HKSAR v. KO LOK YAN MANDY

DCCC 276/2024

[2025] HKDC 1346

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CRIMINAL CASE NO 276 OF 2024

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REASONS FOR SENTENCE

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1.  Ms Ko pleaded guilty before me to 4 charges of Dealing with proceeds known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence, contrary to section 25(1) and (3) of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance, Cap 455.

2.  Particulars of the charges are that she, between A(1) and A(2), in Hong Kong, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that property, namely a chose in action in a total sum of B Hong Kong currency in the account numbered C held under the name of herself with D, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly represented the proceeds of an indictable offence, dealt with the said property.

3.  For Charge 1, A(1) is 25 February 2021; A(2) is 7 April 2021; B is $15,344,050.59; C is 880000032989; D is Airstar Bank Limited.

4.  For Charge 2, A(1) is 22 May 2021; A(2) is 1 June 2021; B is $2,395,599.00; C is 012-358-2-005466-1; D is Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited.

5.  For Charge 3, A(1) is 8 March 2021; A(2) is 24 March 2021; B is $2,196,064.50; C is 50903446; D is Citibank (Hong Kong) Limited.

6.  For Charge 4, A(1) is 13 December 2020; A(2) is 7 April 2021; B is $2,133,143.00; C is 1000783820; D is Welab Bank Limited.

Facts admitted by Ms Ko

7.  At all material times, Ms Ko was the sole holder and sole authorized signatory of the four bank accounts under the 4 charges.

8.  Six citizens fell prey to investment scam.  Scammer whom they met through mobile app or unsolicited text message deceived them into making investment through an untrusted website or mobile app.  To make investments (which never existed), each of them followed the scammer’s instructions to pay money into designated bank accounts, including the Citibank Account subject of Charge 3, as investment capital, between 15 and 21 March 2021.  The total funds paid into the Citibank Account by the six citizens amounted to HK$539,300, although the losses suffered by them were much more.

9.  After they realized they had been deceived, they reported the matters to the Hong Kong Police.

Charge 1: Airstar Bank Account

10.  On 24 February 2021, Ms Ko applied to set up a personal bank account with the Airstar Bank Limited (subsequently known as the Airstar Bank Account).

11.  In her application to set up the Airstar Bank Account, Ms Ko submitted three selfies, a photo of her HKID card, and a video of herself showing the HKID card, as proof of identity.

12.  In the same application, Ms Ko claimed, inter alia:

(a) She opens the Airstar Bank Account for saving money;

(b) Her source of wealth is her wages; and

(c) She is residing at a public rental housing flat in Kwai Chung (“the Flat”).

13.  On 25 February 2021, the Airstar Bank Account was opened.

14.  Between 25 February 2021 and 7 April 2021, both dates inclusive, there had been:

(a) HK$16,439,050.59 credited into the Airstar Bank Account through 95 deposits; and

(b) HK$16,438,107.64 debited from the Airstar Bank Account through 81 withdrawals.

15.  The aforesaid 95 deposits were originated from bank account(s) of 24 individuals.  Among these 95 deposits, 25 were originated from the Citibank and Welab Bank Accounts – involving HK$1,095,000 in total.  Having excluded such money involved, the Airstar Bank Account received HK$15,344,050.59, being the aggregate amount of property having been dealt with, particularized in Charge 1.

16.  In general, during the period covered by the Charge 1, the Airstar Bank Account had been operated as a repository of funds, to receive and dispose of money, in the following manners:

(a) The Airstar Bank Account received various deposits, and disposed of the funds accumulated at once. To illustrate, between 15 and 16 March 2021, the bank account received eight deposits from the Citibank Account (involving HK$578,000) and a deposit from Lai Sin Yi (involving HK$283,000) consecutively, after which transferred HK$860,000 to Tak Shing Import and Export Company.

(b) The Airstar Bank Account received a deposit, and disposed of the funds received in tranches. To illustrate, on 10 March 2021, the bank account received HK$354,000 from Sham Kit Yi, after which transferred HK$351,000 to four other persons.

