HKSAR v. LAU KA SHING

CACC 292 /2018

[2019] HKCA 1228

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 292 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO 174 OF 2016)

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J U D G M E N T

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1.  The applicant and his elder brother (“D2”) were jointly charged with two counts of trafficking in a dangerous drug, contrary to section 4(1)(a) and (3) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, Cap 134. Count 1 alleged that the applicant together with D2 unlawfully trafficked in 1 kilogramme of a crystalline solid containing 976 grammes of methamphetamine hydrochloride (commonly known as “Ice”) on 28 July 2015, outside Block 8 of Po Tin Estate, Tuen Mun. Count 2 alleged that the applicant together with D2 unlawfully trafficked in 1,997 grammes of a crystalline solid containing 1,956 grammes of Ice on 28 July 2015 at Room 1123, Block 8 of Po Tin Estate (“Room 1123”).

2.  D2 pleaded guilty to both counts on the indictment.  The applicant pleaded not guilty to both counts and stood trial alone in the High Court before Deputy Judge Lugar-Mawson (the “Judge”) and a jury.  On 14 September 2018, the applicant was unanimously convicted on each count and, on 19 September 2018, sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment.

3.  By way of a Notice of application for leave to appeal (Form XI), the applicant seeks leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence.  The applicant was legally represented at trial and before me by different counsel.  Having heard argument from Mr Cheung, on behalf of the applicant, I reserved judgment.  This is my decision on leave.

Admitted facts

4.  It was admitted at trial that a black recycle bag containing the Ice particularised in Count 1 was seized outside Block 8 of Po Tin Estate; further, that a yellow bag (Exhibit P7) containing two plastic bags (Exhibits P2 and P3) containing the drugs particularised in Count 2 was seized inside Room 1123 of the same Block at Po Tin Estate on the same date, during a house search conducted with the consent of the applicant and D2.  It was accepted that D2 was the sole tenant of Room 1123.  The authenticity, accuracy and integrity of the CCTV footage covering the lobby, mailbox, and Lift 1 and Lift 2 of Block 8 of Po Tin Estate from 20:38 hours to 20:45 hours on 28 July 2015 were not contested.  The applicant further admitted that he voluntarily and freely participated in a video-recorded interview between 02:27 hours and 03:02 hours on 29 July 2015 (the “VRI”).  The total value of the dangerous drugs in Counts 1 and 2 was estimated at HK$866,133 as at 28 July 2015.

Prosecution case

5.  The prosecution called five witnesses, all of whom were police officers involved in the investigation of the case.  The prosecution also relied on the applicant’s admissions post-recorded in the notebook of DPC 5778 (“PW5”) and in the VRI.

6.  On 28 July 2015 at about 20:20 hours, a team of police officers from the Intelligence Team of the Narcotics Bureau, conducted a surveillance operation in the Lau Fau Shan area.  WPC 4343 (“PW1”) saw a silver-grey Mercedes Benz private car being driven by a man called Wong Chi-chuen (“Wong”) and containing three passengers: the applicant, D2 and an unknown male (the “unknown passenger”).  The car approached the roundabout at Lau Fau Shan Road, with D2 in the front passenger seat, the applicant in the nearside rear seat and the unknown passenger next to him.  When Wong stopped the car at the roundabout, D2 and the unknown passenger alighted from the car and took possession of the yellow recycle bag from another unknown person nearby.  The unknown passenger then returned to the car and placed the bag on the rear seat of the car next to the applicant.  The unknown passenger then left the scene after hailing a taxi.  D2 re‑boarded the car and again sat in the front passenger seat.  Wong then drove away from the area.  At about 20:36 hours, PW1 saw the car again at Po Tin Estate.

7.  At 20:40 hours, DPC 4645 (“PW2”) saw the applicant carrying a yellow recycle bag and entering the lift of Block 8 of Po Tin Estate together with D2.  About 18 minutes later at 20:58 hours, the applicant carrying a black recycle bag with his right hand, and D2 carrying another black recycle bag, were seen walking out of the lift on the ground floor of Block 8 and leaving the building.  D2 then passed the black recycle bag to the applicant and the applicant carried it with his left hand.  The two men continued to walk towards the bus terminus, but were intercepted by DPC 6587 (“PW3”).  Initially, the applicant and D2 tried to escape but they only managed to go two or three steps before being apprehended by PW2 and PW3 respectively. The applicant was subdued and pinned to the ground.  The black recycle bag, with a logo “Lids” printed on the bag (the “Lids Bag”), which had been carried by the applicant with his left hand and dropped to the left hand side of his body, was later found to contain the dangerous drugs particularised in Count 1.

