WONG TO YICK WOOD LOCK OINTMENT LTD v. SUN ASCENT DEVELOPMENT LTD AND ANOTHER

HCIP 47/2024

[2026] HKCFI 2374

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROCEEDINGS NO 47 OF 2024

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D E C I S I O N

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A.  Introduction

1.  In this action, the Plaintiffs claim against the Defendants for copyright infringement, trade mark infringement, and passing-off.

2.  This is the substantive hearing of the Plaintiffs’ application by summons dated 28 July 2025 (as amended on 24 March 2026) (the “O14 Summons”) seeking to enter summary judgment against the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd and 5^th Defendants[1].

3.  The 1^st and 2^nd Defendants do not contest liability. In principle, they agree that judgment be entered against them.

4.  As will be further elaborated below: -

(1)  The 5^th Defendant, on his own volition, came forward to admit that he was the one who caused and/or procured the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to commit the infringing acts in question. As such, the 5^th Defendant, in principle, agreed that judgment be entered against him.

(2)  The current stance of the 3^rd Defendant is that she was not privy to the infringing acts of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants, and their business operation had been solely controlled and managed by the 5^th Defendant. Thus, the 3^rd Defendant denies liability and contests the Plaintiffs’ claims.

B.  Material Background

B1.  The Parties

5.  The Plaintiffs have been carrying on a business of designing, marketing, and distributing luxurious handmade jewellery, accessories, eyewear, leather goods, apparel, fragrance, furniture, luggage, handcrafted furnishings, and home items under the brand name of “Chrome Hearts”. From 2019 to 2023, the Plaintiffs generated an average annual revenue exceeding US$350 million.

6.  The 1^st and 2^nd Defendants are companies incorporated in Hong Kong.

7.  The 3^rd Defendant has been: -

(1)  the 1^st Defendant’s sole shareholder and sole director at all material times; and

(2)  the 2^nd Defendant’s sole director since 4 August 2023 and sole shareholder since 30 August 2023.

8.  The 5^th Defendant is the 3^rd Defendant’s son. The 3^rd and 5^th Defendants assert that: -

(1)  The 3^rd Defendant has been a housewife for more than 2 decades.

(2)  The 3^rd Defendant was merely nominated by the 5^th Defendant to act as a nominal director and a nominal shareholder of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants.

(3)  The 3^rd Defendant has never (i) provided any capital for the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants; (ii) been involved in the management and business operation of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants; and (iii) had any knowledge about the business that the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants carried on.

(4)  The 5^th Defendant was the one who (i) set up the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants; and (ii) solely managed and controlled the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ business operation.

(5)  The 3^rd Defendant merely signed corporate documents for the purposes of fulfilling formality requirements.

B2.  The Plaintiffs’ Intellectual Property Rights  

9.  It is not in dispute that: -

(1)  The 1^st Plaintiff is the owner of the copyright subsisting in the original works of artistic craftsmanship and graphic works that are pleaded and particularized in paragraph 6 and appendix A of the re-amended statement of claim.

(2)  The 1^st Plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the trademarks that are pleaded and particularized in paragraph 10 and appendix B of the re-amended statement of claim.

(3)  The Plaintiffs have enjoyed substantial goodwill in relation to the brand name “Chrome Hearts”.

B3.  The Infringing Acts    

10.  The Plaintiffs’ complaints in this action can be summarized[2] as follows: -

(1)  The 1^st and 2^nd Defendants operated an online store at the website “chromeworld.jp”. They claimed to sell and/or deal with genuine Chrome Hearts products (the “Chrome World Website”)[3].

(2)  The 1^st and 2^nd Defendants promoted the said online business through accounts on Facebook, Pinterest, and Instagram (the “Social Media Accounts”)[4].

(3)  Whilst the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants claimed that their Chrome Hearts products were genuine, the truth was that they were counterfeit. The Plaintiffs had never authorized the business activities of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants.

(4)  The counterfeit products provided by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants were sold to customers in Hong Kong and exported to customers in the Mainland[5].

11.  The initial version of the statement of claim contains pleas suggesting that: -

(1)  the 1^st to 4^th Defendants (including the 3^rd Defendant) controlled and operated the Chrome World Website and Social Media Accounts[6];

(2)  the 1^st to 4^th Defendants (including the 3^rd Defendant) knowingly undertook concerted efforts in furtherance of their common design to operate a business with knowledge that their acts infringed the Plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights[7]; and

(3)  the 3^rd Defendant procured the acts of the 1^st, 2^nd, and 4^th Defendants with knowledge that their acts infringed the Plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights[8].

B4.  The initial version of the Defence filed by the 1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants   

12.  On 18 December 2024, the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants filed a joint defence.

13.  The gist of the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants’ case was that they had no knowledge that the Chrome Hearts products that they sold were infringing products, and reasonable diligence was exercised in the course of sourcing these products[9].

14.  The aforesaid joint defence was drafted by the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants’ former counsel.

15.  As will be further elaborated hereinbelow, it appears doubtful as to whether the pleader had seriously considered that the bases of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendant’s potential liabilities could be different from the bases of the 3^rd Defendant’s potential liabilities. As such, the pleas in the aforesaid joint defence, by and large, do not seek to draw a distinction between the position of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants and the position of the 3^rd Defendant.

16.  In the premises, the pleader (ie the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants’ former counsel) made the following admissions on behalf of the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants on a collective basis: -

(1)   “the Defendants control and operate the Chrome World Website…”[10].

(2)  the Defendants “…only sold authentic Chrome Hearts products which were not sourced directly from official retail stores of Chrome Hearts”[11].

(3)   “the Defendants have implemented due diligence in sourcing and dealing with the goods”[12] and “the Defendants have reasonable grounds to believe that the products dealt in were not infringing copies”[13].

(4)   “the Defendants have used “Chrome World” in the domain name “Chromeworld.jp”, on the Chromo World Website, on packaging of the jewellery and clothing product sold and on “Authenticity Certificates” accompanying the jewellery and clothing products sold”[14].

