F on behalf of S (a minor) v. SUPERINTENDENT OF TUEN MUN CHILDREN AND JUVENILE HOME

HCAL 2563/2019 &

HCAL 2582/2019

[2019] HKCFI 2235

HCAL 2563/2019

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2563 OF 2019

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AND

HCAL 2582/2019

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2582 OF 2019

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(Heard together)

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D E C I S I O N

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INTRODUCTION

1.  There are before the court two applications made by F on behalf of his son, S (a minor):

(1)  HCAL 2563/2019: the first is an application for a writ of habeas corpus in respect of S’s current detention in Tuen Mun Children and Juvenile Home (“the Juvenile Home”) pursuant to an order (“the Order”) made by Mr To Ho-shing, a magistrate sitting as the Juvenile Court at the Kowloon City Magistrate’s Court on 31 August 2019 under Section 34E(4) of the Protection of Children and Juvenile Ordinance, Cap 213 (“the Ordinance”).  The application is made by an ex parte Originating Summons dated 3 September 2019, and the “Superintendent of Tuen Mun Children and Juvenile Home” (“the Superintendent”) is named as the Respondent in that Originating Summons.

(2)  HCAL 2582/2019: the second is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Order.  The application is made by way of a Form 86 dated 3 September 2019 and filed on 4 September 2019.  The Superintendent is named as the Putative Respondent, and the Commissioner of Police and Director of Social Welfare are named as the Putative Interested Parties in the Form 86.

2.  These 2 applications first came before me in the late afternoon of 3 September 2019 on an ex parte basis.  Mr Steven Kwan and Ms Charlotte Chan appeared for the Applicant.  After hearing counsel briefly, I directed that notice of the applications together with a set of the papers in support of the applications should be given and served on the Superintendent as soon as practicable.  I further directed that the matter should come back before me for further consideration on 4 September 2019, at 4:30 pm.

3.  At the hearing on 4 September 2019, Mr Louie Chan, Government Counsel of the Department of Justice, appeared on behalf of (I was told) the HKSAR Government.  It transpired during the course of the hearing that Mr Chan only got notice of the applications and received the papers late in the afternoon on 4 September 2019, apparently because of the manner in which the Superintendent and the Department of Justice were served with the relevant papers (by fax to the general telephone numbers of the Juvenile Home and Department of Justice, and by email to a general email address of the Juvenile Home, in the evening of 3 September 2019).  Anyhow, it was apparent that Mr Chan did not have the chance to read and consider the supporting affirmation of F dated 3 September 2019 (“F’s Affirmation”), or take instructions from the Police in respect of the facts and matters alleged in that affirmation.  The court heard submissions from the parties, and gave directions for further information to be supplied by way of letters to the court in the course of 5 September 2019.

4.  By a letter dated 5 September 2019, Mr Chan provided the court with some further background information relating to the incident on 29 August 2019 (more particularly described below).  Mr Chan also informed the court that the Police had no objection to the immediate release of S.  Mr Kwan provided the court with a transcript of the hearing on 31 August 2019 before the Magistrate.  I am grateful to both Mr Kwan and Mr Chan for their assistance rendered to the court.  This is the court’s decision on the two applications.

BASIC FACTS

5.  On 29 August 2019, at around 10:12 pm, some 70 protestors gathered on Yen Chow Street opposite Sham Shui Po Police Station (“the Police Station”).  The gathering gradually evolved, with some protesters starting to throw bricks and shoot laser guns at the Police Station.  Despite repeated police warnings, the protestors refused to leave and persisted with the aforesaid attacks on the Police Station.  At around 11:42 pm, the police conducted a clearance operation in the vicinity of Yen Chow Street, and arrested 18 persons in the course of the clearance operation.

6.  S was one of those arrested by the Police.  His arrest, for the offence of “unlawful assembly”, took place outside 58 Yen Chow Street at around 11:50 pm on 29 August 2019.  At the time of his arrest, S was wearing a black mask and a black T-shirt, similar that of other protesters at the scene.  Subsequently, three of the arrested persons were charged with one count of “riot”.  No criminal charge was, I understand, preferred against S.