8.  After the applicant and D2 were placed under control, WSSGT Lee Pui-yiu (“PW4”) arrived at the scene.  She firstly picked up the Lids Bag containing the dangerous drug in Count 1 for a quick inspection and placed it back on the applicant’s left hand side.  According to PW4, the black bag carried with the applicant’s right hand (the “Black Bag”) had also dropped on the floor.  The items inside that black bag were loose items.

9.  At around 21:03 hours, DPC 5778 (“PW5”) from the Operations Division of the Narcotics Bureau arrived at the scene.  He declared arrest on the applicant for the offence of trafficking in dangerous drugs and cautioned him.  In response, the applicant said, “It’s only because I had no money, I then resorted to selling the dangerous drugs to the others.  (I) had come to a dead end.  Let me go”^[1] (the “1^st Verbal Admission”).  This 1^st Verbal Admission was later post‑recorded in PW5’s notebook inside Room 1223.  The applicant signed on various places in the notebook and made a handwritten declaration.

10.  Upon a search of Room 1223, a light-yellow bag with logo “Le Petit Pois” printed on it (the “Le Petit Pois Bag”) was found on the mattress inside the Room contained the dangerous drug set out in Count 2.  Upon a further caution administered on the applicant by PW5 in Room 1223, the applicant responded, “Ah Sir, I have already told (you) earlier (I) really had no money.  Give (me) a chance”^[2] (the “2^nd Verbal Admission”).

11.  The applicant and D2 were initially taken to Tuen Mun Police Station, where PW5 post-recorded the 2^nd Verbal Admission in his notebook at about 23:21 hours.  They were both subsequently transferred to the Narcotics Bureau offices at Police Headquarters in Wan Chai, where PW5 conducted a VRI with the applicant.

12.  In the VRI, the applicant denied making the 1^st Verbal Admission^[3] or the 2^nd Verbal Admission^[4].  In respect of the two bags containing dangerous drugs, he admitted carrying the Le Petit Pois Bag from the car to Room 1223 for D2^[5].  He had seen the two transparent re‑sealable plastic bags containing white crystalline substance suspected to be dangerous drug inside the Le Petit Pois Bag, which had been seized on the mattress of the Room^[6].  However, he said he had never carried the Lids Bag for D2 at any time^[7].

Defence case

13.  The applicant elected to give evidence.  He also called D2 as his defence witness.

14.  The applicant testified he did not have any knowledge of any dangerous drugs seized by the police.  The purpose of accompanying D2 on the night of 28 July 2015 was to go out to dinner together. Before the date of the arrest, the applicant had stayed in Room 1223 for just over a year.  While he and D2 were in Room 1223, the applicant focused on packing items in the Black Bag and he did not know what D2 was doing inside the kitchen.  When he and D2 walked out of Block 8, he was not carrying the Lids Bag.  It was PW4 who picked up the Lids Bag somewhere near the location where the applicant was subdued and placed it on the left hand side of the applicant.  He did not make the 1^st or the 2^nd Verbal Admissions to PW5.  PW5 made all of the entries in his notebook in the vicinity of Room 1223.  When the applicant signed on the notebook in the corridor outside Room 1223, the relevant entries were folded over and he could not see or read the contents.  It was only when he was remanded in Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre that he received copies of PW5’s notebook.  The date and time of the acknowledgement of receipt of the copy of the notebook was, therefore, false.

15.  D2’s evidence supported the applicant’s claim that the applicant had no knowledge of what was inside the Lids Bag or the Le Petit Pois Bag.  The applicant had not seen what D2 was doing inside the kitchen.

Application under section 54(1)(f)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 221

16.  Since the applicant had alleged that the police had given false testimony and planted evidence on him, the prosecution applied for leave to cross-examine the applicant as to his previous convictions, pursuant to section 54(1)(f)(ii) of Criminal Procedure Ordinance.

17.  Whilst accepting that the court was not bound by the ruling of the judge in the previous abortive trial, defence counsel opposed the application on the ground that the prejudicial effect of revealing the applicant’s criminal record to the jury outweighed its probative effect.

