APE ACCESSORIES OF PET EXPRESS (HONG KONG) LTD v. LAU KI WAI AND OTHERS

HCA 2224/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2224 OF 2014

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R U L I N G

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INTRODUCTION

1.  There are four summonses before the court, three of which were taken out by the plaintiff (“P”) and the remaining one was taken out by the first three defendants (“D1-D3”), as follows:

(i) P’s summons[1] seeking specific discovery from the defendants (“the 1^st Summons”);

(ii) P’s summons[2] asking that certain parts of the witness statements of D1 and D2 be expunged on the grounds that they are scandalous, vexatious, irrelevant and inadmissible (“the 2^nd Summons”);

(iii) P’s summons[3] seeking separate trials of the issues of liability and quantum (“the 3^rd Summons”); and

(iv) the summons[4] of D1-D3 asking that P’s interrogatories (without order) served on them[5] be varied or withdrawn (“the 4^th Summons”).

2.  By way of background, P’s case against the defendants, very shortly stated, is that it has been running a successful business of selling and delivering pet food and related products in Hong Kong and D1-D3 were among its former employees.  It is alleged that D1-D3 had conspired together and with other people to obtain customer information from P’s database in breach of their duty of confidentiality and then made use of the information in their own business (Galaxy International) in competition with P after they had left its employ.  D1-D3 ceased the operation of Galaxy International after being warned by P.  However, the wrongdoings still persisted with D1-D3 using D4 as a nominee holding a similar business (Easypet).

3.  The defence case, very shortly stated, is that D1 and D2 had never been in possession of P’s confidential customer information and that they had built up the competing business from scratch through their own hard work and effort.  It is further said that their customers came from referrals and promotional activities.  It is accepted that D4 was just a nominee.  However, it is said that Easypet was set up mainly for securing supplies, as P had influenced its suppliers not to supply goods to Galaxy International.  As regards D3, it is said that he, after leaving P, had been pursuing a career as an insurance agent.  It is said that he had no financial interests in either Galaxy International or Easypet and had taken no part in their operation. After the commencement of the present proceedings in January 2015, the business of Galaxy International and Easypet was sold to a third party respectively in September and October 2015.

4.  I am grateful for the helpful written submissions by Mr Kwong (counsel for the plaintiff) and Mr Lung (counsel for the defence), as well as their oral submissions, all of which I have considered in detail.

AS REGARDS THE 1^ST SUMMONS: SPECIFIC DISCOVERY

Legal principles

5.  The legal principles governing specific discovery are well-known and not in dispute, namely: (1) the specific documents or the class of documents exists; (2) the documents relate to matters in issue in the action; (3) the documents are or had been in the possession, custody or power of the other party; and (4) the documents are necessary to dispose fairly of the matter or to save costs: see Full Range Electronics Co Ltd v General-Tech Industrial Ltd & Anor.[6]

6.  A document would be relevant if it meets the broad criteria laid down in The Compagnie Financiere du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co,[7] namely that the document is one which,

“...it is reasonable to suppose, contains information which may – not which must – either directly or indirectly enable the party requiring the affidavit either to advance his own case or to damage the case of his adversary... if it is a document which may fairly lead him to a train of inquiry, which may have either of these two consequences...”

Based on the above, it is clear that “disclosable documents/records” is much wider in scope than “evidence” and it is not the case that every disclosable document or record will be produced at the trial.

7.  Where the party seeking discovery has established a prima facie case, the court has a discretion to order disclosure.  It is for the party who resists discovery to satisfy the court that the discovery is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs: Tullett Prebon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Chan Yeung Fong Nick & Ors.[8]

8.  In the exercise of its discretion, the court will bear in mind the underlying objectives in Order 1A of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) including cost effectiveness, expeditious disposal of cases, proportionality and procedural economy, fairness between the parties and fair distribution of court resources.

The affidavit evidence

9.  P is asking for discovery of seven heads of documents adumbrated in the Schedule annexed to the 1^st Summons. When considering P’s request, apart from counsel submissions, I have also taken into account what is said in the 5^th and the 8^th Affirmations of Jimmy Lee[9] filed in support of the application, as well as the 2^nd Affirmation of D3[10] and the 2^nd Affirmation of D1[11] filed in opposition thereof.

