RANA MD RASEDUI ISLAM v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 553/2020

[2025] HKCFI 3619

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 553 of 2020

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions from the Applicant in open court;

1.  The Form 86 is amended on the Court’s own motion, naming the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office as the Putative Respondent;

2.  The Applicant’s application(s) to amend the Form 86 to add his wife and daughters as Applicants to the action, and/or to consolidate the present action with action(s) commenced by any of his wife and daughters, be dismissed; and

3.  Application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.  The Applicant is a national of Bangladesh. By a Form 86 dated and filed on 8 April 2020 (“Form 86”), which was accompanied by a supporting Affirmation also dated and filed on 8 April 2020 (“the Affirmation”), the Applicant sought leave to commence a judicial review of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”)/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) made on 9 March 2020 (“the TCAB Decision”)[1]. The TCAB Decision was the only document exhibited to the Affirmation. I will use the abbreviations and definitions from it unless otherwise specified herein.

Background

2.  The Applicant’s background and case as to the incidents underlying his claim for non-refoulement relief, and the immigration and procedural history leading up to the TCAB Decision, are set out in the latter. In gist, he fears he will be harmed or killed by Sofikul of JL if he returns to Bangladesh.

3.  The TCAB Decision began by setting out the Applicant’s procedural and immigration history and identifying his fear of being harmed or killed by Sofikul of JL, and the decision-maker’s approach to materials, COI, and function (Paragraphs 1 to 12), then moved on to outline the overall conduct of the hearing including that the Applicant had the assistance of an interpreter and the explanations, reminders, notifications, and opportunities given by the TCAB/NRCPO (Paragraph 13). It then referred to the contents of and principles relating to Torture Risk[2], BOR 2 Risk[3], BOR 3 Risk[4], and Persecution Risk[5] (Paragraphs 14 to 26).

4.  The decision-maker (“Decision-Maker”) then set out the Applicant’s case as set out in the NCF and Interview (Paragraphs 27 to 44) and the evidence given at the hearing (Paragraphs 45 to 49). He then gave his analysis, reasons, and conclusion as to why none of the 4 bases of risk were made out, and that in any event internal relocation was viable and reasonable. The Applicant was hence not entitled to non-refoulement relief and the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 14 August 2018 (“Director’s Decision”) was confirmed (Paragraphs 50 to 58). In particular:

(1)  The Applicant had lived in Dhaka, away from his home village, for 5 years before he left Bangladesh in 2016. The TCAB/NRCPO rejected his claim –which he advanced for the first time at the oral hearing – that in 2014/2015 he had narrowly avoided being attacked and had to move to another area of Dhaka to live in, finding that it was a “fabrication on the part of the Applicant in an attempt to boost a very weak application for non-refoulement”, and found that his evidence was not credible;

(2)  Even if the Applicant had been found to be credible, none of the 4 bases of risk were established having regard to the principles and the evidence (including COI) before it as relevant to topics such as the extent and severity of the past experiences, and state acquiescence; and

(3)  As to internal relocation, even if there were was a risk of harm as claimed, on the facts such was confined to the local area where he and his family had lived and in the circumstances he could hence relocate internally without undue hardship, as inter alia he had lived safely in Dhaka for 5 years before leaving Bangladesh.

Legal Principles relating to Judicial Review

5.  An applicant, even one acting in person, is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly in the Form 86, and to fully and frankly disclose all material facts and potential legal answers (Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, unrep. HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016, Chow J. (as he was then) at §142; Leung Kwok Hung, unrep., HCAL 83/2012, 28 September 2013, Lam J. (as he was then) at §35; Begum Khadija [2018] HKCA 571; Khan Kamran [2020] HKCA 380).

6.  It is trite that the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal, and that the Court should not usurp the role of the TCAB/NRCPO which is (and together with the Director are) the primary decision‑makers. The assessment of evidence, COI materials, and credibility, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the TCAB/NRCPO and the Director, which are entitled to make evaluations based on the evidence available and to decide the weight to be given to them. While the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the TCAB/NRCPO. (Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524; Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022; Re Rupinder Singh [2021] HKCA 886).