18.  Mindful that the applicant’s previous criminal record involved convictions at the Magistrate’s court level, namely, possession of dangerous drugs and theft, which were described by defence counsel as “petty criminal offences”[8], the judge considered that the imputations on the prosecution witnesses amounted to a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.  As such, he ruled that the case was a proper one for him to exercise his discretion in favour of the prosecution.  However, he indicated that he would give “a strong warning” to the jury in his summing‑up that the relevance of the criminal record went only to the character of the applicant[9].

19.  In the ensuing cross-examination on the applicant’s previous criminal record, the applicant confirmed his previous record^[10] and the suggestion that he was “familiar with dangerous drugs”^[11].

Summing-up

20.  In respect of the relevance of the applicant’s previous convictions, the judge duly directed the jury^[12]:

“So what is the relevance of the defendant’s previous convictions in this case? Now, the only reason, and I stress it is the only reason why you have heard about the defendant’s previous convictions is that knowledge of the character of the defendant who has made that attack may assist you to judge the truthfulness of the evidence when you come to consider this matter. You must not, and let me stress this, you must not assume that the defendant is guilty or that he is not telling the truth just because he has previous convictions. His convictions are not relevant at all to the likelihood of him having committed the offence. They are only relevant as to whether you can believe him. You do not have to allow these convictions to affect your judgment but it is for you to decide the extent to which, if at all, his previous convictions help you about the issue of whether or not you can believe him.”

21.  In respect of how the jury were to approach the 1^st and 2^nd Verbal Admissions, the judge directed the jury^[13]:

“The prosecution say that the defendant on two occasions, on arrest and on finding of the drugs in room or flat 1123, made admissions of being involved in drug-trafficking. They say that those admissions are true and they say that Detective Constable 5778’s notebook entries record accurately what the defendant said to him after he cautioned him. Mr Turnbull reminded you yesterday that the defendant signed on that notebook four times.

The defendant’s case is that he made neither of those admissions. It is his case that they were fabricated by Detective Constable 5778. Again, to use colloquial terms, it is his case that he has been verballed and, he says, to the extent that he is said to have adopted the admissions by appending his signature to those notebook entries allegedly recording them, he did so because Detective Constable 5778 tricked him into doing so and the signatures are therefore worthless.

Now, in deciding whether you can safely rely upon these admissions you have to decide two issues: first, did the defendant in fact make them? Did he make those admissions? If you are not sure of that, you must completely ignore them, completely ignore them. If, however, you are sure that he did then ask yourself, ‘Are we sure that the admissions are true?’ Now, in addressing that issue, the issue of whether the admissions or the answers were true, decide whether they were or may have been made or given as a result of something said or done by any of the police officers investigating the case which was likely to render them unreliable.

If you conclude that the admissions were or may have been obtained by the Detective Constable 5778, tricking the defendant in any way at all, in any way at all, then you must disregard them completely.  If, however, ladies and gentlemen, you decide that the defendant made the admissions and that there was no trickery as alleged on the Detective Constable 5778’s part and indeed on the part of any police officer, then you may rely on those admissions.”

22.  Having summarised the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, as well as that of the applicant and D2, the judge highlighted the main issues for the jury’s consideration^[14]:

“I want to urge you, very strongly, that when you are in the jury room you identify and deal with the real areas of dispute in this case. There really are, to my mind, very few, just four and they are these: (1) did Lau Ka-chun pass the black ‘Lids’ bag to the defendant as the second prosecution witness, Detective Constable 4645, says he did? Remember, he is the only witness who says he saw that handover. Was the black ‘Lids’ bag or did the black ‘Lids’ bag fall right by the defendant’s left-hand side or did the Woman Station Sergeant Lee move it there as the defendant says happened?

Thirdly, did the defendant make those two admissions?  If he did, you will have to decide whether or not you accept that they are true.  Now, and the fourth point is really what you make of the defendant’s answers in the video recorded interview and his explanations for them given in his evidence.”

Mitigation

23.   Defence counsel submitted that for trafficking in the quantities of Ice particularised in the indictment, the relevant bracket for sentencing after trial was between 23 and 25 years’ imprisonment, in accordance with the guidelines set out in HKSAR v Abdallah^[15]. It was argued that there were no aggravating factors justifying an enhancement of sentence.

