RE DARAMOLA LOUKMAN MOUNIRU

HCAL 136/2018

[2020] HKCFI 58

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 136 OF 2018

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DECISION

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1.  On 3 October 2019 I refused to extend time to the Applicant’s late application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) in dismissing his appeal regarding his non-refoulement claim upon finding that there was no good reason for his 3 ½ months delay with his application, that he had failed to put forward any reasonably arguable ground for his intended challenge, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision, and that there was no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application.

2.  The Applicant now by a summons issued on 15 October 2019 seeks leave to appeal against that decision which was interlocutory in nature: see Kwok Cheuk Kin v Leung Chun Ying [2018] HKCA 419, and that section 14AA of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 provides that no appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal from an interlocutory judgment or order of the Court of First Instance in any civil cause or matter unless leave to appeal has been granted. 

3.  In considering whether to grant leave to appeal, section 14AA(4) of the Ordinance provides that leave shall not be granted unless the Court hearing the application for leave is satisfied that:

(a)  the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or

(b)  there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

4.  The threshold test for reasonable prospect of success was given by Le Pichon JA in SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125 at [17]:

“ The section requires that the court be satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard before granting leave. Reasonable prospects of success involves the notion that the prospects of succeeding must be ‘reasonable’ and therefore more than ‘fanciful’, without having to be ‘probable’.”

5.  In the present case, the Applicant however did not in his summons or affirmation provide any draft or proposed grounds of appeal, or show any particulars of any error in the decision, or why it may be argued that the decision was unfair or unreasonable, other than a mere repeat of his claim that his life would still be in danger in his home country of South Africa, while the situations there as shown in those copies of news reports attached to his affirmation had all been properly considered by both the Director of Immigration and the Appeal Board in their assessment of the relevant Country of Origin Information when determining his non-refoulement claim, and would not have assisted or advanced his case any further.  As such and in the absence of any error in the decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not see any reasonable prospect of success in his intended appeal, nor do I find any other reason in the interest of justice why the appeal should be heard. 

6.  In the premises and for the reasons given, I refuse to grant leave for the Applicant to appeal, and accordingly dismiss his summons.