KNIGHT FRANK (SERVICES) LTD v. SUEN WING KONG ALBERT

DCCJ 2958/2025

[2026] HKDC 1561

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 2958 OF 2025

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BETWEEN

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ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

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A. Introduction

1.  This is an assessment of damages following interlocutory judgment entered against the Defendant on 9 July 2025, with damages to be assessed and costs.

2.  The Plaintiff is Knight Frank (Services) Limited. It was the employer of Mr Chan Chi Ho Caliam (“Mr Chan”), who was employed as a security guard at Wing Fook Court, 68 Kennedy Road, Hong Kong. The Defendant, Mr Suen Wing Kong Albert, was a resident of Wing Fook Court.

3.  The action arises out of an incident on 7 June 2022. The Defendant assaulted Mr Chan while Mr Chan was on duty. Mr Chan thereafter brought employees’ compensation proceedings against the Plaintiff in DCEC 1714/2022 (“the EC proceedings”). The Plaintiff, or its insurer, paid compensation and costs in those proceedings. It now seeks to recover those sums from the Defendant.

4.  The Defendant has not appeared at this assessment. He has filed no evidence and no submissions. That does not, however, relieve the Court of its duty to examine the claim. The Plaintiff must prove its loss. It must also satisfy the Court that the sums claimed are recoverable in law and are established by the evidence.

5.  The Plaintiff relies on section 25(1)(b) of the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance, Cap. 282 (“ECO”), and sections 3 and 4 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Ordinance, Cap. 377 (“CLCO”). Those statutory routes are related but distinct. The distinction matters because the ECO imposes its own requirements and statutory cap, whereas the CLCO requires the Court to consider bona fide settlement, excessiveness and just and equitable contribution.

6.  The Plaintiff claims HK$586,338.20, made up as follows:

(a) HK$315,260.00, being employees’ compensation paid to Mr Chan;

(b) HK$142,328.20, being Mr Chan’s costs in the EC proceedings; and

(c) HK$128,750.00, being the Plaintiff’s own costs incurred in defending the EC proceedings.

7.  The Plaintiff also seeks interest and the costs of this action.

B. The evidence

8.  The Plaintiff relies on the evidence of Mr Kwok Yuk Fung, a director in its property asset management department. Mr Kwok adopted his witness statement and gave oral evidence at the assessment hearing. His evidence was largely introductory. It identified the relevant documents and explained the Plaintiff’s case on the employment relationship, the incident, the EC proceedings, and the sums now claimed.

9.  I accept Mr Kwok’s evidence so far as it identifies the documents and the payments made. The more important matters are established by the contemporaneous documents themselves. Those documents include the police and criminal materials, the EC pleadings and orders, the earnings record, the sanctioned payment documents, the certificates of assessment and review, medical reports, costs correspondence, and the Plaintiff’s statement of costs.

C. The incident and the Defendant’s responsibility

10.  The incident occurred on 7 June 2022 at about 22:34 hours. Mr Chan was on duty at Wing Fook Court. The police brief facts record that the Defendant entered the security guard post and confronted Mr Chan about the air-conditioning in the lobby. A dispute followed. The Defendant pushed Mr Chan’s chest twice, hit his head once with his left hand, and punched his face several times with both hands.

11.  The police brief facts further record that CCTV captured the assaulting acts between 22:43 and 22:44 hours. Mr Chan was taken to Ruttonjee Hospital. On examination, he had tenderness to the head, face and upper back, bruising to the right side of the face, and an abrasion to the lower lip.

12.  The Defendant pleaded guilty in ESCC 1101/2022 to assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He admitted the facts and was convicted. He was fined HK$5,000.

13.  In the present proceedings, interlocutory judgment has been entered against the Defendant. Liability is therefore no longer in issue at this assessment. It is, however, relevant to note that the documents independently support the conclusion that the Defendant’s assault was the operative cause of Mr Chan’s immediate injuries and of the EC claim which followed.

14.  There is no evidence that the Plaintiff caused, contributed to, or aggravated the assault. The Defendant’s conduct was the immediate cause of the incident.

