WONG, JUSTIN S v. MAK, YUEN MEI ANGELA (formerly known as WONG MAK, YUEN MEI ANGELA also known as MAK, YUEN MEI ANGELA)

FCMC 8870/ 2022

[2026] HKFC 26

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 8870 OF 2022

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D E C I S I O N

(Activation of suspended sentence)

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Introduction

1.  This is the Petitioner’s (“Husband”) application to lift the suspension on the committal order for the Respondent (“Wife”) to serve three months’ imprisonment made on 21 May 2025 (“the Committal Order”).

2.  On 8 May 2025, I found the Wife guilty of contempt of court in that she was in breach of the non-molestation order made by His Honour Judge K K Pang on 3 February 2023 which was further varied on 6 February 2023 and was continued on 13 July 2023.

3.  The Wife gave an undertaking on the same day to the Court and the Husband that she, whether by herself, through her servants or agents, or otherwise be restrained from molesting, harassing, disturbing, defaming, threaten or otherwise interfering with the Husband, including but not limited to, by way of electronic transmissions, publishing or circulating degrading, defamatory, offensive or insulting description or statements of or concerning the Husband and/or his father and/or his mother and/or his sister on any online public platform or social media, including but not limited to Facebook (the “Undertaking”).

4.  On 21 May 2025, I made the Committal Order, but suspended its execution for 24 months on condition that the Wife shall not breach the Undertaking. See: [2025] HKFC 90.

5.  On 11 November 2025, the Husband applied to activate the suspension of the Committal Order for the Wife to serve three months’ imprisonment.

6.  The Husband contended that the Wife had breached the Undertaking since July 2025 by posting at least 114 posts on the Facebook pages of different media and chat groups/discussion forums and Instagram in which she made offending posts against the Husband’s mother and the Husband’s younger sister.

The Wife’s case

7.  According to paragraph 7 of the Wife’s 24^th affirmation filed on 28 November 2025, she admitted ownership of the Facebook and Instagram accounts as identified by the Husband in this application, but she denied making the offending posts.

8.  The Wife said the Husband and others, including her ex-boyfriends knew her Facebook and Instagram accounts’ passwords, hence it was probable that others, including the Husband might have posted those offensive posts and shifted the blame on her.

9.  In the Wife’s 25^th affirmation filed on 5 January 2026, she said she had engaged a forensic expert to examine her electronic devices and retrieve activity logs for both her Facebook and Instagram accounts. However, the forensic expert was unable to conduct the forensic analysis as all those 114 posts no longer existed or accessible on the Facebook and Instagram platform.

10.  The Wife said she had made every effort to ensure that forensic examination could be carried out, but for unknown reasons those posts no longer existed. The Wife said she was not able to defend herself and prove her innocence effectively against the allegations made by the Husband.

11.  The Wife also submitted that despite she was a qualified solicitor, her experiences were mainly in the area of non-contentious work, hence she had only limited litigation experience, which made it exceptionally challenging to represent herself.

The Legal Principles

12.  The standard of proof whether a condition imposed for the suspension of a committal order has been breached is the civil standard of balance of probabilities and not the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the Husband to establish such breach. See: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, Vol 1, §52/7/1, Willwin Development (Asia) Co Ltd v Wei Xing & Ors, HCMP 2946/2014 (30 May 2016) at §§9 and 11.

13.  The burden of proof for the defence rests with the Wife. See: Lee Tso Fong v Kwok Wai Sun & Anor [2008] 4 HKC 36 at§22.

Analysis

14.  It is not disputed that the 114 posts as identified by the Husband came from the social media accounts which belonged to the Wife. The contents of the offending posts fall within the scope prohibited by the Undertaking.

15.  The only explanation put forward by the Wife was bare denial and she claimed that there might be others using her accounts to make these posts. There is however no evidence at all to suggest that the Wife’s passwords were compromised.

16.  The Wife submitted that while the civil standard applied, the application of this standard required cogent and compelling evidence in light of the particular circumstances.

17.  I find that it is highly improbable for any other strangers, such as the Wife’s ex-boyfriends would have the intention of posting offending statements specifically targeted at the Husband’s family and his legal team. In particular, I find that most of these posts were expressing anger and hatred towards the Husband’s mother.

18.  Further, the wordings and descriptions used in these posts were similar to those posts admitted by the Wife in the Order 52 rule 2(2) of the RHC statement filed on 18 December 2024.

19.  If indeed the Wife’s accounts were being hacked as alleged, she would have noticed that someone used her accounts to post over 100 offensive posts. I agree with the Husband’s submissions that any reasonable person in the Wife’s situation would have at the very least, changed the password of her accounts upon discovering someone had published posts under her accounts.

20.  Further, given current technology, if there were unusual login activities on the Wife’s social media accounts, the Wife would have received notifications from the relevant social media platforms. There is, however, no such evidence before the court.

21.  Some of these posts disclosed personal data, such as the age, name of the previous employer and name of the secondary school attended by the Husband’s mother. It is highly improbable that these information would be known to outsiders, such as the Wife’s ex-boyfriends.

22.  Having considered all the evidence, I could not see how it can be said that the Wife’s ex-boyfriends or others would have made those degrading and abusive posts against the Husband’s mother.

