KOO KWOK YEE v. SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE

HCAL 102/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 102 OF 2010

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BETWEEN

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JUDGMENT

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A. Introduction

1.  This is the Applicant’s application for judicial review against the decision (“the Decision”) of Deputy District Judge Rickie Chan made on 5 July 2010 in refusing to give her costs upon her acquittal for the charge of “exporting unmanifested goods” after trial in the criminal proceedings under DCCC 1290 of 2009.

2.  In explaining the Decision, the learned Deputy Judge was of the view that the Applicant had brought suspicion upon herself by reason of her conduct during the investigation in remaining silent and not revealing important material matters relevant to her defence, which matters were only explained by her for the first time at trial[1].

3.  Under section 19 of the Costs in Criminal Cases Ordinance (Cap. 492) (“CCCO”), there is no right of appeal from such a cost order.  The Applicant therefore brought the present judicial review application, seeking (a) an order of certiorari to quash the Decision, and (b) an order to remit the matter to the learned Deputy Judge or a different District Judge to reconsider it and reach a decision in accordance with the findings of this Court.

B. The facts

4.  At the material time, the Applicant was employed as a clerk of 合利五金(香港)有限公司 (“the Company”) which operated a business in transporting and exporting goods to the Mainland.  She earned a monthly salary of HK$12,000.00.

5.  Her main duties included taking calls and orders from potential customers of the Company.  She was also required to liaise with companies in the Mainland to arrange for the export of cargoes from Hong Kong to the Mainland. 

6.  In an operation carried out on 14 October 2008, officers from the Customs and Excise Department found that there were goods packed in some 32 containers which had not been recorded in the relevant manifests.

7.  On 15 October 2008, officers from the Customs and Excise Department arrested the Applicant and one Leung Chi-Keung (“Mr Leung”) in relation to the export of these unmanifested goods.  The suspicion relating to the Applicant arose because she was apparently the person in the Company responsible for arranging the delivery of these unmanifested goods to the cargoes. 

8.  On the same day, Mr Leung and the Applicant (as the 2^nd Defendant) were each formally charged with one count of “exporting unmanifested goods” contrary to section 18(1)(b) of the Import and Export Ordinance (Cap 60) (“the IEO”) and section 159G of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200).

9.  After trial, the Deputy District Judge acquitted the Applicant.  In his Verdict (“the Verdict”) given on 21 June 2010, he explained at paragraphs 105-121 the Applicant’s evidence given at trial, and gave the reasons for her acquittal at paragraphs 148 to 150.  In light of the arguments raised in this application, it is pertinent for me to set these out in full as follows:

“第二被告人的證供

105. 根據第二被告人的說法，她是合利的文件員，月入約一萬二千元。公司有老闆梁偉華（別名叫阿豹）和他的兄弟叫梁文華。其中梁偉華會較多返回公司，梁文華則甚少出現。在合利內，第二被告人負責接聽電話和俗稱接order的工作，他的工作主要是將所有貨櫃齊集，然後跟大陸的報關聯絡，由他們安排船隻來港。之後，第二被告便會聯絡其他運輸公司的拖頭司機將貨櫃拖出碼頭。

106. 在合利內，除了第二被告人一位僱員外，還有其他五名職員，他們包括江小姐、曾小姐、曾先生、李先生和朱先生。其中曾小姐是負責會計工作，不過她對其他同事的工作流程和運作亦十分熟悉；江小姐則負責中檢，第二被告說她本人是做貨運的前期工作，而李先生則負責後期工作；曾先生負責將運送完貨物的空的貨櫃交還給所屬的運輸公司；朱先生則負責影印事務。

107. 第二被告人同意證物174草圖上的擺設，但對於辦公桌是誰屬的，她就有不同的說法。據第二被告人所說，在最後的座位是屬於曾小姐的，在她之前的座位是江小姐，而坐於第二被告人前面的是李先生，李先生再前面的右邊是曾先生，左邊是朱先生。會議室的辦公桌一般是梁偉華佔用的。

108. 在2008年10月18日，海關人員前來合利辦公司室進行搜查，當時所有合利同事都在場，每人都有自己的電腦放在辦公桌上。當時，各同事的電腦都以內聯網給聯繫在一起，換言之，所有同事的電腦是互通的。第二被告人電腦上的資料其他同事其實都可以透過內聯網看得到和利用得到。第二被告人說，在她電腦上的確有屬於她照片的文件夾，原因是她當時正在籌備結婚，所以她正在從大量的舊照片中挑選適合的照片在婚禮中播放出來。