17.  Money credited into the Airstar Bank Account had been disposed of, on the day of receipt or on the next day.

18.  On 7 April 2021, the Airstar Bank Account held HK$983.50 as closing balance.

Charge 2: BOC Account

19.  On 12 November 2015, Ms Ko applied to set up a personal bank account with the Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited (subsequently known as the BOC Account). 

20.  Ms Ko presented her HKID card to officer of the bank, as proof of identity, in support of her application to set up the BOC Account.

21.  In the same application, Ms Ko claimed, inter alia:

(a) She opens the BOC Account for dealing with daily budget; and

(b) She resides at the Flat.

22.  On the same day, the BOC Account was opened.

23.  On 4 May 2021, Ms Ko visited a branch of the Bank of China (Hong Kong) to amend her mobile phone number registered with the bank.

24.  Between 18 March 2019 and 3 May 2021, the BOC Account had received HK$197,162.45.  It had not performed any activity, and had maintained a balance of HK$10.45, between 4 and 21 May 2021.

25.  Between 22 May 2021 and 1 June 2021, both dates inclusive:

(a) HK$2,413,769.00 had been credited into the BOC Account through 1,474 deposits; and

(b) HK$2,385,917.00 had been debited from the BOC Account through 463 withdrawals.

26.  The aforesaid 1,474 deposits consisted of:

(a) 1,373 bank transfers came from bank account of 174 individuals (involving HK$2,209,899);

(b) 91 deposits made through an ATM (involving HK$185,500);

(c) Nine payment reversals (involving HK$18,170); and

(d) A HK$200 deposit made through bank counter.

27.  In general, during the period covered by Charge 2, as a repository of funds, the BOC Account had received various deposits consecutively, and disposed of the funds accumulated erratically. 

28.  To illustrate, on 23 May 2021, the BOC Account received 16 deposits consecutively (involving HK$12,906) between 12 pm and 2:05 pm, after which transferred HK$1,000 to another person at 2:23 pm.

29.  Money credited into the BOC Account had been disposed of, on the day of receipt or in the next two days.

30.  On 1 June 2021, the BOC Account held HK$27,862.46 as closing balance.

31.  Having excluded the payment reversals, the BOC Account received HK$2,395,599.00, being the aggregate amount of property having been dealt with, particularized in Charge 2.

Charge 3: Citibank Account

32.  On 4 March 2021, Ms Ko applied to set up a personal bank account with the Citibank (Hong Kong) Limited (subsequently known as the Citibank Account).

33.  In support of her application to set up the Citibank Account, to the officer of the bank, Ms Ko presented her HKID card (as identity proof) and an integrated monthly statement issued by the Bank of China (Hong Kong) (as address proof).

34.  In the same application, Ms Ko claimed, inter alia:

(a) She opens the Citibank Account for receiving salary payments, saving money and/or making investments;

(b) The source of funds of the bank account is her wages; and

(c) She resides at the Flat.

35.  On the same day, the Citibank Account was opened.

36.  Between 8 and 24 March 2021, both dates inclusive:

(a) HK$2,196,064.50 had been credited into the Citibank Account through 67 deposits; and

(b) HK$2,196,000.00 had been debited from the Citibank Account through 46 withdrawals.

37.  The aforesaid 67 deposits consisted of 63 bank transfers/ATM deposits made by 47 individuals (including the six citizens who fell prey to investment scam) and 4 deposits made by depositor(s) whose identity has not been revealed.

38.  In general, during the period covered by Charge 3, as a repository of funds, the Citibank Account had received various deposits consecutively, and disposed of the funds received through bank transfers to bank account of Ms Ko, a body corporate or two other persons. 

39.  To illustrate, on 16 March 2021, the Citibank Account received 10 deposits consecutively (involving HK$304,770, including money belonging to Chen Yiyun), after which transferred HK$305,000 to the Airstar Bank Account.

