RE MIA AKASH

CACV 112/2026, [2026] HKCA 676

On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 777

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 112 OF 2026

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 67/2020)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is an appeal against the decision of B Fung J (“the Judge”)  given on 6 February 2026[1] (“the Leave Decision”)  refusing to grant leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”)  dated 3 January 2020[2] (“the Board’s Decision”)  dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 18 September 2019 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

2.  The applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the Board’s reasons in reaching the Board’s Decision have been set out therein at [29]-[77], as well as by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [3]-[4], which will not be repeated.

3.  After considering the documents filed by the applicant as well as the applicant’s oral submissions made at the hearing of the leave application, the Judge dismissed the application for the reasons stated at [5]-[10] of the Leave Decision.

Appeal to this court

4.  By a Notice of Appeal dated 10 February 2026, the applicant contended that the Judge failed to consider the leave application “properly”.  Without elaboration or particularising his complaints, the applicant stated that the Leave Decision was “unfair”.

5.  By written submissions dated 16 March 2026, the applicant repeated the matters stated in the Notice of Appeal, as well as making numerous broadbrush, unparticularised assertions such as: (i)  the Judge was “wrong as a matter of law” for not having applied “the principle of procedural unfairness”; (ii)  the Judge “did not [analyse his] claims properly”; and (iii)  the Judge’s decision “to refuse [his] appeal was unreasonable”.  The applicant emphasised that his “enemy” was still looking for him, and that his life would not be safe upon refoulement.

6.  We heard the appeal on 1 April 2026, at which the applicant appeared in person.  At the hearing, the applicant had nothing to add to the matters already stated in the papers filed for the appeal.   

Discussion

7.  As this court has often stated, an appeal to the Court of Appeal is not a fresh application for judicial review.  It is necessary to identify some error on the part of the judge that would justify this court in intervening: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].  The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.  An appeal is not the occasion for regurgitating arguments advanced and rejected by the judge or for running arguments which could and should have been raised but were not raised before the judge.  In the determination of an appeal, the Court of Appeal focuses on the decision of the judge and the court will only reverse that decision if an appellant could demonstrate that the judge made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court or was otherwise plainly wrong.

8.  The applicant has failed to identify any error on the part of the Judge and thus failed to raise any viable ground of appeal. The points advanced by the applicant were bare assertions unsupported by particulars or evidence.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].

9.  In the present case, the applicant claimed that if refouled, he (being a member of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party)  would be harmed or killed by members of the Awami League (“AL”)  by reason of his refusal to join the AL.  The Board, by reason of the material inconsistencies in his evidence, held that the applicant was unable to establish claims which were crucial to his case, such as the alleged assaults by AL members in the past (Board’s Decision, [43]-[46]).  In any event, the Board opined that there were suitable options of internal relocation available to the applicant, which would minimise the risks of harm, if any.  These were factual findings open to the Board on the evidence, and were sufficiently canvassed and considered by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [5]-[10].  We see no basis to interfere.  

10.  The applicant has failed to demonstrate how the Board had acted unlawfully or procedurally unfairly in reaching its Decision, or how such Decision could be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable.

11.  As we have noted, the applicant advanced no viable grounds of appeal against the Judge’s decision.  There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.