7.  According to F’s Affirmation:

(1)  He is the lawful guardian of S (born on 6 January 2004).  He and his wife are legally entitled to the custody of S, and have been responsible for his care and upbringing.

(2)  On 29 August 2019, S informed F that he would attend a public screening of a documentary called “Winter on Fire: Ukraine’s Fight for Freedom” with a classmate in Sham Shui Po that evening.  He further told F that he would return home at around 11:00 pm.  F consented to S attending the public screening, which took place at the junction of Kweilin Street and Fuk Wa Street, near Exit D2 of Sham Shui Po MTR Station.

(3)  In view of the fact that for several days before 29 August 2019, tear gas had been used by the Police in the vicinity of F’s home (in Yen Chow Street, Sham Shui Po) and in view of S’s medical history, F reminded S to wear a mask if he needed to go out.

(4)  S left home at about 8:00 pm on 29 August 2019. He wore a black T-shirt, casual-shorts and a pair of sandals, those being his normal casual outfit when he went out to some nearly places (eg a supermarket or convenience store).

(5)  At about 1:00 am on 30 August 2019, F received a call from a police officer informing him that S had been arrested in Sham Shui Po for the offence of unlawful assembly, and his presence was required for a statement to be taken from S in Cheung Sha Wan Police Station.

(6)  F and his elder son and daughter later arrived at Cheung Sha Wan Police Station.  A cautioned statement was taken from S in the presence of his legal representative between 5:20 am and 6:20 am.  S exercised his right of silence.

(7)  On 2 September 2019, F spoke to S about the circumstances in which he came to be arrested by the Police on 29 August 2019.  S told F that he was arrested on Yen Chow Street when he was on his way home from Exit D2 of Sham Shui Po MTR Station.  When he arrived at the junction of Yen Chow Street and another street, he heard someone shouting and saw police officers running towards him.  So he turned round and went towards the direction of Cheung Sha Wan Road, but found himself surrounded by another team of police officers.  He also heard some police officer(s) shout, “Arrest the ones wearing in black first”.

(8)  S was arrested outside 58 Yen Chow Street, some 325 metres away from his home.

8.  In short, S denies that he took part in any unlawful assembly, and says that he was a mere passerby who happened to be caught up in the aforesaid incident in the evening of 29 August 2019.

9.  On 30 August 2019, the Police made an application to the Juvenile Court at the Kowloon City Magistrate’s Court for an order against, inter alia, S under Section 34(2) of the Ordinance.  In the application, it was alleged (inter alia) that during police enquiry, it was revealed that S’s parents were not aware of S’s participation in the unlawful assembly, nor were they aware of the harm that S would face in the “riot incident”.  It is further stated that:

“In view of the young age of [S], the nature of offence he was arrested for and that his guidance or welfare cannot be properly accounted for by his guardians, [he] is deemed to be in need of care and protection in accordance with Section 34(2)(d) of the Protection of Children & Juvenile Ordinance, Cap 213, Laws of Hong Kong.”

10.  The application came before the Magistrate on 31 August 2019.  F, S and his counsel were present on that occasion.  According to F, the following occurred during the course of the hearing before the Magistrate (see paragraphs 21 to 40 of F’s Affirmation):

(1)  The Magistrate read out the contents of the Police application and asked S’s counsel for comment.  S’s counsel explained that S had attended a public screening of “Winter on Fire” near the Police Station, and referred to Question and Answer 1 of F’s statement to the police dated 30 August 2019, which read as follows:

Q1:    Do you know where was [S] last night, i.e. the night on 29 August 2019?

A1:    [I] know, he told me that he and his friends went to the screening, but I do not know the content, he told me that he will be back around 11 pm, and I live at [address], so he will surely pass through Yen Chow Street when he returns home.

