Tang Kwan Hop v. Fung Kam Shing and Others

HCPI256,182,183&184/2001

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. 256 OF 2001

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J U D G M E N T

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Background

1. There are four suits presently falling to be determined by way of assessment of damages pursuant to an order of Master B Kwan dated 20 September 2001 that there be interlocutory judgment against the three defendants in all four suits, with damages to be assessed and costs to be taxed.

2. Following another order of Master B Kwan dated 8 March 2002, assessment of damages in all four actions was ordered to be tried together.

3. It can be seen from the documentation that after the issue of the writ in each case, there was hardly any participation from the defence.

4. These fatal accident claims arose out of a tragic accident at sea involving two pleasure vessels on 10 January 1999. The 1st defendant was the owner and master of a speedboat and the 2nd defendant was the master of another pleasure vessel, a cruiser, that was at the material time owned by the 3rd defendant. The 2nd defendant was the 3rd defendant's employee. Following a collision between these two pleasure crafts, four otherwise healthy young men, ranging in age from 25 to 30, sadly met their demise. These actions were instituted by their respective administratrices.

HCPI256/2001

5. I turn first of all to deal with the assessment High Court HCPI No. 256/2001.

6. The plaintiff in this action is the widow of the deceased, Wong Chi-wah, who was aged 30 at the time of the accident and death. He was born on 12 April 1968. The evidence disclosed that he had otherwise enjoyed a full working life and reasonable health. He did not appear to have any vice to speak of. There are no children from the union of the plaintiff and the deceased.

7. At the time of his death, the deceased was a clerk in a warehouse earning a basic salary of $7,000 per month, with an overtime pay of $22 per hour. He was also entitled to $200 per month as diligent bonus. These figures are amply supported by the documentation. The evidence also disclosed that the deceased was a hardworking individual who often worked overtime, if necessary even on Sundays.

8. Except for a period when he was laid off in about June 1998 he was in continuous employment. When he was retrenched he was paid $58,770.50. This amount covered his salary to date and severance payments from his former employer. The Kwong On Bank passbook refers.

9. Mr Tsui, counsel for the plaintiff, was able to demonstrate that the average monthly salary of the deceased for the last three months was $9,560. This was an average of the salaries for the months of November 1998, December 1998 and finally January 1999, respectively $9,560, $9,945 and $9,176.

10. It can be seen from the papers that in the months leading up to and ending with November 1998 the salary of the deceased was lower. Mr Tsui conceded that for the first few months the salary of the deceased was hovering in the region of less than $8,000 per month, except for October 1998 which was marginally higher. Since November 1998 there was a general increment in the remuneration of the deceased.

11. It has been submitted that one should adopt the last three months' salary as providing a more realistic basis for determining the earnings of the deceased. This I accept.

12. Mr Tsui further submits that it is not unlikely that the deceased but for his death would have worked until the age of 65. There is no evidence to contradict that and I similarly adopt this scenario as being not improbable.

13. In assessing the notional income of the deceased at the time of the hearing, it was suggested that an 8 per cent annual increment should be adopted and this despite the general downturn in the economy. Whilst one would be slow to generally adopt such an approach, given the economic doldrum in which much of the world finds itself, in the particular circumstances of this case the general rise in the income of the deceased prior to his death would lend some support for this submitted approach.

14. Mr Tsui referred to two authorities as indicative of the courts' approach to applying notional increases. These are Kwan Yau Tai v Eng Kong Container Services Limited, HCPI No. 1238 of 1996, where an annual increment of 8 per cent was used; and Ho Wun Chau v Chan Chuk Mui, [1997] 3 HKC 666 (10 per cent annual increment was allowed). These cases are not on all fours with the instant facts.

15. I am however satisfied that an 8 per cent annual increase of income should be adopted in this case by dint of the fact that there had indeed been salary increases prior to the death of the deceased, despite the generally dismal economy.

16. The notional income of the deceased at trial would therefore be:

$9,560 x 108% (January 2000) x 108% (January 2001) x 108% (January 2002) x 104% (July 2002, i.e. half a year from January 2002) = $12,525.

