|
HCPI 713/2004
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO.713 OF 2004
---------------------
BETWEEN
| |
CHUNG CHUN MAN |
Plaintiff |
| |
and |
|
| |
CHOW WAI KIN |
1st Defendant |
| ST |
CHAN KA LIM |
2nd Defendant |
| |
POWERFUL PLASTIC ENG. COMPANY LIMITED |
3rd Defendant |
----------------------
Before : Deputy High Court Judge Muttrie in Court
Dates of Hearing : 18 to 20 May 2005
Date of Judgment : 21 June 2005
------------------------
JUDGMENT
------------------------
1. The plaintiff, who was born on 10 September 1981, claims damages for personal injuries suffered in a road accident on 11 August 2001. At the relevant time he was a rear seat passenger in a private car, registration number GV 7480, owned by the 3rd defendant and driven by the 2nd defendant, westbound on the Island Eastern Corridor. The car was in collision with another private car, registration number GN 6362, owned and driven by the 1st defendant. As a result of the collision the plaintiff suffered injuries. He pleads negligence on the part of both defendants. The 1st defendant pleads negligence on the part of the 2nd defendant, for whom he says that the 3rd defendant was vicariously liable and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff for failure to wear a seat belt. The 2nd defendant pleads negligence on the part of the 1st defendant but no contributory negligence by the plaintiff. The 3rd defendant denies vicarious liability although it is admitted that the 2nd defendant was permitted to drive the car at the time of the accident. The defendants have filed contribution notices, the 1st defendant against the 2nd and 3rd defendants, and the 2nd and 3rd defendants against the 1st defendant; there is no issue on vicarious liability between the 2nd and 3rd defendants.
2. So far as liability is concerned, what is in issue is whether or not either of the defendants caused the accident by driving negligently or, if both drove negligently, the degree of each one’s contribution to the causation of the accident. There also arises the question of contributory negligence of the plaintiff but, as will be seen, there is simply no evidence that he did not wear a seat belt. There is also the issue of vicarious liability but again there is simply no evidence to support it.
3. The 1st defendant was uninjured but the unfortunate 2nd defendant lost his right arm. I am told that he has taken out proceedings against the 1st defendant and that the defendants will, for the purpose of those proceedings, consider themselves bound by my ruling on contribution here.
Evidence on liability
4. The following facts are not in dispute or incontrovertible. The accident happened at about 7.45 p.m. in fine weather conditions. The 1st defendant was driving GN 6362, a Mazda saloon car. He had been to Chai Wan to visit his father in hospital there, and he was going to Hung Hom via the Eastern Harbour Tunnel for a work colleague’s farewell dinner. The 2nd defendant was driving GV 7480, a Mitsubishi saloon car. The car was owned by the 3rd defendant for whom the 2nd defendant worked. It was owned by the company but kept for the use of Mr Pang Cho Yee, Joey, who was the son of the owner of the company. The 2nd defendant and Mr Pang had been working in the company’s factory at Shenzhen that day and had driven back to Chai Wan. Later the two of them had met at Mr Pang’s home in Chai Wan; the plaintiff had joined them, and after remaining there for some time they were now on the way to have dinner together in Wanchai. According to the 2nd defendant and Mr Pang the latter had asked him to drive the car.
5. Both vehicles were driving in the three-lane westbound carriageway of the Island Eastern Corridor near Taikoo Shing in Quarry Bay, to the east of the point where the carriageway divides, with the right hand lanes going to the Eastern Tunnel and the left hand lanes going to North Point, Wanchai and Central. The 1st defendant’s vehicle moved from the second lane partly into the third (right) lane and its offside collided with the nearside of the 2nd defendant’s vehicle. The latter apparently mounted the kerb and tilted to the right so that its offside bodywork came into contact with and scraped along a metal crash barrier. No other vehicles were involved. A 70 kph speed limit applies on the Island Eastern Corridor at the scene of the accident.
6. The 1st defendant was later charged with dangerous driving. The charge was later amended to careless driving. He was tried at Eastern Magistracy and acquitted.
7. The accident was investigated by PC52512 whose sketch plan was before me by agreement as was a bundle of photographs taken shortly after the accident. The sketch plan shows, on the right side of the third lane, a tyre mark about 40 metres long starting at a point more or less opposite lamp post no. 25061, on a straight road just to the west of the end of a gentle right hand curve. There is a tyre mark of 14 metres on the left of the lane, more or less parallel with that on the right. They end at more or less the same place. About 16 metres to the west are tyre marks where the 2nd defendant’s vehicle has apparently mounted the kerb, and beyond them there is damage to the crash barrier. There is a 44 metre tyre mark running to the stationary position of the car, near lamp post no. 25065.
