CHAN KA YAN KAREN v. SECRETARY FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE

HCAL 1754/2025

[2026] HKCFI 3119

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1754 OF 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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A.  Introduction

1.  Memory is sometimes fallible, but that does not mean every memory is fallible. Similarly, a person may be genuine when stating something incorrectly, but that does not mean every incorrect statement is a genuine mistake. Those distinctions underpin the underlying impugned decision in this case.

2.  By Form 86 dated 7 August 2025, the Applicant challenges the decision (“Dismissal Decision”) made by the Secretary for the Civil Service (“SCS”) and contained in a letter dated 7 May 2025, directing that the Applicant be punished by dismissal under section 10 of the Public Service (Administration) Order (“PS(A)O”).

3.  By way of relief, the Applicant seeks an order of certiorari to bring up and quash the Dismissal Decision.

4.  I gave directions to bring the matter to a ‘rolled-up’ hearing on 10 December 2025. At the hearing, the Applicant was represented by Mr Anson Wong of Counsel, and the SCS was represented by Mr Justin Lam of Counsel and Mr Alvin Hor, Senior Government Counsel.

5.  At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision to be handed down subsequently.

6.  This is my Judgment.

B.  Factual Background

7.  The Applicant joined the Immigration Department (“ImmD”) as an Immigration Assistant on 23 February 2009. At the time of the Decision, the Applicant was a Senior Immigrant Assistant.

8.  On 1 September 2019 at around 00:17, the Applicant was arrested at Prince Edward MTR Station in relation to an incident which occurred on the night of 31 August 2019 (“31 August Incident”).

9.  The Applicant remained silent under caution, and was released unconditionally on the same day.

10.  On 7 August 2020, the Applicant was informed by the Police that the case against her had concluded and no charges would be laid.

11.  But, later, between 23 and 25 February 2021, the Applicant was interviewed by ImmD officers (“Interviews”) with regard to whether she had misconducted herself in the 31 August Incident.

12.  On 23 May 2023, ImmD informed the Applicant that it was contemplating an inquiry into the alleged misconduct under section 10 of the PS(A)O.

13.  On 11 December 2023, an inquiry hearing was held before an Inquiry Committee. The inquiry was made into the following charges faced:

(1)  During the Applicant’s interview with Ms Yiu Yeuk-kuen, Acting Senior Immigration Officer, on 23, 24 and 25 February 2021, regarding her itinerary on 31 August 2019 night before being arrested by the Police at the platform of Prince Edward MTR Station, the Applicant provided the following misleading and factually incorrect information to the department, failing to uphold the core values of honesty and integrity stipulated in paragraphs 2.1, 2.2, 3.3 and 3.4 of the Civil Service Code, seriously compromising the professional image of ImmD and bringing the Government service into disrepute:

(a)  The Applicant claimed that, at about 1930-1945 hours on 31 August 2019, she took a bus from To Kwa Wan to Causeway Bay. In fact, she entered Jordan MTR Station at 1831 hours and exited Causeway Bay at 1905 hours (“Charge 1(a)”).

(b)  The Applicant claimed that, at about 2100 hours on 31 August 2019, she left Causeway Bay after dinner and proceeded to Tin Hau MTR Station to take the MTR to go to Prince Edward MTR Station and while transiting at Central, her boyfriend bought water in a 7-11 convenience store inside the paid area of the Central MTR Station. However, there was no 7-11 convenience store in the paid area of Central Station (“Charge 1(b)”).

(c)  The Applicant claimed that, on 31 August 2019 night, when she transited at Central and headed to Prince Edward MTR Station, she did not change lines. When she learned about online recordings capturing her arrest at the lower platform of Prince Edward MTR Station, she changed to say that she alighted and was arrested at platform number 3 of the lower platform of Prince Edward MTR Station. However, the trains at the lower platform did not depart from Central MTR Station. As such, the commuting route which she provided was unreasonable, which reflected that she did not frankly state her itinerary in taking the MTR that night (“Charge 1(c)”).

(2)  On 31 August 2019 evening, the Applicant travelled on the MTR without paying the fare, in contravention of the regulations made under section 14 of the Mass Transit Railway By-laws (Cap 556B), seriously compromising the professional image of ImmD and bringing the Government service into disrepute (“Charge 2”).

(3)  After being transferred out from the Airport Section on 15 February 2016, the Applicant did not surrender the Airport Staff personalised Octopus card to Octopus Card Limited within 30 days after she ceased to be eligible (i.e. leaving the post) as required, in contravention of condition 6 of the terms and conditions of the MTR Airport Staff Discount Travel Scheme, seriously compromising the professional image of ImmD and bringing the Government service into disrepute (“Charge 3”).

14.  The Inquiry Committee’s conclusions were set out in the Inquiry Report. I would first note that the Inquiry Committee seems to me to have given detailed consideration to the matters, and included within the Inquiry Report a fair summary of the positions adopted by the parties to the inquiry, see, for example, 2.4.19. Materially, the Inquiry Committee found the following discrepancies in the Applicant’s answers:

(1)  The Applicant claimed that, at about 1930 to 1945 hours on 31 August 2019, she took a bus from To Kwa Wan to Causeway Bay when in fact she entered Jordan MTR Station at 1831 hours and exited Causeway Bay MTR Station at 1905 hours.

(2)  The Applicant claimed that, while transiting at Central MTR Station, her boyfriend bought water in a 7-11 convenience store inside the paid area of Central MTR Station when in fact there was no 7-11 convenience store inside the paid area of Central MTR Station.

(3)  The Applicant claimed she was arrested on the upper platform of Prince Edward MTR Station, but she was actually arrested on the lower platform of Prince Edward MTR Station.

(4)  The Applicant claimed she did not change lines during her transit from Central MTR Station to Prince Edward MTR Station, but that was impossible as the trains at the lower platform did not depart from Central MTR Station.

15.  The Applicant was found not guilty of Charges 1(a), 1(b), 2 and 3:

(1)  Charge 1(a): The Inquiry Committee expressed the view that a person cannot reasonably be expected to recall accurately where he went to and what transport he took on a certain day 18 months ago, and that the Applicant’s explanation that she would normally take a bus rang true. Her incorrect statement could well be due to a faulty memory instead of an intention to lie, and the statement was not meant to mislead.

(2)  Charge 1(b): On the basis that the Applicant’s explanation was that it was only a presumption that her boyfriend had bought water inside the paid area, and though that presumption turned out to be wrong, the Inquiry Committee did not believe she had the intention to mislead.

(3)  Charge 2: The Inquiry Committee thought that the Applicant had a reasonable excuse, because anyone in the circumstances she was in would be forced to enter the paid area of the station through the glass door as she did.

(4)  Charge 3: The Inquiry Committee thought that the failure was possibly due to mere negligence on the part of the Applicant, when there was no motive for her otherwise to retain the card. Further, and in any event, the failure to surrender the card could not compromise the professional image of ImmD or bring disrepute to the Government as it was not known to the public.

16.  The Applicant was found guilty of Charge 1(c) only. In making that finding, the Inquiry Committee stated:

6.4  Finding on Charge 1(c)

6.4.1  Charge 1(c) was that the Accused Officer stated that after she boarded the train at Central MTR to transfer to Prince Edward on 31.8.2019 evening, she had ridden on the same line. Upon knowledge that she was featured in some YouTube video of being arrested at the lower platform of Prince Edward MTR Station, she revised her statement that she was arrested on platform 3 of the lower platform of Prince Edward MTR Station. However, the train that plied on the lower platform did not set off from Central. Hence, the travel route she stated did not stand to reason, which reflected that she did not candidly recount her MTR itinerary from Central to Prince Edward MTR Station that evening.

6.4.2  The Accused Officer explained at paragraph 5.2 above why she came to revise her statement regarding the spot of her arrest. To recapitulate, when she was first presented with a layout plan of Prince Edward MTR Station (i.e. Annex 3 to E4) and asked to indicate at which platform of Prince Edward MTR Station she was arrested, she figured that it was at the upper platform. However, she later recalled that it was a long escalator she took that led from the platform to the concourse. She took the initiative to review a YouTube video recording Police arrest at Prince Edward MTR Station on 31.8.2019 and found that she was in fact arrested at the lower platform. She immediately corrected herself regarding the spot of arrest at the interview the following day (Answer 3 of Annex 6 refers). Based on the evidence of Witness 1 (paragraph 2.2.3 above), the YouTube video recording Police arrest at Prince Edward MTR Station at 31.8.2019 (at E14) and her own evidence, there was no doubt that the Accused Officer was arrested by the Police at platform 3 of the lower platform of Prince Edward MTR Station on the material day. She stated that she alighted from the train at platform 3 before her arrest. She also stated that that she boarded the train at Central MTR Station to get to Prince Edward MTR Station without, according to her memory, changing line. However, it could be seen from the Prince Edward MTR Station layout plan (Annex 3 to E5 refers) that the train that plied on platform no. 3 was the Kwun Tong line that set off from Whampoa and destined for Tiu Keng Leng. It did not set off from Central. The train that plied on platform no. 4 (also on the lower platform) did not set off from Central either. It was the Tsuen Wan line that set off from Tsuen Wan and destined for Central. So, the Accused Officer’s statement that she boarded the MTR at Central and ended up at Prince Edward without changing line must be incorrect. At her final address, the Accused Officer stated that she could not explain why she ended up alighting from the train at platform no. 3 of Prince Edward MTR Station if she set off from Central MTR Station. She could not be sure now whether she might have transferred from one line to another while en route to Prince Edward. She simply could not recall every detail of her MTR itinerary on a day 18 months from the day of her interview on 23.2.2021.

6.4.3  Did the Accused Officer lie about her MTR travel route from Central to Prince Edward on 31.8.2019 or was it a case of faulty memory? According to the Prince Edward MTR Station layout plan (Annex 3 to E5 refers), it was impossible for the Accused Officer to go from the Central MTR Station to Prince Edward MTR Station without changing line. The Accused Officer first stated in her interview with the department on 23.2.2021 that she was arrested by the Police at the upper platform where she alighted from the MTR train. Upon knowing that she was featured in some You-Tube video showing that she was arrested at the lower platform of Prince Edward MTR Station, she revised her statement that she alighted at platform number 3 of the lower platform and was arrested there. However, the trains landing at the lower platform did not come from Central Station. So, the itinerary provided by the Accused Officer must be untrue. According to the Accused Officer, she entered Tin Hau MTR Station at about 2130 hours on 31.8.2019. She was intercepted by the Police at 2300 hours upon arrival at Prince Edward MTR Station. There was no reasonable explanation for the unduly long time (i.e. 1.5 hours) required to travel from Tin Hau MTR Station to Prince Edward MTR Station, even if the Accused Officer might have first made a stop at Central MTR Station. The Inquiry Committee believes the Accused Officer was not candid about her itinerary and provide untrue and misleading information to the department. The Inquiry Committee finds the Accused Officer guilty of Charge 1(c).

17.  On 27 December 2024, the Secretariat on Civil Service Discipline (“SCSD”) invited the Applicant to make representations as to whether the disciplinary authority should accept the findings of the Inquiry Committee as well as in mitigation of punishment.

18.  On 6 January 2025, the Applicant submitted her representations to the SCSD (“Representations”). Amongst other things, the Applicant stated that:

(1)  At the time of the investigation it had been nearly a year and six months since the incident and the Interviews were far from the date of her arrest.

(2)  Police had already stated that the investigation was complete, so the Applicant believed the incident was over and did not deliberately continue to remember all the details of the day of the incident.

(3)  The Applicant did her best to explain her itinerary prior to her arrest during the Interviews. However, the officer who conducted the Interviews still asked her to provide answers, which resulted in her answers being less than ideal.

(4)  At the time of the Interviews, the Applicant had just given birth and suffered from memory loss after childbirth. Furthermore, she was solely focused on caring for her newborn, which resulted in heavy mental stress and chronic sleep deprivation. As a result, she was unable to recall many details and her memories were sometimes confused and overlapped.

(5)  The Applicant’s dog had just passed away, which was a major emotional blow and seriously affected her performance during the interviews.

(6)  The atmosphere of the Interviews was stressful and caused one to be mentally exhausted, and inevitably increased the pressure and made the Applicant unable to concentrate.

19.  By letter dated 1 April 2025, the SCSD informed the Applicant that (emphasis in original):

We are about to invite the SCS to exercise the authority delegated to her by the Chief Executive to decide on the punishment to be imposed on you. An extract of our impending submission to the SCS, setting out the consideration of punishment and the advice of the Public Service Commission (“PSC”), is enclosed at Annex A. It will be recommended to the SCS that, having regard to the consideration of punishment and the advice of the PSC, the appropriate punishment for your misconduct would be dismissal

…

Should you wish to make any further and final representations in mitigation of punishment for inclusion in our submission to the SCS, please let the undersigned have them within seven calendar days on delivery of this letter to you. Failing that, the decision as to punishment will be made by the SCS on the basis that you do not wish to make any further and final representations.”

20.  On 9 April 2025, the Applicant submitted her further and final representations to the SCSD.

21.  By letter dated 7 May 2025, the SCS informed the Applicant that:

(1)  The SCS had considered the Report of the Inquiry Committee (“Report”) and was satisfied that the Applicant had misconducted herself as per Charge 1(c);

(2)  The SCS had directed that the Applicant be punished by dismissal under section 10 of the PS(A)O, which would take effect from 8 May 2025;

(3)  The SCS’s findings in full are as follows:

We find it difficult to believe that your memory about what happened on the day of 31 August 2019 would fade so easily, given that you were a member of a disciplined force at the material time, and being intercepted and arrested by the Police should be a most unforgettable event. You had provided misleading and incorrect itinerary information to the Immigration Department. You had been most dishonest with the Immigration Department in the disciplinary proceedings. This dishonesty is in breach of the fundamental requirement of honesty, integrity and loyalty that a civil servant, and a member of the Immigration Service which is a disciplined force, is expected to meet. There could be no excuse in this matter for lying to the Immigration Department. The misconduct is totally unacceptable, unbecoming of a member of the disciplined force and brings disrepute to the Immigration Department and to the Government. Dismissal is the appropriate punishment for a misconduct of this nature and severity, and a lower level of punishment (such as compulsory retirement) is inadequate to reflect the severity of your established misconduct.

(4)  Upon the Applicant’s dismissal, all claims to her retirement benefits or other like benefits and to any other benefits or advantages, including but not limited to all her earned and untaken leave and the emoluments withheld during interdiction, would be forfeited in full.

C.  Relevant Statutory Framework

22.  The challenge in this case does not turn on the legal framework and internal rules of the Civil Service. There is no dispute in that regard. Nevertheless, it may be contextually helpful briefly to summarise those rules.

23.  Section 10 of the PS(A)O provides for the initiation of an inquiry for misconduct warranting dismissal or compulsory retirement as follows:

10.  Misconduct warranting dismissal or compulsory retirement

(1)  If it is represented to the Chief Executive that an officer has been guilty of misconduct, and the Chief Executive is of the opinion that the misconduct alleged may be serious enough to warrant the dismissal or compulsory retirement of the officer, he may cause an inquiry to be made into the officer's conduct in such manner as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Chief Executive under section 21(2).

(2)  If after such inquiry the Chief Executive is of the opinion that the officer has been guilty of misconduct, he may inflict such punishment upon the officer as may seem to him to be just.

(3)  Where an officer is absent from duty without leave for a period exceeding 14 days and it is represented to the Chief Executive that the officer—

(a)  cannot be traced; or

(b)  on being required by notice in writing (sent by post to his last known address) to give, within the period specified in the notice, an excuse for his absence, has failed to give any excuse or to give an excuse that is reasonable,

the Chief Executive need not cause an inquiry to be made under subsection (1) and may summarily dismiss the officer.

24.  Section 16 states that an officer who is dismissed forfeits all claims to retirement benefits or other like benefits and to any other benefits or advantages of an officer.

25.  The Public Service (Disciplinary) Regulation governs the conduct of disciplinary proceedings and procedures leading up to the removal of officers in the Civil Service.

26.  The Civil Service Code provides for the constitutional order of the HKSAR, the constitutional roles and responsibilities of civil servants as members of the executive authorities, as well as the core values and standards of conduct which civil servants should uphold. Of note are the following paragraphs:

2.1  The Civil Service is a permanent, honest, meritocratic, professional and politically neutral institution. The core values set out below are central to the integrity and probity of the Civil Service. They underpin good governance and help the Civil Service gain and retain the respect and confidence of the public.

2.2  Civil servants are required to uphold the following core values, which are of equal importance –

(a)  commitment to the rule of law;

(b)  honesty and integrity;

(c)  objectivity and impartiality;

(d)  accountability for decisions and actions; and

(e)  dedication, professionalism and diligence.