7.  In order for me to give leave for judicial review, I have to be satisfied that there is an intended ground of review which is reasonably arguable, which is one that enjoys a realistic prospect of success (Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676). As a leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process, I am not expected to give elaborate reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23).

Grounds raised by the Applicant

8.  The grounds for the application for leave as apparently raised in the Form 86 and Affirmation are that:

(1)  The Applicant was not given a fair opportunity to put forward his submissions in an oral hearing nor was he invited to submit written submissions. Furthermore, “When the Applicant filed in the Appeal Form, the Applicant was only asked to write grounds for appeal but that will not count as an opportunity to reply to submissions made by the representatives of the [Director]”; (Ground 1)

(2)  The TCAB had “significantly relied on the source of news which is not officially recognized or it is simply hearsay. They have also relied on some cases which are fairly outdated considering the dramatic changes.” In the Affirmation it is further said that “The lack of credible source of information has resulted in them making groundless speculations that it is safe for him to return back to my country of origin”; (Ground 2)

The Applicant’s Further Application

9.  The Applicant sought an oral hearing of his application for leave. Shortly before the oral hearing, he filed an affirmation (“the 2^nd Affirmation”) in English without a translation clause which stated “I would like to add my wife and my daughters on my case. Please grant my Application.” Some documents relating to his wife (“Wife”), and to his and his Wife’s elder and younger daughter (“Daughter 1” and “Daughter 2” respectively, and “Daughters” collectively) were exhibited to such. There was however no suggestion that any of them had filed any judicial review proceedings or intended to do so.

10.  At the oral hearing, the Applicant handed me a copy of a Form 86 in HCAL 1601/2024 filed on 16 September 2024 (“Daughter 1’s Form 86”) and asked me to grant his application (which he said he had made by the 2^nd Affirmation) that I “address [his] case as a family case” and that his case be “converted to a family case”, as he said that there were 4 non-refoulement cases to be “remade as a family case and merged together”, namely his case, his Wife’s case, and those of Daughter 1 and Daughter 2. He said he wished for his Wife and his Daughters to be added as applicants and parties to his case for judicial review. The reason he gave was that he was alone when he filed his case and at the time of the TCAB Decision, but as he was no longer alone and had a family it was relevant that his Wife and Daughters be added as parties, as they were all together as one family and he wanted a decision for the full family. He said that he wished to raise his children in Hong Kong, and that his Wife wished to add that if he were refouled it would not be safe for his children who were very young.

11.  As a matter of context:

(1)  I accept from the documents exhibited to the 2^nd Affirmation that the Applicant had, after the TCAB Decision, fathered the Daughters and married his Wife;

(2)  The 2^nd Affirmation exhibited a letter from the TCAB/NRCPO and a decision dated 10 July 2023 (“Daughter 2’s TCAB Decision”) relating to and dismissing Daughter 2’s claim for non-refoulement relief as assessed against the 4 applicable types of risk. Daughter 2’s TCAB Decision had been reached by a member/adjudicator who was a different person from the Decision-Maker (“Later Decision-Maker”). The Later Decision-Maker had held an oral hearing on 21 April 2023 at which the Wife had represented Daughter 2, and at which both the Applicant and the Wife had adduced evidence. The Applicant explained to me at the hearing that no judicial review had been applied for in relation to Daughter 2’s TCAB Decision, and that he and his Wife would do so when they had enough money;

(3)  In relation to Daughter 1’s claim for non-refoulement, and from the submissions and documents before me at the oral hearing:

i.  The TCAB/NRCPO had made a decision dated 2 February 2023 (“Daughter 1’s TCAB Decision”) in relation to and rejecting Daughter 1’s non-refoulement claim;

ii.  By way of Daughter’s 1 Form 86, both Daughter 1 (as the 1^st Applicant therein) and the Wife (as the 2^nd Applicant therein, presumably as Daughter 1 was and is a minor, albeit that the Wife was not named as the next friend and did not act via a solicitor) sought leave to apply for judicial review of the Daughter 1’s TCAB Decision (“Daughter 1’s Leave Application”). The only ground mentioned in Daughter 1’s Form 86 was that “The decision is substantially unfair”;

