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BALAIYAN ARIVAZHAGAN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
BALAIYAN ARIVAZHAGAN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5010 · HCAL 776/2026
Court of First Instance
HCAL 776/2026
[2026] HKCFI 5010
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 776 of 2026
BETWEEN
| |Balaiyan Arivazhagan |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
1. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial
review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 20 April 2026, the applicant applied
for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The
intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
(“Board”) dated 30 March 2026 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the
applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the Director of
Immigration (“Director”) dated 28 January 2026 rejecting the
applicant’s non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1]. The
Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL000776_
2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. In his Form 86, the applicant named the Director and the Board as the
proposed respondents and did not name any interested party. As the
Board should have been the proper putative respondent and the Director
the proper putative interested party, the Form 86 shall be amended
accordingly on the court’s own motion.
3. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to India, he
would be harmed or killed by a gangster and his followers as the
applicant refused to sell his farmland to the gangster at a low price.
The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the
Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them.
Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s
abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
4. At the scheduled hearing on 6 August 2026, the applicant attended the
hearing in person and submitted a 4-page “Skeleton Argument” to court.
Discussion
5. A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there
is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision[2]. It is therefore sufficient to state my observations
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
6. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full
and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an
affidavit. In the applicant’s Form 86, the applicant provided no
grounds. In the supporting affirmation, the applicant averred that
the Board reached a wrong conclusion on the COI, that the Board’s
Decision was unfair without having properly considered the viability
of relocation and the availability of the state protection.
7. In the “Skeleton Argument”, the applicant put forward 4 grounds in
support of the Leave Application:
1) Failure to properly assess future risk. It was submitted that the
Board had failed to properly consider the alleged escalation of the
threats by the gangster who and his associates had previously used
weapons in the continuing visits.
2) Inadequate assessment of state protection. The applicant averred that
the Board failed to consider the localized nature of the alleged
threat in the context of the evidence of the local influence of the
gangster and the police corruption.
3) Insufficient assessment of internal relocation. The applicant argued
that when assessing the viability of internal relocation, the Board
had not taken into account the applicant’s personal background of
being a farmer with limited education without financial resources,
family support network and employment contracts outside his locality
as well as the applicant’s language and cultural difficulties.
4) Failure to provide adequate reasons. The applicant submitted that the
Board did not sufficiently explain how the applicant’s central
evidence was evaluated against the general COI. The Board had failed
to sufficiently disclose the reasoning process by which it rejected
the applicant’s material evidence.
8. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the
Board found that the applicant’s story was internally consistent as to
the family land dispute. However, the Board found that the applicant
would not face any risk of harm if refouled as the applicant never
suffered any physical injury apart from the verbal life threats.
Hence, it was found that the past ill-treatment failed to reach the
requisite level of severity. It further found that state protection
and internal relocation would be reasonably viable. These are findings
of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with,
subject to there being any public law errors.
9. This court will discuss the applicant’s grounds in his “Skeleton
Argument” by adopting the enhanced standard in scrutinizing the
Board’s Decision.
10. As for Ground 1, this court does not accept that the Board had failed
to properly considered the escalation of threats when assessing the
future risk. In [151] to [156] of the Board’s Decision, the Board had
provided reasons as to why it considered that the applicant would not
face future risk of harm. According to the applicant’s own evidence,
which the Board accepted, the applicant and his family were never
injured in the three incidents in 2025 concerning the gangster. The
applicant’s argument of escalation is not supported by any evidence.
Hence, this court is not satisfied that this ground is reasonably
arguable.
11. As for Ground (2) and Ground (3), in [74] to [141] of the Board’s
Decision, the Board had extensively referred to the relevant COI
before reaching the conclusion on the reasonable a viability of state
protection and internal relocation. In [86], [133] and [134] of the
Board Decision, the Board had referred to the COI which showed that a
person who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from
a rogue state actor and/or a non-state actor is likely to obtain
protection from the state[5] and be able to internally relocate[6] to
escape the risk. Given the fact that the applicant had never reported
the incidents concerning the gangster to the police, this court is not
satisfied that Ground (2) is reasonably arguable. As for internal
relocation, the applicant had not challenged the Board’s findings in
[141] of the Board’s Decision regarding the applicant’s personal
circumstances before its conclusion that it would not be unduly harsh
for the applicant to relocate. In the circumstances, I do not find
that this argument on Ground (3) is reasonably arguable.
12. As for Ground (4), the applicant’s submissions were only general
allegations without any particulars.
13. In conclusion, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly
applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a high
standard of fairness. The applicant has not shown any errors of law
or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.
The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not
reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that
would enable this court to grant leave[7].
Order
14. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
15. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Dated the 4th day of September 2026
| |( Alfred CHAN ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such | |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 4/9/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Balaiyan Arivazhagan |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions| |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Applicant’s ref. no: |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |4/9/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 28078 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |2498/25 (formerly RBCZ |
|use at the hearing, | |5002419/25) |
|including the affidavit | | |
|in support of | |Department of Justice, |
|the application for | |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”), BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this
refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the
risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under
Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s
Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to
process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed
description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang
Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL
21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142].
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst
v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] “Country Policy and Information Note- India: Actors of protection”
published by the UK Home Office on 1 October 2025.
[6] “Country Policy and Information Note- India: Internal Relocation”
published by the UK Home Office on 1 October 2025.
[7] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676