Reasons for sentence

24.  The judge treated both counts as one continuing course of criminal conduct and based his sentence on the total quantity of 2,932 grammes of Ice narcotic.  Accordingly, he adopted 25 years’ imprisonment as the starting point for each count before ordering both sentences to run concurrently, making 25 years’ imprisonment in all.

Grounds of appeal against conviction and sentence

25.  In his Amended Perfected Grounds of Appeal, Mr Cheung has advanced two grounds of appeal against conviction, namely:

(1)  The judge failed to direct the jury in accordance with Specimen Direction 39 in respect of the 1^st and 2^nd Verbal Admissions.  Further, the judge failed to direct the jury that, on the applicant’s case, there were separate and distinct findings of fact to be made in respect of the verbal admissions and the written post-recorded statement in PW5’s notebook (Ground 1).

(2)  The judge erred in the exercise of his discretion by allowing the prosecution to cross-examine the applicant as to his previous criminal record, in a case where the evidence against him was overwhelming (Ground 2).

26.  Mr Cheung advanced two grounds of appeal against sentence, ostensibly in the alternative, which I have re-numbered as follows:

(3)  The judge erred in not applying the guidelines in HKSAR v Abdallah[16] to the quantity of Ice narcotic involved in each count separately (Ground 3).

(4)  Notwithstanding that the judge sentenced the applicant for the total amount of Ice narcotic concerned, the term of imprisonment imposed was manifestly excessive when compared with like cases involving larger quantities of the drug (Ground 4).

Applicant’s submissions

Ground 1

27.  Apart from failing to direct the jury in accordance with the Specimen Direction 39, it was argued that the judge ought to have invited the jury to decide whether the admissions were or might have been made as a result of impropriety which was likely to render them unreliable, even if they found that the applicant had made the admissions.  Further, the jury should have been told to consider whether the admissions were true, even if they found the applicant had made the admissions without any circumstances of impropriety.  Relying on HKSAR v Yeung Chun Hin^[17], Mr Cheung complained the judge had failed to direct the jury that there were separate and distinct findings of fact to be made in respect of both the oral admissions and the written admissions.

Ground 2

28.  It was contended that, on the prosecution case, the applicant had allegedly been caught red‑handed with the dangerous drugs set out in Count 1, in relation to which he had allegedly made an immediate confession. Further dangerous drugs, as set out in Count 2, were found in the applicant’s home, possession of which he, again, allegedly admitted.  Relying on Lawton LJ’s comment in R v Britzman^[18]in respect of the same provision under English law, there was no need for the prosecution to rely upon section 54(1)(f)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 221, since the evidence was overwhelming.  The discretion to grant the application by the prosecution should be exercised sparingly and cautiously as a matter of fairness to the applicant.  Reference was also made to the Victorian case of R v Brown^[19].

Grounds 3 and 4

29.  As to Ground 3, Mr Cheung submitted that the judge did not follow the relevant sentencing guidelines in respect of Counts 1 and 2. In respect of Count 1, where the amount of Ice narcotic was 976 grammes, the appropriate starting point following Abdallah should have been within the range of 20 to 23 years.  In respect of Count 2, where the quantity was 1,956 grammes, the appropriate staring point should have been in the range of 23 to 26 years.

30.  Reliance was placed, in Ground 4, on the following three decisions of this Court involving larger quantities of Ice, but shorter sentences:

Case name	Quantity of Ice involved	Sentence
HKSAR v Mothosola T Max CACC 437/2014	3.87 kilogrammes	Starting point: 25 years
HKSAR v Nkosi X Rose CACC 331/2013	3.3 kilogrammes	Starting point: 24 years
HKSAR v Yamaguchi Masaki CACC 172/2015	5.9 kilogrammes	A term of no less than 26 years as suggested by the trial of the case.

Respondent’s submissions

Ground 1

31.  Mr Chan, on behalf of the respondent, took issue with the complaint that the judge had failed to follow the relevant Specimen Direction.  Read as a whole, the judge had clearly complied with the terms of the Specimen Direction and the case bore no relation to the impugned summing-up in Yeung Chun Hin.  

Ground 2

32.  The leading authority on the equivalent provision in the United Kingdom is R v Selvey^[20].  The jury was entitled to know the credit‑worthiness of the man on whose word the prosecution witness’s character was being attacked.