3.3  Honesty: Civil servants shall set out facts and relevant issues truthfully, and correct any errors as soon as possible. They shall use public resources only for the authorised purposes for which the resources are provided.

3.4  Integrity: Civil servants shall ensure that no actual, perceived or potential conflict of interest shall arise between their official duties and private interests. Where an actual, perceived or potential conflict of interest arises, they shall declare it to their supervisors so that the latter can determine how best to proceed or escalate the matter for a determination as necessary. They shall not use their official position to further personal interests or the private interests of others. They shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any advantage or gift which would, or might reasonably be seen to, compromise their integrity or judgment or influence the discharge or non-discharge of their duties and responsibilities. They shall not place themselves under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might seek to influence them in the performance of their official duties. They shall ensure that the views they express will not compromise their capacity to fulfil their official duties professionally, effectively and impartially. They shall use information gained by virtue of their official position for authorised purposes only. They shall not disclose documents, information or knowledge received in confidence from others in the course of their duties or by virtue of their official position.

D.  Grounds of Review

27.  The Applicant put forward three intended grounds of review, being:

(1)  In arriving at the Dismissal Decision, the SCS failed to take into account relevant considerations, or alternatively, failed to give adequate reasons.

(2)  The SCS’s two reasons for disbelieving the Applicant are irrational.

(3)  The Dismissal Decision is oppressive and thus irrational in the public law sense.

28.  Ground 1 and Ground 2 focus on the SCS’s finding of guilt, whereas Ground 3 focuses on the punishment of dismissal.

29.  As a preliminary observation, the Applicant’s case largely revolves around whether the SCS was justified in disbelieving the Applicant’s claims of “faulty memory” as reasons for her incorrect, inconsistent or contradictory evidence in the Interviews.

30.  Mr Wong submitted that the three grounds are intertwined, i.e. the lack of reasons under Ground 1 would reinforce the unreasonableness of the finding of guilt for Ground 2, and the oppressiveness of the Dismissal Decision under Ground 3 means the Court should anxiously scrutinise the adequacy of reasons under Ground 1 and reasonableness of the finding of guilt under Ground 2.

31.  I accept that there is some degree of overlap between the various intended grounds of review advanced. Therefore, though I will consider each ground individually, I have taken into account the points relevant to the other grounds, in something of an overall iterative process.

32.  Mr Wong also invited me to consider seven contextual factors before going to the individual grounds of review. I can usefully set out those factors here, though I shall keep them in mind and (as seems to me to be appropriate) address them later. They are that:

(1)  At the time of the Interviews, the Applicant was trying to make her best endeavour to cooperate with the department.

(2)  The Interviews, which took place over three consecutive days, were highly intensive and stressful in terms of the length of interview, width and breadth of the questions asked and the fact that the Applicant was required to give details of events which occurred 18 months ago without the aid of any contemporaneous record.

(3)  The Interviews came at an inopportune time when the Applicant’s dog recently passed away, and the Applicant had given birth about three months before and was focused on taking care of her daughter.

(4)  The only incorrect information under Charge 1(c) concerned the Applicant’s claim that she “did not change lines” when she transited at Central MTR Station and headed to Prince Edward MTR Station.

(5)  On the second day of the Interviews, the Applicant voluntarily corrected herself and frankly admitted that she could not recall her journey.

(6)  The Applicant provided multiple explanations for her alleged faulty memory in her final supplementary statement on 6 January 2025, namely that it had been nearly one year and six months since the incident, she had just given birth and was focused on caring for her newborn, her dog had recently passed away, and the atmosphere in the entire interview was stressful and caused her to be mentally exhausted.

(7)  None of the Applicant’s explanations were addressed in either the Report or the letter containing the Dismissal Decision.

E.  Ground 1: Relevant Considerations and Adequate Reasons

33.  The Applicant asserts that the SCS, in arriving at the Dismissal Decision, failed to take into account relevant considerations or alternatively failed to give adequate reasons.

34.  In her Representations dated 6 January 2025, the Applicant gave the following explanation:

At the time of the interviews, I had just given birth three months and suffered from memory loss after childbirth. Furthermore, I was solely focused on caring for my newborn, which resulted in heavy mental stress and chronic sleep deprivation. As a result, I was unable to recall many details, and my memories were sometimes confused and overlapped. Furthermore, my beloved dog, who had been with me for many years, had just passed away, which was a major emotional blow and seriously affected my performance during the interviews.

35.  Hence, the Applicant perhaps put forward four explanations for her alleged faded memory, namely (1) postpartum memory loss, (2) stress from caring for her newborn, (3) sleep deprivation, and (4) emotional distress from her dog’s death.

36.  Mr Wong submitted that none of the above explanations were mentioned, let alone addressed, in the letter containing the Dismissal Decision. I will address that submission. But, first, it can be noted that the Inquiry Committee at least accepted the documentary evidence underpinning those explanations. The Inquiry Committee accepted the Applicant’s evidence of a printout of WhatsApp messages from an animal funeral service provider, and a copy of the birth certificate of her daughter.

E.1  Failure to Take Into Account Relevant Considerations

37.  It is the Applicant’s case that the findings of the SCS are inconsistent with the explanations for the Applicant’s faded memory, in that the SCS either failed to take into account the explanations for faded memory or alternatively, if she had taken them into consideration, failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting those explanations in the Dismissal Decision.

