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SALINO RICHITO SALADAGA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
SALINO RICHITO SALADAGA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 4701 · HCAL 214/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 214/2024 and HCAL 1114/2026
(Heard together)
[2026] HKCFI 4701
HCAL 214/2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 214 of 2024
BETWEEN
| |Salino Richito Saladaga | Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
_____________
AND
HCAL 1114/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1114 of 2026
BETWEEN
| |Salino Richito Saladaga |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|(|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
HCAL 214/2024
The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
HCAL 1114/2026
1. Leave to the applicant to amend the Form 86 by substituting the
Director as the proposed putative respondent, and deleting the
Director as the putative interested party. The filing of the amended
Form 86 is dispensed with.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
HCAL 214/2024
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 24 January 2024, the applicant applied
for leave to apply for judicial review (“2024 Application”). The
intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims
Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated
4 January 2024 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal
against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated
30 June 2022 rejecting the applicant's non-refoulement claim on all
applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the
following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL000214_
2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Philippines,
he would be harmed or killed by a drug dealer who had forced his brother
to sell drugs and other drug dealers after the applicant reported them to
the police. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in
the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them.
Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations
and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
HCAL 1114/2026
3. After the filing of the 2024 Leave Application against the Board’s
Decision, on 18 November 2025, the applicant submitted a written request
(“Request”) for the making of a subsequent claim for non-refoulement under
s 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance. On 30 April 2006, the Director
refused (“Director’s Subsequent Decision”) the Request. By a “Notice of
application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form
86 filed on 17 June 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for
judicial review (“2026 Application”) against the Director’s Subsequent
Decision.
4. The court scheduled a hearing on 28 July 2026 for both leave
applications. The applicant attended in person and had no objections to
have both applications be heard together. Since the applicant had
erroneously named the Board as the proposed respondent and the Director as
the interested party, he applied to amend correcting the errors. The court
allowed the applicant’s proposed amendment by substituting the Director as
the proposed putative respondent, and deleting the Director as the putative
interested party.
Discussion
5. The leave application operates as a “filtering” process. Hence,
there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after
considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced.
6. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and
frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. In
the 2026 Application, the applicant’s Form 86 and the supporting
affirmation provided no such grounds. In the 2024 Application, the
applicant alleged in the supporting affirmation that the Board refused to
accept the documents which were not translated into English and that it had
refused to allow him more time. He further alleged that the interpreter
asked him to hurry as he had another job. The Form 86 in the 2024
Application provided no grounds at all.
7. In light of the allegations the applicant made in the supporting
affirmation of the 2024 Application, the court therefore asked him to
elaborate on the allegations. The applicant appeared to be at a loss when
he was informed of those allegations. After he heard the interpreter at
the hearing interpreted the contents of the supporting affirmation to him,
he said that he never made any of those allegations. He believed that they
were written by the person who prepared the papers for him without his
knowledge. Apart from disavowing the allegations, the applicant had
nothing to say in either of the 2024 or the 2026 Applications.
8. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is
exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial
review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of
law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4]
HCAL 214/2024 Application
9. In the present case, the Board found that the applicant would not be
subjected to future risk of harm as the past ill-treatment failed to meet
the requisite level of severity, and that any feared ill-treatment was
private and personal in nature. The Board further found that both state
protection and internal relocation would be reasonably available. These
are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not
interfere with, subject to there being any public law errors.
10. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board
correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a high
standard of fairness. After the applicant had disavowed all the
allegations he made in the supporting affirmation, the applicant therefore
had advanced no grounds, whether written or oral, in support of the
2024 Application. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably
arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this
court to grant leave[5].
Order for HCAL 214/2024 Application
11. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
HCAL 1114/2026 Application
12. The applicant submitted 2 letters in support of the Request. The
basis of the claim for the Request was that, if refouled, he would be
harmed or killed by the same drug dealer and his gangs.
The statutory provisions on subsequent claims
13. Subsequent non-refoulement claims are regulated by s 37ZO of the
Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115), which provides:
Section 37ZO. “Limitation on subsequent claim
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has
previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another
torture claim.
(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides
sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that—
(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since
the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and
(b) the change, when taken together with the material
previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would
give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.
(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim
under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any
finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the
Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the
person.”
Discussion
14. In the Director’s Subsequent Decision, after the Director had taken
into account the facts and the findings, he made in the Director Decision
and the Board’s Decision, the Director found that the applicant’s claim was
of generally of the same nature or source, and therefore would not amount
to a significant change of circumstances. After having considered the
updated COI, the Director found that there was no change of situation
regarding the previously found availability of state protection and
internal relocation. The Director found that the Request had no realistic
prospect of success and refused the applicant’s Request. These are
findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere
with subject to there being any public law errors.
15. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the
Director correctly applied the law and observed a high standard of
fairness. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural
unfairness or irrationality in the Director’s Subsequent Decision. The
applicant’s intended challenge to Director’s Subsequent Decision is not
reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would
enable this court to grant leave[6].
Order for HCAL 1114-2026 Application
16. Leave to the applicant to amend the Form 86 in terms of [4] above.
The filing of the amended Form 86 is dispensed with.
17. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
|Dated the 21st day of August 2026 | |
| |(Alfred Chan) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|Applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant| | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the Putative |
|interested parties as |on 21/8/2026 |Respondent’s solicitors / |
|may be directed by the| |such Putative Interested |
|Court the order |Salino Richito |Parties as may be directed|
|granting leave and any|Saladaga |by the Court / the |
|directions given | |Putative Interested |
|within 14 days after |Applicant’s ref. no:|Parties’ solicitors on |
|the leave was granted |Nil. |21/8/2026 |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | | |
| | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|b) issue the | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|originating summons | |Claims Petition Office |
|within 14 days after | |Putative Respondent’s ref.|
|the grant of leave and| |no.: |
|serve it in accordance| |USM 20617 |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| | |
|and | |Director of Immigration |
| | |Putative Interested |
|c) supply to every | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C |
|other party copies of | |261/22 (formerly RBCZ |
|every affidavit which | |5000135/22), L/M (35394) |
|the Applicant proposes| |in ImmD RA 7/37/C |
|to use at the hearing,| |(formerly RBCZ/5000135/22 |
|including the | |and RBCZ/0010553/19) |
|affidavit in support | | |
|of the application for| |Department of Justice, |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Senior Assistant Law |
|6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to
the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of
persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified
Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process
claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the
USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3
HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015,
22 December 2016 at [142].
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v
Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676
[6] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676