109. 根據第二被告人說，當客戶給訂單指示時，他們大多會先來電話。合利的客戶主要是來自一間叫報關公司，另一間是叫致富（譯音）公司的。第二被告人說，她沒有聽過一間叫屬都的公司。

110. 在收到客人的指示後，客人會先將文件（包括裝箱單、拖頭文件副本）傳真給第二被告人，之後客戶會將運費的數目告訴第二被告人，原因是合利在香港只是提供拖櫃工作服務給上述兩間公司，然後按月收費，所以每一個別託運生意的費用會直接由客戶支付給上述兩間公司。當收集好所有貨櫃後，第二被告人會致電給報關公司安排船隻，當然目的是盡量將所有貨櫃箱卸載在一艘船上，以省回資源。第二被告人確認P175是和本案有關的裝船資料。

111. 程序是第二被告人接聽了所有的電話，約好所有有關人士及拖頭司機後，便準備證物P175（1），然後第二被告人會在電腦一個叫Access的檔案，將資料打進去。一般情況是第二被告人在一邊聽電話，一邊將這資料打進電腦的Access檔案中的，然後，Access檔案中的資料會給打在證物175（1）這類的文件上，然後傳真給南綸碼頭。

112. 證物P175（1）內所提及的三十二個貨櫃箱沒有封條號碼。第二被告人說，因為她知道這些貨櫃一般要通過中檢才有封條，但確實如何申請中檢和中檢如何檢驗，她是不知情的，她只知道要進口廢塑料就要進行中檢。證物P176（1）頂頭的時間顯示在08年10月15日17時56分，該文件才由南綸傳真過來，那時才有所有封條號碼及重量的資料。這傳真會由江小姐接收，因為江小姐是負責做中檢的職員。證物P171、172（1）、（2）都是江小姐的負責，故此第二被告人沒有必要知道這個過程是如果操作的。證物P190（1）是裝船資料，上有手寫文字。證物P176（1）則是以電腦打上去的。時間上，會先有190（1）才有176（1）的文件出現。證物D2（1）（2）的兩份證書是屬於合利的註冊證書，以第二被告人所知，合利還有上網申請需要的識別碼及密碼。

113. 第二被告人說，她曾經從老闆口中聽說過華寶會將識別碼及密碼提供給合利使用，但由於這不是她負責的範疇，所以第二被告人並沒有特別留意這方面的事情。對第二被告人而言，華寶只是合利其中一名散客，透過電話將付運指示提供給合利，證物P175（1）右邊有「豹睇貨」的註明，即代表梁偉華會對貨物進行檢驗。第二被告人說，「豹睇貨」這些註腳是第二被告人是她按指示打上去的。

114. 公司一向每隻櫃都會給拍照及有人檢查，但有些從海外運抵香港的貨櫃箱本身已有外國的封條及裝箱單，那些貨櫃就不必由人拍照及檢驗。第二被告人說，這是她從梁偉華那邊得知的。但本地的貨櫃就要寫上「豹睇貨」的註腳，因為阿豹是會真的到現場檢驗貨櫃和貨物的。但第二被告人說，她不會監控阿豹如果檢查，而且阿豹睇完之後也不會回來向她報告一切。再者，第二被告人說她也不需要知道，因為她的工作到了貨櫃到達碼頭已經停止了。

115. 第二被告人說，證物P175（1）是在她桌面找到的，但其餘的文件都是在其他同事桌上找到的，例如在江小姐桌上找到的有證物P171、172（1）、（2）、178（1）至（28）、175（2）、（7）；至於證物P176（1）至（3）則在曾先生的桌上找到，證物171（1）也是在曾先生的桌上找到的；至於證物177（2）（3）則在曾小姐的桌上找到。第二被告人承認證物P179（1）至（56）是在她桌上找到的。

116. 第二被告人說，據她所知，10月15日那宗交易內的三十二個貨櫃箱內全都是廢塑料來的，她從來沒有見過證物P156、157、158、159，172的（2）和（3），在08年10月15日至08年10月18日期間，她也沒有見過。除此以外，第二被告人亦表示她沒有見過證物P162至P164。至於證物P181的Excel檔案，特別是隱藏格式內所載的有關貨物資料，第二被告人說她是不知情的。

117. 其實在第二被告人電腦內有關181（1）的格式是老闆吩咐她先在電腦內準備好，用以便將來檢查貨物之用的，但證物P181（1）及相關的隱藏資料都不是第二被告人打上去，根據第二被告人所說，她的電腦和其他同事的電腦都透過內聯網而連了線，而且平常她工作十分忙碌，根本連電話都接個不停，所以沒有時間處理這方面的工作。

