NGUYEN VAN TU v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5266 · HCAL 1102/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1102/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5266
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1102 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Nguyen Van Tu |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and the applicant being absent in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of
Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 6 July 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 23 March 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1102_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board’s Decision was in respect of the applicant’s late filing of
his Notice of Appeal/Petition (“the NOAP”) against the decision of the
Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 22 April 2022 (“the
Director’s Decision”), which rejected his non-refoulement claim on all
the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism.
3. The Board only received the NOAP on 22 July 2022, which was out of
time. In the Board’s Decision, the Board refused the applicant’s
application for the late filing of the NOAP.
Amendments
4. The applicant named the Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
and the Director as the putative respondents and did not name any
putative interested party in Form 86.
5. In fact, only the Board should be named as the putative respondent,
and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
6. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing
administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the
Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.
7. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and to add
“Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party.
Late application
8. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
9. However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 6 July 2023, which was 3
months and 13 days after the Board’s Decision (made on 23 March 2023).
The applicant was hence late for 13 days in making the Leave
Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any good
reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave
Application.
10. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
11. The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and
provided no explanation for the delay when he filed the Leave
Application. Since the applicant was absent at the oral hearing
before this court, no reason was given by the applicant for the delay
at all.
12. Although a delay of 13 days is not substantial, there is simply no
reason for this court to grant an extension of time to the applicant
to file the Leave Application when no explanation was given.
13. More importantly, there is no merit of the intended judicial review at
all as discussed below. Thus, this court is not prepared to extend
the time for the applicant to file the Leave Application, even if an
application for extension of time was made. The Leave Application can
be dismissed on the ground of being made out of time alone.
14. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still examine
the merits of the Leave Application.
The applicant’s case
15. It is not necessary for this court to state the details of the
applicant’s case here as the Leave Application is only about the
applicant’s challenge in respect of the Board’s Decision in refusing
his application for late filing of the NOAP.
16. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Vietnam, he would be harmed or killed by his creditor
due to his inability to repay his loan.
Oral hearing
17. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application.
However, the applicant was absent at the hearing on 10 September 2026.
18. As held in Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091, an application for leave
to bring judicial review should not be dismissed for want of
prosecution merely because the applicant failed to attend the oral
hearing of the leave application. The correct approach is to treat
the applicant as having withdrawn the request for a hearing by reason
of the absence at the hearing, and to proceed to determine the leave
application on its merits.
19. Thus, this court will proceed to consider the merits of the Leave
Application based on the written materials before this court.
Grounds for judicial review
20. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
21. The applicant annexed a document with the title “Grounds on which
relief is sought” to his Form 86. The contents of the said document
were in fact used by many applicants in similar applications as their
grounds for applying leave to judicially review the Board’s decisions.
It is like a template for such applicants and they just used the
grounds stated therein without any regard to their own situations.
Nevertheless, as the applicant is relying on the said grounds to make
the Leave Application, this court will still deal with the grounds as
discussed below.
Discussion
22. As mentioned, all the grounds contained in the document with the title
“Grounds on which relief is sought” are very general. Some of the
grounds therein were directed at the Director. As the Director’s
Decision was superseded by the Board’s Decision, it is no longer
susceptible to judicial review (see Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549).
This court will therefore consider only those grounds directed at the
Board in respect of the Board’s Decision.
23. There are a total of 6 paragraphs under the heading “Grounds” in the
applicant’s said document. Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the applicant’s
grounds were directed at the Director. Hence, they could not be used
to challenge the Board’s Decision and can be simply ignored. Thus,
only paragraphs 1, 3, 4 and 6 of the grounds are relevant to the Leave
Application.
24. In paragraph 3 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator acted unreasonably and was procedurally unfair by placing
too much reliance on country of origin information (“COI”) but failed
to take his personal background and experience into account.
25. In paragraph 4 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing
whether to accept or not to accept explanations provided by him, and
unreasonably required him to respond to questions.