38.  As regards the Applicant’s memory, the relevant section of the SCS’s email to the SCSD dated 5 May 2025 is as follows:

I agree with the IC member and do not agree with the IC Chairman. It is difficult to believe that one’s memory about what happened on the day of one’s arrest would fade so easily, not even under the effects of the grief brought about by the passing away of a beloved pet and the concern for a baby daughter, and the accused officer is a member of a disciplinary force, and arrest by the Police should be a most unforgettable event, not to say that the day 31 August 2019 has been, hitherto, a day that many Hong Kong people cannot forget due to the events that happen at Prince Edward Station and the ridiculous allegations against the Police made up by rioters afterwards.

39.  Mr Wong said the SCS thereby at least ignored “postpartum memory loss” and “sleep deprivation” in arriving at the Dismissal Decision. In any event, he said, the email did not explain why the SCS rejected the explanations, let alone those not mentioned.

40.  With respect, I disagree. First, In light of that contextual background, the SCS’s statement on “the effects of the grief brought about by the passing away of a beloved pet and the concern for a baby daughter” sensibly would include “postpartum memory loss” and “sleep deprivation”, both of which are probable symptoms of the latter “concern”.

41.  Secondly, clearly, the reasons proffered by the Applicant, and referenced in these proceedings by Mr Wong, had indeed been considered by Inquiry Committee (in the Inquiry Report accepted by the SCS). For example, the issue of faulty/inaccurate memory was specifically addressed in the Inquiry Report at 6.2.2 as follows:

To recapitulate, 18 months had lapsed when she was requested at the interviews to recount where she had been to and what transport she took on 31.8.2019. Her memory had faded. She was in a poor condition to give statement because she was distressed by the death of her dog which passed away a few days before the interview. This was not aided by the fact she was stressed in having to nurse and care for her three-month-old daughter. She did not really remember what transport she took to go to Causeway Bay that day.

42.  Other references are to be found in the Inquiry Report at, for example, 6.2.5 and 6.4.2 – the latter specifically in the context of the finding on Charge 1(c): see above.

43.  Further, in making the finding on Charge 1(c), the Inquiry Committee specifically asked itself at 6.4.3 the question whether the Applicant lied about her travel route or whether it was a case of faulty memory.

44.  Nor is the SCS’s statement that “31 August 2019 has been, hitherto, a day that many Hong Kong people cannot forget” an irrelevant consideration as Mr Wong claimed. These were precisely the factors taken into account by the SCS, and it was her finding that the Applicant’s alleged memory loss did not hold weight, particularly against the “unforgettable” nature of her arrest on that specific day.

45.  As Mr Lam submitted, the fact that the SCS’s conclusion was unfavourable to the Applicant does not of itself indicate that the relevant issues were ignored. With that in mind, I do not think it was necessary for the SCS to name each and every reason or sub-reason for memory loss alleged by the Applicant, where the overall finding was that the Applicant was dishonest, particularly where the consideration of such matters was implicit in the SCS’s conclusion.

46.  At this point, I can also address the sixth contextual factor above, i.e. the timing and nature of the Interviews. I note that there were various breaks in the interview, including lunch breaks as well as a break for the Applicant to pump milk. However, at the beginning of each interview, the Applicant was explicitly reminded that the information provided by her “must be correct and the entirety of the facts”, and was asked whether she was “feeling unwell” or if there were “any other circumstances which render [her] unable to conduct the interview”. At the end of each interview, the Applicant was given the opportunity to clarify whether any amendments, corrections or additions were required – to which the Applicant answered in the negative – as well as being given the opportunity to read the record of interview.

47.  Although I accept this may have been something the Applicant subjectively thought, there is also no evidence that she was pressured to provide answers or details even though she could not remember. Rather, it seems that the Applicant at multiple points during the Interviews voluntarily provided details and answers.

48.  For example, the Applicant could provide minute details as to her activity on that day, as well as immediately prior to her arrest. She could recall that (1) the train took longer to arrive at Yau Ma Tei MTR Station, (2) there were broadcasts requesting passengers to leave the train compartments, saying someone set off fire with smoke, someone “hitting the glass of the control room”, (3) anti-riot police “running up from behind to catch people” and using pepper spray, and (4) “the first escalator was running and the second escalator should have stopped”. The Applicant was also able to recall the reason she brought a black shirt on the day, because her boyfriend asked her to bring a spare shirt to change into after he played football.

49.  However, there were discrepancies when it came to the Applicant’s answers regarding her travel itinerary from Central MTR Station to, and subsequent arrest at, Prince Edward MTR Station. The Applicant was shown a copy of a map with a layout of Prince Edward MTR Station. The upper platform consists of Platform 1 (Tsuen Wan Line to Tsuen Wan) and Platform 2 (Kwun Tong Line to Whampoa). The lower platform consists of Platform 3 (Kwun Tong Line to Tiu Keng Leng) and Platform 4 (Tsuen Wan Line to Central). When asked which platform she was on at the time, the Applicant said she was on the upper platform, which would have been true if she were travelling from Central to Prince Edward. The Applicant later amended her answer to say she was at the lower platform when she was arrested. The Applicant also clarified that she “could not remember at that time the reason leading to the difference in the direction of [my] train”, and “for now cannot recall [my] journey at that time”.

50.  In any event, on the materials, I do not accept that the Applicant was under an illusion that she had to answer clearly to every single question, and indeed there were occasions during the Interviews when (without any apparent problem) the Applicant could and did say she did not remember.

51.  I reject the contention that taking into account all relevant factors could only have led to a conclusion that the intense and stressful nature of the interview caused her “mistaken” answers.

52.  In conclusion, I reject the submission that there was a failure on the part of the SCS to take into account relevant considerations with regard to the Applicant’s explanations for her alleged memory loss.

E.2  Failure to Give Adequate Reasons

53.  In the alternative, Mr Wong submitted that if the SCS had in fact taken the explanations into consideration, the duty to give reasons and fairness in the circumstances required her at least to set out in the Dismissal Decision why she rejected those explanations, which (Mr Wong submitted) she failed to do.

