AMMOLITE WEALTH LTD v. KING CHINA PROPERTIES LTD AND OTHERS

HCA 2514/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 2514 OF 2014

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D E C I S I O N
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Background

1.  There are two summonses heard together before me.  One is dated 6 March 2015 taken out by the 1^st, 2^nd, 4^th and 5^th defendants for an order that the plaintiff’s claims against them be struck out and the action be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff’s claims: (1) disclose no reasonable cause of action; (2) are frivolous or vexatious; and/or (3) are otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.

2.  The other one is dated 25 March 2015 taken out by the 3^rd defendant for an order that the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim be struck out and this action be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff’s claims against the 3^rd defendant disclose no reasonable cause of action.  However, the 3^rd defendant obtained leave from me on 22 January 2016 to amend the summons to include the other 2 grounds as those raised by the 1^st, 2^nd, 4^th and 5^th defendants.  In other words, all 5 defendants are now applying to strike out the plaintiff’s claims against them on the same grounds.

3.  There are two causes of action pleaded by the plaintiff in its Statement of Claim against the 1^st, 2^nd, 4^th and 5^th defendants, namely conspiracy to injure and breach of contract; whereas there is only one cause of action against the 3^rd defendant, namely conspiracy to injure.  Originally, the 1^st, 2^nd, 4^th and 5^th defendants complained that the Statement of Claim was not properly formulated in respect of both causes of actions against them.  However, Mr Dawes SC, counsel for the 1^st, 2^nd, 4^th and 5^th defendants, confirms at the hearing that they will not proceed with the striking out application in respect of the breach of contract claim and that part of the Statement of Claim will remain.  In particular, he submits that if the application is granted, only paragraphs 8, 44, 45, 46 and 47 as well as reliefs (1), (2) and (3) should be struck out.

4.  Thus, it is no longer necessary for me to consider whether the claim for breach of contract against the 1^st, 2^nd, 4^th and 5^th defendants should be struck out.  I only need to deal with the claim for conspiracy to injure in respect of all 5 defendants.

5.  The crux of the defendants’ complaint is that the conspiracy plea is embarrassing and failed to meet the standards required in pleading conspiracy/fraud.  However, the plaintiff has proposed to make various amendments to the Statement of Claim as per the draft Amended Statement of Claim enclosed in their letter dated 23 December 2015 to the defendants (see pages 170 to 186 of Bundle B of the Hearing Bundles), but no formal application for the amendments has been made.

6.  The plaintiff has also proposed a further revision to paragraph 15 of the draft Amended Statement of Claim because the original formulation was inaccurate (see pages 194 and 229 of Bundle B of the Hearing Bundles).

7.  The plaintiff submits that if a pleading is defective but the defect is capable of being cured by an amendment, it is not appropriate to order a strike out.  This is so even where the proposed amendment is not before the Court (see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2016 paragraph 18/19/4).  Thus, the plaintiff invites the Court to proceed with the applications on the basis of the draft Amended Statement of Claim (with the new paragraph 15).

8.  The plaintiff further submits that pursuant to Order 20, rule 3(1) of the Rules of the High Court, it is entitled to amend the Statement of Claim without leave. In any event, Master K Lo stayed the action on 15 April 2015 save for the purpose of the present striking out applications.  Upon lifting of the stay, the plaintiff will formally cause the Statement of Claim to be amended.

9.  Nevertheless, the defendants submit that even with the proposed amendments, the claim for conspiracy should still be struck out. There is therefore no prejudice to make reference to the draft Amended Statement of Claim and the new paragraph 15.

Legal principles

10.  There is no dispute about the relevant legal principles applicable in this case, which are summarized below.

11.  Under Order 18, rule 19(1)(a) of the Rules of the High Court, a “reasonable cause of action” refers to one with some chance of success when only the allegations in the pleadings are considered (see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2016 at paragraph 18/19/6).

12.  While the power to strike out is exercised in “plain and obvious cases”, “plain” is not the same as simple and “obvious” is not the same as short.  If the Statement of Claim, however complicated, shows that there is no cause of action a court will order it to be struck out (see Cheung Chui Sou-ying v The Personal Representative of Cheung Yuk-luen alias Wilson Cheung Deceased [1981] HKLR 585, 588H-J per Baker J).

