SINGH JASWANT v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 2130/2020

[2026] HKCFI 3507

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2130 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 8 April 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 20 March 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 16 October 2020.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 20 March 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 3 April 2026. However, 3 April 2026 was a public holiday. By virtue of section 71(1)(b) of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, Cap 1, when the last day of the period in question is a public holiday, the period shall include the next following day, not being a public holiday or a gale warning day or black rainstorm warning day. As 4 to 7 April 2026 were also public holidays, the next following day was 8 April 2026.

5.  In other words, if the applicant had lodged his appeal on 8 April 2026 instead of filing the Summons on that day, he would be within time in lodging the appeal and would not need to apply for an extension of time. Nevertheless, by now, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

6.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

7.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

8.  In the Summons, the applicant did not give any reason why he was late in lodging his intended appeal, nor provide any grounds of appeal. However, in his supporting affirmation dated 8 April 2026, the applicant attached a 10-page handwritten document with the title “Ground For Camp Appeal”, which mentioned some grounds of appeal.

9.  At the hearing of the Summons on 4 June 2026, the applicant explained his delay by saying that he received this court’s letter on 26 or 27 March 2026, but he did not understand the document as he did not know English, and he had to take care of his children. He then sought help from his friend, but by that time, the deadline had passed and his friend suggested to him that he should make an application for extension of time.

10.  As aforesaid, if the applicant had lodged an appeal instead of taking out the Summons on 8 April 2026, he could have met the deadline for appealing. Thus, I am not going to take issue on his delay in lodging the appeal.

11.  Nevertheless, there is no merit of the intended appeal at all. When I asked the applicant for his grounds of the intended appeal, he merely said that the land dispute with his relatives in India was still going on. I then reminded him that he had attached a document to his supporting affirmation, which appeared to be his grounds of appeal. However, the applicant admitted that his friend wrote the document for him and he did not read English. Hence, he could not elaborate on the grounds.

12.  I therefore stood down the case for the interpreter to explain the contents of the said document to him. After the interpreter had explained the document to him, the applicant confirmed that he would not rely on the document as his grounds of appeal as he did not agree with some of the things mentioned there.

13.  I then asked the applicant to tell me the grounds of his intended appeal. In reply, the applicant said that he wanted this court to grant him permission to stay as he wanted to take care of his two children and his elder son had mental problem. He also said that his problem was still there and his life was still at risk. He asked this court to give him some time.

14.  What the applicant said at the hearing concerning his two children and his problem in India cannot amount to any valid ground for his intended appeal against my decision, nor for the intended judicial review.

15.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

16.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal.

17.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal and I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

18.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.