40.  Money credited into the Citibank Account had been disposed of, on the day of receipt or on the next day.

41.  During the period covered by Charge 3, the Citibank Account had transferred a total of HK$1,736,000 to three bank accounts held by Ms Ko:

Bank Account / Bank	Money transferred from the Citibank Account (HK$)
Airstar Bank Account	$1,045,000.00
Welab Bank Account	$512,000.00
PAO Bank Limited	$179,000.00

42.  On 24 March 2021, the Citibank Account held HK$64.50 as closing balance.

Charge 4: Welab Bank Account

43.  On 12 December 2020, Ms Ko applied to set up a personal bank account with the Welab Bank Limited (subsequently known as the Welab Bank Account). 

44.  In her application to set up the Welab Bank Account, Ms Ko submitted two selfies, a photo of her HKID card, as proof of identity.

45.  In the same application, Ms Ko claimed, inter alia:

(a) She opens the Welab Bank Account for saving money;

(b) The source of funds of the bank account is her savings; and

(c) She resides at the Flat.

46.  On the same day, the Welab Bank Account was opened.

47.  Between 13 December 2020 and 7 April 2021, both dates inclusive:

(a) HK$2,645,143.00 had been credited into the Welab Bank Account through 48 deposits; and

(b) HK$2,579,168.18 had been debited from the Welab Bank Account through 64 withdrawals.

48.  The aforesaid 48 deposits were originated from bank account(s) of 10 individuals.  Among these 48 deposits, five were originated from the Citibank Account – involving HK$512,000 in total.  Having excluded such money involved, the Welab Bank Account received HK$2,133,143, being the aggregate amount of property having been dealt with, particularized in Charge 4.   

49.  In general, during the period covered by Charge 4, the Welab Bank Account had been operated as a repository of funds, to receive and dispose of money, in the following manners:

(a) The Welab Bank Account received various deposits, and disposed of the funds accumulated at once. To illustrate, on 22 March 2021, the bank account received two deposits from the Citibank Account (involving HK$382,000) consecutively, after which transferred HK$297,265 to He Shenxia.

(b) The Welab Bank Account received a deposit, and disposed of the funds received in tranches. To illustrate, between 31 March 2021 and 1 April 2021, the bank account received HK$424,000 from So Chi Man, after which transferred HK$486,535.75 to seven other bank accounts, including the Airstar Bank Account.

50.  Money credited into the Welab Bank Account had been disposed of, on the day of receipt or on the next day.

51.  On 7 April 2021, the Welab Bank Account held HK$66,176.15 as closing balance.

Arrest

52.  On 22 November 2021, pursuant to a search warrant, and in the presence of Ms Ko’s elder brother, police officer searched the Flat, found a monthly statement of the Citibank Account covering the period between 8 July 2021 and 7 August 2021 in a drawer inside Ms Ko’s bedroom, and seized it.

53.  On that day, Ms Ko was being arrested in the Sham Shui Po Police Station, who attended a video-recorded interview, and asserted, under caution, inter alia:

(a) She resides at the Flat;

(b) She personally opened the BOC, Citibank and Welab Bank Accounts for saving money; and

(c) She personally opened the Airstar Bank Account to acquire consumption voucher issued by the bank as reward for opening bank account.

Criminal record

54.  Ms Ko has 3 previous convictions two of which were for the offence of “Attempted fraud” committed prior to the present offences but for which she was sentenced after the commission of the present offences.  The remaining one was a minor offence for which she was fined.

Antecedents

55.  Ms Ko is aged 28 (24 at the time of the offences), educated to F4, was working as a cashier with salary of $6,000 at the time of arrest.

Mitigation

56.  Mr Kenny Lau of counsel assigned by the Director of Legal Aid mitigated on behalf of Ms Ko.  The following is a summary of the mitigation submissions.