54.  The relevant principles in relation to the giving of reasons for administrative decisions are trite. Nevertheless, I can restate them as follows:

(1)  There is no general duty to give reasons for administrative decisions, but the nature or circumstances of an adjudication might indicate a necessity for giving reasons.

(2)  If and when a duty to give reasons arises, what is regarded as adequate depends on the particular facts of each case.

(3)  The Court should consider a reasons challenge with practical reality in order to prevent an application for judicial review from being turned into a merits review, and to avoid treating day-to-day administrative decision-making processes as if they were judgment-writing.

(4)  The reasons given should show that the decision-maker has addressed the substantial issues and show why the decision-maker has come to its decision.

(5)  The reasons should show that the issues that arise for serious consideration have been considered.

(6)  But the reasons in any given case may not require great elaboration, and they may be brief.

(7)  Sufficient reasons may be required so as to enable the affected individual to exercise effectively any right to appeal or review.

(8)  The giving of reasons in any individual case must be viewed in the context of that case.

(9)  Hence, it may be that the Court can have regard to the prior interaction or exchange between the parties to determine whether the reasons given are sufficient to meet the requirements of the principles.

(10)  Where the decision-maker purports to have given reasons, the reasons should be subject to the same level of scrutiny as if there was an express duty to give reasons.

(11)  A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the Court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure of the decision-maker to provide an adequately reasoned decision.

55.  Part of the rationale is the Court should not interfere with executive decisions for immaterial irregularities, and that applies whether no reasons or merely inadequate reasons are given: see, for example, PVQ v Permanent SCS for Security [2021] HKCA 444 at §28.

56.  I can set out again the relevant section of the letter containing the Dismissal Decision which is as follows:

We find it difficult to believe that your memory about what happened on the day of 31 August 2019 would fade so easily, given that you were a member of a disciplined force at the material time, and being intercepted and arrested by the Police should be a most unforgettable event. You had provided misleading and incorrect itinerary information to the Immigration Department. You had been most dishonest with the Immigration Department in the disciplinary proceedings. This dishonesty is in breach of the fundamental requirement of honesty, integrity and loyalty that a civil servant, and a member of the Immigration Service which is a disciplined force, is expected to meet. There could be no excuse in this matter for lying to the Immigration Department… Dismissal is the appropriate punishment for a misconduct of this nature and severity, and a lower level of punishment (such as compulsory retirement) is inadequate to reflect the severity of your established misconduct.

57.  Looking at that objectively and fairly, it is at least clear that a reason given for the Dismissal Decision was the finding of dishonesty. The reasons given do not require great elaboration and may be brief, so long as they have dealt with the substantial issues raised. The SCS also addressed, albeit briefly, the Applicant’s “faulty memory” and gave reasons for disbelieving her claim. Reasons were also given for punishing the Applicant by dismissal rather than by way of a more lenient punishment.

58.  Moreover, the Report of the Inquiry Committee was attached to the letter containing the Dismissal Decision. Therefore, the reasoning of the Inquiry Committee in reaching a finding of guilt for Charge 1(c), which appears to have been adopted in full by the SCS, would have been available and known to the Applicant.

59.  I reject the submission that there was a failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.

60.  I therefore do not need to engage with the debate as to whether an applicant bears the burden of showing that he or she has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision, or whether prejudice is only a relevant factor when considering the exercise of the Court’s discretion as regards to relief, and does not go to breach of duty. However, on the facts, I see no substantial prejudice to the Applicant in the way in which she was informed of the Dismissal Decision.

E.3  Conclusion on Ground 1

61.  On the materials, it was simply the case that the Inquiry Committee and the SCS disbelieved the Applicant’s claims of faded memory and/or memory loss. It is evident the SCS thought the allegations were merely retrospective justifications for her misleading and/or dishonest statements as to her travel itinerary. Those reasons were also set out clearly and unequivocally in the letter containing the Dismissal Decision.

62.  Ground 1 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. Alternatively, even if there is a proper basis for the grant of leave, I would refuse Ground 1 on substantive hearing.

F.  Ground 2: Irrationality of Disbelieving Applicant

63.  It is settled, and common ground, that the threshold for establishing Wednesbury unreasonableness is high. In essence, it must be proven that the decision made was one that is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Hence, in the context of this judicial review application, the Applicant faces the hurdle of showing that the SCS’s disbelief of the Applicant was such that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached the same conclusion.

64.  Mr Wong raised 5 specific points as to why the SCS’s disbelief of the Applicant and by extension the Dismissal Decision was irrational:

(1)  It is well recognised that human memory is fallible and unreliable, and it is therefore irrational for the SCS to find the Applicant was dishonest simply because she provided incorrect information about her travel itinerary regarding events which occurred some 18 months prior to the interview, especially when the Applicant indicated she could not remember properly due to those events being so long ago.

(2)  There is no logical connection between (a) being a member of a disciplined service and (b) having a good memory. The Applicant did not receive specific training on memory, nor did her work require good memory.

(3)  There is no logical connection between being intercepted by police and accurately recalling details preceding the interception and arrest.

(4)  The SCS’s reasons for disbelieving the Applicant are contrary to the findings on Charge 1(a), i.e. that “a person cannot reasonably be expected to recall accurately where he went to and what transport he took on a certain day 18 months ago”, and the reason why the Applicant provided incorrect information “could well be due to a faulty memory instead of an intention to lie”.

(5)  There is simply no evidence to contradict, and no cogent reason to disbelieve, the Applicant’s explanations for her faded memory as recorded in the Inquiry Report and/or put forward in the Representations.

