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HCMA 218/2013
香港特別行政區
高等法院原訟法庭
刑事上訴司法管轄權
定罪及判刑上訴
案件編號：高院裁判法院上訴案件2013年第218號
（原九龍城裁判法院刑事案件2012年第2907號）
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| 聆訊日期： 2014年1月23日 |
| 判案日期： 2014年1月23日 |
| 頒布判案理由書日期： 2014年2月5日 |
判案理由書
1. 上訴人在暫委裁判官香淑嫻（裁判官）席前經審訊後被裁定一項「危險駕駛引致他人死亡罪」罪名成立，判處監禁兩年，停牌三年，另需自費修習和完成駕駛改進課程。
2. 上訴人於2013年2月25日被判處監禁，同日提出不服定罪及判處的上訴申請。原審時上訴人有大律師代表，並曾經就上訴申請法律援助，但於2013年5月6日主動撤銷法援申請。2013年5月7日，上訴人親自填寫了「放棄上訴通知書」並於翌日發出。2013年5月10日，高等法院司法常務官向懲教署署長發出備忘，通知署長因為收到了上訴人的「放棄上訴通知書」，所以上訴人的上訴申請已然撤銷。
3. 上訴人向本席申請視「放棄上訴通知書」為無效，要求恢復上訴。聆訊時上訴人由陸資深大律師代表[1]。本席於聆訊後拒絕上訴人的申請，現發下書面理由。
案情背景
4. 上訴人是一名巴士司機，事發當日於土瓜灣道向落山道方向行駛，經過行人過路線時撞倒了受害人，引致她死亡。事發時受害人違反紅色人像燈從路中安全島踏進行人過路處橫過馬路。
5. 裁判官認為上訴人當時的駕駛態度遠遜於一名合格而謹慎的駕駛者會被期望達到的水平，及對一名合格而謹慎的駕駛者而言，上訴人的駕駛方式實屬危險，是顯然易見的，因為：
“顯然上訴人當時對於路面情況疏忽，而且並非一時之間的疏忽，而是有一段時間沒有對路面有足夠專注，及對途人沒有足夠的關顧，非常魯莽，眼見途人橫過行人過路處時，儘管當時上訴人有足夠時間避免意外，但上訴人並非收慢以準備在行人過路處前停低，先讓途人橫過馬路，而是繼續前行，响「安」示警，繼而輕微減速，試圖令途人儘快離開行人過路處，讓自己繼續前行，漠視行人過路處上的行人，對於可能有一些途人會走得較慢掉以輕心，完全沒有察覺死者正以緩慢步速過馬路，直至眼見死者在自己近距離，並且意識到即將收掣不及、有碰撞發生，才連忙較大力剎車及扭右軚，但已太遲，碰撞已發生。”
恢復申請
6. 上訴人為他的恢復申請傳檔誓章。就為何「取消上訴」，他有以下解釋：
“於2013年5月6日，本人因未能聘請律師，法庭沒有通知聆訊日期及附上有關判辭，所以取消所有上訴”
7. 在甚麼情況下法庭可容許上訴人恢復因發出「放棄上訴通知書」而撤銷的上訴申請，上訴庭在Lai Siu Cheung[2]一案中，就此課題作出了詳細的分析，最後得出結論[3]：
“23. It is well-established in this jurisdiction that the restoration of an appeal after an abandonment is permissible only where it can be demonstrated that the abandonment of the original application was a nullity. The reasoning to be followed is that in R v Medway (1976) 62 Cr App R 85 in which the English Court of Appeal reviewed the cases at length, and the correct principles which emerged. This Court is not empowered once an appeal has been abandoned, and therefore dismissed, to deal with an appeal. To do so would require statutory s.83P of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap.221). There is no inherent jurisdiction to hear an appeal which has been dismissed. Once an appeal has been dismissed, the Court of Appeal is functus officio and it is established that there is no co-existing inherent jurisdiction to enable the court to permit an appeal to be reopened because of special circumstances falling short of an abandonment having been a nullity:
The answer to the first question which we have to decide depends upon whether alongside the jurisdiction which undoubtedly, as all authorities show, exists to give leave to withdraw an abandonment where it is shown that circumstances are present which enable the Court to say that that abandonment should be treated as a nullity, there co-exists an inherent jurisdiction, in other special circumstances, enabling the Court to give such leave… .