17. One would note that a lower percentage of 104% was adopted to reflect the half-yearly figures for 2002. The pre-trial median income of the deceased therefore works out at $11,043, being $9,560 + $12,525 ÷ 2.

18. The deceased left as dependants his mother, Lau Sau-ying, who was aged about 59 or 60 at the time of his death, having been born in 1941; his father, Wong Hing-fung, aged between 67 and 68 at the time of his death, having been born in 1932; and finally the widow, Leung Mei-kuen, who was aged 32 at the time of the deceased's death, having been born on 18 August 1967.

19. In determining the value of their respective dependencies, one would have to look at such matters as the family outgoings. These came to $13,523 monthly and consisted of the following:

Mortgage	$7,862.00
Rates	$333.00
Management fees	$328.00
Electricity bill	$450.00
Telephone bill	$300.00
Water bill	$100.00
Gas bill	$150.00
Food	$3,000.00
Grocery expenses	$1,000.00
Total	$13,523.00

It is readily observable that this monthly joint family outgoings exceeded the deceased's earnings even at his higher salary point prior to his death.

20. The deceased was a dutiful son and a responsible husband. He was responsible for the family expenditure as indicated. The respective shares of the plaintiff widow and the deceased of the family expenditure would each be $6,761.50, being $13,523.00 ÷ 2. I would therefore assess the widow's dependency to be $6,761.50 per month at the time of death.

21. The dependency of the elderly parents of the deceased is a simple matter. The evidence revealed that his parents received $500 per month each from the deceased. It is accepted that in the circumstances of this case the dependency of the parents would continue for the rest of their natural lives at $500 per month each. No higher figure has been suggested.

Median Pre-trial Dependency

22. Mr Tsui accepts that the widow's dependency fixed at $6,761.50 per month would unlikely have increased in the pre-trial period. The basis for that would seem to be that the deceased's income was insufficient to meet all the outgoings and any shortfall would have to be made up from savings he had acquired by putting away his severance pay and the pay that he had received from his former employers. Such sums are of course finite and would eventually be used up.

23. For loss of dependency, a number of cases has been cited as indicative of appropriate multipliers. The deceased was aged 30 when he died. It was suggested that a multiplier of 15 in determining loss of accumulation of wealth would be appropriate. Three cases were cited. They were:

(1)	Wan Dan Nei v Dragages et Travaux Publics and Penta-Ocean Construction Company Limited [2000] 4 HKC 116. The deceased aged 40 was given a multiplier of 14;
(2)	Ho Wun Chau v Chan Chuk Mui [1997] 3 HKC 666. The deceased was aged 34 and a multiplier of 14 was adopted;
(3)	Dall v Choy Ying Wai, No. 2 [1999] 1 HKC 544. The deceased was aged 33 and a multiplier of 15 was adopted.

24. I have no quarrel with a multiplier of 15 for the deceased. Similarly, in respect of the 1st plaintiff, the mother and the father, the multipliers suggested for them I too consider them to be appropriate in the circumstances of this case. More specifically, a multiplier of 15 was urged for the widow.

25. Counsel referred to:

(1)	Ho Wun Chau v Chan Chuk Mui (supra), where the widow aged 37 was awarded a multiplier of 14;
(2)	Leung Siu Chun v China State Construction Engineering Corporation referred to in Ho Wun Chau v Chan Chuk Mui, where the widow was aged 32 and a multiplier of 14 was applied; and
(3)	Lau Suk Fong v Wong Fat Kwong [1995] 3 HKC 394, where the widow was aged 35 and a multiplier of 14 was adopted.

26. Turning to the mother, I adopt, as suggested by counsel, a multiplier of 12 upon the basis of:

(1)	Lau Suk Fong v Wong Fat Kwong (supra);
(2)	Cheng Yuk Siu v Registrar General [1990] 2 HKC 531; and
(3)	Ho Wun Chau v Chan Chuk Mui (supra).

27. A multiplier of eight was submitted as appropriate for the father. In arriving at this multiplier counsel referred to:

(1)	Chan Yuk Yin v Chan Cheung Wan [1990] 1 HKC 476; and
(2)	Liu Kang Fun v Tsui Wai Ping 363 of 1999.