iii.  Daughter 1’s Form 86 also asked for an extension of time to apply for leave (even going so far as to identify s. 21 K High Court Ordinance (CAP. 4) and RHC O. 53[6] r. 4(1)) but, instead of giving reasons, merely requested “the opportunity to explain the reasons for my delay in due course”; and

iv.  The typed contents of Daughter 1’s Form 86 had specifically envisaged that Daughter 1’s Leave Application be consolidated (even going so far as to identify RHC O. 53 r. 12 as being the specific provision in relation to the order sought) with a simultaneously filed leave application for Daughter 2. However, in the document as filed Daughter 2’s name had been deleted from that paragraph by hand, presumably as she had not made such an application;

(4)  Given the aforesaid, it is clear that the contents of Daughter’s 1 Form 86 have had the input of someone with some legal training; and

(5)  At the hearing the Applicant said he did not know of the status of Daughter 1’s Leave Application. He also did not provide me with the affirmation filed in support of Daughter 1’s Leave Application (“Daughter 1’s Leave Affirmation”) or with Daughter 1’s TCAB Decision.

12.  I hence deal here, as I indicated I would do at the hearing, with the Further Application and the leave application at the same time.

13.  The Applicant did not specify what provision or power he was relying on in relation to the Further Application. If (as was apparently the case before me) the Further Application is approached and considered as an application to add the Wife and Daughters as Applicants to the present proceedings pursuant to RHC O. 15 r. 6(2)(b), then I reject it for the following reasons.

14.  Firstly, and insofar as it is suggested that I should add the Wife as a party in light of her own claim for non-refoulement relief, the only non-refoulement claim she has made was (as was also mentioned in Daughter 2’s TCAB Decision) rejected by a decision of the TCAB/NRCPO on 9 July 2018, in respect of which she can no longer seek leave to apply for judicial review (Akter Ruksana [2020] HKCFI 1556; [2021] HKCA 483; [2021] HKCA 1425). It would be an abuse of process, and pointless and futile, for her to be joined to the proceedings as an Applicant to re-litigate any such intended judicial review (Elysium Ltd v Sum Ka Kuen Dominic [2023] HKCFI 1690 at §24 as cited in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025 §15/6/1).

15.  Secondly, and also as matter of context:

(1)  The subject matter of this action is whether the Grounds identified above justify granting leave to commence judicial review in relation to the TCAB Decision, and whether judicial review and the relief thereby sought should be granted. That relief as sought is in terms of an order quashing the TCAB Decision and remitting the matter for reconsideration by the TCAB/NRCPO. It is not the Applicant’s pleaded case (nor can it be reasonably argued) that he would, if granted judicial review, be entitled to an order from the court upholding his non-refoulement claim on the merits;

(2)  As summarised above, the TCAB Decision does not concern the Wife or the Daughters as it was reached before the Applicant formed such bonds. Similarly, the present application was also filed prior to such events;

(3)  Since the Further Application related to actual or contemplated proceedings for judicial review by minors, and Daughter 1’s TCAB Decision was mentioned in Daughter 1’s Form 86 and Daughter 2’s TCAB Decision, I have in the interests of prudence accessed and considered the contents of Daughter 1’s Leave Affirmation (which was affirmed by the Wife) and Daughter 1’s TCAB Decision (which was exhibited to Daughter 1’s Leave Affirmation) from the relevant court file. I have highlighted pertinent matters from such below; and

(4)  The relevant TCAB/NRCPO decisions made in relation to his Wife and each of his Daughters were all reached at different times and pursuant to different processes. There was not only separate consideration of each of the Daughters’ claims separate from those of their parents[7] , but also consideration by way of 2 separate proceedings leading to the separate Daughter 1’s TCAB Decision and Daughter 2’s TCAB Decision (albeit that both were reached by the same Later Decision-Maker).