13.  When pleading the tort of conspiracy, the pleader must allege at least one overt act which is the act of all the alleged conspirators or, failing that, a number of overt acts which include at least one act on the part of each conspirator, and the overt act(s) pleaded must be such as to show:

(a) that the conspiratorial agreement alleged against the defendants had been entered into by each and every one of them;

(b) that the agreement and not merely the intention of one person alone was implemented; and

(c) that such implementation caused the damages complained of.

(See Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2016 at paragraph 18/12/8)

14.  The formulation of cause of action should clearly and cogently be made in the pleadings.  It should not be left to an exercise of drawing inferences (see Pido v Compass Technology Co Ltd [2010] 2 HKLRD 537 at paragraph 25).

15.  However, the plaintiff wishes to highlight two points specifically for strike out applications under the “no reasonable cause of action” limb:-

(a) One only looks at the challenged pleading to see if a reasonable cause of action is disclosed, and this test is to be carried out on the assumption that the pleaded facts are true;

(b) The corollary is that so long as all the material facts constituting the cause of action have been pleaded, there is no scope to strike out simply because the pleaded facts are unlikely to be proved. It is the same thing to say that the claim must be impossible, not just improbable, to succeed before it may be struck out.

The plaintiff’s case

16.  The plaintiff and the 1^st defendant are the shareholders of the 4^thdefendant holding 35% and 65% of the shares respectively.  The 5^thdefendant was wholly owned by the 4^thdefendant.  Mr Raymond Wong is the person behind the plaintiff and the 2^nddefendant is the person behind the 1^stdefendant.  The 4^th and 5^th defendants would “supposedly hold (or had supposedly been holding)” 3 projects in Lushan, PRC.

17.  The crux of the plaintiff’s case is pleaded in paragraph 8 of the Statement of Claim as follows:-

“…the Plaintiff invites an inference that the 3 purported Lushan projects (or any of them) were and are not genuine investment projects. Rather they (or any of them) form part of a scheme engineered by the conspiracy of VC [the 3^rd defendant] and WHS [the 2^nd defendant], through the interposition of various corporate entities including King China [the 1^st defendant], the JV Companies [the 4^th defendant] and the JV Subsidiary [the 5^th defendant], to injure the Plaintiff. As a consequence, the Plaintiff claims for loss and damage arising out of such conspiracy…” (square brackets added)

18.  Paragraphs 9 to 25 of the Statement of Claim went on to plead details as to how the plaintiff invested in the 3 projects, ie the Lushan Hotel Project, the Kong Project and the Villas Project.

19.  The plaintiff places reliance on the demand from the plaintiff’s solicitors made to the 2^nd and 3^rd defendants to produce documentary evidence substantiating the alleged expenses of the 3 projects and to render accounts of the 4^thand 5^th defendants.  It is alleged that the 2^nd and/or 3^rddefendants refused to comply.

20.  The plaintiff went on to allege in paragraph 43 of the Statement of Claim (which is deleted in the draft Amended Statement of Claim) that:-

“As a result, the Plaintiff has no knowledge as to whether any of the Lushan Hotel Project, the Kong Project or the Villas Project were genuine projects or were actually carried out, and if so how any of them performed.”

21.  The plaintiff then in paragraph 44 of the Statement of Claim invites an inference to be drawn that the 3 projects were not genuine projects but were schemes engineered by the 2^nd and 3^rddefendants (through the interposition of corporate vehicles including the 1^st, 4^th and 5^thdefendants) to injure the Plaintiff.

22.  To support the alleged conspiracy, the plaintiff also relies on the matters pleaded in paragraphs 8, 13 to 14, 21, 34 to 40 and 42 of the Statement of Claim.

23.  The main relevant amendments in the draft Amended Statement of Claim are as follows:-

(a) Paragraph 43: the plaintiff deleted the suggestion that he had no knowledge as to whether any of the projects were genuine.

(b) Paragraph 44: It is now asserted positively that the projects were not genuine.  In particular, it is said that the scheme was corroborated by: (i) the refusal to render accounts and/or supporting documents: (ii) the refusal to procure the 4^th defendant (or the 5^thdefendant) to commence legal proceedings to recover the alleged expenses and disbursements against the PRC counterparties.