I consider a multiplier for the father fixed at 8 being appropriate.

Pre-trial Loss of Dependency

28. The trial date was 29 July 2002, just two days previous. Counsel accepted that on the evidence disclosed there was a clear deficiency of $4,480 between the pre-trial median income of the deceased of $11,043 and the monthly expenditure made up of $13,523 for housekeeping, $1,000 for the parents in total and $1,000 which the deceased used exclusively for himself. That deficiency, as we have observed, was made up from savings.

29. The credit balance of the Standard Chartered Bank stood at $51,425.97 as at 3 December 1998. I have noted that the savings would have been depleted over time to make up for the shortfall. In fact, on the evidence that would have come about after some 11 and a half months. This period is determined by dividing $51,425.97 by $4,480. It is accepted by counsel that the plaintiff's dependency would have been reduced some 11.5 months after the death of her husband.

30. Adopting an annual increase of 8 per cent, it seems clear that the deceased's income would have risen to $15,778 at the end of 3 years. That amount would be sufficient to meet all his outgoings. This sum, counsel suggests, should be worked out as follows:

$12,525 (notional income at trial) x 108% x 108% x 108% = $15,778.

I accept this calculation as appropriate and correct.

31. The evidence therefore discloses that there would be a period of 24.5 months, i.e. 36 months less 11.5 months when the plaintiff would have had to reduce her dependency on the deceased until he would have attained a stronger financial position.

32. It is further submitted that one could assume that half of the dependency would be reduced producing a sum of $3,381 ($6,761.50 ÷ 2). This figure will be taken as the dependency of the widow.

33. For the first 11.5 months after the accident, there would be full dependency:

$13,523 x 50% x 11.5 months = $77,757.

34. For the next 24.5 months, dependency would be reduced by half, i.e.:

$13,523 x 50% ÷ 2 x 24.5 months = $82,828.

35. For the period after that up to trial, there should be full dependency when one takes into account the general rise in salary and the earning potential of the deceased. Accordingly:

$13,523 x 50% x (43.5 months - 11.5 months - 24.5 months) = $50,711.

36. Turning to the mother, as noted the deceased's savings would have been depleted after 11.5 months had he not died. It is accepted by Mr Tsui that the pre-trial dependency of the mother would have ended after 11.5 months and would again continue when the deceased's financial position strengthened. Hence, her dependency for the 11.5 months would be $500 x 11.5 months. That produces a figure of $5,750.

37. On the basis that the deceased's income would have strengthened some three years from the date of the accident, had he survived, maintenance of $500 per month to the mother would have continued. Accordingly, for the balance of dependency for the mother in the pre-trial period, I would adopt the figure suggested of:

$500 per month x (43.5 months - 3 x 12 months) = $3,750.

The mother's total dependency pre-trial would therefore be $9,500.

38. As the father would benefit under the same circumstances and in the same quantum of $500 per month, I also assess, using the same approach, his pre-trial dependency at $9,500.

Post-trial loss of dependency

39. The widow is entitled to the sum of $922,945. This works out as follows:

$13,523 x 50% x (15 x 12 - 43.5) = $922,945.

40. I have hitherto assessed the notional income at trial of the deceased to be $12,525 per month. Adopting the multiplier of 12 for the mother, and a multiplicand of $500 per month, I assess her post-trial loss of dependency at $68,250, i.e. (15 x 12 - 43.5 months x $500).

41. As for the father's loss, the multiplicand being $500 per month, and the multiplier being eight years' purchase, I assess his future loss at $26,250. That is computed as follows: $500 x (8 x 12 - 43.5 months).

42. As for bereavement, I award the sum of $150,000.

Loss of accumulation of wealth

43. Counsel rightly pointed out that on the authority of Lam Pak Chiu v Tsang Mei Ying [2000] 2 HKC 1, one no longer needs to demonstrate a clear saving pattern before an award can be made under this head. In this case, the court has had no difficulty at all, owing to the frugal and diligent nature of the deceased.