D. The legal basis of the claim

15.  The Plaintiff relies on section 25(1)(b) of the ECO, and sections 3 and 4 of the CLCO.

16.  Section 25(1)(b) of the ECO provides, in substance, that where compensation is payable for an injury caused in circumstances which create legal liability in a third party to pay damages to the employee, the employer by whom compensation is payable has a right of action against that third party for recovery of any sum which the employer is obliged to pay as a result of the accident. The amount recoverable cannot exceed the damages which, in the opinion of the court, would have been awarded to the employee but for the ECO.

17.  Sections 3(1), 3(4), 3(5) and 4(1) of the CLCO are also relied on. Section 3(1) provides for contribution from another person liable in respect of the same damage. Section 3(4) deals with bona fide settlements or compromises. Section 3(5) requires the court to disregard any part of the payment which appears to be excessive. Section 4(1) requires the court to assess such contribution as is just and equitable, having regard to the extent of the person’s responsibility for the damage.

18.  The two statutory routes are closely related in the present case, but they should not be conflated. The ECO route is a statutory recovery claim by the employer against the third party, subject to its own requirements and cap. The CLCO route is a contribution claim, concerned with common liability for the same damage and with the amount of contribution which is just and equitable. Where the relevant liability has been resolved by settlement or compromise, the CLCO also requires the Court to consider whether the settlement was bona fide and whether any part of the payment appears excessive.

19.  As to section 25, the character of the employer’s right was considered by the Court of Appeal in Yardway Motors Ltd v Tam Siu Lun [2005] 2 HKLRD 118. The issue in that case was whether section 25 conferred a right of contribution where the employer was itself partly at fault. For present purposes, the material point is the Court of Appeal’s explanation of the ordinary section 25 case. Yuen JA held at §§48-50 that section 25 is directed to the situation where the employer is not to blame for the injury and its only liability to the employee is the statutory liability to pay compensation under the ECO. In that case, the employer may stand in the employee’s shoes and recover from the third party what the employee could have recovered. Section 25 does not, in itself, provide the mechanism for contribution where the employer is itself partly at fault.

20.  The extent of the indemnity is governed by the Court of Appeal decision in Wong Man Yip v Wah Kwong Construction Material [1994] 2 HKC 214. It is necessary to deal with the way in which the authority was presented. The Plaintiff’s skeleton relies on China Ping An Insurance (Hong Kong) Co Ltd v Chong Tin Po (DCCJ 3525/2010, 29 July 2011) at §§20-21, and states that China Ping An was decided with reference to Kaplan J’s first instance decision in Wah Kwong Construction Material v Wong Man Yip [1994] 2 HKLR 190. The Plaintiff’s list of authorities likewise attached the first-instance decision only. That is not accurate. At §20 of China Ping An, Master B Mak referred to CACV 54/1994, namely the Court of Appeal decision. The distinction matters. Kaplan J held that the employer could recover compensation, interest and the employee’s costs paid in the compensation proceedings, but not the employer’s own legal costs. That conclusion was reversed on appeal. It is therefore the Court of Appeal decision which states the governing principle.

21.  In the Court of Appeal decision, Mortimer JA, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, held at pp.220 -221 that the words “any sum which he is obliged to pay as a result of the accident” in section 25(1)(b) were not cut down by the later words “whether by way of compensation or indemnity”. If the legislature had intended to limit “any sum”, clearer words would have been used. A narrower construction would also produce anomalies when compared with section 24(2). The section was therefore construed as providing a full indemnity, subject to the limitations contained in the section.

22.  The consequence is that, where the employer is blameless, the employer’s recovery under section 25(1)(b) is not confined to the compensation itself. It may extend to sums which the employer was obliged to pay or incur as a result of the accident, including compensation and interest paid to the employee, the employee’s costs paid in the compensation proceedings, and the employer’s own legal costs incurred in those proceedings. That is also consistent with Yardway, where Yuen JA observed at §50 that section 25(1)(b) provides a full indemnity not only in respect of compensation, but also interest and costs, including the employer’s own costs. The expression “full indemnity”, however, must be understood subject to the limitations in the section itself.

23.  Those limitations are important. First, recovery is confined to sums which the employer was “obliged” to pay or incur. In Wong Man Yip (CA), Mortimer JA held at p.221 that “obliged” is not limited to “legally obliged”, but that the test remains a stringent one. Secondly, recovery is subject to the proviso to section 25(1)(b). The amount recoverable under that paragraph must not exceed the damages which, in the opinion of the Court, would have been awarded to the employee against the third party but for the ECO. That limitation applies to the total amount recoverable under section 25(1)(b).