(2)  The Magistrate asked S what the documentary was about.  S answered saying that it was about the clashes between the Ukrainian police and Ukrainians.  The Magistrate asked S about the details of the documentary.  S was unable to tell because, according to S, the documentary was in a language which he could not understand and the subtitles were too far away for him to see clearly.  The Magistrate then ask S why he attended a public screening of a documentary in a language which he could not understand.  The Magistrate also asked S to identify his companion at the public screening, which S did.  The Magistrate asked S why he could not watch the documentary at home on YouTube, and commented that S did not need to attend the public screening to watch it.  Apparently, S’s counsel was not aware at that time that the documentary was not available on YouTube, but said to the Magistrate that there was a difference between watching a documentary at home and watching it with a friend in a public screening.  S’s counsel also told the Magistrate that S had been wearing the black mask since the time that he was at the public screening, and it was not the case that S suddenly put on the mask for the purpose of taking part in some unlawful activities.

(3)  The Magistrate asked the police officers in court to examine S’s mobile phone and invited the police to carry out investigation or commence criminal prosecution against S.  The Magistrate also commented that there were too many coincidences in the case and there must be a reason for S’s arrest.

(4)  Eventually, the Magistrate adjourned the case to 27 September 2019 for a social welfare report about S to be obtained, and made the Order, committing S to detention in the Juvenile Home in the meantime.

11.  F contends that the Magistrate had no lawful justification to make the Order to detain S in the Juvenile Home, and on this basis applies for a writ of habeas corpus on his behalf.  Further or alternatively, F seeks leave to apply for judicial review of the Order on the grounds that:

(1)  the Magistrate took into account irrelevant considerations, namely –

(a)  S could not have been on his way home after attending the public screening based on the wrong assumption that the documentary was available on free public source (pausing here, I should mention that at paragraphs 42 and 43 of F’s Affirmation, it is said that “Winter on Fire with Chinese or English subtitles” is not available on YouTube, and the copyright of that documentary is owned by Netflix, but S does not have access to Netflix), and

(b)  S could have taken an alternative route back home from the place where the public screening was held instead of taking the natural route through Cheung Sha Wan Road and Yen Chow Street where the unlawful assembly was taking place;

(2)  the Magistrate erred in law in making the Order, in that he failed to address the issue of whether the detention of S in the Juvenile Home was necessary for further inquiries to be made about S under Section 34E(4) of the Ordinance; and

(3)  the decision to detain S in the Juvenile Home was Wednesbury unreasonable.

THE HABEAS CORPUS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW JURISDICTIONS

12.  As stated in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2019, paragraph 54/1/3:

“ Whilst the writ will be an effective remedy for those whose detention cannot be immediately justified, it will not be used to litigate matters that are more properly determined by other means (Re Poon Yuk Sum (1956) 40 HKLR 12). Where there is an alternative remedy, such as judicial review which will provide a more or equally effective remedy, the courts will decline to issue the writ (Re Sakchai Suwannapeng[1990] 2 HKLR 231 at 232).

  In general, the remedies of judicial review and habeas corpus are different and are governed by different statutes and rules (R v Home Secretary, ex p. Khawaja[1984] A.C. 74at 99E). A writ of habeas corpus is issued where someone is detained without authority or that the purported authority is outside the powers of the person authorising the detention; therefore, giving rise to an unlawful detention. Judicial review is available where the decision to detain is within the powers of the person authorising the detention but the decision was made by a procedural error or a failure to take into account of relevant matters or that the decision was unreasonable. In such is the case, the decision or action is lawful, unless it is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

13.  There is some suggestion that, consequent upon the judgment of the House of Lords in Boddington v British Transport Police[1998] 2 WLR 639, the error of law category formulated in Cheblak [1991] 1 WLR 890, which appeared to be limited to pure ultra vires cases, may be unsound, and that an applicant for the remedy of habeas corpus should not be constrained to the Cheblak categories (R Gordon, Judicial Review and Crown Office Practice (1999), p 315).    Since I have not heard full submissions on this point, I propose to follow the traditional distinction between habeas corpus and judicial review mentioned above in this decision, ie habeas corpus is concerned with a detention without authority or authorised by someone acting beyond his powers, whereas judicial review extends to cases of abuse of powers and procedural error.

14.  The court’s jurisdiction and the procedures to be followed in relation to an application for a writ habeas corpus are set out in Section 22A of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4, and Order 54 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A.  Section 22A of the High Court Ordinance provides, relevantly, as follows:

“(1) An application may be made to the Court of First Instance—

(a) alleging that a person named in the application is being detained without lawful justification; and

(b) requesting the issue of a writ of habeas corpus in respect of that person.