44. It was submitted that the deceased should have been able to accumulate savings as his financial position improved. That would seem to be beyond doubt, the court having adopted an annual increment of 8 per cent in assessing his earning potential. It was further submitted that the deceased should have been able to save a minimum of $500 each month on the evidence. That seems probable. Upon that basis, he should have been in a position to accumulate $72,000, i.e. $500 per month x (15 x 12 - 12 x 3).

45. Assuming that he would have worked until the age of 65, following the discharge of his mortgage obligations, his savings potential would have been further strengthened. Mortgage payments were $7,862 monthly. It is conceded that not all the money he would otherwise have expended on mortgage repayments would have been available for saving. A lesser monthly sum of $5,000, it is said, ought to be considered as likely to be free for accumulation. This submission I accept. He should therefore be able to accumulate an additional sum of $75,000 over 15 years, i.e. $5,000 per month x 15 years' purchase.

46. The total figure for loss of accumulation of wealth is $72,000 + $75,000 = $147,000.

Funeral expenses

47. A sum of $158,000 has been claimed, but only a small portion, or $43,583, is covered by receipts. Oral evidence was given in this regard. I am prepared to allow no more than $100,000 under this head.

48. In summary, I award as follows:

(1)	Loss of dependency pre-trial
		The plaintiff	$211,296
		The mother	$9,500
		The father	$9,500
		TOTAL:	$230,296
(2)		Post-trial loss of dependency
		The plaintiff	$922,945
		The mother	$68,250
		The father	$26,250
		TOTAL:	$1,017,445
(3)		Bereavement	$150,000
(4)		Loss of accumulation of wealth	$147,000
(5)		Funeral Expenses	$100,000

49. There shall be interest at suitor's fund rate from the deceased's death on the award for bereavement. Pre-trial dependency award attracts interest at half judgment rate from the date of death to the date of judgment and thereafter at judgment rate until full payment. Special damages shall attract interest at half judgment rate from the date of death to the date of judgment and thereafter at judgment rate until payment.

50. Lastly, I award costs to the plaintiff for this assessment, including any costs that may have been reserved to date in this suit, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for counsel.

HCPI182/2001

51. The deceased, aged 25 at the time of the accident and death, having been born on 28 May 1973, left behind a young widow. There are no children of the family. The evidence disclosed that the deceased was enjoying good health and was employed as a senior tradesman at a basic monthly salary of $12,263.

52. For his marriage, he had borrowed from the MTR a sum of money. At the time of his death, he was repaying that loan every month. The loan repayment in this respect was $1,000 per month. In addition, he was also contributing to the credit union at work $300 a month.

53. Both he and his wife were actively engaged in volunteer work under the auspices of the Social Welfare Department. The widow gave evidence in pursuit of the various claims in the suit.

54. The deceased was entitled to various allowances from his employment. On average, his net monthly income was $12,453 as disclosed from the papers. This is taken from his salary details between the months of January and December 1998. He died on 10 January 1999. It has been urged that I should disregard the salary payment for that month as not being truly representative of his earning ability at that time. This I am willing to do.

55. In calculating the notional income of the deceased at trial, Mr Tsui invited me to consider applying an 8 per cent annual increment as being appropriate to fairly reflect his earning capacity. I accede to this approach. The evidence demonstrated that the deceased was a hardworking and frugal individual. I shall latterly refer to the fact that he and his wife were jointly putting away a total of $4,000 a month into an account with the Bank of Communications.

56. From the evidence it is clear that between the months of December 1997 and December 1998 his basic salary had increased by some 15.8 per cent. This is worked out as follows: the total salary from December 1997 and December 1998 inclusive divided by $10,587. Adopting an 8 per cent annual increment in salary, the notional income of the deceased at trial would have been: $12,453 x 108% (January 2000) x 108% (January 2001) x 108% (January 2002) x 104% (July 2002, a six-month period from January 2002) = $16,315.

57. The pre-trial notional median income of the deceased is therefore, $14,384, i.e. ($12,453 + $16,315) ÷ 2.

58. The deceased left behind as dependants, the plaintiff, his widow, Madam Chan Ching Li, aged 22 at the time of the deceased's death; his mother, Chan Mui, born 26 February 1943, and aged 55 at the time of his death; and finally, his natural father, Li Kam Sen, born 1929 and aged 69 at the time of his death.