33.  It was well settled that an appellate court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of a discretion by a trial judge, unless he has erred in principle or there was no material upon which he could properly have arrived at this decision.  The fact that an appellate court would have exercised the discretion differently is not enough to justify interference.

34.  Accusing a police officer of falsely fabricating evidence against a defendant and of wrongfully inducing him to make a written statement are imputing to him a willingness to commit the crime of perjury in order to obtain the conviction of an innocent man.  Such allegations were a serious attack upon the witness’s character.  Mr Chan further argued that the proposition that there was no need for the prosecution to rely upon the equivalent of the section in the United Kingdom Act where the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming was one of the three guidelines in Britzman concerned with the exercise of the discretion in favour of a defendant.  However, no reason or authority was given for the particular proposition.  Furthermore, although R v Owen^[21] had considered and adopted what was said in R v Britzman, the Court had not specifically done so in respect of this particular guideline.

35.  The applicant’s previous criminal record was not very serious.  The judge had taken into account the nature of the convictions and rightly regarded them as minor offences.  He had also compared the applicant’s record with the seriousness of his allegations against the police.  The judge was in the best position to exercise the discretion, in accordance with established legal principles and his decision could not be faulted.

36.  Furthermore, the judge had properly directed the jury as to the purpose of the applicant’s record in his summing-up.  The prosecution’s questioning on the applicant’s record was brief and restrained.  Any concern that the jury would misuse the evidence was minimised.  Therefore, it was an appropriate case for the judge to permit the prosecution’s application.

Grounds 3 and 4

37.  Mr Chan submitted that, given the time and place where the dangerous drugs involved in the two counts were found, as well as the similar nature of the two lots of dangerous drug, the judge’s approach in treating the two offences as one continuing course of criminal conduct was correct.

38.  It was trite law that as long as the particular sentence under consideration fell within the relevant sentencing guideline range, no useful purpose was served by comparing it with sentences passed in other cases on different facts.  If one were to sentence on a strict arithmetic basis, the starting point for the total quantity of Ice narcotic in both counts should have been 24.85 years.  Accordingly, the overall sentence of 25 years imposed on the applicant was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.

Discussion (on conviction)

39.  In respect of Ground 1, I do not see that the directions in this case bear any similarity at all to the judge’s directions, which were the subject of criticism in Yeung Chun Hin.  In that case, the judge had adopted his own abbreviated form of directions, which were not even a correct adaptation of the Specimen Direction.  In so doing, the Court found that he had fallen short of what he should have directed the jury in a number of important respects.  However, in the present case, it seems to me that the same judge, in directing the jury as to how to deal with the impugned oral admissions and post-recorded notebook entries, followed closely the terms of Specimen Direction 39[22].

40.  The judge clearly distinguished between the oral admissions and the post-recorded notebook entries, when he specifically directed the jury that the applicant was saying two things: first, that he had never made the admissions and, secondly, that he had been tricked into signing the notebook recording the admissions[23]. The jury were directed first to determine whether the applicant had in fact made the admissions[24]. If they were unsure of that fact, they were to completely ignore them[25].  They were then told that once they were sure that the applicant had made the admissions, they should ask themselves whether the admissions were true[26].

41.  The jury were then given this explicit direction, which must in context have related to the post-recorded notebook entries[27]:

“If you conclude that the admissions were or may have been obtained by the Detective Constable 5778 (PW5), tricking the defendant in any way at all, in any way at all, then you must disregard them completely.”

Only if they were sure that the applicant made the admissions and that there was no trickery of the officer’s part, could the jury rely on the admissions[28].

42.  With respect to Mr Cheung’s argument, these directions properly derived from Specimen Direction 39, were appropriate to the circumstances of the case and yield of no reasonably arguable ground of appeal. The directions by the judge in Yeung Chun Hin were entirely different.

43.  In respect of Ground 2, the applicant had alleged that he had been framed up with the drugs in Count 1 that he had never possessed; and then tricked into signing false confessions he had never uttered.  The judge was addressed with relevant authority and was fully aware that he had a discretion in the matter.  He determined that the material should go before the jury, notwithstanding (as he was told) that the previous judge, when faced with the same application from the prosecution, had declined to allow the prosecution to cross-examine the applicant on his previous convictions.  He readily understood what the previous convictions were and that they were petty offences, as characterised by defence counsel.  He indicated that he would give a strong warning to the jury in his summing-up, which he in due course gave, in accordance with Specimen Direction 38.