(5)  the Defendants used, inter alia, “the name of “Chrome World JP Ltd and “Chrome World JP”… in the course of trade or carrying on business relating to jewellery and clothing and on the packaging and product leaflet…”[15].

(6)  the 3^rd  Defendant admitted she is named as “the contact for the Alipay account receiving payment for orders made to the Chrome World Website…”[16]

(7)  the Defendants admitted that the 3^rd Defendant “responded on behalf of the 1^st Defendant to an Infringement Take Down Notice sent by the Plaintiff to Shopify Legal in 2021.”[17]

B5.  The Plaintiffs’ application for summary judgment and the subsequent procedural events

17.  On 28 July 2025, the Plaintiffs took out the O14 Summons seeking to enter summary judgment against the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants. They seek the following substantive reliefs:

(1)  a permanent injunction restraining the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants from committing infringing acts[18];

(2)  a permanent injunction compelling the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants to remove all websites and social media platforms that infringe the Plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights[19];

(3)  a permanent injunction compelling the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants to transfer the domain name registration of the Chrome World Website to the 1^st Plaintiff and to cancel or withdraw any other domain name that infringes the Plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights[20];

(4)  an order compelling the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants to deliver up all infringing goods and items[21];

(5)  an order requiring the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants to make full discovery in respect of the communications and transaction records relating to the infringing products[22];

(6)  damages or alternatively (at the Plaintiffs’ option) an account of profits[23]; and

(7)  interest[24].

18.  As of February 2026, the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants had changed counsel, and a new counsel team with expertise in the field of intellectual property had been engaged[25].

19.  On 16 February 2026, the 3^rd and 5^th Defendants respectively filed an affirmation. They asserted the matters summarized in paragraph 8 hereinabove. In gist, the stance of the 3^rd and 5^th Defendants is that: -

(1)  Although the 3^rd Defendant was the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ sole director and sole shareholder, she was only a nominal shareholder/director. She was not privy to the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ infringing acts and had no knowledge in respect thereof.

(2)  The 5^th Defendant was the person who solely controlled the business operation of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants. Thus, he was the one who procured the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to engage in the business activities, which infringed the Plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights.

20.  In her affirmation, the 3^rd Defendant pointed out that she mistakenly admitted some facts in the joint defence filed on 18 December 2024[26]. She then provided the following explanations: -

(1)  As the 5^th Defendant assured her that he would deal the Plaintiffs’ claims with lawyers’ assistance, she did not carefully read the joint defence in detail[27], and she relied on what the 5^th Defendant told her[28].

(2)  However, she recalled that the Defendants’ previous counsel advised that as she was the sole registered shareholder/director of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants, it would be difficult for her to dispute joint liability, and thus she should deal with the Plaintiffs’ claims collectively together with the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants[29].

21.  In his affirmation, the 5^th Defendant asserted that: -

(1)  He was the person who provided instructions on behalf of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants[30]. He did assure the 3^rd Defendant that he would handle the Plaintiffs’ complaints.

(2)  However, as the 3^rd Defendant was, on records, the sole director and sole shareholder of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants, he thought that it would be natural for her to sign the statement of truth that verified the contents of the joint defence, though she did not have direct personal knowledge of the matters involved[31].

(3)  He was willing to be joined as an additional defendant in these proceedings, and he, in principle, agreed to the relief as agreed to by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants[32].

22.  On 10 March 2026, Messrs CPH Legal, ie the solicitors representing the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants (as well as the 5^th Defendant), issued a letter to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors. There, Messrs CPH Legal reiterated the Defendants’ position that (i) 1^st and 2^nd Defendants would not contest liability; (ii) the 5^th Defendant would not contest liability as well; and (ii) the 5^th Defendant agreed to the same relief as agreed to by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants[33].

23.  On 13 March 2026, the Plaintiffs took out a summons seeking to: -

(1)  amend the writ of summons and re-amend the statement of claim, and the purpose of the proposed amendments and re-amendments was to join the 5^th Defendant as an additional defendant; and

(2)  amend the O14 Summons, and the purpose of the proposed amendments was to seek summary judgment against the 5^th Defendant.

24.  In light of the 5^th Defendant’s admissions, in the re-amended statement of claim, the Plaintiffs pleaded, inter alios, the following matters that concern the 5^th Defendant: -

(1)  The 5^th Defendant procured, directed and/or authorized the infringing acts of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants either individually or jointly and/or severally with the 3^rd Defendant[34].

(2)  The 1^st to 3^rd, and 5^th Defendants controlled and operated the Chrome World Website and the Social Media Accounts[35].

(3)  As admitted by the 5^th Defendant, he was responsible for (i) creating and managing the Chrome World Website and the Social Media Accounts[36]; and (ii) managing and operating the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants, which committed infringing acts[37].

(4)  All the Defendants (including the 5^th Defendant) knowingly undertook concerted efforts in furtherance of their common design to operate a business with knowledge that their acts infringed the Plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights[38].

(5)  The 3^rd and/or 5^th Defendants procured the acts of the 1^st, 2^nd, and 4^th Defendants with knowledge that their acts infringed the Plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights[39].

25.  At the hearing on 24 March 2026, I allowed the Plaintiffs’ applications to (i) amend the writ of summons and re-amend the statement of claim; and (ii) amend the O14 Summons. However, I reserved the question of costs.

26.  On 30 March 2026, Messrs CPH Legal, on behalf of 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants, took out a summons seeking to amend their joint defence (the “Amendment Summons”). In gist, the purpose of the proposed amendments is to ventilate the Defendants’ stance set out hereinabove. The following aspects of the proposed amendments are worth-mentioning: -

(1)  The 1^st and 2^nd Defendants do not contest liability[40]. They no longer seek to contend that they are not liable to the Plaintiffs by reasons of (i) their subjective belief that the products that they sold were genuine; and (ii) their efforts in exercising due diligence in sourcing the products.