8. The plaintiff can say little about the accident. According to him, he got into the rear seat, closed the door and put his seat belt on. As the car drove along, he was not paying particular attention. He heard a bang. The vehicle slowed down. He grabbed hold of the grab handle above the car door, as it “stuck to the wall”. After some seconds the car came to a stop. He felt pain. He unfastened his seat belt and lay on his side on the back seat, waiting for rescue. Firemen came and put him in an ambulance and then he lost consciousness.
9. It was suggested to the plaintiff that he, the 2nd defendant and Mr Pang had been drinking at Mr Pang’s home, because it was reported in the medical notes that on admission to hospital the plaintiff smelt of alcohol. This he denied. He said that he was not drunk; he was simply taking a rest in the car seat, and dozing off occasionally, after his day’s work. He did not notice what was happening outside the car and he had no idea of its speed before the accident.
10. The 1st defendant said that his car was travelling at about 65 kph. Near Taikoo Shing there was right hand bend on a slight downslope. His car was in the 2nd lane. He decided to go into the 3rd lane after the bend, so as to position himself to go to the Eastern Harbour Tunnel. Before the bend he slowed to about 60 kph, checked his internal mirror and saw no vehicle behind his. After the bend, he prepared to change lanes. Before indicating, he looked in his wing mirror and saw nothing behind. He looked in his internal mirror and saw a vehicle a long way behind. He looked right and saw nothing. He indicated right and looked over his shoulder into his blind spot and again saw nothing. Two or three seconds after passing the bend he steered gently into the right lane. When his car was about two thirds into the right lane, he saw a black shadow dash against his car, heard a sizzling sound and the cracking of glass in his car. He realised that another car had collided with his. He heard no horn or tyre sounds, and saw no flashing lights or headlamps behind him before the collision. The other car remained stuck to his car for two or three seconds and then left; and then he decelerated slowly and stopped the car about 100 metres ahead. He did not want to stop suddenly for fear of another collision. He found a safe place to stop, under a street lamp, got out and called the police. Mr Pang came up and asked if he had called the police, then went back to his car which was stationary further back, with its headlamps on.
11. From cross-examination it appears that although the other vehicle’s lights could be seen to be on after the accident, the 1st defendant did not see any lights just before the accident. By the time he started to change lanes, he was on the straight. He could see in the wing mirror that the bend was about 40 metres behind him. When his car was two-thirds into the right lane and almost parallel to the road, he heard the sizzling noise, felt the bump and saw a black shadow beside him, almost in a split second.
12. The 1st defendant denied that he had been trying to overtake the 2nd defendant’s car. He denied having been preoccupied by his father’s illness. He insisted that he had done what he should do, namely indicated, looked into his mirror and also looked into his blind spot. He said that the accident could not have been avoided because the other car must have been coming forward at a relatively fast speed.
13. The 2nd defendant’s evidence was that prior to the accident he was driving in the right lane at something over 60 kph. The headlights were on; all four of them came on together. When he was approaching Tai Koo Shing after almost completing a right hand bend, he realised there was a car next to his in the middle lane. When it was about half a car’s length ahead it started to cut into his lane. He sounded his horn but the other vehicle ignored that. He braked and tried to move right but the other car kept coming and pressed against his. There was no room to move further right. The offside body of his own car was pressed against the crash barrier, and afterwards, he did not know how long afterwards, his car came to a stop and he found that his right arm was gone.
14. Under cross-examination the 2nd defendant denied having taken any drink before driving. He did not know if the plaintiff had been drinking. He did not know if the car GV 7480 been modified to make it faster but he agreed that was quite a fast car. He denied speeding and insisted throughout that his speed was only 60-odd kph. He said that the other car was travelling at about the same speed as his own. There was no sudden big impact coming to his left side; it was an ordinary impact. He had braked hard but by the time he had done so the collision had already happened. It happened one or two seconds after he had completed the bend and several car lengths away from the bend. He did not notice if the other car had its indicator on.
