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CACV 46/2024, [2026] HKCA 319
On appeal from [2024] HKCFI 158
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 46 OF 2024
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1808/2020)
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| Before: |
Hon Chu VP and Barma JA in Court |
| Date of Judgment: |
3 March 2026 |
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Judge”) given on 25 January 2024 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 3 September 2020 (“the Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 20 January 2020 (“the Director’s Decision”) rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Background
2. The applicant is a national of Indonesia. She last entered Hong Kong as a foreign domestic helper on 16 February 2015, but she did not depart after the premature termination of her employment, and on 18 April 2017, she surrendered to the Immigration Department. Thereafter, she lodged a non-refoulement claim made by way of written representations dated 15 July 2019 and 14 August 2019.
3. The applicant’s claim was based on a fear of being harmed or killed by her husband. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the Judge at [3] and [4] of the Judge’s decision (“the CALL‑1 Form”)[1].
4. By a Notice of Decision dated 20 January 2020 (i.e. the Director’s Decision), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s Decision covered the torture risk[2], the BOR 2 risk[3], the BOR 3 risk[4] and the persecution risk[5].
5. The applicant appealed to the Board. After a hearing on 29 June 2020, the Board dismissed the appeal on dated 20 January 2020 by the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision covered all applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection. The Board found, inter alia, that the applicant’s evidence on material events giving rise to the alleged risk of harm was inconsistent and incredible.
The Judge’s decision
6. The applicant filed a Form 86 on 10 September 2020 seeking to judicially review the Board’s Decision, without setting out any grounds for review. In the applicant’s supporting affirmation, she merely exhibited a copy of the Board’s Decision.
7. After summarising the facts and background of the case, giving due consideration to the Decisions of the Director and the Board, the Judge refused to grant leave for judicial review. The Judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [12] to [18] of the CALL-1 Form:
“12. The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Board complied with the public law requirements in coming to its Decision on the applicant’s appeal. The Court will not usurp the fact finding power vested in the Director and the Board. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1).
13. The Court will bear in mind that the Board’s Decisions should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny.
14. In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
‘13.(1) … Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.’
15. For the reasons given in paragraph 8 above, the Board found that the applicant’s evidence was not credible and she had failed to establish that she has any real risk of harm as she alleged if she returns to Indonesia. In my view, the Board was entitled to come to the conclusions as it had done.
16. The applicant has raised no valid ground to challenge the Board’s Decision.
17. The applicant fails to show that she has any realistic prospect of success in her proposed judicial review.
CONCLUSION
18. I refuse to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. Accordingly, I dismiss her application.”
Grounds for appeal
8. In the Notice of Appeal dated 7 February 2024, the applicant repeated her dissatisfaction with the Director’s and the Board’s Decisions, claiming that they are “unfair and unreasonable”, as well as stating that she was still at risk of being harmed by her husband and that “a woman is not possible to move another city and stay safely”.
9. In breach of the directions made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals, the applicant failed to lodge her written submissions with the court. In the circumstances, the applicant is deemed to have abandoned her right to rely on written submissions.
10. By a letter dated 17 December 2024, the applicant inquired with the court the progress of the determination of the present appeal.
11. The applicant did not request an oral hearing and consented to the appeal being disposed of on paper by the court. We will accordingly deal with the appeal on paper on the basis of the materials already filed with the court.
Discussion
12. The applicant has in the Notice of Appeal failed to identify any error on the part of the Judge and thus failed to raise any viable ground of appeal. As this court has often stated, an appeal to the Court of Appeal is not a fresh application for judicial review, it is necessary to identify some error on the part of the judge that would justify this court in intervening. The applicant has wholly failed to do so.
13. As this court has repeatedly held, an application for leave for judicial review is not a rehearing of the appeal to the Board and the court’s role is not to act as an avenue of further appeal from the Board. It is incumbent on the applicant to point out the procedural or other public law errors allegedly committed by the Board. The Judge would not be required himself to come to a view on whether the applicant would face any of the proscribed risks of harm upon return. The court should not usurp the role of the Board and will only intervene if public law grounds for doing so are established. See Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, Re Qadir Sher [2018] HKCA 160, Hounkpedji Messanh v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2018] HKCA 152, Re Rizwan alias Rizwan Gulistan [2018] HKCA 162, and Re Masoom Parvez [2018] HKCA 163. The Judge considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board and found no basis for intervening. In our view, he was clearly correct to do so.
14. As we have noted, the applicant advanced no viable grounds of appeal against the Judge’s decision.
15. There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.
| (Carlye Chu) |
(Aarif Barma) |
| Vice-President |
Justice of Appeal |
The applicant acting in person
[1]
[2024] HKCFI 158
[2] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.
[3] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[4] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[5] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
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