23.  The Wife complained that she has been reverse-discriminated against for being a solicitor of Hong Kong. I find her argument is irrelevant, self-contradictory and in any case unviable for the following reasons:

(1)  Every court user, not only a solicitor, has a duty to maintain the solemnity of court proceedings, and ensure orderly operation of the court;

(2)  According to paragraph 5 of the Wife’s 24^th affirmation, she said: “I am a practising solicitor and fully understand the seriousness of the non-molestation undertaking and the consequences of breaching it…”. The Wife now complained that she should not be treated differently because she is a lawyer, but on the other hand, her counsel submitted that because the Wife is a lawyer, the court should accept that it is highly improbable that she would deliberately breach the Undertaking. I find the Wife’s case self-contradictory;

(3)  The Wife was legally represented in the committal proceedings, and she was legally represented at the beginning of this application and is legally represented in today’s hearing;

(4)  At the request of the Wife, the court gave directions at the hearing on 1 December 2025, to allow her to submit further evidence to support her case. Despite repeated indulgences and opportunities given to the Wife, she was not able to adduce any evidence as alleged to support her case;

(5)  The Husband rightly pointed out that if the Wife is found to be in breach of the Undertaking, her status as an officer of the court is a relevant aggravating factor, and not a source of prejudice; and

(6)  In my view, the Wife’s complaint is to divert attention away from the relevant evidence regarding the 114 posts posted on the Facebook/Instagram pages by her. Her complaint is unfounded.

24.  I am satisfied from the evidence before the court and on the balance of probabilities that the Wife had breached the condition of the suspended Committal Order. I find that it is highly probable that it was the Wife who had published these offending posts which contained words defaming the Husband’s mother and the Husband’s sister. The Wife had breached the Undertaking being a condition of the suspended Committal Order.

25.  I find the Wife was testing the limit of the legal system and the solemnity of the Court.

Sentencing

26.  Having found that the Wife had breached the condition on which the Committal Order was suspended, the next question is the appropriate orders to be made.

27.  When the condition of the Committal Order has been breached and the suspension is therefore to be lifted, the court is not invariably bound to impose the suspended sentence. The court has a discretion to do what is just in the circumstances.

28.  The Husband submitted that an activation of the full term of three months’ imprisonment is justified and the minimum.

29.  Lord Denning in Re W.(B.)(an infant) [1969] 2 Ch 50 at page 56 said:

… The court has a discretion analogous to a suspended sentence in the criminal courts. Imprisonment is not the inevitable consequence of a breach. The court has a discretion to do what is just in all the circumstances. It can reduce the length of the sentence or can impose a fine instead. It may indeed not punish at all. It all depends on how serious is the breach, how long has the man behaved himself, and so forth.

30.  Lord Justice Russell further said at page 57:

I agree that when a judge is faced with a case of a suspended committal order, suspended upon a condition that has been broken, that judge is not confined in jurisdiction to finding the condition broken and then necessarily declaring the committal order to be now operative. I think he has and indeed should have a discretion in the matter, looking not only to the past but to the current situation. …

31.  I take into account the Wife’s circumstances, including issues around her emotional problems and possible impact on the child of the family. I have considered whether it would be unjust to activate the suspended sentence.

32.  In my view, despite the fact that the Wife alleged she was depressed and distressed by all her problems, she knew what she was doing when she continued to publish offending posts and she knew that doing such things was in contempt of Court.

33.  When I suspended the Committal Order, I have made it clear to the Wife that was her final chance of avoiding imprisonment. Yet, shortly after the Committal Order was suspended, the Wife had continued to act in blatant disregard of the condition under which the Committal Order was suspended. Her conduct has been unremorseful and unrepentant.

34.  Given the Wife’s breaches, the previous suspension of the Committal Order have failed to secure compliance, I am satisfied that activation is not unjust.

35.  I fail to see how the suggestion that the Wife has good character in general but for the current incident is of mitigating value.

36.  Accordingly, I lift the suspension on the Committal Order, and impose the original sentence under the Committal Order, namely, three months’ imprisonment, for the Wife.

37.  It had been my hope that the Wife would cease and desist from her wilful and contemptuous behaviour. Regrettably, the many opportunities extended to her have been repaid not with remorse, but with recalcitrance. The wilful disobedience of a court order is a serious matter that strikes at the heart of our legal system.

38.  The Wife must understand that court orders must be complied with, and to that end, she must take responsibility for her repeated and sustained breaches of the condition of the Committal Order.

39.  Since the Wife is committed to imprisonment for three months, I need to address the practical consequences of the care arrangement of the child of the family. The current shared care and control arrangements concerning the child is no longer viable, I will make a temporary variation of care and control order to address the needs of the child. I order that there be temporary variation of the care and control of the child to the Husband, until further order of the court.

Costs

40.  I find the amount stated in the Husband’s statement of costs is excessive. Having considered the submissions of the Wife, I accept that adjustments should be made to the hourly rate of the Husband’s legal team, and there were duplicate charging on perusal of documents and preparation of documents. I also consider that certificate for one counsel is appropriate for the present application.

41.  There is no dispute that costs should be assessed on an indemnity basis. I accept the Wife’s submission that the reasonable amount of legal costs of the Husband, including the application to uplift the stay of proceedings as a result of the Wife’s application for legal aid is HK$964,754.

42.  In the premises, I order the Wife do pay the Husband’s costs of his summons filed on 11 November 2025 and the application to uplift the stay of proceedings, with certificate for one counsel, summarily assessed at HK$964,754.