118. 第四辯方證人亦是第二被告人傳召的第一位辯方證人楊聰穎（譯音），他是從事電腦維修的技術人員。根據他的證供，他負責替合利的辦公室設置內聯網的設施，根據他的記憶，這工作約是在6年前所做的。之後他亦常有前往合利辦公室對各電腦進行維修及保養，期間他沒有發現有內聯網中斷連結的情況出現。根據第四辯方證人所有說，合利內的電腦全部以線路接通，經過網絡分享資源，但各同事不需上網就可以在分享的檔案內找到原屬於或原處於同事電腦儲存庫內的資料，只需要電腦的操作人沒有在電腦加上登入密碼，又有將有關資料放在分享區，內聯網內所聯繫的所有電腦使用人都可以在分享區找到有關資料。

119. 第五辯方證人亦是第二被告人傳召的第二位證人曾敏玲（譯音）小姐。第五辯方證人是合利的會計，自04年開始已加入合利工作，她認識本案的第二被告人，因為她們是同事身分。根據第五辯方證人所說，合利公司內的電腦是有內聯網的設置，所有同事的電腦都會給連結起來。電腦系統內有一個Access檔案，用來儲存資料的，其實任何有關貨櫃的資料，收到了就可以打進行這檔案內，而所有同事也可以利用這個檔案，第五辯方證人的電腦內也有這個檔案。

120. 第二被告人平常負責接聽電話、接單和收集貨櫃到碼頭上船的工作，平常工作量十分龐大。第二被告人的工作主要是對外，所有打電話進來的大多數是找第二被告人的。第二被告人負責接單和收集貨櫃，有時候她亦會叫第五辯方證人開票付款，但第二被告人從來不需要到碼頭驗貨。第二被告人收集好貨櫃後，會由江小姐負責報關，有時文件傳真來合利之後，會按誰要處理該項工作的情況由有關同事收回有關傳真，所以要報中檢的文件就會交給江小姐。

121. 至於其他同事方面，李先生負責貨櫃到達碼頭，然後裝卸到船泊的後期工作。如果中檢合格後，有關的封條號碼亦會傳真給李先生。以上是第二被告人的案情。

……

本案的裁決考慮

148. 同樣地，對於第二被告人來說，控方有大量的證供指向和合利聯繫的人就是第二被告人，她就是證供中頻頻聽到的顧小姐，文件中頻頻看到的顧小姐。而且，在她的電腦內亦找到與本案有直接關連的一個Excel檔案。其實本席可以直接作出一個推論，處理該Excel檔案的人，包括將有關資料打進181（1）和（2）至（5）資料的人，或真正那些貨物的擁有人都必定知道該等貨物是在違法情況之下被企圖輸出口的，所以如果第二被告人就是那些資料的輸入者，她必然沒法逃脫有關罪責。

149. 控方的證供，本席認為沒法證明第二被告人知情，但知情並不是唯一的考慮。第二被告人是該電腦的使用者，電腦上有她的私人照片，數量繁多，故此，根本一個簡單的推論就是，那個就是她平常使用開的電腦，如果電腦內有這麼多違法的資料存在，在沒有其他的情況出現底下，法庭很難抗拒作出一個毫無疑點的推論，就是她是與案有關的，亦即是她不能倚賴法例的免責辯護。

150.  本案中，正如較早時候本席的分析，控方的海關人員在她桌上，合利的辦公室內撿取有關證物的過程中出現了很重大的毛病，導致本席未能接受或倚賴他們的說法。辯方提供的說法雖然若果在一個民事的比拼標準下，依然是較弱的一方，但由於控方的說法完全不能為人接受，所以變成辯方的說法就是唯一的說法。在這情況下，本席認為可以接受為一個不能抹殺出現的情況。換言之，簡單來說，第二被告人有關她在合利內工作的範圍、職責，以及電腦的使用情況、內聯網的出現情況，配合辯方第四證人的證供，本席不能排除這方面的可能性，而且這可能性是合理的。換言之，在第二被告人的情況上，她只是一名文員，月入萬多元，她絕對有可能在不知不覺中為其他的犯罪份子所利用而不自覺或不知情。再者，如果本席接受第二被告人的職責，只是去到貨櫃被集齊以後就停止的話，那麼，「豹睇貨」這檔案的確有可能不會在她的日常範圍出現，這個可能性是合理的可能性。故此，雖然在控方的證供中看來，第二被告人的確是十分可疑，但在免責辯護的考慮上，本席必需要採取一個新的角度去考慮。在這新的角度考慮之下，本席認為第二被告人的證供已達至法例有關的要求舉證標準，故此，本席認為第二被告人所面對的第二項控罪，不能成立。”

10.  Apparently, at the trial, one of the essential factual elements in proving the Applicant’s guilt was whether she had knowledge and was aware of contents of a hidden excel file^[2] known as “豹睇貨” (“the Hidden File”) found in her computer at the office.   The Applicant then gave evidence for the first time at trial on the scope of her duties in the Company, the existence of an intranet system in Company’s computer network, and that the other colleagues could thus have had access to her computer without her knowledge. In light of this evidence, the learned Deputy Judge came to the conclusion that he could not rule out the possibility that she was not aware of or did not have knowledge of the Hidden File. 

