HARJIT SINGH v. HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT

HCAL 2105/2025

[2026] HKCFI 3531

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2105 OF 2025

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  Introduction

1.1  On 23 December 2025, I dismissed the Applicant’s application for a writ of habeas corpus with no order as to costs and vacated the hearing on 30 December 2025 at 2:30 pm (“23/12/25 Order”). By a summons dated 22 January 2026 (“Summons”), the Applicant seeks an extension of time to appeal against the 23/12/25 Order.

1.2  At the hearing, the Applicant appeared in person with the benefit of an interpreter. Mr Frenki Fung, Government Counsel, appeared for the 2^nd Respondent.

2.  Relevant background

2.1  In addition to the present proceedings, the Applicant had previously issued another application for a writ of habeas corpus.

(1)  HCAL 2393 of 2024, commenced on 6 December 2024, was dismissed by Coleman J on 6 January 2025 (“January 2025 Decision”)[1];

(2)  On 13 March 2025, Coleman J dismissed the Applicant’s application for extension of time to appeal against the January 2025 Decision (“March 2025 Decision”)[2].

2.2  In the January 2025 Decision, Coleman J observed that the Applicant’s application for a writ of habeas corpus was fundamentally misconceived for the following reasons:

“[3] An application for writ of habeas corpus may be applicable when the applicant suggests that he or she is the subject of unlawful detention.

[4] However, nothing in the present application or in the supporting affirmation suggests that the Applicant is currently being detained. Indeed, the application appears to contain his own residential address, and mobile telephone numbers. On this basis, the habeas corpus application is entirely inappropriate, and it falls to be dismissed.” 

2.3  The foregoing observations were repeated in the March 2025 Decision. Coleman J remarked as follows:

“[2] Though on its face apparently seeking a writ of habeas corpus, such an application was fundamentally misconceived where the Applicant was not detained at all, let alone arguably unlawfully. I dismissed the application in that regard for that reason.”

2.4  The Applicant commenced these proceedings on 17 September 2025. In making the 23/12/25 Order, I referred to the January 2025 Decision and the March 2025 Decision and made the following observations:

“[4] In the entirety of the Applicant’s Materials, the Applicant does not seek to be released from detention…

[8] As in the case of HCAL 2393/2024, the present application for a writ of habeas corpus is plainly misconceived because it is clear that the Applicant is not actually detained…. Indeed, the address given by the Applicant is an address in a residential property in Fu Cheong Estate, Kowloon.”

2.5  It should be pointed out that the hearing of the present proceedings was originally fixed to be heard on 30 December 2025. By a letter dated 15 December 2025, the Department of Justice invited me to dismiss the present proceedings on the simple basis that the Applicant had made the wrong application.

2.6  In making the 23/12/25 Order, I observed as follows:

“[6] Under PD 26.1 §8, in the exercise of the Court’s case management powers, the court may dispose an application without calling upon the Applicant.

[7] I am satisfied that it is appropriate to proceed in the foregoing manner.”

3.  The present application

3.1  In considering whether to extend time to appeal, the court has to consider all relevant factors, particularly (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the merits of the proposed appeal, and (4) the degree of prejudice to the other party.

3.2  In my view, the present application can be disposed of principally by reference to the merits of the proposed appeal.

3.3  The grounds of appeal advanced by the Applicant, insofar as intelligible, may be summarized as follows. First, he appears to refer to previous incidents of “ARREST ME CASE” and “FAKE-FALSE MAKE CASE IN ARREST”. Secondly, he suggests that I should not have dismissed the present proceedings without a hearing. As regards the former, the fact remains that, as at the commencement of the present proceedings, the Applicant was not and is not now in detention. As regards the latter, even were I wrong in manner in which I proceeded, the Applicant has not demonstrated how the outcome would have been different had the hearing on 30 December 2025 proceeded.

3.4  I am therefore not satisfied that an extension of time to appeal should be granted in the present case.

3.5  I should point out that, at the hearing, the Applicant made an impassioned (but not entirely lucid) plea for the court’s assistance to address what he perceived to be longstanding grievances. His frustration was evident, as he even threatened to inflict self-harm were assistance not forthcoming. Even after the hearing, on 12 June 2026, he provided materials to the court complaining that he has received no assistance from various departments. The materials provided and the complaints apparently advanced by the Applicant, as had previously been observed in the January 2025 Decision, are far from being intelligible.

3.6  As I had explained to the Applicant at the hearing (1) putting forward misconceived applications and having such applications knocked back by the court does not in any way alleviate but only exacerbates his frustration and (2) before mounting repeated misconceived applications, he should attempt to seek legal advice, for example from the Resource Centre for Unrepresented Litigants, to formulate a proper claim (if any) using the correct procedure.

4.  Conclusion

4.1  The Summons is dismissed. I also make a costs order nisi that there be no order as to costs.