XU, YANPING v. HIBBERD, ROBIN SIDNEY

HCZZ 22/2026

[2026] HKCFI 2056

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

INTENDED ACTION NO 22 OF 2026

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  This is an ex parte application taken out by the plaintiff by affidavit and is heard in the absence of the defendant.

2.  The background facts are that the plaintiff and the defendant are in the course of matrimonial proceedings in the Family Court with a trial on ancillary relief in about May or June this year.

3.  For the present High Court intended action, the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is based on commercial fraud. One primary basis was that the defendant allegedly fraudulently gained unauthorised access to the plaintiff’s personal account on a date in around June 2023 and there are complaints about the defendant’s way of handling trust of which he is not the beneficiary.

4.  The plaintiff claims to have some causes of action against the defendant which will require appointment of other fiduciaries to handle the trust properly. The plaintiff also alleges that due to misrepresentations made by the defendant at the Family Court, an injunction was obtained by the defendant on ex parte basis on about 19 June 2023. As a result of that injunction, the plaintiff’s accounts, including corporate accounts, were frozen. I have been shown an electronic copy of that injunction which was granted by the Family Court.

5.  For today’s application, the plaintiff has given me a draft injunction order. On broad terms, D’s application should be dismissed because there is no urgency or secrecy which justifies an application on ex parte basis. By way of example, the injunction was granted in June 2023 and we are now in March 2026. Plainly, there is no urgency.

6.  There is also no secrecy because the substance of the application actually involves rights between the plaintiff and the defendant over, for example, documents already filed in the Family Court and trusts already known to the parties. And for some of the orders sought, it will have an impact on how the Family Court will handle the trial in the ancillary relief proceedings in June 2026. For some of the reliefs, the proper forum for the application is the Family Court and not this Court.

7.  I now turn to the draft order and consider the applications one by one. Clause 1 of the draft order seeks to restrain the defendant from interfering with the economic interests or administration of various trusts “through the parties’ on-going matrimonial proceedings now before the Family Court”.

8.  It is inappropriate for this court to grant such a wide order which may have impact on the way the defendant may present his case in the matrimonial proceedings and how the Family Court should deal with the ancillary relief issue. It is particularly inappropriate to grant this order in the absence of the defendant.

9.  Clause 2 seeks a stay of the Family Court proceedings pending final determination of this action. In my view, the application for stay of Family Court proceedings should be done properly in the Family Court and not here in the High Court. The Family Court proceedings deal with a lot more matters than just the trust mentioned by the plaintiff in the present case. Accordingly, without the papers in the Family Court, in the proceedings before me, it is entirely inappropriate for the High Court to grant a stay of the Family Court proceedings.

10.  Clause 3 is in fact related to the trust matters in Clause 1 and Clause 4. What the plaintiff is seeking is the appointment of an interim fiduciary on an interim basis with powers to manage the trust. Again, I see no urgency or secrecy to grant these orders in the absence of the defendant.

11.  Clause 5 seeks to discharge prior freezing orders, injunction orders or undertakings affecting the trust. The papers do not disclose which injunction it was but I am shown an electronic copy of the injunction granted in the Family Court in 2023. The documents showed that on around 25 August 2023 the matter went before H.H. Judge Lo in the Family Court.

12.  According to paragraph 2 of his decision dated 13 October 2023, the parties have settled their disagreements on the injunction. The defendant in the present case, ie, the husband, invited the plaintiff in this case, that is the wife, to continue her undertakings not to remove any asset from two trust accounts and the wife agreed. They could not agree on the costs and so the judge went on to discuss costs.

13.  It is not clear that the injunction had continued. It was probably replaced by an undertaking. Therefore even if the injunction was initially obtained by fraud, according to the plaintiff, in the first place, there appears to be no injunction which can be uplifted and if there is still an injunction in place or effective undertakings in place, the proper venue to set aside them is the Family Court, not the High Court.

14.  If the plaintiff had suffered loss due to the defendant’s application for an ex parte injunction in the Family Court, she can have recourse by seeking damages under an undertaking as to damages pursuant to that injunction. It is not appropriate for the High Court to deal with questions of setting aside of the injunction or undertaking. The proper forum appears to be the Family Court.

15.  Clause 6 of the application seeks effectively an injunction against the defendant restraining him from representing to any financial institution or third-party that he is the owner or acting trustee of two trusts. Once again, I do not see why this matter, even if appropriate, should be done in the absence of the defendant when there is no urgency or secrecy. Effectively, the plaintiff admits that she actually wants some kind of stay in the Family Court proceedings. As I have stated, it is not appropriate for me to grant a stay here.

16.  Clauses 7 to 9 require disclosure of assets and release of information. It is not clear what the purpose of the assets or information is for. The plaintiff has applied for similar disclosure in the Family Court. In the judgment of H.H. Judge Simon Lo dated 2 July 2025, the learned judge commented that part of the disclosure sought related to the wife’s intended action in the High Court, intended complaints to the Law Society of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Bar Association against the husband’s former solicitors and his two former counsel.

“14. I consider that the wife has failed to identify what type of High Court action she is contemplating. While she seems to suggest a claim in the tort of harassment and/or intimidation, the Schedule A documents would not give rise to such causes of action or come to prove in her favour.”

17.  If the documents that the plaintiff now seeks disclosure of is related to the present High Court action, she has not clearly set out the basis of her claim and how the documents may be relevant to her present claim.

18.  Further, the documents are already in existence. There is no urgency or secrecy which would have justified her coming to this court on ex parte basis. If she has a proper case to ask for disclosure of the Family Court proceedings for use in the High Court action, that may be a matter for another day.

(Discussion re clarification)

19.  In summary, I do not find it appropriate to grant any of the eight items of order sought. So I dismiss this ex parte application.