(2)  Whilst the 5^th Defendant has been responsible for the management and operation of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants, the 3^rd Defendant has not been privy to the business operation of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants. The 3^rd Defendant had no knowledge in respect of the matters relating to the present dispute until this litigation was commenced[41].

27.  Pursuant to my directions, the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants’ Amendment Summons was heard together with the Plaintiffs’ O14 Summons at the present hearing.

C.  The Claims against the 1^st, 2^nd and 5^th Defendants

28.  Having said that the 1^st, 2^nd, and 5^th Defendants do not contest liability, at the hearing, I entered judgment against them[42]. The Plaintiffs substantially obtained the relief against the 1^st, 2^nd, and 5^th Defendants as summarized in paragraph 17 above.

29.  However, I refused to grant a proposed injunction to the effect that the 1^st, 2^nd, and 5^th Defendants be restrained from infringing any other intellectual property rights owned by the Plaintiffs. Whilst the Plaintiffs did not plead these other intellectual property rights in the Amended Statement of Claim, they are even unable to identify and/or define the same. It is obvious that the terms of an injunction order should be drafted with reasonable precision, such that the parties would know where they stand. However, the terms of the injunction proposed by the Plaintiffs are hopelessly vague, and the subject matters are not identified with clarity. It would be oppressive and unfair to grant the proposed injunction against the 1^st, 2^nd, and 5^th Defendants.

D.  The Claims against the 3^rd Defendant

30.  I now address the matters in relation to the Plaintiffs’ claims against the 3^rd Defendant.

D1.  The Substantive Legal Principles on Director as Joint Tortfeasor

31.  It would be helpful to set out the substantive legal principles at the outset.

32.  Mr Douglas Clark (for the Plaintiffs) reminded me that section 22(2) of the Copyright Ordinance (Cap 528) provides as follows:-

“Copyright in a work is infringed by a person who without the license of the copyright owner does, or authorize another to do, any of the acts restricted by the copyright” (emphasis added)

33.  However, as pointed out by Mr Philips Wong and Mr William Tse (for the Defendants), it would be incorrect to assume that whenever a company commits an infringing act, a director of the company would necessarily become liable by virtue of his/her office. This depends on the circumstances. In this connection, the learned authors of Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (19^th Ed) at para 24-68 pointed out that: -

“If a company has committed an act of infringement, the directors and controlling shareholders may in certain circumstances be personally liable. Of course, if the director or shareholder has actually committed an infringing act, they are liable…Also, a director may be liable for having authorized an act of infringement. However, directors of a company are not liable simply because they are directors. Conversely, directors are in no different position as a consequence of their directorship than any other person alleged to have accessory liability…Each case will turn on its own facts, and all circumstances of the directors’ acts (plus their state of knowledge) will be relevant. By the same token, a shareholder is in no different position to any other alleged accessory. Whether or not they are liable for the acts of a company will depend upon whether, considering all the circumstances of their acts (plus their state of knowledge), they are liable.” (emphasis added)

34.  It is trite that: -

(1)  A person may be liable on the basis that he procured another person to commit an infringing act. In Lifestyle Equities CV v Ahmed [2024] RPC 14 at paras 107 to 108, the English Supreme Court pointed that in order for a defendant to be liable on the basis of procuring another person (ie the primary wrongdoer) to commit an infringing act, it would have to be shown that (i) the defendant acted in a way that was intended to cause the primary wrongdoer to commit an act which the defendant knew was a wrongful act (and turning a blind eye would be sufficient for this purpose)[43]; and (ii) the defendant knew the essential facts which make the act unlawful[44].

(2)  A person may also be liable as an accessory for a tort based on a common design. In Lifestyle Equities CV (supra) at para 117, the English Supreme Court stated: -

“In summary, to establish a person (A) is liable as accessory on this principle, three conditions must be satisfied: first, another person (B) must commit a tort; second, A must have done an act which assisted B to commit the tort; and, third, A’s act must have been done pursuant to a common design between A and B to do the act which constitutes the tort…”

35.  As pointed out in Lifestyle Equities CV (supra) at para 108, in determining whether a defendant intended to cause the primary wrongdoer to commit the infringing act in question, it would be sufficient to show that there was “blind-eye knowledge” on the part of the defendant. In this connection, in Group Seven Ltd & Anor v Nasir & Ors [2019] 3 WLR 1011 at 1038E-F (para 59), the English Court of Appeal stated: -

“It is not enough that the defendant merely suspects something to be the case, or that he negligently refrains from making further inquiries. As the House of Lords made clear in Manifest Shipping & Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd (The Star Sea) [2003] I AC 469 the imputation of blind-eye knowledge requires two conditions to be satisfied. The first is the existence of a suspicion that certain facts may exist, and the second is a conscious decision to refrain from taking any step to confirm their existence…” (emphasis added)

36.  Whether one person authorized another person to commit an infringing act is a fact-sensitive question, and all the circumstances surrounding the case would have to be considered. In Sky King Machinery Engineering Ltd v Chun Wo Construction & Engineering Co Ltd (HCA 1918/2013, 11 March 2015) at para 19, Mimmie Chan J had this to say: -

“I agree that the authorities highlight the importance, and need, of examining all the relevant circumstances and evidence in the case to ascertain whether, on the facts, it can be said that the person claimed to be the authorizer had expressly or implicitly granted, or purported to grant, the right and conduct to do the act complained of, be it the act of copying or production of the infringing item.”

D2.  The 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants’ Amendment Application

37.  The first matter to deal with is whether the court should allow the Amendment Summons, such that 3^rd Defendant can amend her defence and withdraw the admissions set out in paragraphs 16 above.

Legal Principles

38.  In Re Hin Pro International Logistics Ltd [2016] 1 HKLRD 1367 at para 8 and Hsu Ming Chi v Lam Shu Chit (HCCL 8/2013, 22 October 2014) at paras 13 to 18, Peter Ng J summarized the well-established principles concerning amendments as follows: -

“13. It is a guiding principle of cardinal importance on the question of amendment that generally speaking, all such amendments ought to be made “for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties to any proceedings or of correcting any defect or error in any proceedings”: Re Playmates Investments Ltd [1996] 4 HKC 577 at 582E‑H (per Le Pichon J as she then was); Natamon Protpakorn v Citibank NA [2009] 1 HKLRD 455 at para. 25 (per Cheung JA); Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2014 Vol. 1 para. 20/8/6.

14. Leave is readily granted to amend before trial unless it can be shown that the new claim based on the proposed amendment is bound to fail. While the court is entitled to have regard to the merits of the case, it should only do so when the merits are readily apparent, and are so apparent as not to require prolonged investigation: Natamon Protpakorn v Citibank NA supra at para. 25 (per Cheung JA).

15. If the proposed amendments are bound to fail, no leave to amend should be granted. In this regard, the court will take the applicant’s proposed pleaded case to the highest: Bank of China v Leigh Hardwick unrep., HCA 1110 of 2006, 28 August 2013, per Anthony Chan J at para. 2.

16. Absent any real prejudice, an application for amendment, albeit late, must be decided upon the general principle that a court of law seeks to adjudicate on the real issues and disputes between the parties and, if possible, technical and procedural rules should not stand in the way of allowing the parties to raise their real claims or defences before the court for adjudication: VSC Building Products Co Ltd v Kono Insurance Ltd., unrep. HCA 947/2005, 9 September 2009, per A Cheung J (as he then was) at [22].

17. Where prejudice is claimed, the burden is on the party opposing the amendment to show prejudice. There is no injustice to the opposing party if he can be compensated by appropriate orders as to costs: Re Playmates Investments Ltd supra at 582H, 584C (Le Pichon J as she then was).

18. Lastly, in giving effect to the underlying objectives of the Rules of the High Court, the court shall always recognize that the primary aim in exercising the powers of the court is to ‘secure the just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties’: RHC O 1A r 2(2).”

39.  In Lo Li Li Lilly v Lui Fung He [2016] 2 HKLRD 1460 at para 19, Kwan JA (as Kwan VP then was) pointed out that in considering whether a party should be allowed to resile from a previous admission, the following approach should be adopted: -

“(1) In exercising its discretion the court will consider all the circumstances of the case and seek to give effect to the overriding objective.

(2) Amongst the matters to be considered will be:

(a) the reasons and justification for the application which must be made in good faith;

(b) the balance of prejudice to the parties;

(c) whether any party has been the author of any prejudice they may suffer;

(d) the prospects of success of any issue arising from the withdrawal of an admission;

(e) the public interest, in avoiding where possible satellite litigation, disproportionate use of court resources and the impact of any strategic manoeuvring.

(3) The nearer any application is to a final hearing the less chance of success it will have even if the party making the application can establish clear prejudice. This may be decisive if the application is shortly before the hearing.”

40.  At para 20, Kwan JA (as Kwan VP then was), referring to Sowerby v Charlton [2006] 1 WLR 568 at para 36, emphasized that: -

“Above all, the exercise of any discretion will always depend on the facts of the particular case before the court. The words ‘will consider all the circumstances of the case’ have particular resonance in this context.”

Deliberation

41.  Having considered the full circumstances surrounding the present case, I am of the view that the 3^rd Defendant should be allowed to amend her defence and to withdraw the admissions under the previous joint defence dated 18 December 2024.

42.  I am unable to conclude that the 3^rd Defendant attempted to withdraw the previous admissions in bad faith or that she was playing litigation gamesmanship. In my view, although the 3^rd Defendant was careless, based on the materials and evidence available to the court, it is arguable that the 3^rd Defendant made the admissions in question mistakenly and that her current case has, to say the least, a reasonable prospect of success. It would be extremely unfair to force the 3^rd Defendant to adhere to these admissions, which were arguably incorrect.

43.  First of all, it is arguable that the mistakes in relation to the inaccurate pleas are explicable, and one can see how they came about: - 

(1)  Instead of considering the admissions in the joint defence dated 18 December 2024 in isolation, it is necessary to consider the pleas in this document as a whole in order to understand the case that the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants previously sought to advance.

(2)  As pointed out, the substantive defences that the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants sought to advance jointly were that: (i) it was believed that the products being dealt with were genuine; and (ii) reasonable diligence was exercised in sourcing these products. It appears that the pleader (ie the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants’ former counsel) took the view that these were valid defences to the Plaintiffs’ claims.

(3)  In my view, there are sound reasons to doubt whether the pleader was aware of the legal principles regarding joint tortfeasors set out in Section D1 above. It is doubtful as to whether he had seriously considered (or even considered) the possibility that even though the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants are liable to the Plaintiffs as the primary wrongdoers, the 3^rd Defendant may not necessarily be liable as an accessory.

(4)  It can be seen that the pleas in the joint defence do not even seek to draw a distinction between the position of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants and the position of the 3^rd Defendant, and the pleader, by and large, dealt with the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants’ positions collectively.

(5)  In this connection, I do not lose sight of the fact that paragraphs 34 and 35 of the initial defence contain some admissions that concerned the 3^rd Defendant only[45]. However, these matters (which concerned the Alipay account and the response to the infringement take down notice) were not essential to the initial defences run by the Defendants. It does not appear to me that these pleas are material to the initial lines of defence. It also does not appear to me that the pleader had seriously considered (or even considered) that the basis of the 3^rd Defendant’s liability could be different from the basis of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ liability.

(6)  This echoes, and is consistent with, the 3^rd Defendant’s evidence. It is the 3^rd Defendant’s evidence that the pleader (ie the former counsel) advised that the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants should simply defend the Plaintiffs’ claims collectively[46]. In light of the contents of the joint defence, it appears to me that there must be some elements of truth in what the 3^rd Defendant suggests.

(7)  Had the pleader dealt with the accessory liability on the part of the 3^rd Defendant separately and distinctly, the admissions in question would have been hardly explicable. However, this was not the case. As pointed out, it is doubtful as to whether the pleader had seriously considered (or even considered) the possibility that even though the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants are liable as the primary wrongdoers, it does not ipso facto follow that the 3^rd Defendant would be liable as well. After all, the question of whether the 3^rd Defendant is liable as a joint tortfeasor or accessory depends on other considerations.

