RE PANCHANATHAN RAMU

CAMP 6/2020

[2020] HKCA 553

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 6 OF 2020

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 793 of 2017)

________________________

________________________

________________

JUDGMENT

________________

Hon Chu JA giving the Judgment of the Court:

1.  On 3 June 2020, this Court (Chu and Barma JJA) handed down our judgment[1] refusing to extend the time for the applicant to make a renewed application for leave to appeal the decision of Campbell-Moffat J given on 14 September 2018.  By that decision, the Judge refused to give him leave to apply for judicial review.     

2.  On 12 June 2020, the applicant filed a notice of motion to apply for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant also put in a written submission to support his application.

3.  Having considered the applicant’s notice of motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing.  We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case.

4.  The background to this case and the applicant’s claim have been set out in our judgment.  We will not repeat them.

5.  Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484, leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

6.  In the notice of motion, the applicant stated that he would like to inform the Court of Final Appeal that there were some errors in law. He complained that the decision maker just relied on COI information and facts that favoured the rejection of his claim, when the real situation was different from the COI information.  He also complained that the court ignored the overwhelming evidence of danger to his life.

7.  The written submission repeated the submissions made in the application for extension of time to make the renewed application for leave to appeal (see our judgment at [17]).  It also advanced two further grounds.  The first is that there had been breach of procedural fairness in that: (a) the Torture Claims Appeal Board unlawfully fettered its discretion in refusing his appeal on the grounds that it did not satisfy the requirement; (b) the Board acted in a procedurally unfair manner in dealing with my appeal; (c) the decision to refuse the applicant’s appeal was unreasonable or irrational in the public law sense or as a result of procedural errors or unfairness; and (c) the Board failed to meet the greater care and duty owed to a self-represented claimant.  The second additional ground is that the Board had significantly relied on news that were not officially recognized or were simply hearsay.  It was said that the Board relied on cases that were outdated, considering the dramatic changes, and the lack of credible source of information had resulted in the groundless speculation that it was safe for the applicant to return to his country of origin.     

8.  We are of the view that the points and arguments advanced in the notice of motion and written submission do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  Firstly, they relate only to the circumstances of the applicant and his claim, and do not involve any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b).  Secondly, for the reasons given in [18] to [20] of our judgment, the arguments previously put forward by the applicant in the application for extension of time to appeal and repeated in this application are unarguable.  Thirdly, the points made in the notice of motion and the additional arguments in the written submission, including the issue about country of origin condition, were not raised before the Judge or in the application for leave to appeal out of time made to this Court.  It is not open to the applicant to raise these new points in this application for leave to appeal. They are in any event general assertions wholly lacking in particulars.  

9.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

10.  As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, we dismiss the Notice of Motion.