ALAM MOHAMMED BULBUL v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 3367/2019

[2025] HKCFI 6338

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 3367 OF 2019

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 4 November 2025 (“the  Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of  time to appeal against my order made on 2 September 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 1 November 2019.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 2 September 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 16 September 2025. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In his supporting affirmation dated 4 November 2025, the applicant relied on the ground that he was not very well aware of his deadline to file the Notice of Appeal to seek for an extension of time to appeal.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 10 December 2025, the applicant confirmed that he received this court’s decision sometime in September 2025, but claimed that he lost all his papers during a typhoon in September 2025 including the court’s decision. Later on, when this court asked him to produce the copy of the court’s decision which he claimed to have obtained from the Immigration Department, it showed that the alleged copy was in fact the original of this court’s decision that was sent to him by this court. The applicant then claimed that he only lost his immigration documents during the typhoon and hence he could not lodge the appeal at that time without his proof of identity. He only received his proof of identity again from the Immigration Department on 27 October 2025 and hence he filed the Summons on 4 November 2025.

9.  Thus, the reason for his delay given at the hearing was completely different from the reason given in his supporting affirmation. The reason provided by the applicant in his supporting affirmation was that he was not well aware of the deadline for filing the Notice of Appeal. There was no mentioning that he lost his proof of identity at all. In any event, ignorance of the court procedure is not an excuse. The alleged loss of his proof of identity is also unbelievable, as there is no reason why the Immigration Department would not have immediately issued a temporary proof of identity upon the applicant’s reported loss in September 2025 if that indeed happened.

10.  I am therefore not satisfied that the applicant has a reasonable excuse for the delay.

11.  When I asked the applicant for his grounds of the intended appeal at the hearing, the applicant merely said that he could not go back to his country, he married a Hong Kong resident and is now applying for a Hong Kong ID card, which are clearly not grounds for the intended appeal.

12.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

13.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

14.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review and I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

15.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.