KABA ABDOUL KARIM v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 2455/2020

[2026] HKCFI 3729

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2455 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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The application

1.  By my decision dated 26 January 2026, I refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”) dated 30 October 2020 which refused the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

2.  By a summons issued on 2 March 2026, the Applicant seeks an extension of time to appeal against my decision. As the 14-day appeal period under O.53, r.3(4) of the Rules of High Court expired on 9 February 2026, the Applicant is out of time in his intended appeal by 21 days. The delay is not insignificant.

3.  Prior to the hearing on 31 March 2026, by a letter dated 25 March 2026, the Applicant informed the Court that he had applied for legal aid and requested for the hearing to be adjourned for 3 months. I refused to vacate the hearing on the basis that the application for legal aid was made extremely late, and I lifted the legal aid stay in order for the hearing to proceed as scheduled. This is the same approach adopted in Azmat Ullah v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2023] HKCFI 3308 at [3].

4.  In the end the Court was informed by the Legal Aid Department on 4 June 2026 that the application for legal aid was refused. I will therefore proceed to deal with the application for leave to appeal based on the materials filed by the Applicant and his submissions at the hearing on 31 March 2026.

5.  The applicable principles are trite: the court shall have regard to (a) the length of the delay; (ii) the reasons for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if extension of time were granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226 and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346).

6.  The Applicant explained in the summons and the affirmation in support that the delay was caused by his illiteracy and the fact that he has no legal representation. I do not find the explanation satisfactory especially in view of the fact that the delay was for a full 3 weeks.

7.  As to the proposed grounds of appeal, the Applicant pointed out in the summons that paragraphs 8 and 9 of my decision missed his complaint about unfairness and procedural irregularity. He cross-referred to certain findings in the TCAB decision and essentially said that the TCAB’s decision to reject the Applicant’s evidence was unfair. The Applicant also complained that the TCAB Decision only discussed Country of Origin (“COI”) information on a “high-level overview” but did not use such COI to assess the objective credibility of the Applicant’s fears.

8.  At the hearing on 31 March 2026, the Applicant further submitted that the danger in his home country was still continuing.

9.  None of the proposed grounds has a reasonable prospect of success. As I explained in [5] of my decision, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the TCAB, and the Court may only interfere by way of judicial review if there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. Stripped to the core of the Applicant’s submissions, he was saying that the TCAB ought to have accepted his evidence and I erred in failing to overturn the issue for him. But there was no error; as I explained and held in [8-9], the conclusions reached by the TCAB were ones that it was fully entitled to reach, and I was (and still am) unable to discern any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality to justify intervention.

10.  As to the point about COI, it is clear that the TCAB was alive to the relevant materials (to which I cross-referred in [8] of my decision). What weight is to be placed on the COI and how it impacts on the credibility of the Applicant’s evidence are all matters for the TCAB. Again I was (and still am) unable to find any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality to justify intervention.

11.  In the premises, it would be pointless to extend time for the Applicant’s intended appeal. I therefore dismiss the application.