As we have said at the outset, the jurisdiction of this Court and of its predecessor is based upon statute and we have been referred to and have found no authority to support the existence of a parallel inherent jurisdiction. R v Medway (1976) 62 Cr App R 85 at pp.98 and 99.
24. It follows that the only circumstances in which an abandoned appeal may be restored for hearing is if, as a matter of law, that abandonment may properly be treated as if it had never occurred, and the only circumstance in which that course is permissible is if that abandonment was in law a nullity.”
8. 上訴庭認為，上訴法庭的權力源於條例，上訴申請因為發出放棄通知書而撤銷之後，法庭便沒有權力再去處理該上訴申請了，除非因為某些原故，法庭接納上訴人發出上訴通知書的行為本身在法律上是一無效行為。上訴法庭沒有固有權力，在其他的所謂特別情況之下，批准恢復已撤銷的上訴申請。
9. 此法律原則，上訴庭在其後的Ekeledo[4]案和Ooi Lim Khoon[5]案，也有採納。根據Ooi Lim Khoon案，在視放棄上訴為無效的申請中，法庭無需考慮上訴申請本身是否有充足理據。
10. 雖然這些案例都是上訴庭案件，但由於高等法院原訟庭處理裁判法院案件上訴的權力同樣是源於條例，本席認為同樣的原則適用於裁判法院案件的上訴。
11. 陸資深大律師引用Chan Fu[6]一案，指出上訴庭曾經行使權力，在特殊情況之下准許該案的上訴人恢復申請。該案是一件1978 年的判決，判詞十分簡短，全文如下：
“Both Appellants applied for leave to appeal against their sentences of twelve years’ imprisonment for this raid on a Securicor van. The 2nd Appellant, without notifying either the Director of Legal Aid or his counsel, filed notice of abandonment and they were not aware of what he had done until this morning.
No doubt it was a bad case: firearms were used and shots exchanged with the police and guards. The 1st Appellant was armed with a knife. Mr. Stevenson has referred to Ng Tat-chor v Reg. 1977 H.K.L.R. 66 where this court said that a proper sentence for a robbery in which a revolver is used is a sentence of at least eight years’ imprisonment, but he submits that the circumstances of that case, in which sentences totalling fifteen years’ imprisonment for what are said to have been more serious robberies and accompanying shootings were altered to thirteen years, were so much more heinous that the present sentences are out of line. Mr. Polson accepts that the sentences were at the top end of the scale but contends that they were not manifestly excessive. We have discussed the matter at some length and have come to the conclusion that we ought to allow the appeal of the 1st Appellant and substitute a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.
The application of the 2nd Appellant stood dismissed upon his filing notice of abandonment, but the court thinks that his sentence also was unnecessarily severe and that the judge was right to give him the same sentence as the 1st Appellant. In the special circumstances that he abandoned his application without the benefit of professional advice, justice requires that we give him leave to renew his application and that we likewise reduce his sentence to ten years’ imprisonment.”
