FAKHRUROJI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 124/2026

[2026] HKCFI 3726

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 124 OF 2026

Application for leave to apply for judicial review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only; or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in open court;

1.  On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.

2.  The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the applicant:

The Leave Application

1.  By way of Form 86 dated 2 January 2026 and filed on 12 January 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 19 December 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL000124_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

2.  The Board found that the applicant had not made out a case for non-refoulement protection on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 27 October 2025 and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

Amendments

3.  In Form 86, the applicant named the Director / “T.C.A.B” as the putative respondents and the Director / “TCAB” as the putative interested parties.

4.  In fact, the Board should be named as the putative respondent and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.

5.  This court therefore makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”.

The applicant’s case

6.  It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.

7.  In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Indonesia, he would be tortured or even killed by a man called OBEK due to a relationship dispute.

Oral hearing

8.  The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application, and his case was heard on 25 June 2026.

9.  When this court asked him for the grounds of his intended judicial review, the applicant merely replied that he was afraid to return to his country because of his enemy there. He in fact admitted that there was nothing wrong with the Board’s Decision.

Grounds for judicial review

10.  The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).

11.  The applicant only mentioned that the Board’s Decision was unfair in Form 86. In his supporting affirmation dated 12 January 2026, he also stated that the Board’s Decision was biased and unfair.

12.  As aforesaid, at the oral hearing, the applicant only repeated his fear of his enemy in his country, and confirmed that there was nothing wrong with the Board’s Decision.

Discussion

13.  First of all, the applicant’s complaint in Form 86 and his supporting affirmation that the Board’s Decision was biased and unfair was advanced without any particulars.

14.  The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA 578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244, “general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to the facts of his case”.

15.  Thus, the applicant’s accusations in his Form 86 and affirmation are not valid grounds to challenge the Board’s Decision when they are so vague and general without any requisite particulars related to the applicant’s case.

16.  As to the applicant’s fear of his enemy in his own country, his risks arising from his enemy had been duly assessed but rejected by the Board. If the applicant intends to challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for judicial review.

17.  The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

18.  Thus, despite that the applicant did not advance any valid ground for the intended judicial review, this court will still scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.

19.  In assessing the applicant’s appeal/petition, the Board held an oral hearing on 17 December 2025. The applicant was present at the hearing. Thus, the applicant did have a chance to present his case to the Board in person.

20.  As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board questioned the applicant extensively about his claimed extramarital relationship with OBEK’s wife. The Board found the applicant’s evidence about the alleged relationship to be vague and general. The Board found multiple aspects of the applicant’s claims to be inconsistent and/or inherently improbable. The applicant could not explain coherently as to why he worried that OBEK would look for him and be able to locate him, as OBEK had never met him and did not know his name or home address. The applicant changed his evidence when he was asked to clarify his answers. He avoided questions at times and failed to answer questions directly in his testimonies. The Board had no doubt that the applicant was not a truthful witness.

21.  Moreover, the Board found that even if the information set out in the applicant’s Non-refoulement Claim Form was to be accepted, the Board would still dismiss his appeal/petition. The Board had laid out its reasons for such a finding in paragraphs 61 to 69 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.

22.  In gist, the Board found that OBEK had not met or spoken to the applicant and he did not know the applicant’s name and address. On the applicant’s own evidence, he had stopped contacting OBEK’s wife and even blocked her number. The applicant admitted that he did not know the current relationship status between his girlfriend and her husband. There was simply no basis to assume that they were still married and OBEK would have continued to hold grudges against him should he return to Indonesia.

23.  Moreover, the alleged dispute between the applicant and OBEK was clearly a personal matter and had nothing to do with the state and any of the Convention reasons. The Board found that the applicant had many options for relocation and it would be very difficult for him to be located by OBEK upon his return to his country.

24.  Thus, the Board did not consider that the applicant would face a real risk of any of the proscribed forms of harm should he return to Indonesia. The Board rejected the applicant’s claims for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong.

25.  The finding of facts including the assessment of evidence and risk of harm was primarily within the realm of the Board. The Board was entitled to make its own decision. The applicant’s alleged dangerous situations had been fully considered but rejected by the Board. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its decision.

26.  Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision.

27.  As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.

Conclusion

28.  For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.

Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1