(c) Paragraph 45: Reliance is now placed on paragraphs 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 18 to 20, 22 to 26, 29 to 40 and 44 as the overt acts of the defendants.

Discussion

24.  The plaintiff’s cause of action is based on the tort of conspiracy to injure.  Unlike an unlawful means conspiracy, sole or predominant intention of injuring and/or causing loss of the plaintiff is required for this tort.  The alleged conspirators are not liable for conspiracy to injure if they did not act in order that the claimant should suffer damage but to pursue their own advantage (see Winfield & Jolowicz: Tort (19^th ed), paragraph 19-037 (pp 590-591) and also paragraphs 59-01 to 59-06, Bullen & Leake & Jacob’s Precedents of Pleadings, 17^th ed).

25.  However, I accept the defendants’ submission that there is no basis (as pleaded in the Statement of Claim) to suggest that the sole or predominant purpose on the defendants’ part were to injure the plaintiff rather than to pursue their own advantage (even if the plaintiff’s factual assertions were accepted).  The claim is therefore unsustainable on this basis alone.

26.  Moreover, the pleaded case is defective in that it fails to plead any particulars in relation to each defendant, namely it fails to identify each overt act relied upon for each defendant.  It is not clear at all as to which acts in the “engineering” of the relevant projects are alleged to be part of the conspiracy, and which part of the conspiracy is each defendant alleged to be part of.  These matters are crucial to the liability of each defendant for the tort.

27.  The suggestion that the projects “were not genuine” is only based on an inference that the court is asked to draw, and is contradicted by the plaintiff’s own evidence such as: the plaintiff went on a site visit to Lushan in April 2006 and had been provided with detailed scenario analysis and projects in respect of the Lushan Project; a hospitality management consultancy company had been consulted also for the Lushan Project; Vigers Appraisal and Consulting Ltd had been instructed to inspect the property in relation to be Villa Project.

28.  The proposed amendments in the draft Amended Statement of Claimin cannot cure the defects in the Statement of Claim.  Although it is now suggested that it is not merely an inference but as a matter of fact that the projects were not genuine, this is nothing but an assertion.  All the requisite elements have not been pleaded.  The overt act must show that the conspiratorial agreement (see Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering v Wheelock Marden & Co Ltd & Others [1994] 2 HKC 264). The matters pleaded in the Amended Statement of Claim have clearly failed to meet this fundamental requirement.

29.  It is one thing to say that there was mis-management or that the 2^nd defendant had refused to allow the plaintiff to access the relevant books, it is another thing to say that the 3 projects were “not genuine projects”.  One does not follow the other and there is clearly a quantum leap.  In fact, the plaintiff has been asked to identify the overt acts of each of the defendants at the hearing.  What the plaintiff could do is just to point out each of the paragraphs in the draft Amended Statement of Claim which mentions the names of the defendants, but those matters referred to in the paragraphs are not referring to any particular overt acts of each of the defendants.

30.  Moreover, the plaintiff had admitted in paragraph 43 of the original Statement of Claim that he has no knowledge as to whether any of the Lushan Hotel project, the Kong project or the Villas Project were genuine projects or were actually carried out, and if so how any of them performed.  Yet in the Draft Amended Statement of Claim, the plaintiff suddenly proposes to aver as a fact that these projects were not genuine projects.  If the plaintiff were to formally apply to amend its pleadings, it is difficult to see how he could sign the Statement of Truth.  The plaintiff may say that he acquired different knowledge at difficult times, but there must be basis to show how the different knowledge came about.

31.  The plaintiff also has difficulty to reconcile the internally inconsistent factual matters.  On the one hand, the plaintiff now wishes to assert as a fact that the three projects were not genuine projects.  On the other hand, the plaintiff suggested at paragraph 15 of the Draft Amended Statement of Claim that the 3^rddefendant had a stake in the Lushan Hotel Project and/or in the affairs of the 1^stdefendant, and was financially interested in the Lushan Hotel Project and/or in the affairs of the 1^stdefendant.  If that were the case, the implication would be that the project must be genuine.  If a project did not in fact exist, how could the 3^rddefendant have a stake in or be financially interested in the project or one of the shareholders behind the project?

