RASHID MD HARUNER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5136 · HCAL 770/2025
Court of First Instance
HCAL 770/2025
[2026] HKCFI 5136
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 770 OF 2025
BETWEEN
| |Rashid Md Haruner |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 27 March 2025, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 31 October 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2025/HCAL00
0770_2025_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement
protection in Hong Kong failed on all the applicable grounds under the
Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Accordingly, the Board
affirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”)
dated 24 May 2024, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement
claim.
The applicant’s case
3. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision,
which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
4. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if
refouled to Bangladesh, he feared harm from members of Awami League
(“AL”), but not anyone in particular, due to his support for and
connections with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”). The
applicant claimed that he was asked to quit BNP and join AL, but he
refused. He was once threatened to be killed for his refusal.
Late application
5. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
6. However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 27 March 2025, which was more
than 4 months after the Board’s Decision (made on 31 October 2024).
The applicant was hence late for more than one month in making the
Leave Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any
good reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave
Application.
7. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
8. The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and
provided no explanation for the delay when he filed the Leave
Application.
9. At the oral hearing before this court on 3 September 2026, the
applicant explained that he did not receive the letter from the
Immigration Department or the Board. He only came to know that his
appeal/petition was rejected by the Board when he reported to the
Immigration Department on 26 September 2025, and he made the Leave
Application the following day.
10. However, this could not be true. As aforesaid, albeit late, the Leave
Application was filed on 27 March 2025, which was half a year before
the applicant allegedly came to know about the Board’s Decision on 26
September 2025. The applicant only changed his story to say that he
came to know about the Board’s Decision on 27 March 2025 when this
court pointed out to him that he filed the Leave Application on 27
March 2025. Thus, such an untruthful explanation cannot be accepted.
11. A delay of more than one month is not insubstantial, and the
applicant’s explanation for the delay was not plausible. More
importantly, there is no merit in the Leave Application at all.
12. Having considered the above criteria, this court is not prepared to
grant any extension of time to the applicant to file the Leave
Application. The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the
ground of being made out of time alone.
13. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still deal with
the Leave Application as discussed below.
Oral hearing
14. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and his case was heard on 3 September 2026.
15. When this court asked the applicant for the grounds of his intended
judicial review, the applicant merely replied that he was not safe in
his area in Bangladesh, he still had danger there and he only left his
country to save his life.
Grounds for judicial review
16. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
17. The applicant did not advance any grounds for the intended judicial
review in Form 86, nor in his supporting affirmation dated 27 March
2025.
18. As aforesaid, at the oral hearing, the applicant only said he was not
safe in Bangladesh and danger still existed there.
Discussion
19. First of all, the applicant’s danger in his country had been duly
assessed but rejected by the Board. If he intends to challenge the
Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for
judicial review.
20. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of
judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
21. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite the
lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
22. In assessing the applicant’s appeal/petition, the Board held an oral
hearing on 2 September 2024 and the applicant was present. Thus, the
applicant was given the opportunity to present his case to the Board in
person.
23. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had analyzed the
applicant’s claims with due care. The Board had laid out its material
findings of fact of the applicant’s claims in paragraphs 56 to 96 of
the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.
24. In gist, the Board found no reliable evidence that the applicant was a
supporter of BNP as alleged, and the Board did not find his allegation
that he had been a supporter of BNP credible or reliable. Considering
all the evidence submitted by the applicant, the Board found that even
if all claimed events did take place, the nature and low intensity of
ill-treatment from AL people on the applicant in the past were
indicative of a small future risk of harm if the applicant was to
return to Bangladesh.
25. The Board found no or no reliable evidence that (1) the applicant had
suffered physical and/or mental sufferings of the requisite severity;
(2) the alleged perpetrators had ill-treated the applicant with an
intention listed in the definition of torture in section 37U of the
Immigration Ordinance; (3) the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant
had any relevance to the interest and/or benefit of the Bangladeshi
government; (4) the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution
for any RC[1] reasons; (5) the state of Bangladesh was unwilling or
unable to afford protection to the applicant; and (6) the state of
Bangladesh was unwilling to help the applicant for a RC reason.
26. Further, in relation to the applicant’s complaint about the general
situation of violence in Bangladesh and the inadequacy of state
protection, the Board found that reasonable state protection would be
available to the applicant, and there was nothing before the Board to
indicate that the applicant would not be afforded the requisite level
of protection from the government of Bangladesh.
27. Given its findings as summarised above, the Board noted that the
assessment of the viability of internal relocation for the applicant
was not strictly necessary. Nevertheless, the Board still did so for
the sake of completeness. The Board had given its reasons for the
finding that internal relocation was appropriate and reasonable for the
applicant in paragraph 138 of the Board’s Decision.
28. Thus, the Board found that the applicant’s non-refoulement claim failed
on all the applicable grounds under the USM.
29. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, country of
origin information and risk of harm, was primarily within the realm of
the Board in dealing with his appeal/petition. The Board was entitled
to come to its own conclusion. This court finds nothing wrong or
unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.
30. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high
standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
31. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave
must be refused.
Conclusion
32. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed for being
made out of time and for devoid of merits.
Dated the 16th day of September 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 16/09/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any | |interested parties as |
|directions given within|Applicant’s ref. no: |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave|Nil |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, | |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |16/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and | |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance | |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 23804 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes | |QA T/C 636/24 (Formerly |
|to use at the hearing, | |RBCZ 5001887/23) (T4S14)|
|including the affidavit| | |
|in support of the | |Department of Justice, |
|application for leave | |Senior Assistant Law |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
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[1] The non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol