SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE, SINGAPORE BRANCH v. INTER PACIFIC GROUP PTE LTD AND OTHERS

HCA 1617/2019

[2019] HKCFI 2484

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1617 OF 2019

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DECISION

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1.  By a summons dated 24 September 2019, the plaintiff makes an application for an inspection order under section 21 of the Evidence Ordinance against four financial institutions which are the banks of D3, D8, D9 and D10.  The plaintiff claims that it is making a proprietary claim against all the defendants, including D3, D8, D9 and D10, and that it is necessary to obtain an inspection order to trace and/or identify the whereabouts of the funds in question so that it could take steps to protect them.

2.  On behalf of the 8th and the 9th defendants, Mr Tom Ng takes three points to oppose the application. 

3.  First, Mr Ng says that the plaintiff is not making a proprietary claim against his clients. 

4.  I have only had very limited time to consider the point as the point was only raised orally during today’s hearing.  For the purpose of today’s application, the question before me is whether the plaintiff has shown a good arguable case that its claims against D8 and D9 are proprietary in nature.  I have borne in mind what Lord Browne-Wilkinson said in the case of Westdeutsche Bank v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 at pages 715 B to C and 716 C to D.  

5.  On the very limited submissions that I have received from both parties during today’s hearing, I consider that the plaintiff has surmounted the relevant threshold.

6.  The second point raised by Mr Ng is that I should not determine this application on the summons day, and he relies on what Madam Justice Lisa Wong said at paragraphs 9 and 11 of the case of Acropolis Limited v HSBC [2018] HKCFI 1670.  Given that I consider the plaintiff has crossed the relevant threshold to establish a proprietary claim against D8 and D9, I consider there is some urgency for the plaintiff to trace and identify the whereabouts of the funds. I therefore do not think what was said in the Acropolis case is applicable in this case.

7.  The last point made by Mr Ng is that this court is not in a position to balance the interests of the parties because his clients are due to provide information pursuant to a disclosure order today.

8.  Again, as the plaintiff has crossed the necessary threshold of showing a proprietary claim against D8 and D9, it seems to me that the advantages of granting today’s application (as identified by Mr Alan Kwong in his skeletons) outweigh the potential prejudice that may be caused to D8 and D9. 

9.  I wish to emphasise that what I said about the plaintiff’s ability of showing a good arguable case on its proprietary claim against D8 and D9 is entirely based on the very limited information presently before the court and the very limited arguments received during today’s hearing.  I understand that a substantive hearing will be fixed to determine whether the injunction should be continued, and I do not wish what I have said in these very brief reasons to be binding on the court determining the substantive continuation application. 

10.  For these brief reasons, I am minded to grant the application.