Head 1: Documents/records including employment contract, engagement letters and tax return and payment records showing that D3 did work and/or pursue a career as an insurance agent

10.  It is D3’s pleaded case that after leaving P’s employ, he pursued a career in the insurance business and had not been involved in the business of D1 and D2.  D3 has produced the following documents in support of his assertion: (i) documents showing that he had, after the first unsuccessful attempt in June 2014, eventually passed all the qualifying examinations in September 2014, which was several months after he had left P in April 2014; and (ii) his registration record as an insurance agent with Prudential Hong Kong Limited dated 21 November 2014 which is valid until 6 November 2017.

11.  I agree with Mr Kwong that the documents disclosed by D3 so far do not seem to show any actual employment of him as an insurance agent.  Rather, it shows just that he was qualified to practise as such.  As it is D3 who raises the issue of his employment as an insurance agent, I consider that P is entitled to ask for documents showing such employment and its duration (with dates of commencement and cessation, if applicable) as a matter of discovery.  On the other hand, given the nature of the work of an insurance agent, I am of the view that whether D3 had a “gainful employment” as an insurance agent is, at best, only of marginal relevance as to whether D3 had in fact been involved in the operation of Galaxy International or Easypet.  Even if he had not been able to make much income as an insurance agent, it does not follow that he would have been involved in the business of D1 and D2 in the relevant period of time.

12.  Therefore, I rule that P’s request under this head should be varied and limited to the following:

“any documents/records including employment contracts, engagement letters showing that D3 did work and/or pursue a career as an insurance agent as alleged in §20 of the Amended Defence and §16 of D3’s witness statement and the duration of such employment (with dates of commencement and cessation, if applicable.”

Heads 2, 3 & 6: Documents/records, including messages and emails, showing the alleged referrals of potential clients by friends/ relatives to Ds and identities of the alleged friends/ relatives and clients being referred to Ds as alleged and documents/records, etc, showing that D2 had maintained contact/friendship with P’s customers whilst in P’s employ.

13.  Head 2 requires the defendants to disclose documents and records showing referrals of customers or potential customers to Galaxy International and Easypet by relatives and friends. Head 3 is a similar request concerning documents and records showing the identity of those friends and relatives and also customers concerned.  Head 6 is yet another similar request save that it is about P’s customers with whom D2 had maintained personal contacts.

14.  So far, D2 had produced some “sample messages” which, he said, showing some of the referrals.   P is not satisfied with the samples provided, both in relation to what the samples purport to show and their quantity.

15.  I note that Galaxy International and Easypet had over 1,200 customers and P’s request under these heads would require the defence to plough through each and every one of their emails, Whatsapp messages, Facebook messages, telephone messages and similar databases to locate the requested documents and also to find out who was referred by whom. Even without of any direct evidence of hardship from the defence, in my view an inference can readily be drawn that the burden imposed on them would be onerous.

16.  More importantly, as pointed out by Mr Lung, it is curious to note that Jimmy Lee in his 8^th affirmation deposed that he has:

“every reason to believe that the messages that have already been produced are all the evidence that Defendants are able to produce, and the alleged referral efforts of ‘anonymous’ friends/relatives simply have no real significance or impact. The Defendants know that there is no further evidence to produce, and this is why they resist the present application.”[12]

If this is what P believes, then it will seriously undermine its basis for seeking specific discovery of other documents/records under these heads which have not yet been disclosed, as P is in effect deposing that those records do not in fact exist.  As Mr Lung rightly points out, this is a matter which goes to the court’s jurisdiction to order specific discovery under Order 24, rule 7(3) of the RHC.  For this reason alone, I would have disallowed P’s request under these heads.

17.  Furthermore, there are other reasons why P’s requests under these heads are objectionable:

(i) As pointed out by Mr Lung, P’s pleaded case has been framed in general terms, namely that D1-D3 had conspired to “steal” confidential information from P’s customer database, that D1-D3 set up a competing business after they had left its employ, that it was subsequently found out that there was an overlap to the extent of 984 customers between P and the defendants and that P had been suffering a decrease in revenue ever since the defendants had engaged in competition.  It is noted that P, by putting forward a general case as above, has not given any particulars about the customers who, they say, had been “enticed away” by the defendants.  Therefore, the defence set out to meet P’s case by making an equally general reply that they had not stolen any of P’s confidential information and that they had developed their own customer base.  Following the general rule, the burden is on P to prove that the defendants had in fact obtained and made use of its confidential customer information in their competing business, the extent of such unlawful usage of customer information and the causation and quantum of damages.