(8)  In the circumstances, the alleged mistakes were, to say the least, explicable. As mentioned, the pleas containing the alleged mistakes were not crucial to the initial defences run by the Defendants. There are valid reasons to believe that the pleader (ie the former counsel) might not have exercised caution when he made the pleas in question. It is also doubtful as to whether he was aware of the correct legal position.

44.  Second, the substantive evidence does not show that the 3^rd Defendant had actually participated in the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ business operation and had knowledge in respect thereof: -

(1)  As mentioned, both the 3^rd and 5^th Defendants confirmed on oath that: -

(a)  The 3^rd Defendant has never (i) provided any capital for the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants; (ii) participated in the management and business operation of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants; and (iii) had any knowledge about the business that the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants carried on.

(b)  Meanwhile, the 5^th Defendant was the one who (i) set up the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants; and (ii) managed and controlled the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ business operation.

(2)  Put simply, the 3^rd and 5^th Defendants’ case is that the 3^rd Defendant was merely a nominee or a nominal director/shareholder, who was not privy to the actual business operation of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants.

(3)  The Plaintiffs are unable to adduce a shred of substantive evidence to contradict the 3^rd and 5^th Defendants’ assertions and to show that the 3^rd Defendant was actually involved in the business operation of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants.

(4)  However, the Plaintiffs relied on the following matters: -

(a)  an Alipay account that was used to receive a payment was registered with an email that bears the 3^rd Defendant’s name (yukkit.leung@chromeworld.jp);

(b)  the email address of matsuzaki.norio@chromeworld.jp (which was used in the course of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ business operation) and the email address of yukkit.leung@chromeworld.jp (which bears the 3^rd Defendant’s name) were used by the same Google account user; and

(c)  When the 1^st Plaintiff, through an agent, made a complaint to Shopify Inc, there was a response containing a document, which shows the name of the 3^rd Defendant[47].

(5)  The matters identified by the Plaintiffs do not show that the 3^rd Defendant actually participated in the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ business operation at all and that the 3^rd Defendant was the person who handled the affairs of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants behind the scene. The aforesaid matters only show that the name of the 3^rd Defendant was used by the person(s), who handled the matters of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants. This is simply consistent with the 3^rd and 5^th Defendants’ case (i) that the 3^rd Defendant was a nominee and (ii) that the 5^th Defendant was the one who actually operated the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ business.

(6)  At the hearing, Mr Douglas Clark pointed out that whilst the 3^rd Defendant had knowledge about the Plaintiffs’ claims in these proceedings, the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants still subsequently accepted an order via the Chrome World Website, and an infringing product was exported to Mainland China (the “Post-Writ Transaction”).

(7)  I am not of the view that the matters identified by Mr Clark would avail the Plaintiffs. The 3^rd Defendant might have known about the Plaintiffs’ claims in these proceedings. However, it does not follow that (i) the 3^rd Defendant was the one who executed the Post-Writ Transaction; (ii) the 3^rd Defendant was involved in the Post-Writ Transaction; and/or (iii) the 3^rd Defendant knew about the Post-Writ Transaction. There is not a shred of substantive evidence showing that these were the case.

(8)  Mr Clark emphasized that the 3^rd Defendant was the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ sole shareholder and sole director. However, as a matter of law, a director is not necessarily liable as an accessory by reason of his/her office, and whether a director is liable depends on the circumstances: see Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (19^th Ed) at para 24-68. In the present case, there is no substantive evidence contradicting the 3^rd and 5^th Defendants’ assertions (i) that the 3^rd Defendant was merely a nominee; and (ii) that the 5^th Defendant was the one who exercised control over the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants. On the available evidence, I am unable to infer that the 3^rd Defendant must be (i) privy to the Post-Writ Transaction; (ii) in a position to stop the Post-Writ Transaction; and/or (iii) in a position to cause the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to stop carrying on business operation.

(9)  All in all, the questions of whether the 3^rd Defendant had actually participated in the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ business operation and hence had knowledge of their infringing acts are matter to be investigated at trial. Based on the available evidence, I am not in a position to reject the 3^rd and 5^th Defendants’ case summarily on affidavits, and it appears to me that their case is, to say the least, highly arguable.

45.  Third: -

(1)  Mr Douglas Clark emphasized that the 3^rd Defendant had signed a statement of truth to verify the pleas in the joint defence.

(2)  I accept that this is a matter that the court should take into account in considering the credibility of the 3^rd Defendant. However, the court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the case. The authorities do not suggest that the court should adopt a dogmatic approach: see Lo Li Li Lilly (supra) at paras 19 to 20; Re Hin Pro International Logistics Ltd (supra) at para 8.

(3)  As pointed out in paragraph 43 above, I am of the view that it is explicable as to why the pleas in the joint defence would contain the mistakes in question. This could be ascribed to the pleader’s failure to appreciate or fully appreciate the correct legal position and failure to consider the significance of the pleas in question.

(4)  In this connection, it is also important not to lose sight of the 3^rd Defendant’s own explanations, which are consistent with her case that she was merely a nominee.

(5)  As mentioned, the 3^rd Defendant asserted that she was assured by the 5^th Defendant that he and the lawyers would handle the Plaintiffs’ claims. The 3^rd Defendant’s assertion has been verified and confirmed by the 5^th Defendant.

(6)  In the circumstances, I am of the view that it is explicable as to why the 3^rd Defendant did not exercise a sufficient degree of caution or diligence in the course of dealing with the matters relating to the joint defence.

(7)  After all, it is her case that she was merely a nominee and that she was not privy to the matters that gave rise to the dispute. As the dispute was taken care of by someone else, it is understandable why there was latitude on the part of the 3^rd Defendant. This may not be satisfactory, but is not inexplicable.

