香港特別行政區 訴 梁祖耀

HCMA 225/2020

[2022] HKCFI 1928

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

刑事上訴司法管轄權

不服定罪及判刑上訴

裁判法院上訴案件2020年第225號

(原九龍城裁判法院傳票2019年第30871號)

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判  決  書

1.  上訴人梁祖耀經審訊後被特委裁判官余振邦 (「裁判官」) 裁定一項「不小心駕駛」罪罪名成立，被判處罰款2,000 元及自費參加駕駛改進課程。

2.  上訴人不服定罪及判刑，提出上訴。

3.  上訴人於審訊時及本上訴均由大律師代表。

4.  答辯人同意本案的定罪裁決有不穩妥的地方，不反對法庭批准上訴人的定罪上訴，推翻定罪裁決，並撤銷刑罰。

控方案情

5.  審訊時，控辯雙方以承認事實同意：

(1)  上訴人、岑先生(PW1)及Jamshad Malik (PW2)於2019 年3月7日晚上分別於彌敦道南行方向的左一、左二及左三行車線駕駛私家車；

(2)  上訴人當時曾經從左一行車線切入左二行車線；及

(3)  PW1私家車的右車頭撞向PW2私家車的左車尾。

6.  PW1作供指他於彌敦道左二線行駛時，停在左一線的上訴人私家車突然切入左二線。當上訴人切線時，他的私家車車尾處於PW1車頭前不足一輛私家車的長度。PW1遂即急速停車並稍為向右駛，但仍然與左三線PW2的私家車發生碰撞。PW1指他當時車速約40至50公里。當辯方盤問PW1時向他指出「咁[上訴人]就算有向右切過線喇，其實同你嗰個距離呢，都講緊起碼呢，都有講緊8米至10米過外，同唔同意呀？」PW1不同意。

7.  控方傳召PW2供辯方盤問。PW2指PW1向他承認自己不小心。

上訴人的選擇

8.  上訴人選擇不作供，亦不傳召辯方證人。

裁判官的分析和事實裁斷

9.  裁判官認為本案的爭議點是上訴人從左一行車線切入左二行車線時他的私家車與PW1私家車的相對位置，及於這情況下切線是否屬於安全的駕駛方式。

10.  裁判官指出案中就着兩車距離的證據只有PW1的證供，故此若裁判官全盤拒絕接納PW1的證供，案中沒有足夠證據顯示上訴人的駕駛態度。

11.  裁判官於口頭裁決及《裁斷陳述書》表示他對PW1證供的可信性和可靠性存疑，亦表明不接納PW1就著兩車距離的證供，尤其是與辯方所提出而不符的陳述。

12.  導致答辯方同意本案定罪不穩妥的是裁判官於表明「不接納PW1就着兩車距離的證供，尤其是與辯方所提出而不符的陳述」後，裁判官作出事實裁斷時於《裁斷陳述書》第15段指出「本席接納辯方盤問岑先生時，就上訴人切線時兩車距離方面的提議，即約8至10米的距離。這也是辯方就此提議向岑先生提出爭議的程度。若當時兩車相距更遠，為保障上訴人的利益，他的代表大律師理應於盤問時向岑先生提出更遠的距離。」

13.  裁判官因此裁定當上訴人切線時，兩車的距離是約8至10米。裁判官其後根據PW1私家車時速每小時40公里計算每秒可行駛約11米，繼而裁定當上訴人切線時，兩車的距離少於1秒。裁判官認為上訴人應確保與PW1私家車距離最少2秒才開始切線，但是上訴人切線時所預留的距離卻少於1秒。裁判官認為這情況下進行切線並不是理智謹慎的司機應作出的行為，亦會對PW1造成危險。裁判官因此裁定上訴人不小心駕駛罪名成立。

定罪上訴理據

14.  上訴人定罪上訴的理據是裁判官錯誤地以辯方曾於盤問時向PW1建議的兩車距離作出事實裁定，同時裁判官錯誤地理解辯方以上建議的內容。因此，本案的定罪不安全及不穩妥。

