or indeed at what point in time) but he has failed to do so.

5.  More importantly, there is nothing in either the summons or the supporting affidavit to indicate even an attempt to raise any proposed grounds of appeal, or any error in the decision he seeks to appeal against. When asked at the hearing on 1 September 2025, the Applicant did not add anything apart from pleading for more time before he is to be returned to his home country of Pakistan. As such I fail to see any prospect of success in his intended appeal.

6.  In the premises, it would be pointless to extend the time for the Applicant’s intended appeal. I therefore dismiss the application.