(8)  Having considered all the circumstances of the case, I am unable to conclude that the 3^rd Defendant’s explanations are liable to be rejected summarily. I am of the view that it is arguable that the 3^rd Defendant’s explanations are credible and consistent with her current case. This is a matter to be further investigated and canvassed at trial.

46.  Fourth: -  

(1)  Relying on Ming Shiu Chung & Ors v Ming Shiu Sum & Ors (2006) 9 HKCFAR 334 at paras 84 to 86, Mr Douglas Clark further argued that as the 3^rd Defendant blindly put her signature on her statement of truth, she should not be allowed to resile from the admissions in the joint defence.

(2)  I am unable to accept Mr Clark’s submissions.

(3)  In Ming Shiu Chung, the Court of Final Appeal merely held that a person of full age and capacity is normally bound by his signature on an instrument that purports to have legal effect, and the law does not assist a person who carelessly puts his signature thereon.

(4)  There is no room to apply this proposition in the present context, which has nothing to do with any instrument that purports to carry legal effect and/or any contractual dealings between parties: -

(a)  When a person executes a legal instrument, it is expected that the counterparty (and, in some cases, some other parties) would rely on his signature as an indication that he had agreed to the contents of the legal instrument. If this were not the legal position, there would be uncertainty, and members of the society would not be able to conduct their commercial or personal affairs in a predictable manner. This is the rationale behind the proposition in Ming Shiu Chung.

(b)  The said rationale is not applicable in the present context. Normally, a litigant does not rely on the pleas of the opposing party in a pleading to conduct his commercial or personal affairs. It would be absurd to suggest that a pleading could constitute or should be treated as a legal instrument. It is obvious that the nature and purpose of a legal instrument are different from the nature and purpose of a pleading.

(5)  This explains why the authorities provide that the court should adopt a wholistic approach in considering whether a litigant should be allowed to amend his pleas and/or withdraw an admission see Lo Li Li Lilly (supra) at paras 19 to 20; Re Ng Wai Jing [2016] 2 HKLRD 1460 at paras 19 to 21 (per Kwan JA, as Kwan VP then was); Li Ngan Kwan & Anor v Gao Li Hui [2023] HKCA 781 at para 47 (per Au JA). Mr Clark is unable to cite any authority suggesting that it would be justifiable for the court to adopt a dogmatic approach, and to treat a pleading as if it were a legal instrument.

(6)  As pointed out, in considering whether a party should be allowed to resile from an admission, the court needs to consider all the circumstances surrounding the case, including the reasons and justifications for the withdrawal (which must be made in good faith), the prejudice caused to the other party, the prospect of success, public interest, etc: see Lo Li Li Lilly (supra) at paras 19 to 20; Re Ng Wai Jing (supra) at paras 19 to 21; Li Ngan Kwan (supra) at para 47. If Mr Clark were correct, no litigant (who was careless) could ever withdraw an admission and/or amend his/her/its pleas on factual matters. This dogmatic approach is plainly contradictory to the authorities.

47.  Fifth: -

(1)  Mr Douglas Clark also submitted that the 3^rd Defendant’s current case has no prospect of success as she must be liable as an accessory for turning a blind eye.

(2)  I disagree.

(3)  As pointed out: -

(a)  A director is not necessarily liable as an accessory by reason of his/her office: see Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (19^th Ed) at para 24-68.

(b)  In order to be imputed with “blind-eye knowledge”, two conditions have to be satisfied: (i) suspicion of certain facts; and (ii) a conscious decision to refrain from taking any step to confirm that these facts exist: see Group Seven Ltd (supra) at 1038E-F (para 59).

(4)  As mentioned, it is the 3^rd and 5^th Defendants’ case that the 3^rd Defendant was a mere nominee, who was not involved in the affairs and business operation of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants.

(5)  There is not a shred of substantive evidence showing that before the present dispute arose, the 3^rd Defendant was suspicious that the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants might have committed the infringing acts, in respect of which the Plaintiffs now take issues.

(6)  I cannot see how Mr Clark can seriously ask me to summarily conclude that the requirements for imputing “blind-eye knowledge” are satisfied.

48.  For all the above reasons, I conclude that: -

(1)  It is arguable that there were genuine mistakes in regard to the admissions in question. It is also arguable that these mistakes are explicable, and it is discernable as to how they came about.

(2)  It is arguable that the 3^rd Defendant’s explanations are credible.

(3)  The 3^rd Defendant’s current case has a reasonable prospect of success, and is, to say the least, highly arguable.

(4)  The 3^rd Defendant seeks to withdraw the admissions in good faith. She has not been playing litigation gamesmanship; nor has she been abusing the court’s process.

49.  I now consider the balance of prejudice to the parties

50.  In my view, the starting point is that in giving effect to the underlying objectives of the Rules of the High Court, the court shall always recognize that the primary aim in exercising the powers of the court is to ‘secure the just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties’: see Order 1A, rule 2(2).

51.  If the court refuses to allow the 3^rd Defendant to withdraw the previous admissions and to amend her pleadings, the 3^rd Defendant will suffer grave prejudice and injustice. The implication is that judgment may be entered against her based on some admissions that were arguably incorrect. In this connection, in Chow Kam Hung v Hoi Kong Ironwares Godown Co Ltd [2019] 1 HKLRD 356 at para 37(f), DHCJ Keith Yeung SC (as he then was) had this to say:-

“In respect of the balance of prejudice to the parties, if the applications for amendments are allowed, Chow will have to adduce evidence to prove the matters which he says are covered by the admissions. That is not going to be particularly onerous,as he will have to give evidence in any event on the other elements of his claim. But if the applications were refused, the Defendants would in effect be forced to adhere to a pleaded case which Ng has said in his witness statement to be incorrect. They would be prevented from advancing their factual case which they aver represents the truth. The resulting prejudice would be grave.” (emphasis added)

52.  I wholly agree with the learned Judge’s observations. If the court allows the 3^rd Defendant to withdraw the admissions and to amend her pleadings, the Plaintiffs can still (i) pursue their claims against the 3^rd Defendant based on the averments pleaded in the re-amended statement of claim; (ii) adduce evidence that support these averments; and (iii) challenge the 3^rd Defendant’s current case and dispute her assertions at trial. There is no reason to suppose that the Plaintiffs’ substantive rights would be compromised or that it would be impossible to ‘secure the just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties’.