32.  Paragraph 15 of the Draft Amended Statement of Claim is also untrue, as it is contradicted by an email dated 22 November 2006 from Mr Raymond Wong to the 3^rddefendant and Mr Philip Wong Kun To which contained, inter alia, a report prepared by Mr Raymond Wong for Spinnaker Capital Group, a potential investor in the Lushan Hotel Project.  The report includes a diagram showing the proposed structure of the Lushan Hotel Project, from which it can be clearly seen that the 2^nd and 3^rddefendants would be controlling shareholders of the 1^st defendant.  After this matter was pointed out to the plaintiff, the plaintiff backtracked and proposed a new paragraph 15, in which the plaintiff admitted this time that the 3^rddefendant had informed Mr Raymond Wong that he had an interest in the 1^stdefendant, and in which the plaintiff now avoids pleading whether he knew that the 3^rddefendant had a stake in the Lushan Hotel Project.

33.  Thus, although the plaintiff has proposed various amendments to its Statement of Claim to try to salvage its pleadings, the proposed amendments depart, without any explanation, from what had been previously pleaded.  The plaintiff may say that the facts that it now proposes to plead ought to be taken in its favour for the purposes of these strike out applications, but I have to bear in mind the way in which the plaintiff’s claim has been evolving over time, as and when confronted by the defendants over various matters.  This evolution makes it clear to me that the plaintiff’s claim against the defendants is desperate, and these proceedings are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, and/or an abuse of the process of the Court.  The plaintiff should not be permitted to carry on with these proceedings and the defendants ought not to be dragged into litigation in this way.

34.  Further, the issue in respect of no dominant intention to injure has not been addressed in the proposed amendments.

35.  In the premises, it is clear to me that the relevant cause of action in respect of the tort of conspiracy to injure has not been properly formulated and the Statement of Claim even with the proposed amendments is grossly insufficient and embarrassing, as there remains complete lack of clarity concerning the conspiracy/fraud alleged against the defendants.

36.  However, the plaintiff does not accept that it cannot rely on inference even though it has proposed to amend the Statement of Claim by making factual allegations.  The reasons advanced by the plaintiff are as follows:-

(a) Conspiracies by their nature are often concealed from the knowledge of the victim.  It is unrealistic to expect the victim to be able to plead (and prove) all facts pertaining to the conspiracy. Certain matters can only be determined by inference;

(b) In Yong Wend Chye v Ho Yu Kuen & Others (unreported, HCA 1303/2009, 17 March 2010), Master M Ng remarked that “in most cases where conspiracy is averred, it will be necessary to look at the overt acts as pleaded to see what inferences can be drawn as to the existence or otherwise of the alleged conspiratorial combination or agreement” (underline added);

(c) The learned Master further held that while it is true that fraud/conspiracy must be distinctly pleaded with utmost particularity and distinctly provided, and that it is not allowable to leave such pleas to be inferred from the facts, “one must also consider the practical reality of modern commercial life.  As submitted by Mr. Lam, fraud and/or conspiracy by their very nature are clandestine and difficult to uncover, so quite often proof is not readily obtained.  Hence, the averments of fraud and/or conspiracy cannot be too precise.  In an application to strike out a fraud/conspiracy claim, the court will look upon such application with care to the above considerations, but at the same time will bear in mind that loose allegations that are not properly particularized will be oppressive as regards the defendants when the action goes to trial.  The broad question for the court is whether from the facts as pleaded it can be argued that Ds sufficiently know the P’s case on the conspiratorial combination(s) or agreement(s) that they have to meet”;

(d) The plaintiff submits that this Court should adopt the same approach.  The Statement of Claim (and the draft Amended Statememt of Claim) clearly sets out the basis of the conspiracy – the plaintiff was lured into making substantial payments supposedly for investment projects that were not genuine.  The defendants would have no difficulty in knowing the case to meet;

(e) The present case is yet more peculiar because the conspiracy concerns defendants’ inaction.  Effectively the plaintiff is required to prove a negative, namely the funds were not applied towards the projects.  It is almost logically impossible to positively prove a negative, and it is unsurprising that the Court frequently relies on inferences where a negative averment is sought to be proved;

(f) As a consequence, the plaintiff submits that there is no legal prohibition from relying on inferences in the context of conspiracies and frauds, so long as those inferences are drawn from primary facts that have been proved up to the requisite standard.  If the law is otherwise, it would take an extreme case (eg a co-conspirator turning himself in) before a conspiracy claim can succeed;

(g) In the Statement of Claim (even without the proposed amendments), all the primary facts concerning the conspiracy have been fully pleaded.  Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to invite the Court to infer from those primary facts a conspiracy amongst the defendants to injure the plaintiff and the Statement of Claim is not defective in this regard.

