WIWIN-WINARSIH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5301 · HCAL 2200/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 2200/2024
[2026] HKCFI 5301
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2200 OF 2024
BETWEEN
| |Wiwin-Winarsih |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative interested
party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 20 November 2024, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 8 November 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL00
2200_2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant was unable to establish a real
likelihood of risk pertinent to any of the applicable grounds under
the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board
dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the
Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 4 March 2024 and
confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s claim for non-
refoulement protection.
Amendment
3. In Form 86, the applicant named the Board as both the putative
respondent and the putative interested party, when the Board should be
named only as the putative respondent, and the Director should be
named as the putative interested party.
4. Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative interested
party is amended to “Director of Immigration”.
The applicant’s case
5. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
6. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed and killed by her
creditor Jajo due to her inability to continue to repay a loan
obtained from Jajo. The applicant also claimed that she would be
killed by her father due to her pregnancy in Hong Kong out of wedlock.
Oral hearing
7. The applicant requested for an oral hearing and her case was heard on
3 September 2026, together with her son’s application for leave to
apply for judicial review in HCAL 389/2026.
8. When this court asked the applicant for the grounds of her intended
judicial review, she merely said that her problems still existed in
Indonesia but her problems had all been presented to the Board. She
confirmed that there was nothing wrong with the Board’s Decision.
Nevertheless, she said that her child was born out of wedlock, and her
family would not accept her. Therefore, her problem was not solved.
Grounds for judicial review
9. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
10. The applicant did not advance any grounds for the intended judicial
review in Form 86, nor in her supporting affirmation dated 20 November
2024.
11. As aforementioned, at the oral hearing before this court, the
applicant confirmed that there was nothing wrong with the Board’s
Decision, all her problems had been presented to the Board, her
problem had not been solved, her child was born out of wedlock and her
family would not accept her. However, all these matters are not valid
grounds for the intended judicial review at all.
Discussion
12. First of all, the applicant’s problems in Indonesia, including that
she has a child born out of wedlock and the problems arising from it,
had been duly assessed but rejected by the Board. If she intends to
challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an
application for judicial review.
13. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
14. Thus, despite the fact that the applicant failed to advance any valid
ground for the intended judicial review, this court will scrutinize
the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality as aforesaid.
15. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had analyzed the
applicant’s evidence and discussed the applicant’s credibility in
paragraphs 45 to 60 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary
to repeat the same here.
16. In gist, the Board found that the applicant’s lack of evidence in
support of her case and the contradictions and implausibilities in her
accounts rendered the Board to reject her evidence.
17. Nevertheless, despite its findings on the applicant’s credibility, the
Board still went on to consider the various grounds upon which the
applicant’s case was based.
18. Even on the applicant’s account, the Board found that the applicant’s
disputes with both her creditor and her father were private matters.
The element of official capacity in the applicant’s fear could not be
established. The creditor had never caused any physical harm to the
applicant and her family members. The applicant’s father had always
been protective to her. The Board found that there were no
substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would suffer
severe ill-treatment, serious harm or death from her creditor or her
father upon refoulement.
19. Significantly, this court notes that the Board had discussed the
availability of state protection to the applicant and found that
effective state protection was available to the applicant (see
paragraphs 77 to 83 of the Board’s Decision).
20. Moreover, the Board had given full reasons in paragraphs 84 to 87 of
the Board’s Decision for its conclusion that safe internal relocation
was possible for the applicant, and she would have no difficulty in
securing a reasonable job and settling herself in different parts of
Indonesia.
21. Thus, the Board found that the applicant was unable to make out her
claims for non-refoulement on all the applicable grounds under the
USM.
22. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence and risk of
harm, was primarily within the realm of the Board in dealing with her
appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to come to its own
conclusion. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way
the Board reached its conclusion.
23. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
24. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
25. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 16th day of September 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / the|
|interested parties as |applicant’s |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |on: 16/09/2026 |putative interested |
|granting leave and any| |parties as may be |
|directions given | |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after |Applicant’s ref. no: |the putative interested |
|the leave was granted |Nil |parties’ solicitors on: |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |16/09/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|originating summons | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|within 14 days after | |Claims Petition Office |
|the grant of leave and| |Putative respondent’s |
|serve it in accordance| |ref. no.: |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |USM 23210 |
|and | | |
| | |Director of Immigration |
|c) supply to every | |Putative interested |
|other party copies of | |party’s ref. no.: |
|every affidavit which | |QA T/C 186/24 (formerly |
|the Applicant proposes| |RBCZ 5000200/24) |
|to use at the hearing,| | |
|including the | |Department of Justice, |
|affidavit in support | |Senior Assistant Law |
|of the application for| |Officer |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |(Civil Law) |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2)|
Form CALL-1