44.  This ground of appeal is not reasonably arguable.  Accordingly, since I can see no reasonably arguable grounds of appeal against conviction, leave to appeal against conviction is refused.

Discussion (on sentence)

45.  As for Grounds 3 and 4 in respect of sentence, the judge added the two quantities of dangerous drugs together to arrive at an overall starting point for the total quantity.  Strictly speaking, it would have been more correct to have arrived at an individual starting point in respect of the quantity of Ice narcotic in each count and then made the two sentences partly consecutive and partly concurrent with each other, having regard to the overall totality.  However, the judge’s method of adding the two quantities together and fixing an overall starting point for the combined quantity and then making the two sentences wholly concurrent is acceptable provided the arithmetic is sound.

46.  In this case, the sentence for the total amount of 2,932 grammes of Ice narcotic, arrived at arithmetically, would have been 24.85 years’ imprisonment.  The sentence passed was 25 years’ imprisonment.  I would not normally consider a difference of just under 2 months to be significant enough to amount to a reasonable ground of appeal that a sentence was manifestly excessive.  As for the three cases cited by Mr Cheung, it has been said time and again by appellate courts that comparisons with other cases with different facts and circumstances is not a productive exercise.

47.  However, I am concerned about one matter, although it has not been articulated in the grounds of appeal as they presently stand.  The judge, as I have just pointed out, seems to have adopted a starting point slightly higher than the starting point would have been if he had approached it in a strictly arithmetical way.  And although that difference would not generally be enough to generate a reasonably arguable ground of appeal in itself, it seems that the reason that the judge adopted such a starting point was, as he explained, that “although I have no idea where this large quantity of “Ice” was to finally be traded on, there is evidence that it was to be exported out of Hong Kong, and I stress evidence”[29](my emphasis).  Yet, the judge had earlier accepted that the applicant and his brother were both “mules, the lowest rank in the chain of command”[30].

48.  I am of the view that the question of whether the judge has enhanced the starting point beyond what it should have been and, if so, whether his doing so is justified, is something that needs to be looked at more closely.  For that reason, I shall grant the applicant leave to appeal in respect of sentence.

Conclusion

49.  Having refused leave to appeal against conviction, I should advise the applicant that he has the right to renew his application for leave to appeal against conviction to the Court of Appeal, but he is also warned that one of the consequences of so doing may be that the Court of Appeal could make an order for the loss of any time which the applicant has spent in custody pending his appeal, if the Court of Appeal were to come to the view that there was no justification for the renewal of the application.

50.  No such warning is necessary in respect of the appeal against sentence, on which leave is granted.

[1]     English Translation of Cautioned Statement of the applicant: AB p 65.

[2]     English Translation of Cautioned Statement of the applicant: AB p 67.

[3]     Transcript of VRI: AB p 119, Counters 51-52.

[4]     Transcript of VRI: AB p 122, Counters 71-72.

[5]     Transcript of VRI: AB p 125, Counters 102-105.

[6]     Ditto.

[7]     Transcript of VRI: AB p 129, Counters 143-147.

[8]     AB p 213M.

[9]     AB p 215G-H.

[10]   Evidence of the applicant: AB, pp 330O-331F.

[11]   Evidence of the applicant: AB, pp 331G-331H.

[12]   Summing-up: AB, p 29F-N.

[13]   Summing-up: AB, p 32A-T.

[14]   Summing-up: AB, p 48K-S.

[15]   [2009] 2 HKLRD 437.

[16]   HKSAR v Abdallah [2009] 2 HKLRD 437.

[17]   HKSAR v Yeung Chun Hin [2018] 5 HKLRD 412.

[18]   R v Britzman [1983] 1 WLR 351, at 355G.

[19]   R v Brown [1960] VR 382, per Smith J at 398.

[20]   R v Selvey [1970] AC 304.

[21]   R v Owen (1986) 83 Cr. App. R 100.

[22]   AB p 32A-T.

[23]   AB p 32F-I.

[24]   AB p 32J-K.

[25]   AB p 32K.

[26]   AB p 32L.

[27]   AB p 32O-Q.

[28]   AB p 32Q-T.

[29]   AB p 198M-O.

[30]   AB p 197Q.