RE PAGLINGAYEN ROSALYN RINGOR AND ANOTHER

CACV 316/2019

[2021] HKCA 84

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 316 OF 2019

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 870/2017)

____________________

____________________

________________________

JUDGMENT

________________________

Hon Lam VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 23 June 2020, the 1^st Applicant on behalf of the 2^nd Applicant and herself filed a Notice of Motion, out of time, to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this Court’s judgment of 27 December 2019. In that judgment we dismissed the Applicants’ appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan on 28 June 2019 dismissing their application for leave to apply for judicial review.

2.  Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal (“CFA”) at the discretion of this Court or the CFA if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the CFA for decision.

3.  In the Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the CFA, the Applicants did not raise any specific grounds for leave to appeal.

4.  Pursuant to the Court’s directions of 24 June 2020, the 1^st Applicant lodged written submissions in support on 8 July 2020 for herself and the 2^nd Applicant, who is her daughter and is a minor.  In those submissions, the 1^st Applicant stated that she and her daughter are afraid to return to the Philippines because their lives are in danger and discrimination against her daughter. 

5.  On 27 November 2020, another division of this Court (Lam VP, Barma and Au JJA) handed down the judgment in Fabio Arlyn Timogan v Evan Ruth, Esq, Adjudicator of the Torture Claims Appeal Board, [2020] HKCA 971, CACV 32/2020. 

6.  In our view, that judgment cannot avail the Applicants in the present case.  It is clear from the Board’s decision of 13 October 2017 that the Board assessed the 2^nd Applicant’s claim separately from the 1^st Applicant’s claim[1].  In particular, the Board specifically considered the risk of discrimination to the 2^nd Applicant in the event of refoulement due to her being of mixed race and born out of wedlock.  The Board also considered the 2^nd Applicant’s potential statelessness as well as the specific risk that the 1^st Applicant’s husband might pose to the 2^nd Applicant.

7.  In our view, the Board had properly assessed the 2^nd Applicant’s claim and duly given reasons for rejecting the 2^nd Applicant’s claim.  There is nothing to indicate that the merits of the 2^nd Applicant’s claim were not fully or adequately explored before the Board due to lack of legal representation such that the high standards of fairness were not met.

8.  On this application for leave to appeal to the CFA, the Applicants have not raised any reasonably arguable ground of appeal on the merit of their claims, or any discernible or arguable ground for disturbing our judgment.  The matters raised in the Notice of Motion and written submissions fail to pinpoint any specific error in our judgment or the judgment of the court below.

9.  In the circumstances, we do not consider that there is any question of great general or public importance or which otherwise ought to be submitted to the CFA for determination.

10.  For these reasons, we refuse to grant leave to appeal to the CFA, and dismiss the Applicant’s Notice of Motion.