26. The applicant’s complaints and allegations in the aforesaid grounds
(ie paragraphs 3 and 4 under the heading “Grounds” of the said
document) are simply unfounded.
27. As aforesaid, the Board’s Decision concerns only his application for
late filing of NOAP. The Board made its decision without a hearing
pursuant to section 37ZT(2) of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115
(“the Ordinance”). Thus, the Board did not question the applicant at
all at a hearing. The Board’s Decision has nothing to do with COI
either.
28. In paragraph 1 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator of the Board reached the Board’s Decision wrongly and it
was not reasonable and fair as required by the Wednesbury test.
However, the applicant did not state how or why the Board’s Decision
was wrong, unfair and unreasonable.
29. In paragraph 6 of the grounds, the applicant simply alleged that the
adjudicator ought to allow the appeal/petition and the Board’s
Decision was irrational. There was no particulars or reasons given to
say how or why the Board’s Decision was irrational. In fact, the
Board did not dismiss his appeal/petition. It only dealt with his
application for the late filing of NOAP as aforesaid.
30. The Board had in fact provided full reasons in the Board’s Decision in
rejecting the applicant’s application for late filing of the NOAP.
31. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions
without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial
review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA
578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the
Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244,
“general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant
when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to
the facts of his case”.
32. Thus, none of the grounds that were contained in the applicant’s said
document could establish any valid ground to challenge the Board’s
Decision when they are so vague and general without any requisite
particulars related to the applicant’s case, or are completely
unfounded.
33. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
34. Thus, the applicant cannot ask this court to re-assess his non-
refoulement claim. His alleged danger in his own country had already
been assessed but rejected by the Director.
35. However, despite that the applicant did not advance any valid ground
for the intended judicial review, this court will still scrutinize the
Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality.
36. This court is aware that section 37ZT(2)(b) of the Ordinance has been
amended in 2021. The present section 37ZT(2) no longer requires the
Board to consider “any other relevant matters of fact within the
knowledge of the Board”. As held by the Court of Appeal, this phrase
required the Board to take account of the merits of the appeal (see Re
Khan Kamal Ahmed [2019] HKCA 377, Re Qasim Ali [2019] HKCA 430 and Re
Villarosa Rhea Limbaga [2024] HKCA 95). However, after the amendment,
the Board no longer needs to deal with merits as of 1 August 2021 (see
Re Mohammed Aslam [2025] HKCA 914).
37. As the applicant’s case was not covered by the old section 37ZT(2)(b),
it was correct for the Board not to consider the merits of the
applicant’s case. The current section 37ZT(2) only requires the Board
to take account of the statement of reasons stated in the application
for late filing of the NOAP and the evidence relied on in support of
the reasons.
38. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board did fully consider
the circumstances of the applicant, the statement of reasons stated in
the applicant’s application for late filing of the NOAP and the lack
of evidence in support of the reasons.
39. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the applicant claimed that
his memory was affected due to his being beaten and threatened by the
lenders.
40. The Board considered that there was no evidence to support that there
was a delay on the part of the Director in serving the Notice of
Decision to the applicant. The applicant had not given any evidence
to support that his memory was affected which had resulted in his late
filing of the NOAP. The applicant also did not submit any evidence in
support to satisfy the Board that he had exercised all due diligence
to file the NOAP within the prescribed period but failed to do so
because of circumstances beyond his control. The Board thus found no
basis on which to exercise any statutory discretion to extend the time
limit for the applicant to file the NOAP.
41. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board
reached its conclusion.
42. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court could detect no errors of law, procedural
unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.
43. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
44. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed for being
made out of time and also for lack of merits.
Dated the 16th day of September 2026
| | |
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or the applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors on: |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |16/09/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given |Applicant’s ref. no: |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after |Nil |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted | |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |16/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 20678 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the applicant proposes| |QA T/C 147/22 (Formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 5000506/21) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
| | | |
| | | |
Form CALL-1