15. Mr Pang gave evidence for the 2nd defendant. He said that he found nothing abnormal in the 2nd defendant’s manner of driving before the accident. He himself was thinking about some work-related matter, and that was why he had asked the 2nd defendant to drive. Before the accident he was sitting in the passenger seat, thinking, and not paying particular attention to the road. He thought that his car was travelling at about 60 kph. He saw another car next to his and then it started to come in his direction. He thought that what he saw was the front of that car pointed at his car, and then it collided into the front mudguard of his car. He felt his car tilt to the right, almost to the vertical. He grabbed the handle on the left side, and felt a force pressing against the car from the left. The car hit the crash barrier on the right, slid along and then came to a stop. He did not think the 2nd defendant could control the car at that point. After the accident he found the 2nd defendant in his seat, apparently in great agony, that the plaintiff unconscious in the rear seat. He could not find his mobile phone, to call the police so he ran up to the other car to tell the driver to call them; and then he went back to look after his friends and direct the traffic.
16. Under cross-examination Mr Pang said that the car GV 7480 was as it had been bought, second-hand; he had not modified it. To him it was an ordinary 1,600cc private car. He denied that his party had been drinking before they set off. He could not remember that he had told the police that he had been sleeping before the accident. He thought that the other car was travelling at about the same speed as his own. The 2nd defendant was not speeding.
Evaluation
17. There are before me various documents including the transcript of the trial of the 1st defendant but of course evidence given in that trial is not evidence before me, except insofar as it is admitted. I have referred above to the police officer’s sketch plan. There is also an expert’s report produced in that trial which is not, strictly speaking, in evidence before me except insofar as the findings are admitted. There is no direction for expert evidence in this case. In any event, I do not think those findings would be of much assistance one way or the other. The finding of the Magistrate is of no relevance; there is no question of issue estoppel. Finally although counsel for the 2nd defendant has in argument relied heavily on the fact that in the plaintiff’s pleaded case it is said that the 1st defendant was overtaking the 2nd defendant and cut in front of him (although that appears in the particulars of negligence and not specifically in the averments of fact), pleadings are not evidence.
18. Really the evidence comes down to that of the two drivers, with very little assistance from either the plaintiff or Mr Pang, who were both passengers and paying little attention to what was going on, as well as the surrounding facts and circumstances.
19. I can dispose very shortly of the suggestion that the plaintiff had been drinking. If he had, and he says that he had not although his hospital admission notes show that a doctor apparently smelt drink on him, that is not relevant to any question of contributory negligence on his part. Drunkenness may be relevant to the accuracy of his observations but the smell of drink is not sufficient on its own to indicate drunkenness to the point where observations become inaccurate and in any event the plaintiff’s own observations were sketchy and of little assistance. Drink would only be relevant to 2nd defendant’s driving insofar as it may be argued that, if the three young men were all together for a while before getting into the car and setting off, and one was drinking, the others probably were as well; but they all deny it and the 2nd defendant’s hospital admission notes do not show any finding of drink taken.
20. This leads me to the question of contributory negligence on the plaintiff’s part and it is as well to dispose of it at this point rather than later. The plaintiff says that he had his seat belt on at the time of the accident though he took it off afterwards and lay down to await rescue. There is no evidence to show that he was not wearing his seat belt. There is no reason to disbelieve his evidence and I accept it. So no matter who is to blame for the accident, or to what extent, the question of contributory negligence on the plaintiff’s part simply does not arise.
21. There is also the allegation of vicarious liability. Again, although I have not yet dealt with the question of the liability of the 2nd defendant, if he was liable personally, vicarious liability is as well disposed of at this point. The evidence is that the 3rd defendant owned the car but kept it for the use of Mr Pang who was the owner’s son. The latter asked the 2nd defendant to drive the car, when they were both off duty and going out to dinner with the plaintiff. There is nothing to suggest that the 2nd defendant was driving in the course of his employment. Nor was the driving incidental to his employment. So if he is liable, there is nothing to suggest that his employer should be liable also.
22. According to the 1st defendant, him he was driving exactly “by the book”; he drove within the speed limit, carefully checked his interior and wing mirrors, signalled and checked his blind spot. He gave his evidence well enough and was unshaken in cross-examination. There is nothing to support the suggestions that he might have been preoccupied by other matters. I tend to discount his evidence of slowing down on the curve because the curve is a gentle one and there is really no need to slow down for it, if one is travelling within the speed limit. But there is nothing to contradict his evidence that he signalled before moving to the right and I accept that he did.