11.  As explained above, upon her acquittal, the Applicant through her counsel applied for costs.  The learned Deputy Judge refused it.  In his ruling on costs dated 5 July 2010 (“the Costs Ruling”), he explained at paragraphs 9 to 13 his reaons as follows:

“9. 第二被告人的情況有點不同，因為她的身分並非合利的東主，她只是合利的文員。本席亦在經過審訊後，裁定她可以依賴有關免責條款，得到釋放，但情況並不等同她獲得釋放必然可以得到訟費的賠償。本席認為，訟費應否發放必需是合理和公平情況下作出考慮，而其中必須包括在考慮之列的，就是被告人在本案的調查階段和審案時候的行為，這些行為絕對可以決定或影響法庭在考慮訟費時的取態。代表第二被告人的林大律師向法庭陳述，如果將第二被告人保持緘默的做法作不利的推論的話，這等同剝奪她在法律上保持緘默的權利，亦與普通法內未經定罪應被作無罪考慮的原則不符。

10. 本席經詳細考慮，認為一位被告人在調查階段保持緘默，這點其實是可以在一些合適的情況下在訟費申請上為法庭作出考慮的，本席並非有意提倡需要將接受調查者的緘默權廢掉或剝奪他們的緘默權，但實際上，作為一為嫌疑人，她被調查時所採取的姿態、所作出的行為，全都可以在訟費申請上再度拿出來加以考慮的。

11. 本席依賴有關Cheng Kam Kuen 訴香港特區政府 [2005] HKEC 738一案，以支持本席上述的論據。在Cheng Kam Kuen一案中，法庭的判詞有如下的說法，引述 ‘The right to silence must be jealously guarded. It cannot be taken away or watered down whether in form or in content, and whether directly or indirectly. However, this does not mean that under no circumstances can be refusal or failure to disclose one’s defence or proffer an explanation at the investigation stage done in the exercise of the right of silence be taken to account by the count in considering costs following an acquittal.’

12. 本席理解該判詞所指的就是在適當的個案上，一位被告人被調查時，如果本來有一個有說服力，並可左右控方決定檢控如否的答辯理由，但該被告人或受疑人決定行使緘默權，不將有關答辯或詳情透露，引致控方認為他們所擁有的證據比實際的為強的話，這其實基本就是符合了法庭拒絕頌費的其中一種情況。因為被告人確實可以在被調查時行使緘默權，這是在憲法上得到保證的權利，沒有任何東西可以將其動搖，但一經行使這緘默權後，最終該受疑人或被告人在審訊過後如果得到釋放，就要面對不能得回訟費的後果。因為她保持緘默，沒有將如本案內重要的辯護情節，包括她公司內各人分工的狀況，電腦系統有內聯網的設置等等情況，第二被告人無論在任何階段，都沒有向調查人員提出，直至審案期間，她才首度將該等答辯理由及證據提出。

13.  故此，本席認為在這程況下，控方在搜集了所有有關證據後，特別是在第二被告人所使用的電腦內發現極其對她不利的證據後，被告人的緘默實際上就是自招懷疑的行為，亦直接地令控方錯誤地相信他們擁有檢控第二被告人的證供或證據比實際的為強。故此，本席認為在這情況下，法庭不應行使酌情權，發放訟費予第二被告人。因此，就第二被告人的訟費申請，法庭的裁決亦是將其申請駁回。”

12.  Dissatisfied with the Decision, the Applicant applied for judicial review against it, with leave granted by me on 13 October 2010.

C.  This judicial review application

13.  In summary, the grounds of the judicial review are that the Decision is:

(1)  Illegal; and/or,

(2)  Irrational.

14.  Fundamental to these grounds is the Applicant’s primary contention that the Decision amounts to invariably depriving a defendant’s costs in a criminal proceedings once the defendant has exercised his constitutional right of silence.   This is (submitted by the Applicant) both wrong in law and irrational in the public law sense.