59. In assessing the dependency claims in this case, it would be necessary to take into account the outgoings of the family. At the time of the deceased's death he was residing with his widow, his parents and his two brothers. Their monthly combined family expenses for the household amounted to $8,550, particulars of which have been set out in the plaintiff's statement which the plaintiff adopted as being true and correct when she testified.

60. The evidence further disclosed that the deceased contributed $4,500 a month towards the family expenses whilst his two siblings paid the balance. The share of each family member in the combined household expenses of $8,550 can be determined by dividing that sum by the number of heads in the family, i.e. six. This produces a figure of $1,425 per person. The siblings of the deceased were not his dependants.

61. The average rate of dependency of the widow and his parents at the time of the deceased's demise amounted to $1,150 each, being [$4,500 (contribution to housekeeping expenses) - ($4,500 (for food) ÷ 6) -($1,800 (rental) ÷ 6)] ÷ 3 dependants.

62. Having accepted that it would be just to apply an annual rate of increase of 8 per cent to arrive at the deceased's notional earnings at trial, the monthly worth of each dependant at trial in July 2002 would be $1,150 x 108% x 108% x 108% x 104% = $1,507. The median pre-trial dependency is therefore $1,328.50 or [$1,150 + $1,507] ÷ 2.

Loss of dependency

63. Different multipliers would have to be adopted for the three dependants in this case. As for the deceased, aged 25, able-bodied and who could have been expected to work well into his 60s, I shall adopt a multiplier of 16 as submitted by Mr Tsui. He made reference in this regard to Leung Yuet Han v Lee Heung Toi HCA No. 3549 of 1982 (deceased aged 25, multiplier 16) and Yau Wong Fui v Winning Fire Engineering Limited, PI No. 110 of 1996 (deceased aged 23, multiplier of 16). This multiplier will be used to assess the loss of accumulation of wealth.

64. As far as the widow is concerned, she was aged 22 at the relevant time. I adopt a multiplier of 16 upon the basis of Leung Siu Chun v China State Construction Engineering Corporation, HCA No. 4704 of 1990 (widow aged 29, multiplier of 14 adopted) and Mohammad Hanifa v Wong Chi Tat, HCA No. 6238 of 1988 (widow aged 32, multiplier of 15 taken).

65. In respect of the mother's dependency claim, she being aged 55, I consider that a multiplier of 13 is apt: see Ho Wun Chau v Chan Chuk Mui [1997] 3 HKC 666 (parents' age 59 and 58, multiplier of 12 used).

66. As far as the father's claim is concerned, I would adopt a lower multiplier of 6, he being aged 69 to 70 at the material time. This multiplier was submitted by Mr Tsui by reference to the case of Chan Yuk Yin v Chan Yuk Bing, HCA No. 7911 of 1988 (where a multiplier of 6 was used in respect of a 69 year old dependant).

Pre-trial loss of dependency

67. A multiplicand for all three dependants, namely the plaintiff widow, the mother and the father, of $1,328.50 will be used. In each case I shall award pre-trial loss of dependency of $57,790, being $1,3528.50 x 43.5 months. The value of their dependencies in the period up to the date of the trial is identical.

Post-trial loss of dependency

68. Again, I would adopt a multiplicand in each case of $1,507. I have previously explained how this figure was arrived at. The plaintiff widow is therefore entitled for post-trial loss of dependency to a sum of $223,790, being $1,507 x (16 x 12 - 43.5 months). The mother is awarded $169,538, i.e. $1,507 x (13 x 12 - 43.5 months). Finally, the father will be paid the amount of $42,950 as damages under this particular head. His award is calculated thus: $1,507 x (6 x 12 - 43.5).

Damages for bereavement

69. A sum of $150,000 as claimed is awarded under this head.

Loss of accumulation of wealth

70. There is ample evidence of the saving ability of the deceased. Both he and his widow were careful with their money and they have demonstrated an ability to save. The documentation relating to the Bank of Communications deposits showed that the deceased was able to save $3,000 each month. In addition, the deceased regularly contributed $300 a month by way of saving to the Co-operative Society at work.