(ii) As such, it is not for the defence to justify each and every customer whom they came into contact.   Of course, if the defence would like to do just that so as to make their case more convincing, it is a matter for them.  However, the present requests for discovery are, in my view, a disguised attempt by P to make the defence help “beefing up” its case. The defence has no such obligation.

(iii) P’s request under these heads is, in my view, unreasonably oppressive, given the amount of damages at stake, the limited value of the discovery sought and the burden which may be imposed on the defence.

Taking into account all of the above, I refuse to exercise my discretion to order discovery under these heads.

Heads 4 & 5: Documents/records showing the promotional activities prior to January 2015 and the expenses incurred for the same

18.  There is no dispute about the relevancy of materials under these heads.  Mr Lung’s reply was that a significant number of documents have already been disclosed as samples and there is no utility in asking for all the promotional materials.  It is asserted that the exercise would be extremely burdensome. 

19.  With respect, I am unable to accept Mr Lung’s submission.  The defence case is that the defendants’ customer base was built up partly by promotional activities.  As such, in my view P would be entitled to seek discovery about the number, frequency and scale of the promotional activities concerned.  The provision of documents of sample promotional activities simply would not serve the purpose.  Also, the claim that the exercise would be “extremely burdensome” is a bare assertion not supported by any objective evidence.  On the other hand, I note also that the period in question is just less than two years.  Moreover, one would reasonably expect that the documents pertaining to the promotional activities in question would form part of the defendants’ normal business records for accounting and tax purpose.  As such, I am unable to see how it could be “extremely burdensome” for the defence to disclose those.

20.  It may be the case that the materials sought under these heads would contain confidential commercial information.  However, as Mr Kwong points out, “confidence” has never been a justification in itself for refusing production, although it may be a relevant matter for the court to take into account in the exercise of its discretion: see Science Research Council v Nasse;[13] and also generally Documentary Evidence in Hong Kong, by Charles Hollander.[14]  Furthermore, Mr Kwong has confirmed that the defence might redact confidential business information, if necessary.  In any event, P will be under an implied undertaking not to use the documents obtained for purposes unrelated to these proceedings: see generally Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2017, at §24/14A/1.

21.  Therefore, I allow the request under these heads.  There is liberty to apply for direction regarding redaction, if necessary.

Head 7: Documents/records including the contract and payment records, etc, showing that Ds had sold the competing business to a third party in October 2015

22.  This head relates to documents showing the sale of Galaxy International and Easypet and the identity of the purchaser.

23.  With respect, I am unable to see the relevancy of the documents sought under this head to any pleaded issues.  There have been no pleadings that the sale of either Galaxy International or Easypet was other than genuine or that the defendants had been carrying on a competing business in names other than Galaxy International and Easypet.  Therefore, I am unable to see how the discovery sought under this head can have any bearing on the resolution of the pleaded issues.  If it is P’s speculation that the defendants might have still been engaging in a similar business as before, then in my view it would not be a proper exercise of the court’s discretion to order specific discovery on the basis of a mere speculation.

24.  If, as Mr Kwong contends, the information is relevant to injunctive relief, then the answer, as pointed out by Mr Lung, is that any injunctive relief will be personal against the defendants regardless of the name by which they carry on their competing business. 

25.  I disallow the request under this head.

Conclusion on the 1^st Summons

26.  Based on the above, the results are as follows:

(a) Head 1 is allowed but varied as set out above;

(b) Heads 4 and 5 are allowed, with liberty to apply in relation to redaction, if so advised; and

(c) Heads 2, 3, 6 and 7 are not allowed.

AS REGARDS (II): STRIKING OUT

Legal principles

27.  Again, the legal principles are not in dispute and they are conveniently summarised in Talent Weaving Dyeing & Printing Ltd v Able Billion Textiles Ltd[15] (as per Registrar Lung) as follows:

(a) this court has the jurisdiction to strike out or expunge any scandalous matter in the witness statements;

(b) evidence that bears no relevance to the pleaded issues in dispute is scandalous and is inadmissible and liable to be struck out;

(c) evidence given by way of witness statements pursuant to Order 38, rule 2A shall not make inadmissible evidence admissible;

(d) witness statement which is inconsistent with the party’s own pleadings should be struck out, and to decide relevance, the court will only refer to the pleadings;

(e) scandalous parts of witness statements by reference to the pleaded issues should be struck out; and

(f) evidence that is beyond the ambit of the pleaded issues is scandalous and should be struck out.