24.  Against that background, and subject to the point made above as to the correct identification of the Wah Kwong authority referred to in China Ping An, the District Court decisions in Hong Kong Red Cross v The Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups (DCCJ 2233 of 2007, 12 February 2010) and China Ping An, both relied on by the Plaintiff, are consistent with those Court of Appeal authorities. They are useful illustrations of the application of section 25 to claims by or through blameless employers and insurers for compensation and related costs incurred by reason of a third party’s wrongful act.

25.  As to the CLCO, it is also relied on by the Plaintiff and leads to the same practical result.

26.  Section 3(4) of the CLCO facilitates bona fide settlements. Its purpose is to enable a party who has settled a claim to seek contribution without having to prove its own actual liability to the injured person, provided that it would have been liable assuming that the factual basis of the claim against it could be established. That is the effect of Li Shiu To v Cheung Pik Ng (No 2) [2018] 1 HKLRD 934 at §§27-37.

27.  The claimant must still establish that the person from whom contribution is sought was liable to the injured person in respect of the same damage. Section 3(4) does not dispense with that requirement. As Li Shiu To makes clear at §§30 and 33, the statutory assumption concerns the claimant’s own liability; it does not prove the contribution defendant’s liability.

28.  That requirement is plainly satisfied here. The damage in question is the injury suffered by Mr Chan in the assault. The Defendant committed that assault and pleaded guilty to assault occasioning actual bodily harm on 28 June 2022. In the present action, interlocutory judgment has also been entered against him, with damages to be assessed. The injury relied on in the EC proceedings and in Mr Chan’s pleaded personal injury claim arose out of the same assault. The Defendant’s liability and the Plaintiff’s liability therefore relate to the same damage, namely Mr Chan’s injury arising from the assault.

29.  The remaining questions under the CLCO are therefore questions of quantum and apportionment. Insofar as the Plaintiff relies on payments made by settlement or compromise, the Court must consider whether the settlement was bona fide and whether any part of the payment appears excessive. Section 3(5) requires the Court to disregard any part of a settlement payment which appears to be excessive. Section 4(1) requires the Court to assess such contribution as is just and equitable having regard to the extent of the contribution defendant’s responsibility for the damage.

30.  In Liao Kuo Chun v Win Capital (HK) Ltd [2010] 4 HKLRD 257 and So Kai Hau v YSK2 Engineering Co Ltd [2018] HKCFI 1803, the assessment is approached by reference to responsibility for the damage, including blameworthiness and causative potency.

31.  This case is more straightforward than many contribution cases. The Defendant’s responsibility was direct and personal. He committed the assault which caused Mr Chan’s injury. There is no other tortfeasor before the Court, and there is no evidence of fault on the Plaintiff’s part. Subject to proof that the sums claimed were properly paid or incurred, and subject to the applicable statutory controls, the CLCO analysis points to the Defendant bearing the recoverable loss.

32.  The just and equitable result is therefore that the Defendant should bear the whole of the recoverable loss, subject to the Court’s assessment of the individual heads of claim and to the separate statutory cap under section 25(1)(b).

33.  For the sake of completeness, I would add that nothing turns on whether the relevant payments were made by the Plaintiff directly or by its EC insurer on its behalf. The pleaded and evidenced case is that they were payments made in discharge of the Plaintiff’s statutory liability to Mr Chan.

E. The EC proceedings and payments

34.  Against that legal framework, I turn to the EC proceedings and the payments and costs on which the Plaintiff relies.

35.  Mr Chan commenced the EC proceedings against the Plaintiff. His application pleaded the same accident: that on 7 June 2022, while working at Wing Fook Court, he was assaulted by a resident and sustained personal injuries.

36.  By consent order dated 20 January 2023, interlocutory judgment on liability was entered against the Plaintiff in favour of Mr Chan, with compensation to be assessed. The order was expressly made without prejudice to any issue which might arise in any later common law claim.

37.  The Plaintiff filed a list of earnings. It showed Mr Chan’s total earnings for the 12 months before the accident as HK$200,300, giving an average monthly income of HK$16,691.67.