53.  I accept that in light of the previous admissions, the Plaintiffs decided to seek summary judgment against the 3^rd Defendant under the O14 Summons. But for these admissions, the Plaintiffs might not have pursued the application against the 3^rd Defendant. It is obvious that once the 3^rd Defendant’s admissions are withdrawn, the Plaintiffs’ application would be substantially undermined or weakened. Arguably, it can be said the 3^rd Defendant authored the Plaintiffs’ prejudice.

54.  However, there is no reason to suppose that the prejudice suffered by the Plaintiffs is not compensable by costs: -

(1)  In exercising its discretion on costs, the court will undoubtedly take into account that (i) the previous admissions (which have now been disowned) induced Plaintiffs to pursue the application for summary judgment against the 3^rd Defendant and (ii) the 3^rd Defendant only sought to withdraw these admissions after the Plaintiffs’ application for summary judgment was taken out.

(2)  Indeed, as Mr Philips Wong fairly accepted, the 3^rd Defendant shall pay the Plaintiffs’ costs prior to 30 March 2026, ie the date when Defendants took out the Amendment Application.

55.  At the hearing, Mr Douglas Clark further suggested that the Plaintiffs suffered prejudice, in that they missed the opportunity to sue the 5^th Defendant earlier, and by now, he might have dissipated his assets with a view to rendering himself “judgment-proof”.

56.  I am not persuaded by Mr Clark’s suggestion: -

(1)  First of all, the suggestion that the 5^th Defendant might have dissipated assets for the purposes of evading judgment is speculative. There is no evidence showing that this has been the case.

(2)  Second, more fundamentally, I agree with Mr Philips Wong’s submissions that the prejudice in question must emanate from the admissions in question. It does appear to me that the Plaintiffs could blame the 3^rd Defendant in regard to their failure to identify the 5^th Defendant as a wrongdoer earlier. After all, the reality was that the 5^th Defendant voluntarily came forward to admit liability.

(3)  Third, in any event, even if the Plaintiffs have suffered prejudice as suggested by Mr Clark, I am not of the view that the Plaintiffs’ prejudice would outweigh the 3^rd Defendant’s prejudice (should the Amendment Application be disallowed). As pointed out, it would be gravely unjust to affix liability on a litigant based on some admissions that are arguably incorrect.

57.  In the premises, the balance of prejudice lies overwhelmingly in favour of allowing the 3^rd Defendant to withdraw her previous admissions and to amend her pleas.

58.  As regards the question of delay: -

(1)  Whilst I accept that the 3^rd Defendant could have taken out the Amendment Application earlier, it is noteworthy that the Defendant’s current case was disclosed and fully ventilated in the affirmations filed by herself and 5^th Defendant on 16 February 2026.

(2)  There is no suggestion that the Plaintiffs need more time to adduce meaningful evidence to address the assertions made by the 3^rd and 5^th Defendants. This is hardly surprising. The Plaintiffs are not even privy to the internal matters of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants at all. Indeed, the Plaintiffs merely relied on the matters set out in paragraphs 44(4), (6), and (8) hereinabove (which do not show that the 3^rd Defendant actually participated in the substantive business operation of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants).

(3)  Taking all the circumstances into account, I am not of the view that the Plaintiffs have suffered any real prejudice.

59.  As regards the question of the public interest: -

(1)  There is no suggestion that the amendments of the 3^rd Defendant’s pleas and the withdrawal of her previous admissions would lead to any satellite litigation.

(2)  Meanwhile, whilst I accept that the 3^rd Defendant was not diligent in dealing with the matters relating to the joint defence dated 18 December 2024, I am not of the view that her conduct was oppressive or abusive. It cannot be said that whenever a litigant seeks to rectify a mistake, the court’s process has been abused and that the court’s resources have been used disproportionately. This depends on the circumstances.

(3)  In any event, as mentioned, having considered the factual circumstances surrounding these proceedings, I am of the view that it is arguable that the mistakes on the part of the 3^rd Defendant were genuine and explicable.

(4)  I am not of the view that the concern of public interest lies in favour of refusing the Amendment Application.

60.  For all the above reasons: -

(1)  I allow the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants’ Amendment Application.

(2)  I grant leave to the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants to amend the defence filed on 18 December 2024 as per the draft amended defence of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants and the draft amended defence of the 3^rd Defendant annexed to the inter partes summons dated 30 March 2026.

(3)  I also grant leave to the 3^rd Defendant to withdraw all her admissions contained in the pleas under the previous defence filed on 18 December 2024 (including those set out in paragraph 16 hereinabove).

D3.  The Plaintiffs’ Application for Summary Judgment against the 3^rd Defendant 

61.  I now deal with the Plaintiffs’ application for summary judgment against the 3^rd Defendant under their O14 Summons.

Legal Principles

62.  In Guanghua SS Holdings Limited v Lim Yew Cheng & Another [2022] HKCFI 1052 at para 13, Peter Ng J set out a helpful and succinct summary of the proper approach to applications for summary judgments: -

(1)  The order 14 machinery works on the basis that if the plaintiff’s application is properly constituted, it is prima facie entitled to judgment unless the defendant shows cause to the contrary.

(2)  The mere assertion in an affidavit of a given situation by the defendant responding to an application for summary judgment does not, ipso facto, justify granting leave to defend.

(3)  The burden is on the defendant to show a real or bona fide defence or some other reason for a trial. The defendant must satisfy the Court that his evidence is capable of being believed and that on the basis of such evidence, there is a fair or reasonable probability of the defendant having a real or bona fide defence.

(4)  In deciding whether there is a fair or reasonable probability of the defendant having a real or bona fide defence, the court does not isolate each factual issue and consider whether it is possible that the defendant’s story on that issue is credible. Rather, the court must look at the whole situation.