37.  There is no problem with the above proposition of the law.  However, in our present case, one simply does not know what the plaintiff’s case is by reading the pleadings.  It is not clear what the fraud or conspiracy consists of.  It is alleged that the 3 projects were and are not genuine investment projects, but no one knows in what way these projects were or are not genuine. It is also not clear what each defendant did in the alleged conspiracy.  Such a bare allegation is simply not enough to plead a case based on conspiracy or fraud.

38.  As to the point about pleading intention to injure, the plaintiff submits that in paragraph 45 of the Statement of Claim (and also in the draft Amended Statement of Claim), it was pleaded that the conspiracy was carried out by the defendants “with the sole or predominant intention of injuring the Plaintiff and/or of causing loss to the Plaintiff by engineering a scheme regarding projects that were not genuine”.  This is a standard plea for conspiracy to injure claims (see Bullen & Leake & Jacob’s Precedents of Pleadings (17^th edition) paragraphs 59-02 to 59-03).  Thus, as a result, the Statement of Claim is not defective by failing to plead the requisite intention.

39.  The plaintiff also submits that taking the defendants’ point at the highest, it was no more than an assertion that it is unlikely (even improbable) for the plaintiff to be able to prove the requisite intention at trial, but this is not the correct test to be applied in a strike out application.  The Court must assume the pleaded facts in favour of the plaintiff.  Although the defendants rely on leading textbooks for the proposition that the conspirators are not liable for conspiracy to injure if they did not act in order that the claimant should suffer damage but to pursue their own advantage, and argues that there is no basis to suggest that the sole or predominant purpose on the defendants’ part were to injure the plaintiff rather than to pursue their own advantage (even if the plaintiff’s factual assertions are accepted).

40.  The plaintiff submits that this argument may be superficially attractive but legally incorrect as follows:-

(a) If the plaintiff’s factual assertions are accepted as true (which is the correct approach), then the plea concerning intention (which is a factual plea) must also be accepted as true.  One does not cherry-pick which pleas are assumed to be true.  In that case, the defendants’ point simply goes away;

(b) The principle that the conspirators are not liable for conspiracy to injure if they did not act in order that the claimant should suffer damage but to pursue their own advantage is irrelevant at best.  If the plaintiff had pleaded that the defendants intended to benefit themselves out of the conspiracy, it might provide justification for a strike out.  But as things now stand, the possibility of an alternative intention was never raised.  To put it bluntly, the fact that an unpleaded alternative intention is not “good enough” is irrelevant in determining whether the pleaded intention completes the cause of action;

(c) Of course, if it is the defendants’ case that they carried out the conspiracy with the intention to benefit themselves but not to injure the plaintiff, they are at complete liberty to plead it as a defence so that the 2 alternative intentions will become an issue for trial.

41.  However, these arguments of the plaintiff can only be valid if its case about the conspiracy or fraud has been clearly pleaded in the first place. As aforesaid, no such clear case has been pleaded and hence it is unclear what intention the plaintiff is relying on.  Thus, I accept that the lack of a specific plea of the alleged intention to injure is defective.

42.  As to the lack of particulars, the plaintiff submits that where a pleading is alleged to be defective only in not containing particulars to which the other side is entitled, an application should be made for further and better particulars and not for an order to strike out.  Even a serious want of particularity in a pleading may not justify striking-out if (a) the defect can be remedied and (b) the defect is not the result of a blatant disregard of court orders (see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2016, paragraph 18/19/6). However, the defendants never requested for particulars before applying to strike out.