38.  The Certificate of Review of Assessment dated 1 March 2024 certified the injury as “multiple injuries resulting in left wrist pain and neck pain radiating to both upper limb pain with psychiatric impairment”. It certified periods of absence from duty, and assessed permanent loss of earning capacity at 5%.

39.  Under section 16H of the ECO, such a certificate is admissible in evidence without further proof and is evidence of the matters stated in it. There is no contrary evidence.

40.  The sanctioned payment documents show that HK$184,100 was offered by way of sanctioned payments. The notice also recorded periodical payments of HK$129,360 and medical reimbursement of HK$1,800. The total is HK$315,260.

41.  Mr Chan accepted the sanctioned payments totalling HK$184,100 on 12 August 2024.

42.  I am therefore satisfied, as a matter of fact, that HK$315,260 was paid in respect of the EC claim. I now turn to the basis on which that payment is claimed against the Defendant.

F. Whether the compensation payment was recoverable

43.  The sum comprised periodical payments of HK$129,360, medical reimbursement of HK$1,800, and sanctioned payments totalling HK$184,100. The sanctioned payments were accepted by Mr Chan in resolution of the employees’ compensation claim.

44.  At the hearing, counsel was asked about the calculations appearing in the Plaintiff’s skeleton submissions, which did not appear to correspond with the sums paid. She confirmed that the Plaintiff’s claim is put on the basis of the sums actually paid, and not on the basis of a separate recalculation of Mr Chan’s statutory compensation entitlement. I therefore proceed by reference to the payments established by the documents. The question is whether those payments are recoverable from the Defendant. Under the CLCO, the Court must consider whether the settlement was bona fide and whether any part of it appears excessive. Under section 25(1)(b) of the ECO, the Court must also be satisfied that the payments were sums which the Plaintiff was obliged, in the relevant sense, to make as a result of the accident.

45.  As to the basis of the claim, the Board assessed a 5% permanent loss of earning capacity. The periods of absence were certified. The earnings figure is supported by the list of earnings. The medical reports provide a sufficient basis for an employees’ compensation claim. As to the manner of resolution, the settlement was made by sanctioned payments and accepted by Mr Chan. There is no evidence of collusion or inflation.

46.  I am satisfied that the compensation sum of HK$315,260 was paid bona fide, was properly referable to the accident, was a sum which the Plaintiff was obliged, in the relevant sense, to pay, and was not excessive. Subject to the section 25 cap considered below, it is recoverable.

G. Mr Chan’s costs in the EC proceedings

47.  The Plaintiff claims HK$142,328.20 in respect of Mr Chan’s legal costs in the EC proceedings.

48.  The correspondence between Messrs Or & Lau and Messrs Deacons shows that Mr Chan’s solicitors put forward a claim for costs and disbursements. Deacons objected to the claim. Negotiations followed, which resulted in an agreement that the employee’s costs and disbursements would be settled at HK$142,328.20. Messrs Or & Lau accepted that sum on 16 December 2024, and a cheque in that amount was sent on 3 January 2025.

49.  The agreement as to Mr Chan’s costs is not conclusive against the Defendant. Under the CLCO, the question is whether the payment was made bona fide in discharge or compromise of a costs liability arising out of the EC proceedings, and whether the amount paid was excessive. Under section 25(1)(b), the question is whether the payment was a sum which the Plaintiff was obliged, in the relevant sense, to pay as a result of the accident.

50.  The correspondence is material because it shows that the costs claim was scrutinised and negotiated, rather than simply accepted as presented.

51.  The EC proceedings lasted from 2022 to 2024. They involved interlocutory judgment on liability, medical evidence, assessment and review by the Board, sanctioned payments, and the resolution of costs. The initial claim for costs was much higher than the sum ultimately agreed. The correspondence shows that the claim was not accepted uncritically. In that context, and having regard in particular to the reduction from the amount first claimed by Mr Chan, I am satisfied that the agreed sum of HK$142,328.20 was paid bona fide, was properly referable to the EC proceedings arising out of the accident, was a sum which the Plaintiff was obliged, in the relevant sense, to pay, and was not excessive.

52.  Subject to the section 25 cap considered below, Mr Chan’s costs in the EC proceedings are recoverable in the sum of HK$142,328.20.

