YU PAK KAN v. BUSY FIRM INVESTMENT LTD

CAMP 445/2022

[2023] HKCA 105

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 445 OF 2022

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM DCCJ NOS 2083 & 3630 OF 2017 (CONSOLIDATED))

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Chow JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

INTRODUCTION

1.  This is a renewed application by Busy Firm Investment Limited (“the Defendant”)  for leave to appeal against the judgment of Deputy District Judge Tracy Chan (“the Judge”)  dated 14 July 2022 upholding Yu Pak Kan (“the Plaintiff”)’s claim of adverse possession in respect of a portion of Lot 1006 in DD 122 (“the Portion”)  of which the Defendant was the paper owner.

2.  Having considered the Defendant’s Written Statement in support of the application for leave to appeal dated 26 October 2022 and the Plaintiff’s Written Statement in opposition to the application dated 8 November 2022, as well as the papers before us, we consider it appropriate to determine the leave application on the basis of written submissions only without an oral hearing pursuant to Order 59, rule 2A(5)(a)  of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A.

BASIC FACTS

3.  The Plaintiff is the legal and beneficial owner of Lot 1005 in DD 122, Yuen Long, New Territories (“Lot 1005”), which he purchased from 2 sisters (“the Vendors”)  in 2004.  The Defendant was the paper owner of a neighbouring lot, namely, Lot 1006 in DD 122 (“Lot 1006”).

4.  According to the Plaintiff, in 2003, he was looking for a place for his fire services installations business (“the Business”), and was taken by a property agent (“the Agent”)  to view a stone house (“Stone House”), which was erected partly upon Lot 1005 and partly upon Lot 1006.  He was given to understand that the Stone House was being used and occupied by the mother of the Vendors.  On his physical inspection of the Stone House, he observed that Lot 1005 was fenced off together with (inter alia)  the Portion (“the Occupied Area”), which also included a small portion of another neighbouring lot (namely, Lot 1004).  Originally, he found Lot 1005 to be too small for his purpose and did not make a decision to purchase it immediately.  Later, he went back and talked to the Vendors’ mother and told her that he wanted to purchase the Portion as well as Lot 1005.  The Vendors’ mother told him that they did not own the Portion and therefore they could not sell it to him.  However, she also said that she had been using the Portion for many years without interruption, and confirmed that part of the Stone House was built outside Lot 1005 and stood upon the Portion.

5.  Eventually, the Plaintiff and the Vendors entered into a provisional sale and purchase agreement (“the Provisional Agreement”)  dated 6 February 2004, under which the Plaintiff agreed to purchase from the Vendors the property described as “元朗永寧村 D.D.122, Lot 1005, 地連石屋一間” (Yuen Long Wing Ning Village D.D. 122, Lot 1005, land together with a stone house)  for the consideration of HK$200,000.  On the day of the signing of the Provisional Agreement, the Plaintiff mentioned to the Vendors that the existing fencings were old and had to be replaced.  The Vendors told him that he could start constructing new fencings.  The keys to the Stone House were then handed over to the Plaintiff.  On the next day, he engaged 3 workers to build new hoardings (“the Hoardings”) more or less along the inside of the old fencings and also installed a new gate (“the Gate”)  for access to the Occupied Area.

6.  On 20 February 2004, the Plaintiff entered into a formal sale and purchase agreement with the Vendors.  Completion of the sale and purchase took place on 2 December 2004.

7.  Apart from the Hoardings, the Plaintiff said that he had carried out works in the Occupied Area from time to time.  He realigned the electricity cables and fixed some electricity sockets and switches inside the Stone House, and renovated the toilet and kitchen.  He levelled a small slope near the Gate with bricks, and built canopies along the Hoardings near the right hand side of the Gate.  He used the covered area for storage of the fire-fighting equipment of the Business.  Later, he also built a metal rack and a canvass canopy at the top near the Gate.  The canvass canopy had been blown away by typhoon several times, and he fixed and repaired the same from time to time.

8.  On 2 August 2017, Lot 1005 and Lot 1006 were resumed by and reverted to the Hong Kong Government pursuant to the Lands Resumption Ordinance, Cap 124.