(5)  In assessing the credibility of the defendant’s factual case, while the court will not embark upon a mini-trial on affidavit evidence, the court is not obliged to suspend its critical faculties and assume that the defendant’s evidence is accurate.

(6)  If having regard to inherent plausibility, inconsistency with contemporaneous documents and other compelling evidence, the defence is not credible, the court must say so.

(7)  If the defendant’s evidence is incredible in any material respect, it cannot be said that there is a fair or reasonable probability that the defendant has a real or bona fide defence.

Deliberation

63.  I repeat the analysis of the factual circumstances and evidence set out in paragraphs 43 to 47 hereinabove.

64.  For the reasons already explained, I am of the view that: -

(1)  It is arguable that the 3^rd Defendant’s admissions under the pleas in the joint defence filed on 18 December 2024 were mistaken and that the mistakes were explicable: see paragraph 43 above.

(2)  It is arguable that the 3^rd Defendant’s explanations regarding these mistaken admissions were credible and consistent with her current case: see paragraph 45 above.

(3)  The current case advanced by the 3^rd Defendant is not contradicted by the substantive evidence. In this regard, the matters relied on by the Plaintiffs are consistent with the 3^rd Defendant’s case. They do not show that the 3^rd Defendant had actually participated in the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ business operation and had knowledge in respect thereof: see paragraph 44 above.

(4)  There is no evidence showing that the 3^rd Defendant was suspicious that the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants committed acts that infringed the Plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights, such that she might be imputed with “blind-eye knowledge”: see paragraph 47 above.

65.  The Plaintiffs emphasized (i) the fact that the 3^rd Defendant was the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ director/shareholder on records; and (ii) the 3^rd Defendant’s previous admissions under the joint defence.

66.  However, as already explained: -

(1)  A director is not necessarily liable as an accessory by reason of his/her office, and whether a director is liable depends on the circumstances: see Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (19^th Ed) at para 24-68. In this connection, there is no direct substantive evidence contradicting the 3^rd Defendant’s current case that she was merely a nominee with no actual involvement in the business operation of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants: see paragraph 44 above.

(2)  There are valid reasons to believe that the previous admissions were mistaken and explicable, and the court cannot summarily reject the 3^rd Defendant’s explanations (which are consistent with her current case): see paragraphs 43 and 45 above

67.  In my view, there must be, to say the least, triable issues on whether (i) the 3^rd Defendant authorized or procured the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to commit the acts that constitute infringement of the Plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights; and (ii) the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, and 5^th Defendants infringed the Plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights pursuant to a common design.

68.  I accept that due to the admissions under the previous joint defence, the Plaintiffs might take the view that it was justifiable to seek summary judgment against the 3^rd Defendant. However, in light of the clarifications under the affirmations filed by the 3^rd and 5^th Defendants on 16 February 2026 and the Amendment Application taken out on 30 March 2026, it is no longer justifiable for the Plaintiffs to pursue the application for summary judgment against the 3^rd Defendant.

69.  The appropriate course to take is to grant unconditional leave to defend in favour of the 3^rd Defendant. I so order.

70.  For completeness, it should be mentioned that at the hearing, Mr Douglas Clark, relying on Sir Elly Kadoorie & Sons Ltd v Samantha Jane Bradley [2026] HKCFA 2, asked me to grant a “free-standing” injunction against the 3^rd Defendant to restrain her from committing infringing acts against the Plaintiffs. If I understand correctly, Mr Clark’s point is that even though the court is, at this stage, not satisfied the Plaintiffs’ causes of action against the 3^rd Defendant are established, it would still be open to the court to grant a free-standing” injunction. Mr Clark further emphasized that (i) the 3^rd Defendant was the sole shareholder/director of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants (who have admitted liability); and (ii) the proposed injunction would not cause any prejudice to the 3^rd Defendant (as she claims to be a nominee with no actual involvement in the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ business operation).

71.  Mr Philips Wong pertinently referred me to BMC Global Ltd & Anor v Tor Asia Credit Master Fund LP (HCA 2392/2016, 14 October 2016). At para 42, Chow J (as Chow JA then was) stated: -

“The grant of an injunction by the court is always a serious matter and must be fully justified. The court should not grant an injunction merely because it may be said that the defendant would suffer no prejudice. The absence of prejudice is only one factor in the overall assessment of the balance of convenience.” (emphasis added)

72.  I am not inclined to the view that the Plaintiffs are, at this stage, entitled to seek a permanent injunction against the 3^rd Defendant. The context of Sir Elly Kadoorie is obviously very different from the present case. Further, the Court of Final Appeal did not suggest that regardless of whether a viable cause of action exists, the court should immediately proceed to grant an injunction against a party so long as it can be shown that such a party would not suffer any prejudice.

73.  In any event, at the hearing, Mr Philips Wong indicated that since the 3^rd Defendant was not privy to the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ operation at all, all along, the 3^rd Defendant’s stance was that she was agreeable to provide an undertaking (on a non-admission basis) in terms of the permanent injunction as agreed to by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants.

74.  In my view, this is a very sensible and pragmatic approach to resolve this part of the disputes between the parties, and I do not see any reason why the court should not accept the 3^rd Defendant’s undertaking.

75.  In light of the 3^rd Defendant’s undertaking (which I accept), it is unnecessary for this court to consider whether a “free-standing” injunction should be granted.

E.  Costs

76.  It appears to me that some aspects of these proceedings are unusual.

77.  I direct the parties to lodge and serve written submissions on the questions of costs as between:

(1)  the Plaintiffs and the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants;

(2)  the Plaintiffs and the 3^rd Defendant; and

(3)  the Plaintiffs and the 5^th Defendant.

78.  These written submissions on costs should be lodged within 14 days and confined to 5 pages.

79.  I will deal with the questions of costs on paper.

F.  Other Matters

80.  I express my gratitude to Mr Douglas Clark, Mr Philips Wong, and Mr William Tse for their very helpful assistance.

Dated 17 April 2026