28.  On the other hand, there is a caveat, as pointed out by Mr Lung, at pre-trial stage the court should only strike out those parts that are plainly objectionable, and in case of doubt, the matter should be left for determination by the trial judge: Ng Yuk Pui Kelly v Dung Wai Man & Others.[16]

Affidavit evidence

29.  I have regard to what is said in the 6^th affirmation of Jimmy Lee filed in support of P’s application.  However, what is contained in that affirmation to a very large extent depends on the legal advice that the deponent has received.

D1’s witness statement, §§51 & 52

30.  In these paragraphs, D1 says he suspected that P obtained the customer lists of Galaxy International and Easypet through theft by a Ms Fok and he gives his grounds (consisting of certain factual circumstances) for so suspecting.  On the other hand, it is P’s case that it obtained the lists with the help of forensic computer experts.

31.  Judging from what D1 says in the above paragraphs, he does not dispute that the customer lists obtained by P were in fact those of Galaxy International and Easypet.  There is also no dispute that there was a substantial overlap of customers between P and the defendants.  As such, with respect to Mr Lung, I do not consider the way P managed to obtain the customer lists of Galaxy International and Easypet as important to the main issues.  However, I agree with Mr Lung that it may be relevant to the credibility of Ms Fok if she is to be called as a witness for P.

32.  In the circumstances, I refuse to expunge the aforesaid paragraphs from D1’s witness statement.

D1’s witness statement, §53

33.  In this paragraph, D1 expresses his personal opinion that P’s case is sketchy and baseless.

34.  Mr Kwong complains that the words are not facts that D1 can prove to his own knowledge and therefore should be expunged: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2017, at §38/2A/6.  Mr Lung’s reply is that even assuming that P’s submission is technically correct, it services no practical purpose by taking out that part. 

35.  As a matter of principle, I agree with the submission of Mr Kwong and I order that the paragraph be expunged.

D1’s witness statement, §§82-84

36.  These paragraphs are about: (i) the allegation that P had exerted pressure on suppliers so as to make it difficult for Galaxy International and Easypet to conduct their business (§82); and (ii) D1’s suspicion that P had caused complaints to be made to the Consumer Council (§83) and Next Magazine (§84) against Galaxy International and Easypet. 

37.  Mr Lung submits that the above paragraphs would provide the trial judge with the full picture and they also tend to show that P was merely concerned with driving the defendants out of competition.

38.  With respect, I am not in agreement with Mr Lung as regards the advantage that the court may have by having regard to what he said is the “full picture”.  A “full picture” would be helpful insofar as it enables the court to understand and resolve the issues that are put forward by the parties as contained in the pleadings.  However, the court is not tasked to resolve and is not concerned with all the disputes between the parties.  Moreover, more often than not financial considerations are the main reason behind litigations on commercial matters.  It is also understandable that businessmen naturally do not like competition, especially when it is from their former employees.  Nevertheless, motives of the litigants are generally not relevant to the issues that the court is tasked to determine.

39.  As regards (i) above, in the present case even if it is P’s motive to drive the defendants out of competition by the present proceedings, I am unable to see how this would help the tribunal of facts to decide whether or not the defendants had in fact obtained and made use of P’s customer information in breach of their duty of confidentiality.

40.  As regards (ii), I note that the matters stated in §§83 & 84 are only D1’s speculations of which there is no evidence in support.  In fact, at §83 D1 has not even identified P as the source of the complaint.  In my view, the allegations tend to distract the court from the issues.

41.  Therefore, I order that the paragraphs be expunged.

D2’s witness statement, §24

42.  In this paragraph, D2 alleges that Mr Lee of P was so angry with him that he tried to drive him out of competition by harassment, by the proceedings in the Small Claims Tribunal and by the present proceedings.  D2 even said that he had heard that Mr Lee had resorted to triad members. 

43.  Mr Lung submits that the above allegation forms the background of the present action and should not be struck out.  With great respect, I am unable to agree with him.  My reasons are as follows:

(a) As aforesaid, P’s motive in taking out the present proceedings is plainly not necessary and unhelpful to the resolution of the issues.