答辯人陳詞

15.  答辯人同意裁判官看來是依賴了辯方盤問時向PW1的兩車距離作為證據，並裁斷為事實，即當上訴人切線時，兩車的距離是約8至10米。但辯方盤問時向PW1作出提問而PW1不同意的並非證據。辯方盤問時向PW1的兩車距離，在PW1作出否定後，裁判官不能依靠該提問來裁定上訴人切線時兩車的距離實際上是約8至10米。答辯人認為裁判官上述裁斷有不穩妥之處。

16.  於裁判官對PW1證供的可信和可靠性存疑及表明拒絕接受PW1就有關車輛相對位置的證據後，答辯人認為案中沒有足夠證據證明上訴人切線時兩車的距離太短的基礎證明上訴人不小心駕駛，亦沒有足夠證據證明上訴人如何無適當的謹慎及專注，或未有合理顧及PW1。故此，同意本案的定罪不穩妥，不反對推翻本案的定罪裁決。

陳詞的考慮及上訴的處置

17.  答辯方公平及正確地指出盤問證人時，提問中向證人指出的事項，若證人不同意或否定，那盤問方曾向證人指出的事項並未成為證據。盤問方曾向證人指出的事項而證人同意的才成為證據。

18.  答辯方正確援引Supreme Court of South Australia的案件Police v Eiffe [2007] SASC 178，法庭於該案指出辯方律師的提問並非證據：

“18. In Robinson the Queensland Court of Appeal held that a jury was entitled to have regard to discrepancies between the case as put to witnesses by defence counsel, as against the evidence of the person from whom those instructions must be taken to have come, usually the accused. In this case counsel’s submission seeks to add a new dimension to that principle. Here it is suggested that the questions themselves, standing alone, can be taken to amount to the accused’s instructions. That is tantamount to saying that the questions contain admissions by the defendant as to his presence and participation in the incident. I cannot think that is so.

19. A similar submission was put and rejected by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Lander (1989) 52 SASR 424. There the appellant was charged with obtaining money by false pretences. The accused did not give evidence in her defence. The principal evidence against her came from an accomplice and the jury was warned of the danger of conviction in the uncorroborated evidence of that witness. One matter left to the jury as potentially providing such corroboration was inferences which it was suggested could be drawn from questions asked by the accused counsel’s in cross-examination. Those questions contained assertions which, it could be inferred, were based on the accused’s instructions. In separate judgments each member of the Court agreed that the questions put could not be used in the way suggested. King CJ made this observation at 426:

Only evidence can amount to corroboration. Statements contained in counsel’s questions are not evidence and cannot be converted into evidence by a process of inference. Use may legitimately be made of matters occurring in the course of the trial including the conduct of the accused’s case, in evaluating evidence but inferences drawn from the conduct of the case cannot amount to evidence of facts in issue and cannot therefore amount to corroboration.”

(底線後加)

19.  答辯方正確指出陪審團指引第44部 (Defendant who has not given evidence) 第7段亦有以下指引：

“Where counsel put forward material factual allegations to witnesses in cross examination, or in a closing address, for which there is no evidential foundation, the jury should be reminded in the course of the summing up that they are enjoined to consider their verdict ‘according to the evidence’, that mere suggestions by counsel in the course of questioning are not evidence and that the speeches if counsel do not constitute evidence, and [unless of course the suggestions have been accepted by a witness or by admission on the other side] that there has been no evidence to the effect suggested. For example, where the defendant has, through counsel, made serious allegations against prosecution witnesses, the suggested direction may be supplemented by the comment that counsel’s allegations are unsupported by evidence. It should, however, remain a neutral direction.”

20.  於本案，PW1否定辯方向他指出的兩車距離大約為8 至10米後，裁判官不能依靠該提問來裁定上訴人切線時，兩車距離實際上大約為8至10米。裁判官也沒有基礎以該8至10 米的兩車距離，加上他以PW1私家車時速每小時40公里計算每秒可行駛約11米，繼而裁定當上訴人切線時，兩車的距離少於1秒，並以此作為他裁定上訴人不小心駕駛罪名成立的基礎。

21.  本席同意上訴方及答辯方就着裁判官錯誤以辯方向PW1提出但為PW1否定的兩車距離來裁定兩車距離實際上大約為8至10米的陳詞。該錯誤的事實裁定最終導致裁判官裁定上訴人不小心駕駛罪名成立。

22.  本席同意上訴方及答辯方的陳詞，本席裁定上訴人定罪上訴得直，推翻定罪裁決，並撤銷刑罰。