(2) An application can be made by the person alleged to be detained, or by any other person on that person’s behalf, and, in particular, can be made by or on behalf of a person who claims to be legally entitled to the custody of another person.

(3) An application can be made ex parte.

(4) As soon as practicable after receiving an application, the Court of First Instance must inquire into the allegation that the applicant is being unlawfully detained. All proceedings under this section are to be conducted in open court unless the Court, in exceptional circumstances specified by the Court, orders the proceedings, or a part of the proceedings, to be conducted in camera. All orders and decisions made in respect of those proceedings, and the reasons for those orders and decisions, are in every case to be announced in open court.

(5) On considering the application, the Court of First Instance must, if satisfied that the application has substance, do either of the following—

(a) order the issue of a writ of habeas corpus directing the person having custody of the applicant to have the applicant brought before the Court at a specified time on a specified date and to certify to the Court the grounds for the applicant’s detention;

(b) order the person having custody of the applicant to appear before the Court in order to justify the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention.

(6) The Court of First Instance may dismiss an application for a writ of habeas corpus if satisfied, on considering the application, that it has no substance.

(7) The person to whom a writ of habeas corpus is directed must, not later than the time and on the date specified in the writ—

(a) produce before the Court of First Instance the person alleged to be detained; and

(b) make a formal return to the writ.

However, the Court of First Instance may extend the time within which a writ of habeas corpus must be complied with if it is satisfied that there is a good reason to do so.

(8) If for any reason it is not possible for the person to whom a writ of habeas corpus is directed to comply with the writ, that person must nevertheless make a return to the Court of First Instance specifying the reason why it is not possible to comply with the writ.

(9) When a person is brought before the Court of First Instance in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus, the Court must immediately inquire into the circumstances surrounding the detention of the person and must order the release of that person from detention unless satisfied that the detention is lawful.

(10) If a person who has custody of a detained person appears before the Court in accordance with an order made under subsection (5)(b) but fails to satisfy the Court that the detention is lawful, the Court must order the detained person to be released from detention immediately.

(14)  The right to obtain a writ of habeas corpus under the common law is preserved and is affected by this section only in so far as it is inconsistent with this section.”

15.  Under Order 54, rule 2(1) of the Rules of the High Court:

“The judge to whom an application under rule 1 is made ex parte may make an order forthwith for the writ to issue, or may -

(a) where the application is made otherwise than in court, direct that an originating summons for the writ be issued, or that an application therefor be made by originating summons to a judge in court;

(b) where the application is made to a judge in court, adjourn the application so that notice thereof may be given, or direct that an application be made by originating summons.”

16.  Further, Order 54, rule 4 of the Rules of the High Court provides that:

“Without prejudice to rule 2(1), the judge hearing an application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjudiciendum may in his discretion order that the person restrained be released, and such order shall be a sufficient warrant to any superintendent of a prison, constable or other person for the release of the person under restraint.”

17.  In Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2019, paragraph 54/4/2, it is stated that:

“It is modern practice for the courts to dispose the application on the adjourned hearing rather than on the substantive hearing. On the adjourned hearing, the judge may, in his discretion, order that the detainee be released. Such an order is a sufficient warrant to any governor of a prison, constable or any other person for the release of the detainee. If such an order is made, the writ itself will not be formally issued and a return of writ will not be needed nor will there be a need to show cause for the detention.”

18.  The test for deciding whether to issue a writ of habeas corpus is as follows: the applicant need not convince the court of the merits of his case, but should raise an arguable case which deserves further consideration (see Cheng Chui Ping v Superintendent of Tai Lam Centre for Women & Another [2000] 3 HKLRD 694, at 697 per Stock J, as he then was).

19.  On the other hand, when deciding whether to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the court applies the well-known test of whether the application is reasonably arguable with a realistic prospect of success.  Further, the court may grant interim relief, normally after leave to apply for judicial review has been obtained (see Practice Direction SL3, paragraph 10).  As for the principles for granting interim relief, see梁頌恆 v 立法會主席, [2018] HKCFI 1869 (HCAL 1160 & 1165/2018), at paragraphs 12 and 13, which I do not propose to set out here.

DISCUSSION

20.  The following provisions of the Ordinance are relevant for the present purpose:

“34 Powers of juvenile courts in relation to guardianship and custody and control of children and juveniles in need of care and protection

(1) A juvenile court, on its own motion or upon the application …of any police officer upon being satisfied that any person of or above the age of 7 years brought before the court … may –

(a) appoint the Director of Social Welfare to be the legal guardian of such child or juvenile; or

(b) commit him to the care of any person whether a relative or not, who is willing to undertake the care of him, or of any institution which is so willing; or

(c) order his parent or guardian to enter into recognizance to exercise proper care and guardianship; or

(d) without making such order or in addition to making an order under paragraph (b) or (c), make an order placing him for a specified period, not exceeding 3 years under the supervision of a person appointed for the purpose by the court:

Provided that no order shall be made under paragraph (a) without the consent of the Director of Social Welfare.

(2) For the purposes of this Ordinance, a child or juvenile in need of care or protection means a child or juvenile –

(b) whose health, development or welfare has been or is being neglected or avoidably impaired; or

(c) whose health, development or welfare appears likely to be neglected or avoidably impaired; or

(d) who is beyond control, to the extent that harm may be caused to him or to others,

and who requires care or protection.

34E. Detention of child or juvenile in place of refuge

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 34(1), where an application is made to a juvenile court under that section or under section 34C the court may, whether or not the child or juvenile in relation to whom the application is made is before the court, order the detention or continued detention of the child or juvenile in a place of refuge for a period not exceeding 28 days from the date of the order in the first instance in order that further inquiries may be made about the child or juvenile, and, if necessary for that purpose, may during the continuance in force of such order make further orders of detention for such period or periods as the court thinks fit, provided that the total period of continuous detention does not at any time exceed an aggregate of 56 days.”

21.  It can be seen that the Magistrate has power, under Section 34E of the Ordinance, to order the detention of a child or juvenile in relation to whom an application is made under Section 34 in a place of refuge for an initial period of 28 days in order that further inquiries may be made about the child or juvenile, which period may be extended by a further order or orders up to an aggregated total of 56 days of continuous detention.

22.  In the present case, there is no doubt that:

(1)  S is a child or juvenile;

(2)  an application has been made in relation to S under Section 34 of the Ordinance; and

(3)  the Juvenile Home is a place of “refuge” within the meaning of Section 34E.

23.  The remaining condition which has to be satisfied for the Magistrate to lawfully exercise his power under Section 34E is that the detention is “in order that further inquiries may be made about the child or juvenile”.  It should be noted that the purpose of making an order under Section 34E is not to punish the child or juvenile for having committed any criminal offence.  An order under Section 34E is made in circumstances where there is in existence an application for (inter alia) a care and protection order under Section 34, and the juvenile court considers that further inquiries are required to be made before deciding whether to make a care and protection order.

24.  In the present case, the Magistrate was faced with two conflicting versions of the event.  On the one hand, the Police alleged that S took part in an unlawful assembly in the vicinity of Yen Chow Street opposite the Police Station in the late evening of 29 August 2019.  If that version should turn out to be the correct one, a case can justifiably be made that S is in need of care or protection on the ground that he is “beyond control, to the extent that harm may be caused to him or others” within the meaning of Section 34(2)(d) of the Ordinance.  On the other hand, if S’s version should turn out to be the correct one, S would be an innocent passerby in relation to the incident which occurred in the vicinity of his home on 29 August 2019, and it would be difficult to justify an order being made under Section 34 and, it follows, an order under Section 34E, against S.

25.  It is, I believe, obvious from the questions and answers between the Magistrate and S and his counsel that the Magistrate was not convinced by the explanation given by or on behalf of S for his presence in the vicinity of the unlawful assembly on 29 August 2019.