9.  It is the Plaintiff’s case that he had dispossessed the Defendant and had been in exclusive adverse possession of the Portion since early 2004 for a continuous period of more than 12 years, and the Defendant’s title to and interest in the Portion had been extinguished by virtue of s 17 of the Limitation Ordinance, Cap 347.

10.  On 31 March 2017, the Defendant commenced HCA 797/2017 in the High Court (which later became DCCJ 3630/2017)  to recover vacant possession of the Portion against the Plaintiff.

11.  On 4 May 2017, the Plaintiff commenced DCCJ 2083/2017 in the District Court against the Defendant for (inter alia)  a declaration that he had acquired a good possessory title to the Portion.

12.  The two actions were consolidated by an order of Master S H Lee dated 8 September 2017.

THE JUDGMENT

13.  The consolidated action was tried by the Judge in November 2021.

14.  By a written judgment dated 14 July 2022 ([2022] HKDC 615)  (“the Judgment”), the Judge found in favour of the Plaintiff.  In the Judgment, the Judge made, inter alia, the following findings:

(1)  The Plaintiff fully enclosed the Occupied Area by the Hoardings with the Gate installed in early 2004.

(2)  With such complete fencing of the Occupied Area, the Plaintiff had exclusive possession (ie factual possession)  of the Occupied Area since 2004.

(3)  The Plaintiff had also proved the necessary animus possidendi (ie an intention to exclude all others or the world at large from the Occupied Area)  required for establishing adverse possession since 2004.

(4)  The Plaintiff had been using the Occupied Area soon after the assignment on 2 December 2004 for the Business and also as his residence.

15.  Accordingly, the Judge granted the following declarations:

(1)  the Plaintiff had acquired a good possessory title to the Portion prior to the date of its resumption by the Government on 2 August 2017;

(2)  the Defendant was barred from bringing any action against the Plaintiff for recovery of the Portion; and

(3)  the Defendant’s title to and interest in the Portion had been extinguished prior to the date of the resumption.

THE APPEAL

16.  The Defendant was not satisfied with the Judgment, and sought leave to appeal from the Judge.  On 12 October 2022, the Judge gave a decision refusing to grant leave to appeal, holding that there was no reasonable prospect of success in the Defendant’s intended appeal, and there was no other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard ([2022] HKDC 1092)  (“the Leave Decision”)

17.  By summons dated 26 October 2022 (“the Summons”)  filed in the Court of Appeal, the Defendant renewed the application for leave to appeal.  Five grounds of intended appeal have been raised by the Defendant:

(1)  The Judge erred in law, failed to take into account or give reasons for rejecting relevant matters and/or was plainly wrong in her assessment of the credibility of the Plaintiff (“Ground 1”).

(2)  The Judge erred in law and/or fact in relying solely on the self-serving and uncorroborated assertions of the Plaintiff that he was the one who erected the Hoardings on 7 February 2004 (“Ground 2”).

(3)  The Judge erred in finding that the Plaintiff mistakenly believed that he purchased the Portion as supporting an intention to possess (“Ground 3”).

(4)  The Judge erred in law and/or fact in placing the burden of proof for establishing the existence of a licence on the Defendant when as a matter of law the burden is on the alleged squatter (ie the Plaintiff)  to establish, by cogent and compelling evidence, that he was in possession of the land as of wrong and not by virtue of any licence or permission (“Ground 4”).

(5)  In assessing the evidence of the Plaintiff, the Judge erred in law in failing to direct herself on the necessity of cogent and compelling evidence from the alleged squatter to establish the elements of adverse possession and to caution herself against placing undue weight on the self-serving statements and assertions made by the alleged squatter (“Ground 5”).

DISCUSSION

18.  The test for granting leave to appeal under s 14AA of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4, is well settled.  Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success, or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal shall be heard.  For this purpose, reasonable prospect of success means that the prospect must be more than “fanciful”, but does not have to be “probable”.

19.  The applicable principles concerning appeals against findings of fact made by a primary judge are well settled: see the judgment of Lam VP (as he then was)  in China Gold Finance Ltd v CIL Holdings Ltd, CACV 11/2015, 27 November 2015, at §§11-22 -

(1)  The Court of Appeal can only intervene in a finding of fact by a primary judge where the finding is plainly wrong.

(2)  It is a misuse of the appellate process to place before the Court of Appeal submissions which, in substance, are (or should be)  submissions advanced by way of closing submissions at the trial after the judge has heard all the evidence.

(3)  In an appeal, the Court of Appeal focuses on the question whether the primary judge has fallen into palpable errors which could give rise to grounds for intervention by the appellate court.  It is not germane that the Court of Appeal may reach a different conclusion from that of the judge.

(4)  It is not helpful for counsel and litigants in person to merely repeat submissions already advanced and considered by the primary judge at the trial.  The starting point should be the judgment of the primary judge and the identification of palpable errors (which must be errors of such nature which warrant intervention by the Court of Appeal)  in the judgment.  The mere assertion that the finding of the judge is against the weight of the evidence or that the judge should have reached another conclusion because of points advanced in the closing submissions below are not errors coming within that category.

(5)  Where a trial judge has reached a conclusion on the primary facts, the kinds of mistake which could engage an appellate court’s power of intervention are: (i)  where there was no evidence to support the conclusion, (ii)  the conclusion was based on a misunderstanding of the evidence, or (iii)  the conclusion was one which no reasonable judge could have reached.

(6)  With the recognition of the rationale for appellate restraint, there is also a greater appreciation of the need to exercise restraint in respect of findings of secondary facts based on inference drawn from findings of primary fact.

Ground 1

20.  Ground 1 concerns the Judge’s assessment of the credibility of the Plaintiff.  The Defendant raises three points in support of this ground.

21.  First, it is argued that the Judge wrongly dismissed the significance of “certain matters” which affected the credibility of the Plaintiff on the basis that they were not “directly relevant to the issues in dispute” when (i)  such matters were relied upon by the Plaintiff to bolster his factual case, and (ii)  the Plaintiff’s credibility is of central importance in view of the fact that his evidence consisted largely of his own uncorroborated assertions.

22.  This complaint has no validity.  The Judge was fully aware of the need to evaluate the credibility of the Plaintiff against the backdrop of undisputed and indisputable facts, and to weigh the inherent probabilities of the parties’ respective cases.  The Judge also correctly reminded herself that the internal consistency (or inconsistency)  of the Plaintiff’s evidence would have a bearing on whether his evidence was credible and reliable on the whole, that the events related by the Plaintiff span over a long period of time and it was not impossible that his memories might fail him, and that she should also be guided by the overall impression of the characters and motivations of the Plaintiff (§20 of the Judgment).  The Judge was entitled to take the view that the various matters relied upon by Mr Chan for attacking the credibility of the Plaintiff, including the date on which he registered the Business, whether Kitty So & Tong were nominated by the Plaintiff to represent him in the land transaction, and whether he had told the Agent and Kitty So & Tong that he had purchased the Portion, were not directly relevant to the central issues in dispute (namely, whether the Plaintiff had proved the two essential elements of adverse possession for a continuous period of at least 12 years), and accept the Plaintiff’s evidence or explanations in respect of those matters (§§22-32 of the Judgment).  It is incorrect to say that the Plaintiff’s evidence consisted largely of his own uncorroborated assertions.  His case was supported by aerial photographs, survey sheets and the expert evidence of a surveyor (Mr Leung), whose evidence was accepted by the Judge.  In finding that the Plaintiff had proved the necessary animus possidendi, the Judge expressly reminded herself that apart from the assertion (self-serving statement)  made by the Plaintiff, his intention could be inferred from his act (namely, the erection of the Hoardings)  (§46 of the Judgment).  The Judge’s approach regarding the evaluation of the Plaintiff’s evidence cannot be faulted.