71. Looking at a minimum quantum of saving, as demonstrated on the evidence, I adjudge and find that the deceased was able to set aside $3,300 each month at least. The loss of accumulation of wealth can therefore be calculated using this figure of $3,300 a month in part as multiplicand. Thus $3,300 x 16 years' purchase x 12 = $633,600.

72. We have referred to the fact that the deceased was repaying a marriage loan that he had secured from his employers, the MTR Corporation. That eventually would be repaid. The monthly repayment was $1,000 at the time of his death. It has been suggested that a minimum of at least half that amount, i.e. $500, could also be applied towards savings. This I am willing to accept.

73. Accordingly, to the sum of $633,600 must be added the following figure of $84,000. This sum of $84,000 is made up as follows: $500 x (16 x 12 - 24). Total damages for loss accumulation of wealth therefore amount to $717,600, i.e. $633,600 + $84,000.

74. That is not the end of the matter of course as this particular suit involves the element of provident fund. The evidence shows that 2.5 per cent of the basic salary of the deceased was deducted monthly as his contribution towards his provident fund.

75. The pre-trial notional median income of the deceased was assessed at $14,384. Upon the basis of provident fund contribution of 2.5 per cent, the pre-trial contribution made by the deceased would have been $14,384 x 2.5% x 43.5 months = $15,643. The MTR Corporation would have to make an identical contribution so a further sum in a similar amount would have to be factored in in calculating the value of the provident fund to him at the time he retires, pre-interest.

76. In summary, the provident fund contribution from the deceased and his employers would have amounted to $15,643 x 2 = $31,286.

77. I have previously accepted that the notional income of the deceased at trial would have been $16,315. This is the multiplicand I shall adopt for the purpose of calculating damages for post-trial loss of accumulation of wealth under the head of provident fund. Thus: [$16,315 x 2.5% (the deceased's contribution) + $16,315 x 2.5% (the MTR Corporation's contribution)] x [16 x 12 months - 43.5 months] = $121,139.

78. The total amount claimed for loss of accumulation of wealth in terms of provident fund entitlement would be $152,425. This amount would have to be added to the sum of $707,600 previously assessed as the loss of accumulation of wealth from savings, making a total of $870,025.

Funeral expenses

79. A sum of $102,000 has been claimed under this head of damage. However, not all receipts were supplied. The documentary evidence supports only an amount of $32,480. However, the oral testimony of the plaintiff was to the effect that she had spent on several other items totalling some $9,200. She was not able to give much detail beyond that.

80. In this case, there being a vast difference between the claimed amount and the supported amount, it would neither be fair nor just to simply award the plaintiff the amount claimed without the necessary documentary support.

81. I consider that the plaintiff's evidence was coherent. She tried her best to adumbrate the items of expenses. I do not think that she has exaggerated any of the figures advanced. She came across as being patently candid. I am prepared to award an amount slightly over the receipted expenses. I award a sum of $70,000 under this head.

82. In summary, I award as follows:

(1)	Loss of dependency pre-trial
		The plaintiff	$57,790
		The mother	$57,790
		The father	$57,790
	There shall be interest at half judgment rate on these sums from the date of death to the date of judgment (43.5 months) and thereafter at judgment rate until full payment.
(2)	Post-trial loss of dependency
		The plaintiff	$223,790
		The mother	$169,538
		The father	$42,950
(3)		Bereavement	$150,000
		There shall be interest thereon at the interest rate on suitor's fund from the date of the deceased's death until full payment.
(4)		Loss of accumulation of wealth	$870,025
(5)		Funeral Expenses	$70,000
		There shall be interest on this amount of $70,000 at half judgment rate from the date of the deceased's death to the date hereof, i.e. 43.5 months and thereafter at full judgment rate until payment.

83. I award the plaintiff the costs of this assessment, to be taxed if not agreed, against the defendants, including any costs that may have been reserved to date in this suit and certificate for counsel.

