RE AKOKO JANET NALWONGA
[2026] HKCA 2082 · CACV 225/2026
Court of Appeal
CACV 225/2026 [2026] HKCA 2082 On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 1038 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 225 OF 2026 (ON AN APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 561 OF 2021) _____________________ _____________________ Before: Hon Chu VP and Hon Cheng J in Court Date of Judgment: 4 November 2026 ___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Cheng J (giving the Judgment of the Court): By our judgment handed down on 19 May 2026 ([2026] HKCA 986) (“the Judgment”), we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-Refoulement Claims) Jeffrey Chau (“the Judge”) given on 2 March 2026 dismissing the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review. On 29 May 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal against the Judgment to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant also lodged written submissions to support the application. Having considered the Notice of Motion and written submissions, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing. We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case. The background to this case, the applicant’s claim and our reasons for dismissing the appeal have been set out in our Judgment. We will not repeat them. Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision. In the Notice of Motion, the applicant challenged the correctness of [7] of our Judgment and questioned the purpose of applying to the court for judicial review when the court will not intervene unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”), and asked the Court of Final Appeal to consider her case. In the written submissions, the applicant reiterated the facts of her claim that she would be in danger upon refoulement to Kenya due to the serious land disputes between her and her influential uncles. She also stated that the Director of Immigration, the Board and the Judge have underestimated the danger posed by her uncles and have erred in relying on trivial inconsistencies in her account in dismissing her claim. She argued that the Judge did not consider the Board’s decision with enhanced scrutiny and maintained that her claim is reasonably arguable with a realistic prospect of success such that leave should have been granted for her to apply for judicial review. In her written submissions, the applicant attached three news articles purporting to show that killings and conflicts over land disputes are prevalent in Kenya, dated 3 March 2008, 30 January 2026, and 31 May 2026 (collectively “the New Documents”). We are of the view that the matters put forward by the applicant do not provide any viable grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal: (1) The applicant’s assertion in the Notice of Motion regarding the established legal principles stated at [7] of our Judgment is without substance and in any event misconceived. The court has a supervisory role in a judicial review and does not examine the applicant’s claim afresh. We have already explained this at [7] and [8] of our Judgment. (2) The written submissions are merely repetitions of the applicant’s factual claim and the threats of harm from her uncles over land disputes which have been entirely rejected by the Board on credibility grounds, and do not involve any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Ordinance. (3) The matters put forward do not properly engage with our reasons for dismissing her appeal and are unarguable for reasons given in [9] to [11] of our Judgment. As for the New Documents, they are plainly inadmissible. An application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal is not an occasion for fresh evidence to be adduced, particularly when there was ample opportunity for such evidence to be produced at earlier stages of the decision-making process: Re Kayani Muhammad Saleem [2018] HKCA 903 at [4]. The Court of Appeal will not admit fresh evidence unless the three requirements laid down in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 are met. In this connection, the applicant has not explained why any of the New Documents are relevant to her non-refoulement claim. Furthermore, she has not explained why the two earlier articles could not have been produced earlier with reasonable diligence. We also do not see any basis for the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b). As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, the Notice of Motion is dismissed. The applicant acted in person.
Citation
Court
Procedural posture
Issues
Holdings
Legal principles
Disposition
Appeal history
RE AKOKO JANET NALWONGA
CA · [2026] HKCA 2082
This judgment