NAWAZ MUHAMMAD v. NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 1341/2020

[2026] HKCFI 2206

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1341 OF 2020

________________________

BETWEEN

________________

__________________

D E C I S I O N

__________________

1.  By a summons issued on 24 March 2026 (“Summons”) supported by an affirmation of the same date (“Affirmation”) the Applicant applied for an extension of time to appeal my order dated 11 November 2025 (“Order”) wherein I had refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) dated 15 June 2020 (“NRCPO Decision”).

2.  In dealing with the application I have had regard below to the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the prospects of the intended appeal, and the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time is granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346; Nupur Mst [2018] HKCA 524; Nguyen Van Quyen [2025] HKCA 510).

3.  In the Summons, the Applicant said that “The Court has served the judgment to my address” but that he “received it lately and it was out of time to appeal”, hence he asks for an extension of time. The Affirmation reiterates that “my schedule time passed” and asks for permission. As I understand it, the Applicant is thereby apparently claiming that he had received the CALL-1 which had been sent to his address, but on some unspecified date after the 14-day period. No grounds of appeal have been identified by the Applicant.

4.  I refuse the application and dismiss the Summons for the following reasons.

5.  Firstly, as the 14-day period for the Applicant to appeal against the Order expired on 25 November 2025 (RHC O. 53 r. 3(4)), the application is over 3 months late. I do not accept that the Court has been given a reasonable explanation for this substantial and inordinate delay. Both the Notice of Hearing, and the letter of 11 November 2025 from the Court containing the Order and the CALL-1 containing my reasons at [2025] HKCFI 5227, were sent (and were not returned undelivered) by post to the Applicant at the address provided by him in the Form 86[1], which was also his reported address as of 17 July 2025 as had been provided to the court by staff of the Director. Yet he has not provided evidence to substantiate his apparent claim that he had received the Court’s 11 November 2025 letter after the 14-day period in question. Nor has he explained how, why, or when he allegedly received such after that period.

6.  While the Applicant has, for the first time, specified in the Summons and Affirmation a different address at Wing Ning, Tsuen Ping Shan, Yuen Long, I do not see that such is said to (or could) be relevant to his claim, or the delay in question. After all, it was and is his duty to give the court an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner, and he must bear the consequences of any delay or failure of communication arising from his failure to do so (Hasmi Rizwan Imran HKCA 439 at §§14-15; Rai Tika Kumari [2025] HKCA 78).

7.  Secondly, and in any event, the prospects of success of the intended appeal are important as the court will not grant an extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal (Tran Van Anh [2025] HKCA 408). As regards such I had, in my decision, reviewed the NRCPO Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard, and found no reasonably arguable public law grounds to vitiate such. I do not see that there is any proper ground of appeal with any prospect of success, particularly when the Applicant has not identified any basis (in the nature of an error of law, any failure to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court, or that I was plainly wrong) on which the Court of Appeal would reverse my decision (Nupur Mst, supra).

8.  It would therefore be futile to extend time, and would needlessly prejudice the Respondent, were I to grant the Applicant an extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal.