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TA THI THO v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
TA THI THO v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5327 · HCAL 699/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 699/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5327
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 699 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Ta Thi Tho |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
1. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
2. There shall be no extension of time for the applicant to file the
application for leave to apply for judicial review out of time.
3. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 12 May 2023, the applicant applied for
leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The
intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
(“Board”) dated 26 October 2022 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the
applicant's appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration
(“Director”) dated 27 January 2022 (“Director’s Decision”) rejecting
the applicant's non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1].
The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL000699_
2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. In her Form 86, the applicant named the Board and the Director as the
proposed respondents and did not name any interested party. As the
Board should have been the proper putative respondent and the Director
the proper putative interested party, the Form 86 shall be amended
accordingly.
3. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Vietnam,
she would be harmed or killed by the loan shark and his henchmen for
an outstanding loan borrowed by her son with whom the applicant had
lost contact. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in
detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to
repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the
Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
4. At the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave Application,
this court scheduled a hearing on 10 September 2026. The applicant
attended the hearing in person. She submitted that she had lost
contact with her son and requested more time to be allowed to stay in
Hong Kong. She stated that while in Hong Kong she has been provided
with living allowances but in Vietnam her situation would be bad.
Discussion
5. A leave application operates as a “filtering” process. Hence, there
is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
6. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full
and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an
affidavit. In her Form 86, the applicant averred that the Board’s
Decision was unreasonable and procedurally unfair by placing too much
reliance on the COI without taking into account of her personal
background and experience. The Board was procedurally improper and
unfair by asking the applicant to provide response that she was unable
to provide. The supporting affirmation provided no grounds at all.
7. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the
applicant was late for almost 3 months when she filed the NOA.
Pursuant to s.37ZT of the Immigration Ordinance[5], the Board
determined, as a preliminary decision, whether to allow the
applicant’s late filing of the NOA. After it had considered the
applicant’s purported explanation for the delay stating that when she
received the Board’s Decision, Covid pandemic broke out, and that she
was required to stay home to self-quarantine, the Board did not accept
that the applicant had exercised all due diligence to file the NOA
within the specified period and that she had failed to do so because
of circumstances beyond her control. The Board refused to allow the
late filing of the appeal against the Director’s Decision.
Notwithstanding the Board’s refusal to allow the applicant’s late
filing of the NOA, the Board continued to consider the merits of the
applicant’s case. The Board found that according to the COI on the
average monthly wages of a person in Vietnam, it would be implausible
for a loan shark to lend such a large sum of money to the applicant’s
son to start a business. It further found that the alleged past ill-
treatment did not attain the minimum level of severity. Hence, the
Board found that the applicant’s non-refoulement claim was not
meritorious. These are findings of fact, which the court in a
judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there being any
public law errors.
Repealed provisions under the previous s.37ZT
8. Before 1 August 2021, the previous provisions under s.37ZT (2)(b)
mandated the Board to take account of “any other relevant matters of
acts within the knowledge of the Board”.
9. Additionally, s.37ZT (3) provided that the Board “may allow the late
filing of the notice of appeal” if it is satisfied that “by reason of
special circumstances, it would be unjust not to allow the late filing
of the notice of appeal”.
10. However, s.37ZT (2)(b) was repealed. Section 37ZT (3) was replaced by
the new 37ZT (3) as follows:
“The Appeal Board may allow the late filing of the notice of appeal if
the person filing the notice provides sufficient evidence in writing
to satisfy the Board that the person -
a) had exercised all due diligence to file the notice within the
period specified … but
b) failed to file the notice within the period because of
circumstances beyond the person’s control”
11. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the
Board correctly applied the law under s.37ZT and observed a high
standard of fairness. The only averments in the applicant’s Form 86
were general and vague. The applicant has not shown any errors of law
or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.
The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not
reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that
would enable this court to grant leave[6].
Whether to extend time for the late application
12. Another matter I need to consider is the delay. Pursuant to O 53 r
4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, an application to apply for
judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within 3
months from the date of the Board’s Decision. The Leave Application
was late for about 4 months.
13. The delay is lengthy, a good reason shall be required. At the
hearing, the applicant only stated that she did not know the
procedure. I do not accept the applicant’s reason for the delay.
Ignorance is not a valid reason. Most importantly, since I have found
that there is no good prospects of success in the intended challenge,
I therefore refuse to exercise my discretion to grant the applicant an
extension of the time to file the Leave Application out of time.
Order
14. The Form 86 shall be amended on the court’s own motion.
15. There shall be no extension of time for the applicant to file the
application for leave to apply for judicial review out of time.
16. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
|Dated the 29th day of September 2026 | |
| |(Alfred Chan) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 29/9/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Ta Thi Tho |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions| |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Applicant’s ref. no:|directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |29/9/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 20309 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |2294/21 (Formerly RBCZ |
|use at the hearing, | |500200/21) |
|including the affidavit | | |
|in support of | |Department of Justice, |
|the application for | |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to
the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of
persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified
Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process
claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the
USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3
HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015,
22 December 2016 at [142].
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v
Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Unless otherwise
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ÜhÉ/ýPJaJmH o([pic]sH h¶Q.hÉ/ý5?PJaJmH sH "h specified, all references
to the statutory provisions in this decision are references to the
prevailing Immigration Ordinance.
[6] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676