26.  On behalf of F, Mr Kwan argues that the power to make an order of detention under Section 34E(4) is limited to the purpose stated in that subsection, ie “in order that further inquiries may be made about” the child or juvenile in question.  He further argues that if further inquiries may be made without detention, the juvenile court would have no power to make an order under that subsection.  I am by no means satisfied that the power to make an order of detention under Section 34E(4) is so limited.  I accept that if detention is necessary in order for the further inquiries to take place, the juvenile court would undoubtedly have the power to make an order for detention.  However, it is well conceivable that a case may arise that although the relevant inquiries can be made without detention of the child or juvenile, the juvenile court is not in a position to immediately make a care and protection order under Section 34 but takes the view that, pending the necessary inquiries, the child or juvenile ought to be detained for his/her protection.  In such a case, there would be a strong argument that the juvenile court also has power to make an order for detention in the best interests of the child or juvenile.  In this regard, it should be recognized that making inquiries is not an end in itself.  The end is to put in place the best possible arrangement for the interests of the child or juvenile.  This having been said, I do not have to reach a final conclusion on the true construction of Section 34E(4) in this decision.

27.  In the present case, if the Magistrate:

(1)  was not convinced by the explanation offered by S and his counsel to account for S’s presence in the vicinity of the unlawful assembly;

(2)  was unable to decide, on the basis of the materials before him on 31 August 2019, whether to make an order against S under Section 34;

(3)  considers that a social welfare report about S should be obtained and further investigation should be carried out by the Police (these being the relevant further inquiries) before deciding whether to make an order under Section 34; and

(4)  took the view that S ought to be detained to prevent him from taking part in further unlawful assemblies,

I consider that the Magistrate was justified, or at least there is a strong argument that the Magistrate was justified, in making an order for the detention of S under Section 34E(4) pending the further inquiries.

28.  One difficulty that I face in the present case is that the evidence before me does not disclose the full circumstances of S’s arrest.  In particular, I do not know whether S was seen by police officers to have taken part in the unlawful assembly for some time prior to his arrest, or S simply happened to be seen in the vicinity of the unlawful assembly on his way home and was arrested because he had a black mask on his face and wore a black T-shirt.  I also do not have the benefit of considering the Magistrate’s full reasons for making the Order (beyond considering the transcript of the hearing provided by Mr Kwan).

29.  Overall, I am not satisfied, on the limited materials before me, that the Order made by the Magistrate to detain S in the Juvenile Home is without lawful justification, and I do not consider that a writ of habeas corpus should be issued, or that S should be released under Order 54, rule 4 of the Rules of the High Court.  I am prepared, however, to grant leave to apply for judicial review on the basis that the application is reasonably arguable with a realistic prospect of success.  On this footing, I am also prepared to grant interim relief that S be immediately released from the Juvenile Home subject to the conditions that (i) he must stay at home during the period from 10:00 pm in the evening to 6:00 am in the morning, and (ii) he must not participate in any unlawful meeting, assembly or procession, from the date of his release to 27 September 2019, conditions which I understand are agreeable to F, being S’s legal guardian.  I grant interim relief having regard to: (i) the importance of a person’s right to liberty, (ii) S’s wish to be able to attend school, (iii) S’s good conduct in the past and the favourable letter from the principal of S’s school, and (iv) the special circumstances of this case as outline above.  I am also comforted by the fact the Police have indicated that they have no objection to S being released immediately from the Juvenile Home.

30.  I should make it clear that:

(1)  nothing in this decision is intended in any way to affect the adjourned hearing of the application for a care and protection order under Section 34 of the Ordinance before the Magistrate on 27 September 2019 in KCJP 119 of 2019, or the order that the Magistrate may make in that application; and

(2)  this decision should not be regarded as setting any precedent that a child or juvenile detained pursuant to Section 34E(4) of the Ordinance pending further inquiries would generally be released.  Each case will have to be determined on its own facts.

DISPOSITION

31.  In relation to HCAL 2582/2019, I grant leave to apply for judicial review, and further grant interim relief as indicated in paragraph 29 above.  The application should thereafter follow the usual procedures under Order 53 of the Rules of the High Court.

32.  In relation to HCAL 2563/2019, if F still wishes to pursue the application for a writ of habeas corpus, I direct that it be made by originating summons under Order 54, rule 2(1)(b) of the Rules of the High Court within 14 days of the date of this order.

33.  The costs of the applications, including the costs of the hearings on 3, 4 and 5 September 2019, shall be in their respective causes.