15.  As pointed out by Mr Lam, counsel for the Applicant, the central question arising from the present challenge is whether and to what extent, if at all, the Applicant’s non-disclosure of a probable defence in the exercise of her right of silence warrants a deprivation of costs in criminal proceedings.

16.  This question involves an examination of the legal principles applicable in depriving an acquitted defendant’s costs in criminal proceedings in situations where the defendant has exercised the right of silence. 

17.  As will be seen below, this issue has in fact been considered in many authorities and can now be said to be governed by some well established principles.

C1.    Applicable principles on depriving acquitted defendant of costs

18.  Under s. 5 of the CCCO, the Court has a wide and general discretion in awarding costs. 

19.  In the exercise of such discretion, costs should normally be awarded to an acquitted defendant unless there are “positive reasons” for making a different order.  One usual example of such a positive reason is where a defendant has brought suspicion upon himself and thereby misleading the prosecution into thinking that their case was stronger than it turns out to be^[3].

20.  Whether the defendant has so brought suspicion upon himself includes the consideration by the trial judge of the defendant’s conduct during the investigation, such as “how he responded to the investigators, the answers he gave when confronted with the accusations, the consistency of those answers with his subsequent defence”^[4].

21.  Thus, it has been repeatedly said in authorities decided in Hong Kong and Australia that, in considering whether the defendant has brought suspicion to himself so as to deprive him of costs, it is legitimate for the trial judge to consider the manner in which he behaved during the investigation stage.  This includes taking into account of the defendant’s conduct in remaining silent, provided that in the judge’s weighing exercise in considering costs, he must give sufficient due regard and weight to the fact that it is a fundamental constitutional right for the defendant to remain silent.   This however does not amount to any infringement of the defendant’s right of silence, which deals with proving guilt[5].

22.  This long line of authorities has recently been reviewed and considered by A Cheung J (as he then was) in Cheng Kam Kuen v Hong Kong Special Administrative Region^[6].

23.  In Cheng Kam Kuen, the applicant brought a similar judicial review application against the district judge’s decision to refuse to award costs to him after he was acquitted.  The district judge refused the applicant costs on the basis that the applicant had brought suspicious on himself in the investigation stage in remaining silent. 

24.  After reviewing these authorities, A Cheung J agreed with those principles enunciated in them and concluded at paragraphs 27-33 as follows:

“27. Both on first principles and authorities, I totally agree that the right of silence is a fundamental part of the common law and the criminal law (I include here the absence of any affirmative duty of disclosure of the defence prior to trial – indeed an accused may choose to keep silent even at trial and simply put the prosecution to proof of its case). The right must be jealously guarded. It cannot be taken away or watered down, whether in form or in content, and whether directly or indirectly. This has been recently reaffirmed by the Court of Final Appeal in Lee Fuk Hing v. HKSAR [2005] 1 HKLRD 349.

28. However, this does not mean that under no circumstances can the refusal or failure to disclose one’s defence or proffer an explanation at the investigation stage, done in the exercise of the right of silence, be taken into account by the court in considering costs following an acquittal. The Court of Appeal in Kwok Moon-yan, supra, has said so in terms. The Australian cases have both explained why and demonstrated in what circumstances this may be done. Quite apart from the fact that Kwok Moon-yan as a decision of the Court of Appeal is binding on this Court, I agree with the conclusion that has been reached in these authorities.

29. Some may interpret this conclusion as putting a premium on an accused’s exercise of his constitutional right to silence, not in terms of guilt or innocence, but in terms of his ‘reasonable expectation’ (as opposed to ‘right’) to costs.

30. Ultimately this is a question of where to draw the line. The constitutional right of silence, enshrined in article 11(2)(g) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights contained in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap. 383), which is itself entrenched by article 39 of the Basic Law, is essentially concerned with an accused’s innocence or guilt. One could certainly argue that the possibility of an accused being deprived of costs by reason of his silence or non-disclosure may have the effect of putting undue pressure on him not to exercise his right to silence, thereby indirectly diluting that right and adversely affecting his position on innocence or guilt – the very object of protection of the right of silence in the first place. I can see the force of the argument.

31. Countering this are several considerations: the suggested connection is an indirect one; the direct point in question is costs, not guilt or innocence, and when legal aid is widely available, concern during the investigation/pre-trial stage about recovery of costs in future is in all likelihood more imaginary than real; what is in issue is payment of costs out of the public revenue to the accused, not payment of costs by him to anybody; there is no right or entitlement to costs, which is a discretionary benefit created by statute which does not see fit to exclude – at least not expressly – non-disclosure in the exercise of the right of silence from the discretionary considerations that may be taken into account; and that in an appropriate case the exercise of the right may be taken into account is not tantamount to an automatic refusal of costs – rather the fact that the non-disclosure was the result of the exercise of the accused’s constitutional right of silence must be firmly borne in mind and given due weight in the weighing exercise itself (Ling at pp. 387-388).

