KHAWAJA WALEED v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 1582/2025

[2026] HKCFI 2975

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1582 OF 2025

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 10 March 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 7 January 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 5 June 2024.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 7 January 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 21 January 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons and his supporting affirmation dated 10 March 2026, the applicant gave two different reasons for seeking extension of time. In the Summons, he said that he did not get the High Court decision, whereas in his affirmation he said that he got the Judgment late in his mail box. However, the applicant did not mention any ground for his intended appeal in the Summons or his affirmation.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 14 May 2026, when I asked the applicant why he was late in appealing, he said that he never received my decision dated 7 January 2026 even up to the time of the hearing on 14 May 2026. He only found out about my decision through his friend who checked the decision online for him.

9.  When I asked the applicant when his friend found out about my decision, he said that it was on 13 March 2026. I then pointed out to him that it could not be so because the Summons was filed on 10 March 2026. The applicant then changed his version by saying that his friend found out about my decision around 10 or 11 March 2026.

10.  I then asked the applicant why in his affirmation, he said that he received the Judgment late in his mail box, which is contradictory to his allegation that he never received the decision. The applicant then explained that his friend helped him to write the affirmation. However, the applicant speaks and understands English very well. In fact, at the hearing on 14 May 2026, the applicant chose English instead of Urdu to conduct the proceedings himself without any help from the interpreter. He could communicate with me perfectly and fluently in English without any problem at all. Thus, there was absolutely no reason why he would need any help from his friend to write his affirmation. Even if he had his friend’s help, he should be able to read the contents of his own affirmation and could have easily found out the mistake when he affirmed his affirmation before a Commissioner for Oath.

11.  Thus, the explanations given by the applicant for his delay were unsatisfactory. There was absolutely no reason for him to give two contradictory versions about whether he had received the decision or not.

12.  More importantly, the applicant did not give any valid ground for his intended appeal. As aforesaid, the applicant did not mention any ground for his intended appeal in the Summons or his affirmation. At the hearing of the Summons, when I asked the applicant for his grounds of appeal, he merely said that he had problems with a religious group if he went back to Pakistan and he would not be safe. He further said that the Torture Claims Appeal Board could have gone to the internet to check everything because the situation in Pakistan was that people could just kill anyone. It is clear that these allegations only concerned the basis of his non-refoulement claim. They cannot amount to any valid ground for his intended appeal.

13.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

14.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

15.  In the circumstances, there is no proper excuse for the applicant’s delay in lodging the appeal and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

16.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.