43.  The plaintiff also submits that in any event, the draft Amended Statement of Claim has provided the requisite particulars on both the overt acts of the conspiracy and the conspiratorial agreement.  For overt acts, they lie in the fact that the projects were not genuine notwithstanding repeated contrary representations and assurances from the defendants.  One may ask rhetorically, if the defendants on numerous occasions asked the plaintiff to remit funds on the basis of investments into projects that were not genuine, how is it possible that those do not constitute overt acts of a conspiracy?

44.  As to the conspiratorial agreement, the plaintiff says that it has been sufficiently pleaded in the main body of the draft Amended Statement of Claim because the fingerprints of the defendants were all over the documents and correspondences.  As an obvious example, one may consider the resolution passed at a shareholders’ meeting of the 4^th defendant on 5 October 2006.  The meeting was attended by Mr Raymond Wong, and the 2^nd and 3^rd defendants, and it clearly showed the involvement of the natural persons involved.  For the corporate entities (the 1^st, 4^th and 5^th defendants), it has been pleaded that they have always been and still are under the 2^nddefendant’s control.  The involvement of the 3^rd defendant has been specifically particularized in paragraph 45 because he had less apparent connections with the corporate entities.

45.  Nevertheless, I do not accept the above submissions. It is clear to me that the alleged particulars identified by the plaintiff are not really particulars telling us what the conspiracy or fraud is and no overt acts of the defendants have been pleaded.  There is no need to seek further particulars first when the plaintiff’s case, which is based on conspiracy or fraud, is so unclear in the first place and no cause of action has been established.  The burden is on the plaintiff to plead such a case clearly with all the particulars first.  The defendants are entitled to apply for striking out forthwith when no such clear case has been pleaded. 

46.  The plaintiff also submits that the striking out applications are deployed as tactical makeshifts in that:-

(a) If the plaintiff’s case is true, it is understandable that the defendants are reluctant to prepare a Defence, still less to go through discovery.  They are unable to positively say that the projects were genuine (because once it reaches discovery their lies will be easily exposed by the lack of documents), but they cannot admit that the projects were false pretences;

(b) The only possibility open to the defendants is to attempt an audacious strike out, thereby stalling the preparation of the Defence and the discovery process.  To that end, it must be said that the defendants have achieved quite some success.  The action was commenced back in 2014 and the parties are still stuck with the Statement of Claim.  As to now no one really knows what case the defendants are planning to run – one does not even know whether the projects are alleged to be genuine;

(c) The strike out applications may also put pressure on the plaintiff when the parties attempt settlement so that more favourable terms may be extracted.

47.  It is therefore submitted by the plaintiff that the defendants were trying hard to dig up every conceivable pleading point in support of the strike out applications.  But the truth remains that the applications are opportunistic and entirely without merit.  This aspect may also be relevant to costs.

48.  I do not think that the ulterior motive of the defendants is relevant here.  The defendants have to show that the plaintiff’s pleading is so bad that it should be struck out, and I think they have shown that to be the case. Whether they have the ulterior motive as alleged by the plaintiff is neither here nor there.

Conclusion

49.  For the above reasons, I find that the defendants succeed in their striking out applications in that the claims based on conspiracy to injury must go. Part of the plaintiff’s claims against the 1^st, 2^nd, 4^th and 5^th defendants and all the claims against the 3^rd defendant should therefore be struck out.

50.  Although Mr Dawes SC has already identified which of the paragraphs in the Statement of Claim should be deleted, the plaintiff and the 3^rd defendant have not expressed their views yet.  I will give a chance to all the parties to work out the details as to which part of the Statement of Claim should be struck out based on my ruling.

51.  I therefore order as follows:-

(1) The plaintiff’s claims against all the defendants which are based on conspiracy to injure be struck out;

(2) The parties do within 14 days from the date of this decision submit to the court a joint statement on the specific parts of the Statement of Claim that should be deleted in view of my ruling that those claims based on conspiracy to injure be struck out;

(3) If the parties cannot agree on such a joint statement, the case be fixed for further hearing to resolve this matter; and

(4) Costs order nisi: the plaintiff do pay the defendants’ costs in respect of their striking out summonses with certificate for counsel to be assessed summarily on paper; the defendants do submit their Statements of Costs within 14 days from today; and the plaintiff do submit its Statement of Objection within 14 days thereafter.