57.  The maximum penalty for the money laundering offence is 14 years’ imprisonment.  There are no sentencing guidelines for the offence.  The amount of money laundered is the major consideration and should be reflected in sentencing: HKSAR v Lam Ka Sin [2021] 2 HKLRD 32, para 27.

58.  In HKSAR v Boma [2012] 2 HKLRD 33, the Court of Appeal said a sentencing court should take into account the following non-exhaustive list of features when dealing with offences of money laundering:-

(a) The nature of the predicate offence;

(b) The state of the offender’s knowledge;

(c) Where the operation involved an international dimension, this would be a significant aggravating feature;

(d) The sophistication of the offence, including the degree of planning;

(e) Where the offence was committed by or on behalf of an organized criminal syndicate would be an aggravating feature;

(f) Whether there was one transaction or many and the length of time over which the offence was committed;

(g) Whether the offender continued to launder funds after he had discovered the nature of the funds were proceeds of an offence or a serious offence was involved;

(h) The role of the offender and the acts performed by him.

59.  Whilst there are no sentencing guidelines for money laundering cases, the Court of Appeal in Secretary for Justice v Wan Kwok Keung [2012] 1 HKLRD 201, at para 15, stated that starting points for such cases could be as follows:-

(a) HK$1 million to HK$2 million – 3 years;

(b) HK$3 million to HK$6 million – 4 years;

(c) Above HK$10 million – over 5 years.

60.  Ms Ko’s instructions were that she opened the bank accounts upon the requests of her brother and close friend.  She simply complied and passed the bank accounts over for their use.  She had not taken part in the actual handling or dealing of the monies.

61.  Ms Ko pleaded guilty in good time, showing her remorse.  She has underestimated the consequences of lending her bank accounts.

62.  Ms Ko is living with her mother (71) who is in court to give her support. Ms Ko became a beauty parlour receptionist after release for the Attempted Fraud convictions.  Recently, she started her apprenticeship with a friend as a beauty specialist.  Hopefully, she could start her career in this area after release.

63.  Ms Ko does not have any similar conviction record.

64.  In the present case, there is no evidence that Ms Ko had participated in, or had knowledge of, any predicate offence.  Nor was there evidence of any international dimension.

65.  The total amount laundered is HK$22,068,857.09.  The duration of the offences were about 6 months.  According to Wan Kwok Keung, a starting point of over 5 years can be adopted.

66.  Mr Lau raised no dispute to the prosecution’s request for enhanced sentencing based on the witness statement of CIP Li Yiu Nam.

67.  Mr Lau reminded the court of the totality principle.

68.  Mr Lau submitted on behalf of Ms Ko three mitigation letters written in Chinese respectively by Ms Ko herself, her mother, and a friend.  The contents generally are that Ms Ko is regretful for her stupid mistake; that she committed the offences for economic reasons; that since her arrest, although she was under enormous stress awaiting the proceedings, she did not give herself up and went to learn about the beautician industry from a friend; that Ms Ko is a kind, responsible and serious person who is willing to help her friends.  The letter writers asked for a chance be given to Ms Ko to reform herself.

69.  Upon enquiry by the court, Mr Lau submitted that Ms Ko simply passed over control of her BOC Account to her brother upon request.  For the other 3 subject bank accounts, Ms Ko opened them and passed over control of them to her close friend for a promised reward of HK$4,000 which she never received.

70.  Again upon enquiry by the court, Mr Lau submitted that the PAO Bank Limited account held in Ms Ko’s name (mentioned in para 35 of the Amended Summary of Facts) was a similar account the control of which she had passed to others and therefore the amount of HK$179,000 transferred into it was not remuneration for her money laundering activities.

Sentence

71.  The maximum penalty for a money laundering offence is 14 years’ imprisonment and a HK$5 million fine.  There are no sentencing guidelines though a deterrent sentence is invariably called for.  Needless to say, it is a serious offence.

