WIDAYATSAH NUR ROHMAN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 2693/2019

[2025] HKCFI 2997

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 2693 OF 2019

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Leave to apply for judicial review be refused.

Observations for the Applicant:

1.  The Applicant is a 40-year-old national of Indonesia who arrived in Hong Kong on 4 March 2017 as a visitor with permission to remain as such up to 3 April 2017 when he did not depart and instead overstayed, and more than 1 year later on 5 July 2018 he surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if he returned to Indonesia he would be harmed or killed by his creditors over his unpaid debts. He was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim.

2.  The Applicant was born and raised in Desa Semandino, Sub-district Kauman, District Ponorogo, East Java, Indonesia. After leaving school he worked as a farmer and construction worker to make his living, got married and raised a family with a son in his home district.

3.  In 2014 he started to borrow money from 3 of his friends to meet his wife’s medical and hospital expenses due to her stomach ailments, but for which he could only make part repayments, and when his friends started to lose their patience with him and demanded repayments of their loans with threats to kill him should he fail to do so, the Applicant became fearful for his life and departed Indonesia on 4 March 2017 for Hong Kong where he overstayed and subsequently raised his non-refoulement claim for protection, for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 17 January 2019 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).

4.  By a Notice of Decision dated 28 February 2019 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non‑refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

5.  In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from his creditors upon his return to Indonesia as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no evidence of any real intention of any of them who were all his friends to seriously harm or kill him other than to press him to repay his debts, that in any event these were private monetary disputes between him and his creditors only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Indonesia with a large population of 263 million people spread across a vast territory that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Bali or Jakarta where it would be difficult if not impossible for his creditors to locate him.

6.  On 11 March 2019 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which the Board did not find it necessary to hold any oral hearing and proceeded to deal with the appeal on papers based on the materials and information provided by the Applicant earlier to the Director and were available in the hearing bundle before the Board. On 8 July 2019 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.

7.  In its decision the Board found that the Applicant had failed to produce any reliable evidence to support the existence of his alleged loans or the incidents occurred prior to his departure of Indonesia, but that even if his account of events were true that there is no evidence of any real intention of his creditors to seriously harm or kill him other than to press him to repay his debts, and that in any event these were private monetary disputes between him and his creditors only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon his return to Indonesia as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for him to move safely to other parts of the country away from his home district without any risk of being located by his creditors that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.

8.  On 16 September 2019 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and put forward the following grounds for his intended challenge:

(1)  That the Board reached the decision wrongly in assessing his non-refoulement claim as the decision was not fair or reasonable as required by the Wednesbury test in failing to recognize that his life must be protected by the criminal law from extra-judicial killings that he may face if deported back to his home country;

(2)  That the Board failed to appreciate or place proper or sufficient weight or importance to the presence of State Acquiescence in his case which led to an unfair outcome of rejecting his claim without realizing that he was tortured at the behest of the state law enforcement agencies and politicians that the state would be rendered liable to the Applicant by cause of the state and its public officials failing to provide reasonable protection for its citizens under the duty of due diligence;

(3)  That the Adjudicator acted unreasonable and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance on COI but failed to take into account the Applicant’s personal background and experience in assessing his claim;

(4)  That the Board had listed relevant COI which supported the Applicant’s aversions that the police in his country would not be able to protect but failed to consider or give sufficient weight to such evidence and instead ruled otherwise against the Applicant’s case which was a clear case of unfair attitude shown by the Board which in itself is enough to render its decision void;

(5)  That the Board failed to attain the high standard of fairness required by the Wednesbury test in failing to take into account the Applicant’s argument that corruption and incompetency of the administration in the Applicant’s country is still a very serious problem as various human rights organizations had compiled reports that stated testament to the Applicant’s assertions;

(6)  That the Adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing whether or not to accept the Applicant’s explanations and unreasonably required him to respond to questions that he was not in a position to offer any response;

(7)  That the Adjudicator failed to take into account the nexus of political parties and official corruption which exist in the Applicant’s country making the persecution of the Applicant effectively persecution by the State;

(8)  That the Adjudicator made a ruling to dismiss the Applicant’s appeal based on findings which the Adjudicator ought to allow and thus the decision was irrational.

9.  These are however all just bare and vague assertions of the Applicant containing a few key words or phrases but without any relevant or necessary particulars or specifics or elaborations as to how they apply to his case or how the Board or the Adjudicator had erred in the decision, or in what way was the decision unfair or unreasonable or that the Adjudicator had acted procedurally unfair or irrational, or how did the Adjudicator fail to take into account of relevant COI or being selective or improperly rely on irrelevant COI, or what relevancy were state acquiescence or extra-judicial killings to the Applicant’s case or what evidence is there to suggest that the Applicant has ever been tortured by law enforcement agencies or politicians when on the factual basis of even his own case that it was a private monetary dispute between him and his creditors only without any official involvement or political element at all, nor was he able to do so at the hearing of his application. As such, and as none of these assertions were properly elaborated or presented with any relevant particulars or specifics by the Applicant, I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for his intended challenge.

10.  As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.

11.  In the Applicant’s case, while it seems to me questionable that the Board did not conduct any oral hearing for the appeal and yet appeared to take issue with the existence of his alleged loans and incidents without giving the Applicant any opportunity to reply or respond thereto, the fact is that it has been correctly established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risk of harm in the Applicant’s claim even if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of Indonesia, there is simply no justification to afford him with non‑refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.

12.  In the premises, and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.

13.  For all these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I therefore refuse to grant leave and accordingly dismiss his application.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1