23. The fact is, however, that after the accident the 2nd defendant saw GV 7480 stationary on the road behind him, with its headlights on. It must have had those lights on at the time of the accident because the 2nd defendant would have been in no position mentally or physically to switch them on afterwards. There were four lamps, two in the usual place and two in the bumper below and the uncontradicted evidence of the 2nd defendant and Mr Pang is that they all switch on together. GV 7480 was, therefore, well lit and highly visible to a driver taking proper care to look in his mirror, and then look again in the mirror and blind spot before changing lanes. Yet the 1st defendant did not see it.
24. The 1st defendant’s contention is that GV 7480 must have been going very fast, because he did not see it coming even though he kept a proper lookout. Now the road is wide and the curve is gentle, and according to the 1st defendant he was already 40 metres beyond it when he started to change lanes. If this contention is true, then even without going into involved mathematical calculations of differential velocities it would follow that GV 7480 was travelling so fast as to have come up on GN 6362 practically instantaneously. While, for reasons that appear below, I doubt that it was travelling at 60-odd kph as the 2nd defendant says, there is simply no evidence of very high speed. The skid marks and so on do not help without expert evidence; and even the expert evidence which was before the magistrate only shows a range of speed at which the vehicle might have been travelling before the skid marks started.
25. The 2nd defendant says that his car was travelling at only 60-odd kph. Now I do not see that the suggestion, for it is really no more than that, that the car might have been modified to go faster is significant here. Nor are the 2nd defendant’s youth and his previous convictions for speeding. Also, I note that the 2nd defendant, like the first, gave his evidence quite well and was not shaken in cross-examination. What is significant however is the 2nd defendant’s own evidence that he realised that the 1st defendant’s car was in the lane next to his only when it was about half a length ahead. That suggests that GV 7480 was going faster than GN 6372, because if they were both travelling at about the same speed, the one would have been crawling past the other and GN 6372 would have been in the 2nd defendant’s field of vision for a long time. I can go no further than that; there is no evidence from which the relative speeds of the two cars can be gauged.
26. Perhaps more important, though, is that the 2nd defendant’s own evidence — and that of Mr Pang — suggests that even if he was travelling at much the same speed as the 1st defendant, he was not paying attention and keeping a proper lookout on the traffic around him. If he had been, he would have seen GN 6372 long before it was merely a short distance ahead of him; and he would have seen its turn indicator signal. Even if he did not see that, on his own evidence, the impact he felt on the left side was not particularly heavy. That agrees with the 1st defendant’s evidence that he moved gently into the right lane. So if the 2nd defendant had been keeping a proper lookout to the side he would have had time to realise that the 1st defendant’s car was moving towards his, and he would have been able to take evasive action sooner than he did.
27. Overall it seems to me that the 1st defendant cannot have been keeping a proper lookout because if he did, he would have seen the brightly-lit and highly visible GV 7480 coming up behind him in the right lane. If the latter was moving at a speed in excess of the limit, that would make no difference because it is a matter of common experience that vehicles often travel at excessive speed on roads like the Island Eastern Corridor. One need only drive, or be driven at an exact 70 kph to be overtaken on both sides by a succession of vehicles. The prudent driver has to expect that and take action accordingly; so the need to keep a sharp lookout behind and to the side is particularly strong. It also appears that the 1st defendant should, in the circumstances, have travelled further beyond the curve before changing lanes; granted that it is a gentle curve and the backwards visibility would go well into it nevertheless it is prudent to expect that where there is a curve, something will come round it sooner or later. It also seems to me that, on his own evidence, the 2nd defendant was probably driving at excessive speed but, whether his speed was excessive or not, in any event he was not keeping a proper lookout ahead and to the side. In the premises, both of them drove negligently.
Apportionment
28. Both drivers drove negligently. If the 1st defendant had kept a proper lookout and seen the 2nd defendant’s vehicle coming, he could have carried straight on and let it pass. The accident would not have happened. If the 2nd defendant had kept a proper lookout and seen what the 1st defendant’s vehicle was going to do, he could have dropped back and let it change lanes. The accident would not have happened. However it seems to me impossible, on the evidence before me and particularly since my findings against each defendant are based largely on that defendant’s own evidence to say that either of them contributed to the accident to a significantly greater extent than the other. I therefore find each of the 1st and 2nd defendants 50% liable.