65.  As to the first point, it was clearly not the finding of the Inquiry Committee and the SCS that the Applicant was dishonest “simply because she provided incorrect information”. Rather, it was their conclusion – see above – that, having failed to give a reasonable explanation for her activity and travel itinerary on the material day, the Applicant had provided untrue and misleading information to the department.

66.  As to the second and third points, there may be some force to the argument that the Applicant did not receive special training on memory, nor did her work require good memory. However, it is not unreasonable to accept that an arrest and the events preceding that arrest would be quite unforgettable. Similarly, there is at least significant room for doubt that a member of a disciplined service can remember being arrested by a member of another disciplined service, and yet not remember the immediate circumstances that occurred before or led to the arrest.

67.  I reject Mr Wong’s submission that a person might recall the moment he or she is arrested because that is unforgettable, but the details prior to interception are irrelevant. The arrest did not occur in a vacuum, and it is not unreasonable to think that the events immediately preceding the arrest, which may have had an effect on or led to the arrest itself, would also be in mind and remembered. Indeed, after arrest, the Applicant was obviously specifically asked about those matters, though she chose to remain silent.

68.  The Applicant’s apparent ability or otherwise to recall in some detail her activity prior to the arrest and the accuracy of that recollection was perfectly reasonably a factor in the SCS’s consideration, which ultimately went against the Applicant’s claim of “faulty memory”.

69.  As to the Inquiry Committee’s findings on Charge 1(a), where the view was expressed that a person cannot reasonably be expected to recall accurately where he went and what transport he took on a certain day 18 months beforehand, it should be borne in mind that comment was specifically in relation to her travel itinerary to Causeway Bay earlier on the day. By way of contrast, the Applicant was arrested at Prince Edward MTR Station immediately or shortly after disembarking the train, yet gave the wrong answer as to which platform she was on when she was arrested, and only revised her answer upon watching a YouTube video of her arrest.

70.  On the fourth point, Mr Wong’s submission was that there was a flaw in logic for the Inquiry Committee to find the Applicant was not guilty of Charge 1(a), but guilty of Charge 1(c). Mr Wong submitted there was no evidence to contradict and no cogent reason to disbelieve the Applicant’s explanations for her faded memory when it was accepted earlier. However, I think I have already addressed the thrust of that point above. On the way the matter was explained in the Inquiry Report, as was apparently accepted in full by the SCS, there was no flaw in logic.

71.  Rather, as Mr Lam submitted, the Inquiry Committee properly looked at the charges, separately on their specific facts. As opposed to the stance explained towards Charge 1(a), the Inquiry Committee explained why it had reason to believe the Applicant was being deliberately misleading and/or dishonest in relation to Charge 1(c).

72.  In any event, it is undisputed that the Applicant travelled from Central MTR Station to Prince Edward MTR Station, and that the Applicant was arrested at the lower platform of Prince Edward MTR Station. The issue was whether the Applicant had changed lines to reach Prince Edward MTR Station.

73.  Again, I note that the Applicant was reminded of her duty to tell the whole truth and asked whether she was unwell or unable to continue the interview. The Applicant was also given opportunities to amend any answers given at the end. The Applicant was therefore plainly aware of the importance of telling the truth, yet failed to explain her “faulty memory” until her Representations following the Inquiry Committee’s finding of guilt.

74.  On this ground, the question is ultimately whether the Applicant can demonstrate there was only one reasonable conclusion and that all other conclusions were Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. I have already noted that the Inquiry Committee and the SCS did not discount the possibility of faulty memory. Rather, it was fully considered. But, the conclusion from the evidence presented and the inconsistencies in the Applicant’s own answers was that the Applicant had deliberately answered in a misleading and/or dishonest way. The conclusion reached by the Inquiry Committee and the SCS that the Applicant had provided misleading answers and was thus dishonest is not arguably a conclusion which was irrational or unreasonable in the public law sense.

75.  With respect, some of the points put forward by Mr Wong also seem to me to be an indirect challenge to the merits, albeit framed as procedural. Whilst judicial review is to consider the integrity of the decision-making process, the merits of the actual decision were for the SCS to decide.

76.  Ground 2 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. Alternatively, even if there is a proper basis for the grant of leave, I would refuse Ground 2 on substantive hearing.

G.  Ground 3: Oppression of Penalty Imposed

77.  It is of course trite that the punishment has to be proportionate to the charge.

78.  The SCSD thought dismissal was “the most appropriate punishment for a misconduct of this nature and severity, and a lower level of punishment (such as compulsory retirement) is inadequate to reflect the severity of your established misconduct”. The SCS agreed, in the terms I have set out above.

79.  However, Mr Wong submitted that the penalty imposed was so oppressive as to be irrational.

80.  The general approach regarding irrationality challenges going to the severity of punishment was laid down by the Court of Appeal in Tam Yuk Fun Toffee v SCS for the Civil Service [2026] HKCA 389 at §§40-43, and can be summarised as follows:

(1)  As a disciplinary sanction is not primarily punitive in nature, considerations which would ordinarily weigh in mitigation of punishment have less effect than on the ordinary run of sentences.

(2)  The reputation of the profession is far more important than the fortunes of any individual member. Thus, even when a severe penalty might heavily impact an applicant, which might attract some sympathy, nevertheless “duty to the public” is the test to be applied.

(3)  However, it is ultimately a matter for the disciplinary authority to decide the weight to be attached to such circumstances in the overall weighing exercise when deciding on the appropriate sanction.

(4)  The disciplinary authority with the requisite judgment and expertise regarding the professional standards of its discipline is most qualified to conduct the assessment and weighing exercise.

(5)  Therefore, the Court should exercise a considerable degree of judicial restraint and give due deference to the disciplinary authority’s judgment as to the appropriate sanction.