16.  Thirdly, I do not see that the application falls within either limb of RHC O. 15 r. 6(2)(b) as I do not see that any of his Wife or Daughters ought to have been joined as a party, that they will have their legal or financial rights directly affected by the determination of this action (including any order made), or that they have the requisite direct interest in the subject matter of the action. Rather, they have at best only a remote, indirect, and contingent interest which is insufficient to justify their intervention in this case. I also do not see that any relevant question or issue arises under r. 6(b)(ii) which it is “just and convenient” to determine between the parties in these proceedings, and would not exercise my discretion to add the order the addition of the Wife or Daughters to the action as Applicants (Elysium, supra, at §§19-24, 28, 30, 34, 37, 40-44; Kwan Chi On v Hong Kong Baptist University [1998] 1 HKC 88 at 96G-H; Chong Kai Man v Kwan Yau Hang & anor., unrep., HCA 1298/2011, 30 September 2013, Hartmann DHCJ. (as Hartmann NPJ. was then) in particular at §§2, 7-10, 16-22, 24-26; Wong Chun Loong Tony v Ada Ltd [1991] 1 HKC (CA) at 94D-I; Man Whi Chung v Man Ping Nam & anor. [2003] 1 HKC 549 (Andrew Cheung DHCJ. as the Chief Justice was then) at §§15-21). In particular:

(1)  I do not see that determining the subject matter of (including awarding the relief sought in) the Applicant’s case would prevent Daughter 1 from advancing Daughter 1’s Leave Application, much less directly affect her legal and financial rights. Nor does her application or the vague ground/complaints alleged within (which do not even amount to a proper or properly particularised ground of judicial review)[8] raise relevant matters, questions, issues, and/or rights that should also be determined in this case as per r. (6)(b)(i) or (ii). A fortiori when:

i.  Daughter 1’s Leave Application arises from Daughter 1’s TCAB Decision, which was reached pursuant to a separate (from the TCAB Decision and the wife’s decisions) assessment process carried out at a different time by the Later Decision-Maker. In particular, Daughter 1’s TCAB Decision was reached after an oral hearing on 17 June 2022 at which evidence (including further oral evidence) was adduced by both the Applicant and his Wife, consequent to which the Later Decision-Maker made his own findings relating to and rejecting Daughter 1’s non-refoulement claim. This included negative findings as to the credibility of the Applicant and the Wife, and a finding that internal relocation was available (including in particular to Dhaka) (see e.g. Paragraphs 24 and 25 on pp16-19, and Paragraphs 40-45 and 47 et seq. especially 65-66); and

ii.  I do not see or accept that the existence and contents of Daughter 1’s TCAB Decision or the complaints raised within Daughter 1’s Leave Application are relevant to the issues or remedies that arise in the present application, let alone that such would have had an important influence on the result of the Applicant’s claim that had resulted in the TCAB Decision.

(2)  The above analysis applies a fortiori in relation to Daughter 2 and the Wife as:

i.  there are no grounds identified for any judicial review that might be advanced by either or both of them (let alone any that deal with the issues of res judicata and abuse of process in relation to the Wife), and hence no relevant matters, issues, questions, and/or rights that should be so determined as per the rules; and

ii.  Daughter 2’s TCAB Decision was reached after yet another oral hearing on 21 April 2023 at which evidence was adduced by the Applicant and his Wife, pursuant to which the Later Decision-Maker made findings relating to and rejecting Daughter 2’s non-refoulement claim. This included negative findings as to the credibility of the Applicant and the Wife, and a finding that internal relocation was available (including in particular to Dhaka) (see e.g. Paragraphs 24 and 25 on pp18-19, and Paragraphs 40-45 and 47 et seq. especially 65-66);

(3)  Rather, the interest of the Applicant’s Wife and Daughters is, at best, only a remote, indirect, and contingent one, viz. if relief is granted to the Applicant as sought, a reconsideration by the TCAB/NRCPO might result in findings and/or an outcome relating to the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim, which might (depending on the findings/outcome) be relevant to the determination of Daughter 1’s Leave Application, and/or any putative process relating to the Wife and the Daughters’ non-refoulement claims;

