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1995 MP No. 2557
IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG
HIGH
COURT
MISCELLANEOUS
PROCEEDINGS
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BETWEEN
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WING
TUNG YICK INVESTMENT CO. LTD
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1st Plaintiff
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WU
WAN
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2nd Plaintiff
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WU
YUK WA
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3rd Plaintiff
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WO
KON KAU
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4th Plaintiff
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WO
KON HING
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5th Plaintiff
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WU
KOON FOOK
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6th Plaintiff
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WU
SHUI MUK
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7th Plaintiff
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and
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THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
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Defendent
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Before: The Hon. Mr.
Justice Keith in Court
Dates of Hearing: 7th
and 8th December 1995
Date of Delivery of
Judgment: 8th December 1995
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JUDGMENT
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INTRODUCTION
1. This case
concerns three lots of agricultural land in Tai Lam Chung. They are Lots 299A,
300 and 302 in Demarcation District No. 384, Tuen Mun. On 5th
January 1994, the land was resumed by the Crown under section 3 of the Crown
Lands Resumption Ordinance (Cap. 124) (“the CLRO”). The Crown requires the land
for the transfer of raw water. On the resumption of the land, the Crown became
liable to pay statutory compensation under the CLRO. Part of the statutory
compensation has already been paid. The issue which this case has been brought
to resolve is to whom the balance of that compensation is payable. The
Plaintiffs all contend that it is payable to the 1st Plaintiff.
THE RELEVANT STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
2. Compensation
under the CLRO is payable to “the former owner” of land which has been resumed,
and to “any person having an estate or interest in the land immediately before
reversion”: section 6(1)(a) of the CLRO. The words ”owner” and “former owner”
are defined in section 2 of the CLRO. The combined effect of those definitions
is that the fomer owner of land which has been resumed is “the person who was …
registered or entitled to be registered in the Land Registry in respect of
[that] land … immediately before the land reverted to the Crown”.
THE 1ST
PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM
3. The Plaintiffs’
claim that the 1st Plaintiff, Wing Tung Yick Investment Co. Ltd. (“the
Company”), is entitled to the statutory compensation under the CLRO is based on
the Company’s acquisition of the land prior to its resumption. The Company’s
purchase of the land is said to have been effected by two instruments:
(i) Two formal sale and purchase agreements were
executed on 25th October 1993. By those agreements, the persons who
purported to be the owners of the land agreed to sell the land to the Company.
(ii) Two assignments were executed on 3rd
January 1994. By those assignments, the persons who purported to be the owners
assigned their interest in the land to the Company. The assignments originally
bore the date of 8th January 1994 on them. That date had been
inserted on the assignments by the Plaintiffs’ solicitors. However, the
Plaintiffs’ assertion that the assignments were in fact executed on 3rd
January 1994 is not disputed.
Although the Plaintiffs’
solicitors had sought to register the sale and purchase agreements in Land
Registry, they had not been registered by 5th January 1994. Since
they had not been registered by then, the Company is only entitled to
compensation under the CLRO, by virtue of being the former owner of the land,
if the Company had been entitled, prior to 5th January 1994, to be
registered in the Land Registry in respect of the land.
4. It is common
ground that anyone who has a beneficial interest in land is entitled to have that
interest registered in the Land Registry. It is also common ground that the
sale and purchase agreements had the effect of passing a beneficial interest in
the land to the Company provided that the vendors had a good and valid title to
pass. Accordingly, whether the Company is entitled to the statutory
compensation turns on whether, by the time that the sale and purchase
agreements were entered, the vendors had acquired a good and valid title to the
land.
THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND
5. Prior to 1992,
the land had been registered in the Land Registry in the names of various
people who held the land as tenants in common in equal shares. They were: (i)
Wu Loi, (ii) Wu Oi, (iii) Wu Ting, (iv) Wu Yan and (v) Wu Kwong-fat Patrick and
Wu Kwong-sang (who were tenants in common in equal shares as between
themselves). There is no dispute that Wu Yan, Wu Kwong-fat Patrick and Wu
Kwong-sang had a good and valid title to their shares in the land. Accordingly,
the execution by them of the two sale and purchase agreements passed a
beneficial interest in their shares in the land to the Company. Since their
shares in the land amounted to two-fifths of the land, the Company has been
paid two-fifths of the statutory compensation due. The dispute relates to the remaining
three-fifths of the land.
6. By 1992, Wu
Loi, Wu Oi and Wu Ting had all died. Between them, they had had seven sons. Six
of them are the 2nd to 7th Plaintiffs. The seventh was Wu
Ying, who himself died after the land had been resumed by the Crown. In the
belief that the shares of Wu Loi, Wu Oi and Wu Ting in the land had been vested
in their seven sons as their successors-in-title, the seven sons executed the
two sale and purchase agreements. It is not disputed that the seven sons were
their fathers’ successors-in-title. What is disputed is whether the land had
become vested in the seven sons. If it had, the Company is entitled to the
remaining compensation.
THE VESTING OF THE LAND
IN THE SEVEN SONS
7. No grant of
probate or administration of the estates of Wu Loi, Wu Oi and Wu Ting was made
by the High Court within three months of their respective deaths. That
triggered the application of section 17 of the New Territories Ordinance (Cap.
97) (“the NTO”). Prior to 1st March 1993, section 17 provided:
“…
the Land Officer, on ascertaining the name of the person who is entitled to
such land in succession to the deceased person (hereinafter called the
successor), and on being satisfied that any estate duty which may be due has
been paid, shall register the name of the successor, and upon such registration
being effected the said land shall vest in the successor for all the estate and
interest of the deceased person therein, or for such estate and interest as
shall be entered on the register by the Land Officer against the entry of the
name of the successor …”
Since then, the Secretary for Home Affairs has been
substituted for the references to the Land Officer.
8. The seven sons
applied to the Land Officer to be named as the successors of their fathers. In
due course, approval was given for them to succeed to the estates and interests
of their fathers, with effect from the dates of their fathers’ deaths. Those
approvals were given in written notices to that effect
(a) on
26th June 1992 in respect of Wu Ying, the 2nd Plaintiff
and the 3rd Plaintiff,
(b) on
1st July 1992 in respect of the 4th, 5th and 6th
Plaintiffs, and
(c) on 29th November 1993 in
respect of the 7th Plaintiff.
However, since these
approvals declared that the succession was to take effect from the dates of their
fathers’ deaths,
(a) Wu
Ying, the 2nd Plaintiff and the 3rd Plaintiff succeeded
to the estate of their father, Wu Loi, on 6th March 1998,
(b) The
4th, 5th and 6th Plaintiff succeeded to the
estate of their father, Wu Oi, on 19th June 1989, and
(c) The
7th Plaintiff succeeded to the estate of his father, Wu Ting, on 19th
August 1992.
9. On
what basis is it said, therefore, that the land had not become vested in the
seven sons by 25th October 1993 when they purported to sell the land
to the Company by the two sale and purchase agreements? The only basis on which
that is alleged is that the written approvals had not been registered under the
Land Registration Ordinance (Cap. 128) (“the LRO”). Section 2(1) of the LRO, so
far as is material, provides:
“…
all … instruments in writing …, by which any parcel of ground may be affected,
may be entered … in the [Land Registry] in the prescribed manner.”
Section 3(2) of the LRO
provides for the effect of non-registration:
“All
such … instruments in writing … which are not registered shall, as against any
subsequent bona fide purchaser … for valuable consideration of the same parcels
of ground …, be absolutely null and void to all intents and purposes.”
Mr. Nicholas Bradley for
the Attorney-General argues that the registration to which section 17 of the
NTO relates is registration under section 2(1) of the LRO.