(b) D2’s allegation that Mr Lee had resort to triad is not only devoid of details, but also based on hearsay from an unidentified source.  Therefore, its probative value is very much in doubt. On the other hand, it is very prejudicial to P. 

(c) In any event, the allegation contains a serious imputation against Mr Lee’s general character which is a matter beyond the scope of analysis for the court: see Sun Legend Investments Ltd v Ho Yuk Wah.[17]

44.  Therefore, in my ruling this paragraph should be expunged from D2’s witness statement.

Conclusion on the 2^nd Summons

45.  To conclude, it is ordered that:

(a) as regards D1’s witness statement, §§51 & 52 are to remain but §§53, 82-84 are to be expunged; and

(b) as regards D2’s witness statement, §24 is to be expunged.

AS TO (III): SPLIT TRIAL

Legal principles

46.  The general rule is that in civil cases, apart from cases involving intellectual property, all issues ought to be tried and resolved in one go.  A split trial on liability and quantum is an exception rather than the norm.  See Coenen v Payne.[18]

Consideration

47.  Relying on what is said in the 7^th affirmation of Jimmy Lee, the contents of which I have duly noted, Mr Kwong contends that the determination of the issue of quantum would require extensive discovery and expert evidence.  It is further submitted that the issue of quantum may not arise at all.  It is therefore submitted that a split trial would expedite the trial, save costs and much of court’s time.

48.  I am surprised that the suggestion that there may not be a trial on quantum would come from P rather than the defence.  With respect, I am unable to agree with Mr Kwong on whether there should be a split trial. My reasons are as follows:

(a) In my view, the questions of liability and quantum are intertwined in the present case.  As pointed out by Mr Lung, the question on liability would necessarily require evidence on the extent of the diversion of business opportunities, if any, from P.  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that many of the case materials would relate to both liability and quantum.  On the other hand, in case of a split trial the court should as a general rule exercise its discretion in favour of limiting discovery as appropriate to the stage of the proceedings: Baldock v Addison.[19]  However, there would likely to be difficulties in limiting discovery and thus undermining one of the advantages of having a split trial. 

(b) Nor can I see how the necessity or otherwise of having expert evidence, which is a common feature in civil litigations, can provide a sufficient justification for a split trial.

(c) I do not agree that much of court’s time can be saved.  Depending on how the issue of liability is resolved, another set of trial dates will have to be fixed for the hearing on quantum and there is bound to be a time gap in between.

Conclusion on the 3^rd Summons

49.  In my view, the matters relied upon by Mr Kwong, whether taken individually or as a whole, do not justify a split trial in the present case.  As such, I refuse to exercise my discretion to order a split trial.

AS TO (IV): INTERROGATORIES

Legal principles

50.  There is no dispute as to the applicable legal principles which have been summarized by Ma J (as his Lordship then was) in Kao Lee & Yip v Donald Koo Hoi Yan & Ors:[20]

(1) The general principle is that interrogatories are admissible where they go to support the applicant's case or destroy the opponent's.  The width of this general principle is similar to the Peruvian Guano principles governing discovery of documents.

(2) However, this only goes to the question of admissibility. Whether a court will in its discretion allow interrogatories is entirely a different matter.  Too often in the past, there has been a tendency to order interrogatories once admissibility is demonstrated.  This is wrong.

(3) In the exercise of its discretion, the court must bear in mind that interrogatories will be ordered only where they are necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter, or for saving costs.  This is the key consideration going to the exercise of discretion.

51.  As regards how the court should exercise its discretion, Ma J referred to Lee Nui Foon v Ocean Park Corporation (No 2)[21]where Cheung J (as his Lordship then was) said that the relevant factors include:

(a) the interrogatories must not be fishing, oppressive, prolix or imprecise.  An interrogatory will be oppressive if the answer cannot be given without an examination of the respondent's record, with the expenditure of much time and trouble: Parker v Wells;[22]

(b) the interrogatories must not be questions which went to the evidence the opposing party intended to adduce;

(c) the interrogatories must not be questions which went to the facts which would assist in establishing the opposing party as opposed to the case of the party seeking to interrogate; and

(d) the interrogatories must not be effectively asking for documents of discovery.