12. 陸資深大律師陳詞指，上訴庭沒有在Lai Siu Cheung案中提及Chan Fu案，所以Chan Fu案仍然是有效的案例，本席須要考慮。
13. 明顯地，在Chan Fu案中，上訴庭沒有將恢復申請的權力規限於「放棄上訴是無效行為」的情況之下，違背Lai Siu Cheung案的原則。上訴庭在Chan Fu案中就是否有權在特殊情況之下容許恢復上訴申請沒有作出任何法理分析，似乎當時上訴庭是理所當然地認為它是有此權力的。
14. 上訴庭在Lai Siu Cheung案中所依重的Medway[7]案，在Chan Fu案時應已可供參考，但可惜上訴庭在Chan Fu案中沒有就該案作出任何考慮，相信是當時案件的焦點不在於此。
15. 本席認為，上訴庭在Lai Siu Cheung案，以及其後的案例之中，已清楚地確立了現時就上訴庭恢復申請的權力方面的法律原則。上訴庭在案中的法理分析極具說服力，本席亦十分認同。本席認為，Lai Siu Cheung案相比於Chan Fu案明顯地較有說服力，Chan Fu案已不能代表本地現時的相關法律。
16. 在確定了相關法律原則之後，本席須進而考慮上訴人放棄上訴是否「無效行為」。
17. 上訴人因為「未能聘請律師，法庭沒有通知聆訊日期及附上有關判辭，所以取消所有上訴」。除此之外，上訴人沒有在他的誓章中提及他發出放棄上訴通知書時的情況以及他對此行為的理解，而只是著墨於案件證據和裁判官的判決。
18. 本席認為，上訴人的所謂取消上訴的原因，實在令人難以理解。「法庭沒有通知聆訊日期及附上有關判辭」這些事情，和取消上訴的決定，難以扯上任何關係。至於未能聘請律師，根本上沒有任何原因，要促使上訴人要急於在找到律師之前，決定取消上訴。
19. 其實這些所謂原因，就算解釋得到上訴人為何發出放棄通知書，也完全不能證明上訴人當時的行為是無效行為。甚麼情況可以構成無效行為，上訴庭在Lai Siu Cheung案中也有指出[8]：
“We do not think it is wise to attempt some exhaustive definition or summary of those situations, but it will be seen that, typically, they tend to concern the applicant’s understanding of the effect or consequences of the document he is signing or, perhaps, misapprehending the effect of an appeal were he to persist.”
20. 所以，申請撤回放棄上訴通知書的上訴人，一般來說，須要提出證據，說明他簽署或發出通知書時對此文件和行為的理解。而上訴庭亦指明，基於就上訴成功機會的錯誤法律意見而發出放棄通知書，並不足以令它成為無效行為。上訴庭在Lai Siu Cheung案中識別了就上訴的成功機會給予的錯誤法律意見和就放棄上訴通知書的性質和意義給予的錯誤法律意見兩種不同的情況，並引述了Bridges[9]一案以作解釋[10]：
“The rationale for a mistake as to prospects of success on appeal (irrespective of the cause of the mistake) not giving rise to a null notice of abandonment is that a notice of abandonment signed or served for that reason remains the true act of the applicant. Wrong advice of this kind does not result in a decision that is not properly informed for the purposes of the nullity test.”
21. 本案上訴人所說的他放棄或「取消」上訴的原因，極其量只能說是有關於他對上訴成功機會的誤解，完全不涉及他對此行為性質的理解。
22. 基於上述理由，本席不准許撤回放棄上訴通知書的申請。因此，亦無需處理陸資深大律師有關上訴理據的陳述。
答辯人：由律政司高級檢控官馮美琪代表香港特別行政區
上訴人：由鄒偉雄律師行轉聘陸貽信資深大律師、李國銓大律師及劉日雄大律師代表
[1] 由李國銓大律師和劉日雄大律師協助。
[2] HKSAR v Lai Siu Cheung [2005] 1 HKLRD 1.
[3] 第23至24段。
[4] HKSAR v Ekeledo Nandipha Eunice [2013] 4 HKLRD 5.
[5] HKSAR v Ooi Lim Khoon [2011] 5 HKLRD 100.
[6] Chan Fu & Anr v R (Crim App 1156/1977) unrep.
[7] R v Medway (1976) 62 Cr App R 85.
[8] 第26段。
[9] R v Bridges (1998) 104 A Crim LR 322.
[10] 第27段。
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