(4)  None of the requirements of RHC O. 15 r. 6(4) and (in relation to the Daughters and Daughter 1’s Leave Application) in RHC O. 80 r. 2 or Fabio, supra, at §57 have been complied with (see also Valdez Evelyn Ochoada [2021] HKCA 141 at §§26-27). I do not see that there is sufficient reason for me to treat the latter failure as an irregularity and depart from the norm in relation to the Further Application or as to the remainder of this action, given the lack of any explanation for non-compliance, and the failure to advance any, or any proper, grounds on behalf of the Daughters to vitiate their respective TCAB decisions, particularly in the circumstances set out in paragraph 16(1)i and 16(2)ii above (applying the approach in Jassal Tajinder Kumar [2021] HKCA 125 at §§27-29, 34); and

(5)  It would be inappropriate to exercise my discretion to allow any of the Wife or the Daughters to be joined when:

i.  Given the matters in these subparagraphs, joinder would also bring to this action an additional layer of dispute unrelated to its subject matter, and unnecessarily confuse and complicate the clear issue to be determined here. It would also needlessly delay the resolution of such issue and the entire application (which was issued over 5 years ago) in circumstances when such can and should be determined without further delay;

ii.  As Daughter 1’s Leave Application is still afoot, joinder would result in a multiplicity of proceedings which is contrary to the true purpose of the rule and inimical to the just and expeditious disposal of the present action (see in particular Kwan Chi On v Hong Kong Baptist University [1998] 1 HKC 88 as applied in Elysium, supra);

iii.  It was not suggested that Daughter 1’s Leave Application could be abandoned and that she be joined so that she can proceeded with her application in these proceedings instead. In any event, I do not see that that I should condone such course of action given the matters in sub-paragraph (4) above, given the vague complaints advanced in Daughter 1’s Leave Application do not even amount to a ground for judicial review, and given the substantial and unexplained undue delay in relation to Daughter 1’s Leave Application which was filed 16 months out of time[9]; and

iv.  There is no ground of judicial review advanced by the Wife or Daughter 2, and by the time of filing of the 2^nd Affirmation any putative application for leave in relation to Daughter 2 was already 19 months out of time which is a substantial undue delay.

17.  Even if the Further Application is treated as one made under RHC O. 53 r. 12 to consolidate the present action with other actions, I dismiss such for the following reasons:

(1)  The only action which could be potentially consolidated with this action is Daughter 1’s Leave Application;

(2)  RHC O. 53 r. 12 does not apply as the vague complaints set out in Daughter 1’s Form 86 (which do not even amount to proper grounds for judicial review) are not the same as the Grounds in the present application; and

(3)  In any event, I refuse to make an order consolidating the proceedings since:

i.  Insofar as may be relevant, given the matters in paragraph 16(1)i and ii above I do not see that the present application and Daughter 1’s Leave Application concern any common issues or questions of law or fact (let alone one that bears sufficient importance to the rest of the issues) or that any rights to relief claimed therein are in respect of the same transaction or series of transactions; and

ii.  I also do not see that it is desirable or that there is any reason I should exercise my discretion to consolidate the two actions. Firstly, and again, there has been a failure to comply with the requirements of RHC O. 80 r. 2 and Fabio, supra. Given the matters relating to such at paragraph 16(4) above, I decline to treat such as an irregularity and to depart from the norm in relation to the Further Application, or as to the remainder of this action or any consolidated proceedings. Secondly, consolidation would delay the resolution of the present application as time would be needed to fulfil the requirements in RHC O. 80 r. 2 and Fabio, supra. Thirdly, and in any event, consolidation would inevitably delay the resolution of the current proceedings. Such delay would be pointless given that no, or no proper, grounds for judicial review (or explanation for her substantial undue delay) have been advanced on behalf of Daughter 1, and given also the matters in paragraph 16(1)i and ii above. It is hence far more appropriate to proceed with and resolve the Applicant’s leave application (which was issued over 5 years ago) on its own without further delay, and for Daughter 1’s Leave Application to assessed in due course and separately.