Quantum
29. The plaintiff was born on 10 January 1981. He was aged 20 at the date of the accident and 24 at the date of trial.
30. He suffered multiple injuries including fractures of four right ribs, a right pneumothorax, a right lung contusion, liver laceration and laceration to the right flank of the abdomen. Exploratory laparotomy revealed small lacerations of the liver and spleen causing haemoperitoneum. He was admitted to hospital on the date of the accident, 11 August 2001, and remained there until his discharge on 27 August 2001. A follow-up scan on 11 October 2001 revealed that the liver haematoma had resolved. He was last seen at the outpatient clinic on 15 October 2001 and according to the hospital report he remained well with no residual disability.
31. The plaintiff now says that he suffers frequent pain in his right side, where he suffered the injury. He has had physiotherapy for it, but the pain has not subsided. The doctors tell him that he has recovered, but he still feels the pain. Before the accident he used to swim and play basketball but now he has no energy for either and he does not like to swim because he does not want people to see his scars.
32. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was employed by one Kwong Tsun Engineering Co. whose work was to renew large-scale printing machines. He says that he had to bend and squat and he frequently had to lift heavy objects. He had done this work for three or four years except for a period as a carpenter’s apprentice. He had been with his current employer for one year. He earned $11,000 per month plus overtime of $1,000 per month and bonus. There is a letter from the employer to confirm this, but no wage slips or other documents. He never paid tax, nor completed any tax return.
33. The plaintiff had sick leave from 11 August to 27 October 2001 and from 25 January to 5 May 2002. After the accident, his employer closed down. He did not seek similar employment because he could not lift heavy objects. He says that he started working in his mother’s newspaper stall, drawing a salary of $5,000 to $6,000 and sometimes $6,500 per month from February 2004, although from some time in 2003 he was helping out in the stall casually and for no pay.
34. The court was shown a surveillance videotape of the plaintiff working in the newspaper stall in November 2004 and May 2005. He appeared to be able to move about without difficulty, to shift heavy trolleys and to carry piles of newspapers. The piles consisted of as many loose newspapers as a man can comfortably and conveniently hold between both his hands at one time. This is a convenient way of moving loose newspapers and does not necessarily show that the person doing it cannot lift something heavier if he needs to do so. Apart from that, he appeared to bend, squat and so on like a fit young man. Under cross-examination he agreed that he could do all these things and indeed that he could work as a technician doing light work such as changing a screw; but he maintained that he did not think he was able to move heavy objects.
35. On 17 November 2004 the plaintiff was examined by the experts on both sides, Dr Wong See Hoi and Dr Lam Kwong Chin who produced a joint report. At that stage he was complaining of residual tightening pain at the right chest, aggravated even on normal breathing and worse on exertion. His main complaint was paraesthesia and numbness around the laceration scar at the right lower chest and the experts agreed that this might be due to injury to the cutaneous nerve rather than the fracture. Dr Wong puts the pain-related impairment of the whole person at 3% and Dr Lam at 1%. The experts agree that the plaintiff could resume his pre-injury work as a technician in a printing machinery renewal company but with reduction in efficiency. He would have difficulty in lifting heavy objects or climbing. Dr Lam says that that the sick leave period to October 2001 was sufficient; Dr Wong however says that the further period to May 2002 was also reasonable.
PSLA
36. Counsel for the plaintiff argues that the injuries fall within the upper end of the serious injury category and that the award should be in the region of $500,000. He refers to the cases of Ho Wai Yee v. Yip Chuen, HCPI 291/2001, Koon Sai Kwong v. Welcome Engineering Co. Ltd, HCPI 9330/1999, and Lam Wai Chun v. Tam Chi Wai & Ors, HCPI 1352/2000, all cases of awards for fractured ribs. Counsel for the 1st defendant, whose figures on quantum counsel for the 2nd defendant adopted, puts it much lower; he argues that the figure should be in the region of $180,000. He refers to various cases, namely Yuen Pak Cheong v. Chan Kai Leung, HCPI 254/2003, Mak Ping v. Choi Po Chun, HCA7085/1988 and Wong Hung Fan v. Tse Hong Shing, HCA7480/1988 and in particular to a District Court award in Chan Wai Leung v. Mo Sheung Wan & Anor,DCPI 166/2001 in which the plaintiff, who was assaulted and suffered rib fractures, head injuries and abdominal bruising and was in hospital for five days and off work for four months was awarded this figure.