32. As I said, authorities apart, ultimately this is a question of value judgment and drawing the boundary of the right of silence. The authorities reviewed in this judgment have shown where that boundary, in the wisdom of the judges concerned, should be drawn. For my part, I agree with the conclusion reached.

33. How much weight, if any, should be attached to the refusal or failure to explain or non-disclosure in a particular case is an entirely different matter. Furthermore, as mentioned above, in the weighing process, the fact that the refusal or failure to explain was done in the exercise of the accused’s constitutional right of silence must be fully borne in mind and given due weight.” (emphasis added)

25.  Further, His Lordship also emphasized^[7] that:

(1)  The person in the best position to weigh all these matters was clearly the trial judge himself, and,

(2)  In judicial review applications, where the Court exercised a supervisory jurisdiction, it must be slow to interfere with the exercise of discretion by an inferior court or tribunal if and where the trial judge had correctly identified the relevant legal principle. 

26.  Adopting the above legal principles, I would now turn to consider the merits of the grounds advanced in the present judicial review application.

C2.    Illegality

27.  Mr Lam for the Applicant submits that the learned Deputy Judge erred in law in the Decision in that he had erroneously formed the view that once the Applicant had exercised her right of silence, she would invariably have to face the consequence of a dismissal of a costs application.  In other words, Mr Lam suggests that the Deputy Judge had formed the view that a defendant would automatically be deprived of costs once he had exercised his right of silence.  This is contrary to the legal principles set out above and is thus an error of law.  The Decision should be therefore quashed.

28.  Mr Lam’s above contention is premised on the reading of the following italicised words of paragraph 12 of the Costs Ruling, which states as follows:  

“12. …因為被告人確實可以在被調查時行使緘默權，這是在憲法上得到保證的權利，沒有任何東西可以將其動搖，但一經行使這緘默權後，最終該受疑人或被告人在審訊過後如果得到釋放，就要面對不能得回訟費的後果。因為她保持緘默，沒有將如本案內重要的辯護情節，包括她公司內各人分工的狀況，電腦系統有內聯網的設置等等情況，第二被告人無論在任何階段，都沒有向調查人員提出，直至審案期間，她才首度將該等答辯理由及證據提出。”

29.  However, in my view, paragraph 12 must be read properly as a whole and together with paragraphs 5, 6, 10, 11 and 13 of the Costs Ruling. They are as follows:

“5. 在訟費的問題上，自從《刑事案件訟費條例》生效後，本港法院已有很多有關訟費的案例出現，基本上，在這方面的法律爭拗和考慮已大致廣為法律人士所接受。即簡單來說，根據《刑事案件訟費條例》第15（c）條，一般來說，獲釋的被告人，如法庭認為公平及合理，就應該賦予被告人有關審訊的訟費，在這問題上，這是審案法官的酌情範圍。此後，在有關條例生效前，在訟費考慮上的最廣為人接受的案例為Tong Cun Lin 訴香港特區政府 [1999] 2 HKCFAR 531，該案釐定了一連串法庭在考慮訟費上應考慮的事項，這案例亦在其他有關案件中被考慮及確認。其他的案件包括Tsang Wai Ping 訴香港特區政府[2005] 8 HKCFAR 80、香港特區政府訴 Cheng Chak Ming Bartholomew [2004] HKEC 575及Hui Yiu Sang 訴香港特區政府 [2006] 9 HKCFAR 308。

6. 故此，經過一連串案例的判定後，大致上獲釋的被告人除非有以下兩種情況出現，否則正如本席在上述段落中所提，法庭應在公平和合理情況下頒予訟費。這兩種特殊情況包括：一，如果被告人本身的行為為自己帶來受嫌的情況，並錯誤地引導控方相信控方所擁有的檢控他的證據比實際的為強；二，技術上的釋放。

......

10. 本席經詳細考慮，認為一位被告人在調查階段保持緘默，這點其實是可以在一些合適的情況下在訟費申請上為法庭作出考慮的，本席並非有意提倡需要將接受調查者的緘默權廢掉或剝奪他們的緘默權，但實際上，作為一為嫌疑人，她被調查時所採取的姿態、所作出的行為，全都可以在訟費申請上再度拿出來加以考慮的。

11. 本席依賴有關Cheng Kam Kuen 訴香港特區政府 [2005] HKEC 738一案，以支持本席上述的論據。在Cheng Kam Kuen一案中，法庭的判詞有如下的說法，引述 ‘The right to silence must be jealously guarded. It cannot be taken away or watered down whether in form or in content, and whether directly or indirectly. However, this does not mean that under no circumstances can be refusal or failure to disclose one’s defence or proffer an explanation at the investigation stage done in the exercise of the right of silence be taken to account by the count in considering costs following an acquittal.’

