MAHMOOD SHAHID v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 124/2021

[2026] HKCFI 2788

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 124 OF 2021

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D E C I S I O N

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Introduction

1.  The Applicant is a national of Pakistan. He entered Hong Kong illegally on 8 February 2008. He was arrested by the police on 11 February 2008. He then made an application for non-refoulement.

2.  On 20 March 2015, the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) refused the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim. The Applicant’s subsequent appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) was dismissed on 19 April 2017 (the “Board’s First Decision”).

3.  On 9 May 2017, the Director invited the Applicant to submit additional facts, if any, relevant to his non-refoulement claim on any other absolute and non-derogable rights including right to life under Article 2 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (“BOR 2”). The Applicant did not respond. As a result, on 6 June 2017, the Director issued another decision refusing the Applicant’s claim based on BOR 2. The Applicant’s subsequent appeal to the Board was dismissed on 15 October 2020 (the “Board’s Second Decision”).

4.  By Form 86 filed on 3 February 2021, the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s First Decision (the “Leave Application”). The hearing of the Leave Application took place on 13 October 2025 and the Applicant attended in person. At the hearing, the Court asked the Applicant whether he intended to apply for judicial review against the Board’s First Decision or the Board’s Second Decision. The Applicant looked confused and could not answer. As a result, the Court proceeded as if the Leave Application was in respect of both the Board’s First Decision and the Board’s Second Decision. It should be noted that the Leave Application was filed out of time.

5.  By the decision dated 19 November 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 5519) (the “Court’s Decision”), this Court dismissed the Leave Application on the ground that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s First Decision and the Board’s Second Decision is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success, and that there was no valid explanation for the delay.

6.  By the Summons filed on 13 February 2026, the Applicant applied for an extension of time to appeal against the Court’s Decision, as the 14‑day period for him to file the appeal under Order 53 rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court had expired (the “Application”).

7.  The Application was heard on 11 May 2026 and the Applicant attended in person. At the hearing, when being asked about the delay in making the Application, the Applicant simply said he did not know that he needed to appeal within 14 days.

8.  Apart from the above, the Applicant indicated that he had nothing to say in respect of the Application.

Discussion

9.  In considering whether to extend the time to appeal, it is trite that the court will take into account: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason(s) for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the degree of prejudice to the other party if an extension of time is granted. The prospect of success of an intended appeal is important. The court will not grant an extension of time to appeal for a hopeless appeal to be pursued. (see Re Mushtaq Imran Ali [2025] HKCA 705, at §§16-17)

10.  In the present case, there was delay of about 2 months. I have reservation on the explanation given by the Applicant at the hearing. There is no evidence on what he had done in the 2-month period.

11.  Despite the lack of satisfactory explanation for the delay, I shall still proceed to consider the merit of the intended appeal before deciding on the Application.

12.  In the Summons and in the supporting Affirmation, the Applicant did not provide any grounds in support of the intended appeal. Despite being given a further opportunity to make submissions in respect of the Application at the hearing on 11 May 2026, the Applicant indicated that he had nothing to say in respect of the Application.

13.  I have considered the Court’s Decision together with the Board’s First Decision and the Board’s Second Decision in detail. The Board had considered and provided adequate and valid reasons in dismissing the Applicant’s case. The Applicant did not provide any grounds in support of the Leave Application. The Court had reviewed the Board’s decisions, and came to the decision that there is no realistic prospect of success in the intended challenge of the Board’s two decisions (§§12-13 thereof). This, coupled with the fact that there was no valid explanation for the delay in making the Leave Application, led to the Court dismissing the Leave Application. I do not see any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Court’s Decision. Neither has the Applicant made any such allegations. It is incumbent upon the Applicant to demonstrate with sufficient particulars that the Court had erred in the Court’s Decision. The Applicant has plainly failed to do so. Accordingly, I fail to see any prospect of success in the intended appeal.

Conclusion

14.  As there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay, and more importantly no prospect of success in the intended appeal, I refuse to extend the time for the appeal. The Application is hereby dismissed.