37. The joint experts’ report must be accepted. It is true that they are orthopaedic surgeons rather than specialists on the internal organs but I do not think that reports from such specialists would have been necessary. The liver, spleen and lung injuries healed in due course. So did the ribs. I accept that there is some continuing pain but apart from that, there really was nothing much wrong with the plaintiff after about May 2002. Curiously enough the plaintiff appears to have told the experts that he started working in the newspaper stall in August 2002. In cross-examination he simply denied that he had told them this. In any event, there is no real evidence to suggest that the plaintiff could not go back to work as a printing technician. He could have returned to his pre-accident work in May 2002, although with some difficulties. There is no good reason shown why he did not seek work then. He might have some difficulty in lifting heavy objects, but as appears from his own evidence he only thinks that that might be so and in any event the experts say that this would only mean that he suffered some reduction in efficiency.
38. So far as the plaintiff’s ongoing complaints that he cannot play basketball and swim are concerned, there appears to be no good medical reason why he cannot do these things.
39. The plaintiff was in hospital for over two weeks and unable to work for nine months. I take into account that the internal injuries were quite extensive although they healed of themselves with conservative treatment. So did the ribs. I accept that the ribs would have been painful. I accept that there is some ongoing pain even now. However, I cannot see that the injuries fall within the upper end of the serious injuries category. I think a proper award is $350,000.
Pre-trial loss of earnings
40. There seems to be no good reason why the plaintiff could not seek further work as a printing technician at least by 5 May 2002. If he only went to work for his mother in 2004, that was his own choice. The evidence of actual earnings is rather sketchy, but there is no evidence to suggest that it should not be accepted. I will, therefore, allow loss of $12,000 per month for the period from 11 August 2001 for a period of nine months, i.e. $108,000.
Post-trial loss of earnings
41. Given that the plaintiff is able to return to work as a printing repair technician there is no post-trial loss.
Loss of earning capacity
42. In Moeliker v. Reyrolle & Co. Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 132, it was said that this head of damages should be considered in two stages. First, the court must ask if there is a substantial or real risk that the plaintiff will lose his present job at some time before the estimated end of his working life. If there is, the court must quantify the present value of the risk of financial damage which he will suffer, having regard to the degree of risk, the time when it may materialise, and the factors, favourable and unfavourable, which will or may affect his chances of getting a job at all, or an equally well-paid job.
43. Given that the plaintiff now works in the parental newspaper stall there is no real risk that he will lose his present job at some time before the estimated end of his working life. There is accordingly no basis for an award for loss of earning capacity.
Special damages — medical expenses
44. The hospital charges amount to $8,076 and there is no real dispute of this figure. It is awarded.
Travelling expenses
45. The plaintiff puts a figure of $1,000 on this. The figure is reasonable, though there is no specific documentary support for it. It is awarded.
Tonic food
46. The plaintiff claims $24,220. Various receipts are produced. However the evidence is rather unsatisfactory. There is no evidence that the food was taken on medical advice. The plaintiff was not clear about the nature or the purpose of the tonic food, or whether it was he or other family members who consumed it. However, followingKing Light Industrial Ltd v. Lo Wai Keung (1994) 3 HKC 54, I am satisfied that, even in the absence of the necessary evidence as to the advisability or suitability of the tonic food, I can allow a nominal sum for such food which the plaintiff reasonably believed would assist in his recovery. I will allow $5,000 under this head.
47. The final award is as follows :
| PSLA |
$350,000 |
| Pre-trial loss of earnings |
108,000 |
| Tonic food |
5,000 |
| Travelling expenses |
1,000 |
| Medical expenses |
8,076 |
| |
____________ |
| Total : |
$472,076.00 |
48. There will be a final judgment in favour of the plaintiff against each of the 1st and 2nd defendants for 50% of :
| (1) |
$472,076.00; |
| |
|
| (2) |
interest at 2% on the figure of $250,000 for pain, suffering and loss or amenity from the date of the Writ to the date of judgment and on the special damages and pre-trial loss of earnings at half the judgment rate from the date of the accident; and |
| |
|
| (3) |
costs to be taxed if not agreed. |
49. The plaintiff’s claims against the 3rd defendant are dismissed with costs, to be taxed if not agreed.
50. Since the judgment is to be handed down and parties wish to be heard on the costs of the first day of the trial, the costs orders will be nisi.
| |
(G.P. Muttrie)
Deputy High Court Judge |
Mr T.K. Wong, instructed by Messrs T.K. Cheng & Co., for the Plaintiff
Mr Osmond Lam, instructed by Messrs Chong & Partners, for the 1st Defendant
Mr Victor Gidwani, instructed by Messrs Tang & So, for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants
|