12. 本席理解該判詞所指的就是在適當的個案上，一位被告人被調查時，如果本來有一個有說服力，並可左右控方決定檢控如否的答辯理由，但該被告人或受疑人決定行使緘默權，不將有關答辯或詳情透露，引致控方認為他們所擁有的證據比實際的為強的話，這其實基本就是符合了法庭拒絕頌費的其中一種情況。因為被告人確實可以在被調查時行使緘默權，這是在憲法上得到保證的權利，沒有任何東西可以將其動搖，但一經行使這緘默權後，最終該受疑人或被告人在審訊過後如果得到釋放，就要面對不能得回訟費的後果。因為她保持緘默，沒有將如本案內重要的辯護情節，包括她公司內各人分工的狀況，電腦系統有內聯網的設置等等情況，第二被告人無論在任何階段，都沒有向調查人員提出，直至審案期間，她才首度將該等答辯理由及證據提出。

13.  故此，本席認為在這程況下，控方在搜集了所有有關證據後，特別是在第二被告人所使用的電腦內發現極其對她不利的證據後，被告人的緘默實際上就是自招懷疑的行為，亦直接地令控方錯誤地相信他們擁有檢控第二被告人的證供或證據比實際的為強。故此，本席認為在這情況下，法庭不應行使酌情權，發放訟費予第二被告人。因此，就第二被告人的訟費申請，法庭的裁決亦是將其申請駁回。”

30.  Looking at these paragraphs of the Costs Ruling together,  objectively and properly:

(1)  The learned Deputy District Judge correctly identified the applicable legal principles at paragraphs 5, 6 and 11 of the Costs Reasons.  He fully recognised that costs was a matter of discretion, and that generally an acquitted defendant should be given his costs, unless there were circumstances to justify otherwise. Further, and in particular, he correctly reminded himself by reference to the relevant dicta of A Cheung J in the Cheng Kam Kuen case that, in the exercise of his discretion on costs, he must give due regard and weight to the fact that the right of silence was the defendant’s fundamental right.

(2)  After properly identifying the above legal principles, the learned Deputy Judge emphasized in the beginning of paragraph 12 of the Costs Ruling, that it was in an appropriate case that a defendant’s exercise of right of silence wouldlead to the court’s exercise of discretion to deprive him costs[8]. It was only then he went on to say that in such a case, a defendant would have to face the consequence of not being awarded costs after the exercise of right of silence.

(3)  The learned Judge then applied the principles to the case before him, and formed the view that the Applicant’s conduct in remaining silent and not reviewing the important matters relevant to the use of the computer to the prosecution in the investigation had brought suspicion to herself.  In the exercise of his direction, he declined to award her costs.

31.  Reading these relevant passages in the Costs Ruling fairly and objectively as explained above, I am not satisfied that the Deputy District Judge had formed the view (as suggested by Mr Lam) in his ruling that, as a matter of principle, in all cases once a defendant had exercised his right to silence, his application for costs would invariably have to be refused.

32.  Mr Lam further submits that the Decision is still wrong in law in that (a) remaining silent per se is not an indication of bringing suspicion upon oneself^[9], and (b) there is in any event no causal connection in the present case between the acquittal and the exercise of right to silence.

33.  With respect, I am also not persuaded by these submissions.

34.  First, there are cases where the trial judge is entitled to conclude that remaining silent itself constitutes a reason or the reason for bringing suspicion upon oneself for the purpose of considering costs.  This depends on the particular circumstances of each case.  As said by Mason CJ in Latoudis v Casey, supra, at 544:

“Nevertheless, I am persuaded that, in ordinary circumstances, an order for costs should be made in favour of a successful defendant. However, there will be cases in which, when regard is had to the particular circumstances, it would not be just and reasonable to order costs against the prosecutor or to order payment of all the defendant’s costs. If, for example, the defendant, by his or her conduct after the events constituting the commission of the alleged offence, brought the prosecution upon himself or herself, then it would not be just and reasonable to award costs against the prosecutor.