52.  Ma J also drew special attention to Det Danske Hedeselskabet v. KDM International Plc[23] where Colman J referred to various considerations for the court to bear in mind when considering the question of interrogatories:

"Fifthly, requests for information ascertainable by cross-examination at the trial are inappropriate unless the party questioning can establish that it is essential for the proper preparation of his case that such information is made available to him before trial, in the sense that if the matter is left until cross-examination at the trial that party will, or probably will be irremediably prejudiced in his conduct of the trial or the trial may be unduly interrupted or otherwise disorganised by the late emergence of the information."

Request 1: People who had made referrals to D1 and representatives of Galaxy International and Easypet who had received such referrals

53.  This is P’s request to D1 to state the names of the relatives and friends who had referred customers to Galaxy International and Easypet, their occupation, their relationship with D1, for how long they have known D1 and the circumstances in which they came to know each other.  It further requests D1 to state the identities and particulars of “all the other persons who have referred customers/clients” to the two companies.  Lastly, it requests D1 to list out the names of the representatives of Galaxy International and Easypet who had received the referrals and the relationship of such representatives and the referrers.

54.  Bearing in mind the legal principles stated above, with great respect, P’s request under this head, viewing as a whole, seems to me to be a typical example of a fishing expedition.  It has to be borne in mind that the burden is on P to prove its case at the trial and not the other way round.  By the same token, the defence has not obligation to help P prepare its case.

55.  In my view, P is only entitled to know the names of the persons who, the defence says, had made referrals to the defendants under items (a) & (f)(i) and also the names of the representatives of Galaxy/Easypet who have received such referrals under item (g).  However, I disallow all the other requests under this head.

Request 2: Customers who had made purchase

56.  This is P’s request for D1 to state who, out of around 250 customers (whose contact details are said to have been collated from the defendants’ promotional activities) had eventually purchased products from Galaxy International and Easypet.

57.  With respect, I find this request not only oppressive but also unnecessary for fair disposal of the matter or for saving costs.  The people who provided their names to the defendants during promotion may not necessarily be the same people who placed orders, as the orders could have been placed by the people who had given their names to the defendants.  Also, the interrogatory is effectively asking the defendants to justify the orders which came to them.  It is also effectively asking for documents of discovery. Therefore, I disallow this request.

Request 3: Identity of purchaser who took over Galaxy International and Easypet

58.  This request is similar to Head 7 of 1^st Summons which I have disallowed.

59.  I find that this request does not relate to any of the issues in this action.  As submitted by Mr Lung, who ultimately took over the competing business does not affect the issues that the court will have to resolve at the trial.  I disallow this request.

Request 4: Names and contact details of P’s Customers with whom D2 maintained friendship/contacts whilst in P’s employ

60.  This request is similar in substance to Head 6 of the 1^st Summons.  It is also similar in substance to Request 1. 

61.  Having considered the principle stated in Det Danske Hedeselskabet v KDM International Plc above, I exercise my discretion to allow this request but limit it to the extent of the names of the customers with whom he had maintained friendship/contacts whilst he was in P’s employ.  P should already have their contact details in its database.

Request 5: People who had made referrals to D2 and representatives of Galaxy International and Easypet who had received such referrals

62.  This request is similar to Request 1 and therefore similar considerations apply.

63.  As regards (a) – (d) of this request, the relevant conversation between D2 and his friend (who is said to have made 30 referrals to D2) has already been disclosed.[24] However, the document does not show the friend’s identity.  I am of the view that P is entitled to ask who that “friend” was and I am unable to see why D2 should conceal the name from P.  Therefore, (a) is allowed.  As regards the other information sought by P, namely (b) the occupation of the friend; (c) for how long D2 had known him; and (d) how D2 came to know him, those items are in my view plainly irrelevant to the issues to be tried.

64.  Similarly, as regards (e), which is about the identity and particulars of other people who had made referrals to D2, I would allow the interrogatory about (i) the names of those referrers.  However, I would not allow (ii) their occupations; (iii) for how long D2 had known them; and (iv) how he came to know them, which are in my view plainly irrelevant.

65.  As regards (f), which is about the names of those representatives of Galaxy/Easypet who had received referrals, I would exercise my discretion to allow it.  However, I would not allow (g) which asks about the relationship between the representatives and the referrers, as I consider this to be plainly irrelevant.

66.  To conclude, in relation to this request I allow only (a), (e)(i) and (f) but not the others.

COSTS

67.  Neither side is wholly successful in their respective applications.  In the circumstances, I make an order nisi that there no order as to costs as regards the four summonses before the court.