72.  The total amount laundered came to about HK$22 million; this is a huge sum for this type of offence.  The predicate offence appears to be fraud but there is no evidence that Ms Ko knew about this.  Ms Ko’s role was clearly to lend an existing (BOC) bank account and to open and pass over control of new accounts for the purpose of money laundering.  There were numerous transactions on the four bank accounts over a total period of about 6 months.  The promised reward was HK$4,000 but there is no evidence she ever received it.

73.  I intend to adopt a global starting point to cover all 4 charges. Bearing the principles enunciated in Lam Ka Sin, Boma and Wan Kwok Keung, and the above factual considerations in mind, I will begin with a starting point of 5 ½ years’ imprisonment.

74.  Ms Ko pleaded guilty in good time earning for herself the full 1/3 sentencing discount.  There are no other mitigating factors of weight to justify another sentence reduction.  The sentence before any enhancement would be 44 months’ imprisonment.

75.  Prosecution has furnished information in the form of a witness statement of CIP Li Yiu Nam dated 11 July 2025 tending to show the prevalence of money laundering offence and the extent of harm caused to the community by recent occurrences of this offence.

76.  Mr Lau offered no objection to the reception of this information by the court nor did he object to the prosecution’s request for enhanced sentencing based on the information.

77.  I have therefore received the information.

78.  As shown in Table A on page 5 of the statement, the total number of money laundering stooges arrested had been rising consistently from the year 2020 (760) to the year 2024 (7,883).  The figure for the first 5 months of the year 2025 was 2,146.  By using the mathematical method of extrapolation, the forecast for the whole of the year 2025 would be 5,150.  This represents a drop.  However, the number is still substantial as compared with the previous figures.  The proportion of stooges arrested to the total number of arrested persons in detected Deception (with money laundering element) and Money Laundering cases in the first 5 months of the year 2025 (as well as the projected proportion for the whole year) still stands at 70.87%.

79.  I am satisfied that money laundering offence is still prevalent.

80.  As shown in Table B on pp 6-7 of the statement, for (local) Deception cases (with money laundering element) detected with arrest, the amount of losses reported by victims for the first 5 months of the year 2025 came to HK$219.11M.  The projected losses for the whole of the year 2025 (by extrapolation) would be HK$525.86M.  Although this represents a drop from the corresponding (actual) figure of HK$2,143.41M for the year 2024, it is still substantial.

81.  Also from Table B, the number of detected with arrest cases with use of (local) stooge accounts stands at 329 for the first 5 months of the year 2025. The projected figure for the whole of the year 2025 (by extrapolation) would be 789.  This represents a substantial drop from the figure of 3,675 cases for the year 2024.  However, the amount of reported losses (including losses by overseas victims) and proceeds laundered in this type of cases still stands at HK$428.53M for the first 5 months alone of the year 2025 which is already substantial even without regard to the projected figure for the whole year.

82.  I am satisfied that the extent of the harm (including harm to the reputation of Hong Kong as a well-known international financial hub) caused to the community by recent occurrences of the money laundering offence is still substantial.

83.  Accordingly, I will exercise the power under section 27(11) of OSCO, Cap 455, to enhance the sentence of Ms Ko.  Having regard to the circumstances of the case, I adjudge 21% enhancement to be appropriate.  I will round down where there are decimal places in the calculation result.

84.  I am of the view that the resulting sentence thus arrived at is not too excessive in the circumstances of the offences and the offender.

85.  I will impose notional sentences (after enhancement) for the individual charges and make an appropriate order to arrive at the final sentence for Ms Ko.

(Ms Ko, please stand)

86.  For Charge 1, the sentence is 48 months’ imprisonment.

87.  For Charge 2, the sentence is 33 months’ imprisonment.

88.  For Charge 3, the sentence is 29 months’ imprisonment.

89.  For Charge 4, the sentence is 33 months’ imprisonment.

90.  I order that 2 months of the sentence on Charge 2, 1 month of the sentence on Charge 3, and 2 months of the sentence on Charge 4, are each to run consecutively to the sentence on Charge 1, making a final sentence for Ms Ko of 53 months’ imprisonment.