THE FORM OF REGISTRATION
UNDER SECTION 17 OF THE NTO
10. Mr. Bradley’s
argument is based in part upon certain assumptions made by the Court of Appeal
in two recent cases:
(i) In Light Ocean Investments Ltd. v. Enway
Development Ltd. [1994] 3 HKC 31, Nazareth V.-P. assumed at p. 36E that the
registration of a manager to represent a clan, family or t’ong under section 15
of the NTO is registration at the Land Registry, i.e. under section 2(1) of the
LRO.
(ii) In Wu Koon Tai v. Wu Yau Loi [1995] 2 HKC
732, Litton V-P assumed at p. 738I that the registration to which section 17 of
the NTO related is registration by memorial, which could only refer to
registration at the Land Registry under section 2(1) of the LRO.
I cannot accept this
argument. The form of registration contemplated by sections 15 and 17 of the
NTO was not argued in Light Ocean or Wu Koon Tai. The
correctness of the assumptions made by Nazareth V-P and LittonV-P were never
put to the test. Since the assumptions were made without argument, it would not
be right for me to treat them as the informed view of the Court.
11. In
my judgment, there are three reasons why the form of registration contemplated
by section 17 of the NTO is not registration under the LRO:
(i) The Land Officer’s obligation under section 17 is
to register “ the name of the successor”. The system of registration under the
LRO relates to registration of documents. Names as opposed to documents are not
registerable under the system of registration created by the LRO.
(ii) The effect of the registration by the Land Officer
of “the name of the successor” is that the deceased’s interest in the land
vests in the successor. Registration of instruments affecting land under the LRO
does not have that effect. Registration under the LRO does not pass title.
Since registration under section 17 has the effect of passing title,
registration under the LRO is not the form of registration contemplated by
section 17.
(iii) Where the registration contemplated by the NTO is
registration under the LRO, the NTO makes that clear. Thus, section 15 of the
NTO requires the re-entry by the Crown upon land held by a clan, family or t’ong
to be effected by “the registration of a memorial thereof”. I have already
referred to the fact that registration by memorial can only refer to
registration under the LRO.
If
the form of registration contemplated by section 17 of the NTO is not
registration under the LRO, what form does the registration take? How does the
Land Officer register the name of the successor? The answer is provided by
looking at what the Land Officer actually does. When a right to succession is
asserted, the Land Officer opens a file and assigns a number to it. In due
course, he records, in a record kept for that purpose, the file number, the
applicant’s name and address, the date when the application was first made and
particulars of the deceased. Once he has determined, in accordance with Chinese
law and custom, that the applicant is indeed the deceased’s successor-in-title,
he notifies the applicant of that fact. In these circumstances, the
registration of the name of the applicant as the successor is constituted by
the record which records the details of the application and the written notice approving
his succession. It may be that Land Officers have assumed in the past that
registration is not complete until the written approvals have been registered
under the LRO. That would enable any member of the public to ascertain in whom
land vests by simply inspecting the Land Register. But for the reasons I have
given, I do not believe that that is what section 17 of the NTO, properly
construed, actually requires.
CONCLUSION
12. For these
reasons, the names of the 2nd to 7th Plaintiffs and Wu
Ying had been registered as the successors to the estates of their fathers, and
their fathers’ interests in the land had vested in them. It follows that the
sale and purchase agreements
passed a beneficial interest in the land to the 1st Plaintiff
on 25th October 1993. The 1st Plaintiff was therefore the
former owner of the land when the land was resumed by the Crown on 5th
January 1994, and I declare that the Director of Lands is obliged to pay the
remaining compensation under the CLRO with interest thereon to the 1st
Plaintiff. That is the only relief which I grant. Mr K.M. Chong for the
Plaintiffs told me that if I granted that relief, the Plaintiffs would not seek
any other relief.
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(Brian
Keith)
Judge of the High Court
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Mr. K.M. Chong,
instructed by Messrs. Ho & Chan, for the Plaintiffs
Mr. Nicholas Bradley,
Senior Crown Counsel, for the Attorney-General
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