LI XIAO YI v. TANG CHUNG WAH (also known as ALAN CHUNG WAH TANG)

HCMP 406/2025

[2026] HKCFI 2649

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 406 OF 2025

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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1.  On 13 April 2026 the Defendant in the present committal proceedings issued a summons seeking an adjournment of the trial fixed for three days commencing on 18 May 2026. I heard the application on 29 April 2026; in other words, less than three weeks before the commencement of the trial. In short, the grounds on which the Defendant seeks an adjournment are that there are two applications for leave to appeal related matters pending before the Court of Appeal and that the committal proceedings should be adjourned until after they (and if leave is obtained presumably the substantive appeals) have been determined. I dismissed the application on the day following the hearing (30 April 2026). These are my reasons for doing so.

2.  Adjournments of an originating summons are governed by Order 28 rule 5 of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”), which provides that the court may, if necessary, adjourn an originating summons either generally or to a particular date as appropriate.  As the application is in substance an attempt to adjourn a trial Order 35 rule 3 of the RHC is also relevant.  It provides that the court may adjourn a trial in the interests of justice on such terms as the court thinks fit.  The principles by reference to which an application for an adjournment of this sort is determined are well-established.  A trial is a substantial matter, and it should not be adjourned save in exceptional circumstances[1].  As one would expect the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that there are exceptional circumstances justifying an adjournment.  It is not for the respondent to demonstrate prejudice if an adjournment is not granted, although the interests of the respondent and any possible detriment that may be caused by an adjournment are relevant to determining the application if the court is satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated exceptional circumstances at which point a consideration of the impact of an adjournment on both parties will be necessary.  In considering whether there are exceptional circumstances, the court will consider factors such as whether the adjournment will be likely to address the problem faced by the applicant[2].

3.  Delay in seeking an adjournment is also relevant.  As Tsui J explains in Re Estate of Yang Foo Oi[3] if a party wishes to reverse an unfavourable result it is incumbent on them to proceed diligently.  The Judge accepted that if a bona fide appeal is being pursued with reasonable diligence and its outcome would have a material impact on the trial and it is not possible for the appeal to be dealt with before the trial, this arguably would amount to exceptional circumstances[4].  I agree.

Discussion

4.  I handed down judgment in the substantive proceedings of HCA 1492/2018 on 17 October 2024 (“Judgment”) with reasons delivered on 21 January 2025.  A Notice of Appeal was issued by the plaintiff therein (“Company”) out of time in CACV 80/2025 (“Appeal”).  I refused to grant leave to appeal out of time.  An application has been issued before the Court of Appeal in CAMP 56/2026.  No directions have yet been made for its determination.  The most recent reason for this would appear to be the Registrar of Appeals seeking evidence of the Committee of Inspection (the Company is in liquidation) sanctioning an appeal.  It seems to me clear that the Appeal has not been progressed diligently.  It also seems clear to me that its outcome will have little, if any, bearing on the determination of the committal proceedings as the grounds on which contempt proceedings have been brought are different from the issues which are relevant to the Appeal[5].  Mr Tang apparently wishes to advance grounds, which include those relevant to the contempt proceedings[6], but it seems to me that they are irrelevant to the determination of the Judgment and the Appeal.  It does not follow that if the Appeal is successful then the contempt proceedings will fail and neither does the determination of the contempt proceedings render the Appeal, if leave is granted, nugatory.

5.  The recusal application is directly connected with the contempt proceedings.  I have, however, already determined that in my view it is not reasonably arguable[7]. The recusal application was filed on 19 September 2025 and dismissed by me on 3 November 2025 when the date for the hearing of the contempt proceedings was fixed.  As I have mentioned Mr Tang sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his recusal application.  The summons is dated 17 November 2025. It was open to Mr Tang to seek an adjournment of the trial in May 2026 at any time from 3 November 2025.  As I mentioned at the outset Mr Tang did not issue his application until 13 April 2026. This invited the Plaintiff’s submission that Mr Tang is trying to create delay.  It seems to me that there is no credible explanation for Mr Tang not making the application much earlier.

6.  In my view Mr Tang has not demonstrated exceptional circumstances that justify adjourning the trial in May 2026.  In reaching this decision I have also had regard to both the Plaintiff’s entitlement to have the proceedings determined promptly, the public interest in having a serious complaint against a liquidator also determined promptly and the fact that the court’s diary has been booked now for some time.  As Mr Ho on behalf of the Plaintiff quite properly acknowledged the trial in May will determine whether Mr Tang has committed contempt. Sentencing will be dealt with subsequently and when that might be be assessed in the light of the progress of Mr Tang’s leave applications.

7.  I will make a costs order nisi that Mr Tang pays the Plaintiff’s costs forthwith with a certificate for counsel, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.