18.  Returning to the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review I have, in the aforesaid circumstances, amended the Form 86 of my own motion to reflect the identity of the proper putative respondent.

19.  As for the merits of the Applicant’s application, given the seriousness of the issues at hand and the Grounds raised, I have considered the TCAB Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard and bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness. Having done so and summarised the contents thereof above, I do not see that the Applicant has any reasonably arguable case that there was procedural unfairness, an error of law, and/or irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test that vitiates the TCAB Decision, even taking into account Grounds 1 and 2 either individually or cumulatively. Hence there is no basis for the court to intervene by way of judicial review, and I am not satisfied that there are any reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review which enjoy a realistic prospect of success.

20.  As to Ground 1, I do not see that there was any such procedural unfairness as alleged before the TCAB/NRCPO. On the contrary, from paragraph 13 of the TCAB Decision it is clear that the Applicant was not deprived of an opportunity to reply to the Director’s written submissions, or to make any meaningful oral or written submissions to the TCAB/NRCPO. I see no reasonable argument that the high standard of fairness was departed from. A fortiori when there is no indication that the Applicant complained at the hearing about these matters, and where he has not provided any specifics of these alleged issues, let alone of how they apparently prejudiced or tainted the conduct of the hearing or the TCAB Decision. Ground 1 is hence devoid of merit and is not a reasonably arguable ground of judicial review.

21.  I also do not see any reasonably arguable ground for judicial review arising in relation to Ground 2. Here, an oral hearing was held at which salient matters were canvassed with the Applicant, pursuant to which the decision-maker drew conclusions based on (and giving reasons with reference to) the relevant evidence and COI before it. The Applicant has not identified what source of news or cases relied on was/were alleged to be “not officially recognized”, hearsay or outdated, let alone how it is reasonably arguable that there was a public law error in relation to the conduct of the oral hearing and the findings pursuant thereto as set out in the TCAB Decision.

22.  Furthermore, the assessment, reasoning, and findings regarding credibility, risk of harm, the availability of internal relocation, Torture Risk, Persecution Risk, BOR 3 Risk, and BOR 2 Risk[10], were all matters primarily within the province of the decision-making body.

23.  In addition to and apart from the above, I do not see how the 2^nd Affirmation and the post-TCAB Decision developments in his life (including the formation of the relevant bonds with his family, and the status and progress of their non-refoulement claims and attendant litigation) are relevant to or assist the Applicant’s application for leave, or the issues before me. I reject them as being irrelevant and inadmissible as:

(1)  Judicial review is not a further avenue of appeal or for revisiting the assessment in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh absent any legal error (see the authorities cited in paragraph 6 above); and

(2)  I do not see that such matters satisfy the second condition in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 as:

i.  I am not satisfied that the existence and contents of Daughter 1’s TCAB Decision (or Daughter 1’s Leave Application and the complaints advanced therein) would have had an important influence on the result of the Applicant’s claim that had resulted in the TCAB Decision, given the findings of the Decision-Maker (as summarised at paragraph 4 above including on internal relocation), the matters set out at paragraph 16(1)i above and the vague nature of the complaints raised in Daughter 1’s Leave Application;

ii.  I am also not satisfied that the existence and contents of Daughter 2’s TCAB Decision (or the fact of any intended judicial review on unidentified grounds) would have had an important influence on the result of the Applicant’s claim that had resulted in the TCAB Decision, given the aforesaid findings of the Decision-Maker and the matters set out at paragraph 16(2)i and ii above; and

iii.  Given the conclusions in i. and ii. above, and also those in paragraph 14 above, I am not satisfied that matters relating to the Wife that arose post-TCAB Decision would have had an important influence on the result of the Applicant’s claim that had resulted in the TCAB Decision.

24.  There is hence no basis for the court to intervene by way of judicial review, and I am not satisfied that there are any reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review which enjoy a realistic prospect of success.

Conclusion

25.  In the circumstances, I dismiss the application for leave for judicial review and have made the orders set out above.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1