(6)  To succeed in an irrationality challenge, the applicant must satisfy the court that the sanction is so unduly oppressive and out of proportion to the occasion that it falls outside the bounds of any decision open to a reasonable authority.

(7)  It is not enough for the Court to intervene even where it is felt that a less severe sanction could have been imposed.

(8)  It is trite that differently constituted disciplinary authorities will reasonably take different views on the gravity of the accused misconduct and/or the sanctions to be imposed.

(9)  Therefore, mere citation of other decisions in which lighter sanctions were imposed cannot be a valid ground of rationality challenge.

81.  Ultimately, the proper question is whether dismissal falls within the reasonable range of sanctions in the circumstances of the present case, and the assessment and weight to be attached to the factors relevant to the exercise at hand is a matter for the SCS: see Tam Yuk Fun Toffee at §62.

82.  Mr Wong submitted that, given the importance of the interests affected by the Dismissal Decision and the gravity of its potential consequences, a heightened standard of review should apply. Mr Wong cited R(KP) v SCS of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and SCS of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 370 (Admin) in support. However, with respect, I do not think this really assists the Applicant’s case. R(KP) involved a challenge to a refusal to grant leave to allow the claimant to enter the UK on the basis of his criminal convictions. What justified the application of the higher standard of review was the fact that the challenged decision affected the claimant’s vital interests and had potentially grave consequences for him: see §79. Although there need not be a “right” impacted by the challenged decision, I do not think the consequences arising from dismissal come very close to the affected “interests” envisioned by the court in R(KP) so as to justify any higher standard of review. I am afraid that Mr Wong’s submission that the Applicant’s current financial difficulties are a result of the Dismissal Decision – true though that almost certainly is – does not add any significant weight in this regard.

83.  Mr Lam sought to emphasize that the charge here was one of dishonesty – where the Applicant, in full knowledge of the obligation to provide truthful information, was dishonest or gave misleading information in the Interviews. As such, he submitted, Ground 3 should fall away once the severity of the Applicant’s actions are made clear.

84.  For his part, Mr Wong submitted that the Dismissal Decision is indeed oppressive, and hence irrational, taking into account the following circumstances:

(1)  The Applicant had over twelve years of service in the Government and, prior to her arrest and subsequent inquiry, a clear disciplinary record.

(2)  There were a number of mitigating factors in relation to the Interviews, and the mistakes made and reasons for them.

(3)  Compulsory retirement was meted out for the two precedent cases referred to in the SCSD’s Submission, and the allegation that the Applicant’s case is “more serious than the precedents” and “should warrant a heavier punishment than both precedents” is plainly erroneous, if not irrational.

(4)  The misconduct in Charge 1(c) did not affect any persons outside the Applicant’s department, and the impact of the misconduct in terms of “compromising the professional image of the department” and bringing disrepute to the Government was relatively low.

(5)  The Applicant has suffered serious hardship as a result of the Dismissal Decision.

85.  In deciding that the Applicant should be punished by dismissal, the gravity of the misconduct was considered in detail. Amongst other things, it was found that:

(1)  The gravity and nature of the Applicant’s established misconduct of Charge 1(c) was very serious as she provided misleading, self-conflicting and factually incorrect information to ImmD during the investigation, and she failed to provide a clear and honest account of her itinerary before arrest.

(2)  As a civil servant and law enforcement officer, the Applicant should have avoided putting herself in a “suspicious and disadvantaged position” near the scene of unlawful activities.

(3)  The Applicant failed to meet the requirements of honesty and integrity contrary to paragraphs 2.1, 2.2, 3.3 and 3.4 of the then-prevailing Civil Service Code as well as the requirements put forward by the then SCS for all civil servants to uphold the core values and principles of the civil service including law-abiding, dedication, impartiality, political neutrality, etc.

86.  ImmD concluded that, taking into account all circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct and balancing that with the Applicant’s disciplinary and service records, proposed mitigating factors and precedent cases, the Applicant was to be punished by dismissal. Similarly, the SCSD found that compulsory retirement was not adequate enough to reflect the severity of the established misconduct, and supported the recommendation of dismissal.

87.  Considerably wide discretion is given to the Chief Executive – or the SCS as delegated – in determining the punishment, such that he may inflict such punishment “as may seem to him to be just”. This is, as Mr Lam submitted, a decision that the Chief Executive may make with reference to his own considerations of seriousness rather than any objective standard. To an extent I accept that, but not so far as to think the Court could never interfere. However, the likely rare circumstances when Court intervention might be justified have been delineated by the Court of Appeal as described above.

88.  Viewing the evidence holistically, but acknowledging the gravity of the consequences of the Dismissal Decision, I am inclined to think that Ground 3 is reasonably arguable as would justify the grant of leave to apply for judicial review. However, even if so, and in light of the Court of Appeal’s firm reminders – being (1) as to the need for judicial restraint in circumstances such as in this case, (2) that reputation of the profession is far more important than the fortunes of any individual member, so that (3) even when a severe penalty might heavily impact an applicant, which might attract some sympathy, nevertheless “duty to the public” is the test to be applied – I do not think the Applicant’s arguments of oppressiveness/irrationality satisfy the high standard required on substantive hearing to overturn the penalty imposed by Dismissal Decision.

89.  Therefore, Ground 3 also fails.

H.  Result

90.  As all of the grounds of review fail, at least on substantive review, the Applicant’s application for judicial review is dismissed.

91.  As to costs, I presently see no reason why they should not follow the event, and I order the Applicant to pay the SCS’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed. However, I will make this order first on a nisi basis, which will become absolute after 14 days unless an application is made within that period to vary the nisi order. Any variation application will be dealt with on paper.