HCPI183/2001

84. The deceased in this suit died at the age of 26. He was unmarried and had no children. He was born on 8 July 1972. At the time of the accident on 10 January 1999, the deceased was a self-employed vehicle driver, earning a net monthly profit of $20,000. He had hitherto enjoyed good health. The plaintiff, his mother, was financially independent of the deceased.

85. The principal head of claim in this case is that for loss of accumulation of wealth. Although it is clear on the authority of Lam Pak Chiu v Tsang Mei Ying [2001] 2 HKC 1, that a clear saving pattern is no longer a prerequisite to founding a claim for damages for loss of accumulation of wealth, the evidence in this case clearly indicates that the deceased had surplus funds in excess of his needs.

86. It was the plaintiff's evidence that the deceased had given her $6,000 a month which she put away as savings. Her evidence was that she regarded it as her own savings. Be that as it may, even in the absence of sufficient evidence of spending habits and recurrent expenditure of the deceased, there would come a time, had the deceased not died, when he would have considered taking on other responsibilities, for example, marriage to the girlfriend with whom he was living at the time of his death. Had the deceased not made monthly contributions of $6,000 to his mother, such amount would have been freely available for his own use.

87. He was turning a not insubstantial profit of $20,000 a month. I have been invited to consider that the deceased should have been able to save at least $6,000 monthly.

88. It is clear that the plaintiff was employed and earning a salary at the time of the accident and since. She was drawing a salary of $11,500 a month and clearly did not require the support of her deceased son, let alone the monthly contribution of $6,000 per month. The witness statement of the plaintiff mother confirmed that the deceased was a frugal individual. There is no evidence to contradict her and I accept it as a fact for the purpose of this assessment.

89. The deceased was the owner of a private car which he had acquired by securing a loan. That loan was fully repaid by September 1998 before his death. The vehicle was sold for $50,000. That much is shown on the evidence. Whilst repayment for the car was ongoing, he was repaying $3,442 a month. Upon the discharge of the loan that amount would have fallen free for his disposal as he wished. I am prepared to accept and do accept that the deceased could have, had he lived, saved $6,000 per month minimum. That is the multiplicand that I adopt for assessing damages for loss of accumulation of wealth.

90. I would use a multiplier of 16 in view of the age and health of the deceased, see:

(1)	Leung Yuet Han v. Lee Heung Toi, HCA No. 8190 of 1983; deceased aged 25, 16 years' purchase used;
(2)	Yau Wong Fui v Winning Fire Engineering Limited, HCPI No. 110 of 1996; deceased aged 23, multiplier of 16 adopted; and
(3)	Lee Yuet Ling v Kwan Kwing Kai, HCA No. 3910 of 1991; deceased aged 26, 16 years' purchase adopted.

91. Damages under this head therefore are assessed at $1,152,000, i.e., $6,000 x 16 years' purchase x 12 months.

Bereavement

92. Bereavement would attract an award of $150,000 as claimed.

Funeral Expenses

93. There was some confusion in this regard. Mr Tsui for the plaintiff did his valiant best to sort matters out to assist the court. There was in particular a document in Chinese where the figure written on it was quite indecipherable. That appears under divider C, at page 20 of the bundle of documents.

94. Having looked at the figures and the documents again, I am prepared to award the amount claimed in this case of $113,000. I am satisfied that the plaintiff has provided sufficiently clear evidence on which to base this amount. That is the sum I adjudge to be payable under this head.

Conclusion

95. In summary I award as follows:

(1)	Loss of accumulation of wealth	$1,152,000
(3)	Bereavement	$150,000
	This carries interest at the interest rate for suitor's fund from the date of the deceased's death until full payment.
(5)	Funeral Expenses	$113,000
	There shall be interest at half judgment rate on this amount from the date of death to the date of judgment (43.5 months) and thereafter at full judgment rate until payment thereof.

96. The plaintiff shall have her costs of this assessment including any costs reserved in respect of the suit, if any, to be taxed if not agreed. There shall be certificate for counsel.