H. The Plaintiff’s own legal costs in the EC proceedings

53.  The Plaintiff also claims HK$128,750, being its own legal costs incurred in defending the EC proceedings. This item stands on a different footing from Mr Chan’s costs. It is not a settlement payment made to Mr Chan. It is most directly analysed under section 25(1)(b), since Wong Man Yip establishes that an employer’s own legal costs in the compensation proceedings may fall within the sums which the employer was obliged to incur as a result of the accident. The questions are whether those costs were incurred as a result of the accident, whether the Plaintiff was obliged, in the relevant sense, to incur them, whether the amount is proved, and whether it is reasonable.

54.  I am satisfied that the Plaintiff was obliged, in the relevant sense, to incur legal costs in the EC proceedings. Mr Chan brought those proceedings against the Plaintiff as his employer. The Plaintiff had to deal with liability, earnings, medical evidence, the assessment and review of assessment, sanctioned payments, and the employee’s costs. Those matters all arose out of the accident caused by the Defendant’s assault.

55.  The Plaintiff relies on the Respondent’s Statement of Costs for summary assessment in DCEC 1714/202. It sets out the work done by the Plaintiff’s solicitors and certifies that the amount claimed does not exceed the Plaintiff’s liability to its solicitors. The work includes (1) communications with the Plaintiff, the insurer, Mr Chan’s solicitors, the Labour Department and others, (2) preparation and perusal of court documents, (3) perusal of evidential documents, (4) legal research, (5) quantification of the claim, (6) general care and conduct, and (7) disbursements including adjuster’s fees and search fees. The total claimed is HK$128,750.

56.  I have considered this item with care. The statement of costs is certified, identifies the work done, and is consistent with the nature and duration of the EC proceedings. Those proceedings required the Plaintiff to deal with liability, medical evidence, earnings, assessment, review, sanctioned payments and costs. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the sum of HK$128,750 was reasonably incurred as a result of the accident, was a sum which the Plaintiff was obliged, in the relevant sense, to incur, and is not excessive.

57.  Subject to the section 25 cap considered below, I therefore allow the Plaintiff’s own EC costs in the sum of HK$128,750.

I. The section 25 cap

58.  It remains to consider the statutory cap under section 25(1)(b). This is a separate requirement under the ECO.

59.  Section 25(1)(b) provides that the amount recoverable under that paragraph must not exceed the damages which, in the opinion of the Court, would have been awarded to the employee but for the ECO. The proviso therefore requires the Court to consider the likely outer limit of Mr Chan’s common law recovery against the Defendant. It does not require a full assessment of Mr Chan’s personal injury claim, but the Court must be satisfied that the total amount recoverable under section 25(1)(b) does not exceed what Mr Chan could properly have recovered from the Defendant at common law.

60.  The Plaintiff’s skeleton submissions did not deal with this proviso. No separate attempt was made to identify Mr Chan’s hypothetical common law damages against the Defendant, or to relate the total claim of HK$586,338.20 to that measure. This omission does not alter the statutory requirement. The Court must be satisfied that the limit imposed by section 25(1)(b) is not exceeded.

61.  The total claimed is HK$586,338.20. I approach the matter as a broad statutory cross-check. The materials before the Court include Mr Chan’s pleaded personal injury claim against the Defendant, the medical evidence, the certified periods of absence, the 5% permanent loss of earning capacity, and evidence of his age and earnings. A common law claim would include pain, suffering and loss of amenities, loss of earnings or loss of earning capacity, medical expenses and interest. Having regard to those matters, I am satisfied that the total amount claimed does not exceed the damages which Mr Chan could properly have recovered from the Defendant. The statutory cap is therefore not infringed.

J. Summary of recoverable sums

62.  For the reasons given above, I find that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover the following sums from the Defendant:

(a) employees’ compensation paid to Mr Chan: HK$315,260.00;

(b) Mr Chan’s costs in the EC proceedings: HK$142,328.20; and

(c) the Plaintiff’s own legal costs in the EC proceedings: HK$128,750.00.

63.  The total is HK$586,338.20.

K. Interest

64.  The Plaintiff is entitled to interest on HK$586,338.20 at judgment rate, from the date of judgment until payment.

L. Costs

65.  The Defendant must pay the Plaintiff’s costs of the assessment of damages. Having considered the Plaintiff’s statement of costs, I summarily assess those costs at HK$90,000.