LAU MO CHOI v. LAU MUK FAT (as the Manager of Lau Shau Wo Tso ‘劉壽和祖’)

HCA 1263/2012

[2026] HKCFI 493

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1263 OF 2012

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D E C I S I O N

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I.  INTRODUCTION

1.  On 6 October 2025, I handed down my decision (the “Leave Decision”) ([2025] HKCFI 4748), whereby I refused the Defendant’s application for leave to appeal against the Decision handed down on 2 July 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 2656) (the “Main Decision”). On 17 October 2025, the Defendant then made a renewed application before the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal (CAMP 205/2025) and also an application for a stay of the disclosure order I made at §18 of the Main Decision (the “Disclosure Order”). Upon requisitions raised by the Registrar of Civil Appeals, the Defendant issued a Summons on 14 November 2025 (the “Stay Summons”) before me for an order to stay the Disclosure Order.

2.  In support of the Stay Summons, the Defendant filed the 2^nd Affirmation of Lau Muk Fat on 14 November 2025 (the “2^nd Affirmation of Lau Muk Fat”) and 3^rd Affirmation of Lau Muk Fat on 8 December 2025. In the 2^nd Affirmation of Lau Muk Fat, the Defendant deposes that the affirmation is also in opposition to the Disclosure Order. No leave has been granted for fresh evidence for appeal or application for leave to appeal. I shall consider the evidence only for the purpose of the Stay Summons.

II.  DELIBERATION

3.  Given my refusal of the Defendant’s application for leave to appeal, the consideration I mainly have is whether the intended appeal would be rendered nugatory and where the balance of convenience lies despite lack of reasonable prospects of success of the intended appeal. In reliance on Akai Holdings Limited (in compulsory liquidation) v Ho Wing On, Christopher, HCCL 40/2005, 16 April 2009 at §55, the Plaintiff reminds me that it is not a must that a disclosure order would be stayed pending appeal simply because the disclosed information cannot be recalled, and that it is a balancing exercise.

4.  In the present case, the Disclosure Order is for the purpose of the assessment of quantum, the dates of the trial of which have not been fixed. The Plaintiff submits that because he is the paying party, the further delay there is to the trial, the more interest would accrue against him on the assessed sum at the end of the trial. He submits that therefore, it is necessary to have the Disclosure Order implemented as soon as possible so that the trial could proceed with as quickly as possible. However, in my view, pending the application for leave to appeal or the appeal proper (if leave be granted), even if the Disclosure Order is implemented, the trial would be unlikely to take place. If the appeal would be allowed, it would likely mean that the Settlement Agreement was irrelevant to the trial, and the trial would have to proceed that way. If the appeal would be disallowed, it would likely mean that the Settlement Agreement was relevant to the trial, and so it would have to be considered at trial. In other words, stay or not, much of the trial would still depend on the outcome of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal proper (if leave would be granted). This would have to be taken into account in estimating the trial length and fixing the trial dates. Overall, if there is any prejudice caused by the delay, a grant or a non-grant of the stay order would not make much difference.

5.  To support his position that the Defendant would not suffer any prejudice without stay, the Plaintiff submits that he is a member of the Tso, and thus he is in any event entitled to the disclosure of the Settlement Agreement. In making such submissions, I think he relies on Re Estate of Cheung Kung Hai, deceased, HCMP 3956/2002, 29 January 2004, which stands for the general legal principle that a beneficiary of a trust is entitled to disclosure of relevant documents and information in relation to the trust property. The Plaintiff is right, and so, in this sense, it can be said that the Defendant would not suffer any prejudice if there is no stay. However, if the Settlement Agreement is disclosed under the Disclosure Order, the Plaintiff would be under an implied undertaking not to use the Settlement Agreement for other purposes than the assessment of quantum. If the Plaintiff has some other purposes in mind and if he thinks fit upon proper legal advice, he can certainly make a separate application for disclosure of the Settlement Agreement. On the whole, this lack of prejudice factor lies against a stay, but does not do so significantly.

6.  The Defendant submits that the appeal would be rendered nugatory if there is no stay. I agree only partially because even if the Settlement Agreement has been disclosed, the appeal would still be of utility in determining whether the Settlement Agreement is relevant to the assessment of quantum. That said, partially it is, partial rendering of the appeal nugatory is still a concern to me.

7.  Lastly, the Defendant expresses his worry in the evidence that the Plaintiff may misuse the Settlement Agreement for other purposes detrimental to the Tso (for example, hindering the implementation of the Settlement Agreement). There is no explanation of how this misuse could happen, given the implied undertaking not to use the disclosed information for other purposes. There is also no proper evidence to suggest that the Plaintiff would breach this undertaking. His worry is mere speculation, to which I pay no regard.

III.  CONCLUSION

8.  Having considered all the above, I think the partial rendering of the appeal nugatory sways me in favour of a grant of the stay. So, I order that the Disclosure Order be stayed pending the determination of the Defendant’s application for leave to appeal in CAMP 205/2025 or further order of the Court. Costs shall be in the Defendant’s application for leave to appeal in CAMP 205/2025.