23.  Second, the Defendant argued that the Judge wrongly characterised his counsel’s question of or suggestion to the Plaintiff that Winning (a client of the Plaintiff)  first patronised the Business in 2016 as “made on no basis” when it was the Plaintiff who volunteered that answer. In his evidence, the Plaintiff said that he registered the Business in 2016 because that was suggested to him by Winning.  The Plaintiff did not, in his original answer to the Defendant’s counsel, say that Winning first patronised him in 2016.  That was a suggestion put to the Plaintiff by the Defendant’s counsel in cross-examination.  The Plaintiff initially accepted this suggestion, but later retracted it upon being shown some business records, explaining that he had made a mistake and his memories failed him (§§24 and 25 of the Judgment).  The Judge was entitled to accept the Plaintiff’s explanation for the mistake.  As for the Judge’s remark that the said suggestion by the Defendant’s counsel was “made on no basis”, the Judge clearly explained her reasons for this remark (§23 of the Judgment).  On any view of the matter, this is a very minor point which cannot possibly give rise to a valid ground of appeal.

24.  Third, the Defendant argues that the Judge failed to take into account or give any reasons for not taking into account the Plaintiff’s inconsistent testimony as to whether or not he had specifically told the Agent and the staff of Kitty So & Tong that he had agreed to purchase not only Lot 1005 and the Stone House but also the Portion.

25.  The Judge considered the evidence given by the Plaintiff, but did not find his evidence to be inconsistent as submitted by the Defendant’s counsel (§§29-31 of the Judgment):

“[29] I have considered all the evidence. I find that Mr Yu’s evidence is not inconsistent with the circumstances of the present case. The Property Agent introduced to him Lot 1005 which he found suitable but too small. When he spoke to the Mother, he knew that they did not own the Portion but had been in use for many years. He said he did not find it necessary to tell the Property Agent that he had purchased also the Portion together with Lot 1005. He was asked whether he had asked the Property Agent to attach a map showing the boundaries of what he had purchased. He said he did not find it necessary because he spoke to the Land Owners, they agreed, all parties agreed, and the Mother had used it for so many years. I accept his evidence.

[30] When asked whether he had told the solicitor or legal executive he had purchased Portion also, he said he did and they replied that the place was big enough. He was asked whether he asked the solicitor or the Property Agent to add Portion of Lot 1006 to any of the sale and purchase agreements, be it provisional or formal, he said he did not because he did not know the law, he did not know these things.

[31]  Having heard Mr Yu and considered his evidence, I find that he was not articulate enough to express himself fluently. I however accept that he told the court what had happened during the negotiation and the transaction the best he could in the light of time lapse. I do not find the complaint of Mr Chan about the credibility of Mr Yu substantiated.”

26.  The Judge explained in greater detail why she did not find the Plaintiff’s evidence to be inconsistent at §§14-18 of the Leave Decision.  The Judge acknowledged that it might have been better if she had set out her analysis in the Judgment (§19 of the Leave Decision).

27.  Generally speaking, analysis of the consistency (or inconsistency)  of the oral evidence of a witness is a matter primarily for the trial judge.  The depth or level of the analysis required depends on the circumstances of the case, including the significance the evidence under consideration as well as the nature and seriousness of the alleged inconsistency.  The trial judge is not obliged to deal with each and every minor factual point raised by a party in his judgment, or deal with it to the depth or level that the party may desire.  Where the trial judge decides to expressly address a particular factual point in a judgment, what is required of the judge is that he should demonstrate that he correctly grasps the point, and explain his essential reasoning and how the point is resolved.

28.  In our view, the manner in which the Judge dealt with the alleged inconsistencies in the Plaintiff’s testimony at §§29 and 30 of the Judgment is sufficient in the circumstances of the present case.  We have also considered the Judge’s analysis at §§14-18 of the Leave Decision and read the relevant parts of the transcript of the Plaintiff’s evidence.  We consider that it was open to the Judge to take the view that there was no inconsistency in the Plaintiff’s evidence.

Ground 2

29.  Under this ground, the Defendant argues that the Judge erred in relying solely on the self-serving and uncorroborated assertions of the Plaintiff that he was the one who erected the Hoardings in February 2004.  Three points are raised in support of this ground:

(1)  The Judge erroneously focused primarily on whether the Hoardings were in existence at the material times but failed to apply her mind or give any adequate reasons to address the question of whether the Plaintiff had established by cogent and compelling evidence that he was the one who caused the Hoardings to be erected.

(2)  The Judge failed to take into account or give reasons for not taking into account the fact that the Plaintiff failed to produce documentary record of the alleged HK$35,000 spent on erecting the Hoardings despite the fact that he was able to produce records of construction works carried out for his business dating as far back as 2002 and 2003.