HCPI184/2001

97. The deceased, Chan Ka Lun, was the second oldest of the four men killed in the boating accident. He was aged 29 at the time of his death. He remained unmarried and had no children. He was born on 26 December 1969. At the time of the accident and death he worked as a self-employed truck driver with a monthly net income of $23,000 on average. He had enjoyed good health.

98. The deceased had fully paid up a car loan by the time he died. The loan repayment was $8,000 a month. With the end of this financial obligation, his net income, but for the accident, would have increased to about $30,000 per month from February 1999.

99. Mr Tsui submits that the deceased could have been expected to work until the age of 65. There is no evidence to suggest otherwise and I accept this submission.

Loss of accumulation of wealth

100. According to the witness statement of the plaintiff, the deceased contributed on average $13,000 monthly towards the family expenditure. Such contributions would be used partly towards housekeeping expenses and partly for paying off a mortgage on a property which the family had acquired in the deceased's sister's name. It is clear that this property, which has been left vacant, was regarded as the family home for mother and her children, although title was taken in the name of the daughter.

101. The plaintiff mother explained in reference to a bank passbook certain items which she had encircled. Those amounts she attributed as having emanated from the deceased. She was asked why it was that she had bothered to mark them off from the other entries. She explained that those were the sums that the deceased had given her. The notations served as aide-memoire for the eventuality that the deceased might at some future time ask for financial assistance or the return of the money. Those amounts can therefore be regarded as sums saved for and on behalf of the deceased.

102. The total family expenditure amounted to $9,550 as set out in the witness statement of the plaintiff. It covered items from rental, food to the usual utilities.

103. There were four individuals living at home. The combined family expenditure of $9,550 will have to be divided by four to assess the notional amount attributable to each of those enjoying the household expenses. That produces a figure of $2,388, i.e. $9,550 ÷ 4.

104. It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the deceased should have minimum savings of $5,612 per month. This, I understand, was upon the assumption that the deceased would have been responsible for the whole of the mortgage repayments as well as payment of his own share of the family expenses. This submission I accept.

105. This amount of $5,612 is arrived at by deducting from his average monthly contribution to the family of $13,000, the sum of $2,388 (his own share of the household expenses) and $5,000 (mortgage repayments).

106. Counsel further referred to:

((1)	Wan Dan Nei v Dragages et Travaux Publics and Penta-Ocean Construction Company Limited [2000] 4 HKC 116 (deceased aged 40, multiplier of 14 used);
(2)	Ho Wan Chau v Chan Chuk Mui, [1997] 3 HKC 666 (deceased aged 34, 14 years' purchase was used); and
(3)	Dall v Choy Ying Wai (No. 2) [1999] 1HKC 544 (a multiplier of 15 was adopted for the deceased aged 33).

107. I am persuaded by counsel that a multiplier of 15 is appropriate for this case. This is applied to a multiplicand of $5,612 as explained earlier. Thus, loss of accumulation of wealth computes to $1,010,160 or $5,612 x 15 x 12.

Funeral Expenses

108. Counsel conceded that the costs of the vegetarian meal for mourners should not be allowed on the authorities. $86,300 worth of expenses under this head of claim are supported by receipts. The plaintiff testified that the amount paid to Yuen Yuen Institute of $6,000 was not for beverage but for a resting place for the deceased. She also explained that $12,000 was spent on the religious ceremony for her son.

109. Her evidence also supports an additional claim of $90,000 as the documentation and her evidence confirm that the deceased's remains would have to be disinterred some eight or ten years down the road. That would incur this additional expense as she explained.

110. Under this head I am prepared to and do allow $200,000 in total.

Summary

111. In summary, I award as follows:

(1)	Loss of accumulation of wealth	$1,010,160
(3)	Bereavement	$150,000
	Interest on this sum at the usual rate on suitor's fund from the date of the deceased's death.
(5)	Funeral Expenses	$200,000
	On one half of this amount, there shall be interest at half judgment rate from the date of death to the date of judgment (43.5 months) and thereafter at full judgment rate full payment. On the remaining half there shall be interest at judgment rate from today.

112. The plaintiff is additionally entitled to the costs of the assessment with certificate for counsel. Such costs are to be taxed, if not agreed, and are to include any costs that may have been reserved in respect of this suit.