THE QUEEN v. LEE CHING HUNG

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

Criminal Appeal No. 412 of 1985

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BETWEEN

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JUDGMENT

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Power J.

1. In this matter, the defendant was convicted on one count that he did on the 30th of May 1985 at Kowloon steal 84 postal packets and their contents belonging to the Postmaster General. There was no indication given to the sentencing court nor has any been given to us as to the value of the contents of those packets. The appellant has a good family background and it was because of this, the Probation Officer felt that there was no need for probation guidance. This Court wishes to say that it has been impressed by the fact that the appellant's family has come to Court today and is obviously giving him their continuing support. We would also like to say how impressed we were by the Probation Report. It was an excellent Probation Report. We were impressed not only by its contents but also by the thoroughness with which it was prepared by the Probation Officer and we commend him for that.

2. In cases of this nature, the breach of trust is of a particularly mean kind. The taker, the offender, intends to take all he can i.e. all of value in the letters stolen. It is implicit in the committing of the offence that he then destroys the accompanying letters. Intended recipients, therefore, have no way of protecting themselves and, initially at least, have no way even of knowing that their letter, which may contain messages to which they have been looking forward to receiving, has been stolen. The appellant in this case says that he was under some kind of pressure and that others were involved but that he cannot reveal their identity because he fears revenge will be taken on his family members. Even if some weight be given to this, and to his age and to the support which has been given to him by his family, and to the fact that he has a previous clear record, this Court is, nonetheless, satisfied, bearing in mind particularly the deterrent aspect of such a sentence, that an offence of this nature must be punished with a custodial sentence and that it would be wholly inappropriate to order that the sentence be suspended. We make it plain that, in principle, we do not consider a sentence of two years for an offence of this nature is inappropriate. We are, however, satisfied that, in all the circumstances of this particular case, the sentence was excessive. We order that the sentence be substituted by one of imprisonment for twelve months. In so doing, we wish to make it plain to other persons who might be minded to commit offences of this nature that they must not mislead themselves into thinking that such clemency would automatically be extended to them.