(3)  The Judge failed to draw adverse inference against the Plaintiff for failing to call any of the 3 construction workers, whom the Plaintiff said were familiar to him and were his regular workers, to give evidence at the trial.

30.  None of these points has merit.  In respect of (1), there was no requirement on the Judge to expressly state in the Judgment that she should look for cogent or compelling evidence in support of the Plaintiff’s case on adverse possession.  The Plaintiff’s evidence that it was he who caused the Hoardings to be erected was not contradicted by any evidence, and there was nothing inherently improbable in that evidence.  The Judge was entitled to accept his evidence on this matter.  In respect of (2), the Plaintiff said that he paid for the materials for the erection of the Hoardings and there was no need for any records, in contradistinction to his business records[1].  Mr Chan has not put forward any submission as to why such explanation should not be accepted.  In any event, the absence or unavailability of documentary record of payment of a relatively small sum of money (HK$35,000)  made some 14 years prior to the commencement of the proceedings is hardly surprising.  In respect of (3), the Plaintiff said that he had never thought of calling the 3 workers to give evidence as witnesses at the trial[2]. Bearing in mind that the Plaintiff’s evidence concerning the erection of the Hoardings was not contradicted by any evidence or inherently improbable, his explanation was not unreasonable.

31.  Further, there was no positive case raised in the Defendant’s Defence that the Hoardings were not erected by the Plaintiff[3], but by someone else.  No factual witness was called by the Defendant to give evidence at the trial.  As held by the Court of Appeal in Pacific Electric Wire & Cable Co Ltd v Texan Management Ltd, CACV 90, 91 & 93-96/2012 (17 September 2013), per Kwan JA (as she then was)  at §155, “there must be some evidence adduced by the opposite party which raises a case to answer on an issue arising on the pleadings between him and the party against whom adverse inferences are sought to be drawn before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference (proposition (3)  in Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority)”.  Proposition (3)  in Wisniewski is as follows: “There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the former on the matter in question before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue” (recited at §106 of Pacific Electric Wire & Cable Co Ltd).  The failure of the Plaintiff to call the 3 construction workers to give evidence was not, in the circumstances, something that should lead to an adverse inference being drawn against him.  Neither do we consider it incumbent on the Judge to expressly deal with these matters (ie points (2)  and (3)), which have no substance in any event, in the Judgment.

Ground 3

32.  Under Ground 3, the Defendant argues that the Judge erred in finding that the Plaintiff mistakenly believed that he purchased the Portion as supporting an intention to possess.

33.  The Judge did not make any such finding.  What the Judge held, accepting Mr Chow’s submission which was based on Law Yuk Fong v Man Chung Wai[4], was that “even if a squatter mistakenly believes himself to be the owner of land, animus possidendi can still be established” (§50 of the Judgment). The Judge went on to find the element of animus possidendi proved having regard to (i)  the erection of the Hoardings by the Plaintiff to secure his possession of (inter alia)  the Portion, and (ii)  the installation of the Gate to allow himself and persons authorised by him to go in and out (§51 of the Judgment).  The Judge did not consider any mistaken belief on the part of the Plaintiff that he had purchased the Portion as evidence in support of the requisite animus possidendi.

34.  The Defendant complains that:

(1)  the Judge erred in failing to apply her mind to or give any reasons addressing the question of whether the fact that the conveyancing documents expressly referred only to Lot 1005 and the Stone House showed that the Plaintiff knew he was not acquiring any right to possess and never intended to possess the Portion as part of the conveyance;

(2)  the Judge erred in failing to draw any adverse inference (or failed to give reasons for not drawing such inference)  against the Plaintiff for failing to call the Vendors, the Property Agent and the staff of Kitty So & Tong who handled the conveyancing transaction to give evidence; and

(3)  the Judge erred in assuming and/or finding that due to the Plaintiff’s lack of sophistication he had mistakenly believed that he had “purchased” the Portion together with Lot 1005 when this was not the Plaintiff’s pleaded case and contrary to the documentary evidence.