I agree with Toohey J that, if a defendant has been given an opportunity of explaining his or her version of events before a charge is laid and declines to take up that opportunity, it may be just and reasonable to refuse costs. Likewise, if a defendant conducts his or her defence in such a way as to prolong the proceedings unreasonably, it would be just and reasonable to make an award for a proportion of the defendant’s costs.” (emphasis added)

35.  Toohey J also said these at 565:

“It is unnecessary to speak in terms of a presumption; it is enough to say that ordinarily it would be just and reasonable that the defendant against whom a prosecution has failed should not be out of pocket.

Now, in a particular case there may be good reasons connected with the prosecution such that it would not be unjust or unreasonable that the successful defendant should bear his or her own costs or, at any rate, a proportion of them. To return to the examples given earlier in this judgment, if a defendant has been given the opportunity of explaining his or her version of events before a charge is laid and refuses the opportunity, and it later appears that an explanation could have avoided a prosecution, it may well be just and reasonable to refuse costs: see, by way of illustration, Reg. v. Dainer; Ex parte Milevich. This has nothing to do with the right to silence in criminal matters. A defendant or prospective defendant is entitled to refuse an explanation to the police. But if an explanation is refused, the successful defendant can hardly complain if the court refuses an award of costs, when an explanation might have avoided the prosecution.” (emphasis supplied)

36.  Whether this is so in a particular case is a matter for the trial judge, who is the person in the best position to decide once he has correctly identified the applicable legal principles.

37.  Secondly, insofar as the present case is concerned, after considering the prosecution’s evidence, the Deputy District Judge came to the view that the Applicant was “highly suspicious” (“第二被告人的確是十分可疑”)[10].   There was no challenge on the judge’s said view.  In any event, he was the best person to form that view after trial, and I see no basis to say he was not entitled to do so. 

38.  In the circumstances, given that there was evidence to show that Applicant was “highly suspicious”, I am satisfied that it was therefore fully open to the Deputy Judge to conclude that, by her remaining silent during the investigation in not giving explanations as to the scope of her job duties and the general access to her computer by other colleagues of the Company by way of the intranet, the Applicant had by her own conduct brought suspicion on herself and/or misled the prosecution into thinking that the case against her was stronger than it was.  This conduct constituted the “positive reason” for making a different costs order. Cf:  Cheng Kam Kuen, supra, paras 35-43.

39.  In the premises, for all the above reasons, I do not think the learned Deputy District Judge has committed any error of law in the Decision.  I reject the first ground of judicial review.

C3.    Irrationality         

40.  The Applicant says the Decision is also Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational in the public law sense, since it amounts to depriving a defendant’s costs in criminal proceedings simply because he has exercised his fundamental and constitutional right of silence.  

41.  Mr Lam for the Applicant contends in his skeleton submissions that it is irrational to condemn future acquitted defendants to paying costs as some form of “punishment” for keeping silent when first, it is their fundamental right to remain silent, and, secondly, if acquitted, they should not be subject to any form of deprivation which can be a sort of punishment whether monetary or not.

42.  I reject the Applicant’s arguments:

(1)  As explained above, the legal principles show that:

(a)  the usual starting point is that an acquitted defendant should generally be awarded his costs, but

(b)  it is sometimes justified to deprive such a defendant his costs by reason of his remaining silent when, in and only in the proper circumstances (including after taking into account of the reasons for his acquittal and giving due weight and regard to his excise of the right of silence is a fundamental right), it amounts to bringing suspicion upon himself, and 

(c)  this has nothing to do with, and is not an infringement of, his exercise of the constitutional right of silence. 

(2)  Thus, once and when the legal principles have been correctly identified and applied, it is a matter of weighing process in the judge’s exercise of discretion to decide whether the defendant’s conduct in remaining silent has in those circumstances amounted to some “positive reasons” to bringing suspicion upon himself.  In this respect, the trial judge is in the best position to make that decision, as he is the person who has the best knowledge of the full picture of evidence at trial before him and the reasons why the defendant is acquitted.

(3)  In the present case, the Deputy Judge had correctly identified in the Costs Ruling the applicable legal principles.  In light of the reasons given in the Verdict and the Costs Ruling, I do not think it could be seriously suggested that the Decision is one where no reasonable judge in the same position as the Deputy Judge would have come to.  As I have also said above, it was fully open to the Deputy Judge to find the “causal link” and “positive reason” between her conduct of remaining silent during the investigation and bringing suspicion upon herself. 

(4)  The Decision is thus not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational in the public law sense.

43.  I therefore also do not accept this 2^nd ground of judicial review.

D.  Conclusion

44.  For all the above reasons, this judicial review application must be dismissed. I further make an order nisi that the Applicant shall pay the Respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.  Unless any of the parties applies to vary it, the order nisi shall become absolute 14 days from the date of this judgment.

45.  I thank counsel for their assistance in the matter.