35.  As for (1), the fact that the Portion was not referred to in the conveyancing documents was not controversial, but did not mean that the Plaintiff knew that he was not acquiring any right to possess the Portion (it being not, in any event, any part of the Plaintiff’s pleaded case that he thought he was acquiring from the Vendors a right to possess the Portion), still less that the Plaintiff never intended to possess the Portion after he entered into occupation of the Occupied Area (including the Portion)  in 2004.  The Plaintiff’s evidence, and the Judge’s view, on this matter was set out at §51 of the Judgment (see §38 below).

36.  As for (2), it is necessary to consider the Plaintiff’s explanations for not calling the said potential witnesses to give evidence at the trial:

“When asked why he did not call KST staff to be witness, he said he did not know he had to do so. There was no follow-up question asked. Mr Yu also said that the Property Agent shop had moved and he had no contact with the Property Agent… When asked why he did not call the [Vendors] to be witness, he said they might not be willing to take the trouble. Earlier he said they moved away and he did not have their contact.” (§25 of the Leave Decision)

37.  The Judge considered these explanations to be “reasonable” (§26 of the Leave Decision).  We do not consider that any adverse inference should be drawn against the Plaintiff for failing to call the potential witnesses to give evidence (see §31 above).  The fact that the Judge did not expressly deal with this point in the Judgment is neither here nor there.

38.  As for (3), what the Judge found, at §51 of the Judgment was the following:

“In my judgment, the concept of a lawful conveyancing of a property might be too complicated for the plaintiff and he used the words ‘buy’ and ‘sell’ very loosely. As he said, when asked why he did not ask to put down purchase of the Portion in the documents, ‘I did not know these things’. It is not disputed that after the Assignment, he has not become the paper title owner of the Portion. He however believed that he could use it because the Land Owners had fenced it off and been using it for many years. This was part of the deal. This is important to him because he found Lot 1005 to small. He started use it after the transaction. Even if he believed he had ‘purchased’ the Portion, it did not work against his intention to exclude the world at large.” [emphasis added]

It is clear that the Judge did not make any finding that the Plaintiff had mistakenly believed that he had “purchased” the Portion together with Lot 1005 as suggested by the Defendant.

Ground 4

39.  Under this ground, the Defendant argues that the Judge erred in placing the burden of proof for establishing the existence of a licence on the Defendant when as a matter of law the burden is on the Plaintiff to establish that he was in possession of the land as of wrong and not by virtue of any licence or permission.  This ground is a non-starter.  It was never any part of the Defendant’s Defence that the Plaintiff’s occupation of (inter alia)  the Portion was in the capacity of a licensee, whether of the Vendors or the Defendant or anyone else.  Further, there was in fact no evidence that the Plaintiff’s occupation of the Portion after the assignment in December 2004 was as licensee.  The Judge’s statement at §48 of the Judgment (namely, “It was Mr Chan’s contention that the Gap was for the convenience of the Land Owners to enter into the Area as the plaintiff only stayed there under their permission or license.  I find this contention of Mr Chan not supported by any evidence”)  was not about “burden of proof”, but “absence of evidence”.

40.  Mr Chan’s complaint that the Judge erroneously took into account irrelevant and un-pleaded matters, namely, the comment at §49 of the Judgment that “Last but not the least, the court was informed that there is litigation between the [Vendors] and the defendant herein over similar issues, but it does not seem to cover dispute in the Portion”, can take the matter no further, when the question of licence was never a live issue in the case.

Ground 5

41.  The Defendant’s last ground of appeal, namely, that the Judge erred in failing to direct herself on the necessity of cogent and compelling evidence from the Plaintiff to establish the two elements of adverse possession and to caution against herself against placing undue weight on the self-serving statements and assertions made by the Plaintiff, adds nothing of substance to the other grounds of appeal which we have already dealt with above.

42.  In all, we are not satisfied that the Defendant’s intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success.  We also do not see any other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal shall be heard.

DISPOSITION

43.  The Summons is dismissed with costs to the Plaintiff, which we summarily assess in the sum HK$80,000.

44.  We consider the application for leave to appeal to be totally without merit.  Accordingly, we make an order that no party may request the present determination to be reconsidered at an oral hearing inter partes under Order 59, rule 2A(8)  of the Rules of the High Court.