RE TOBES HYDIE

CACV 564/2019

[2020] HKCA 985

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 564 OF 2019

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1130/2018)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Lam VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 2 September 2020, the Applicant applied by a Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this Court’s (Lam VP and Pang JA) judgment of 21 August 2020. In that judgment the Court dismissed the Applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan on 4 December 2019 dismissing her application for leave to apply for judicial review.

2.  Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal (“CFA”) at the discretion of this Court or the CFA if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the CFA for decision.

3.  In her Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the CFA and her supporting affirmation of the same date, the Applicant raised the following matters in support of her application:

(1)  it is not true that there is no substance in the grounds of the application;

(2)  no complaint was made as to the duty lawyer’s poor performance, for fear that he will be picked out for misappropriating by the adjudicator;

(3)  the Applicant did not have enough time to address the bundle;

(4)  the judges erred in holding that there was no state acquiescence or involvement;

(5)  the judges failed to find out the clear details of the current situation in the Philippines.

4.  Pursuant to the Court’s directions of 29 September 2020, Applicant duly lodged her written submissions in support on 27 October 2020.  Those submissions consist largely of general statements of law quoted from case law and legislation without identifying how they specifically relate to or apply in this case.  At paragraph 2 (penultimate page) of those submissions, the Applicant submitted that the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) failed to scrutinize the Director of Immigration’s decision, and that the Board ought to have considered matters such as country of origin conditions.

5.  The submissions and the grounds were advanced as if this application was a fresh hearing of the application for judicial review and did not address our reasons for dismissing the appeal as set out in [12] to [13] of the judgment of 21 August 2020. Performance of duty lawyer, the time for addressing the bundle and state acquiescence were not matters relied upon by the Applicant previously in the appeal.

6.  As this Court had held repeatedly, an application for leave to appeal to the CFA is not the occasion for running an applicant’s case afresh.

7.  The Applicant has not raised any reasonably arguable ground of appeal for disturbing our judgment. The matters raised in her Notice of Motion and her written submissions do not identify any specific error in our judgment or the judgment of the court below.

8.  Further, there is no question of great general or public importance or which otherwise ought to be submitted to the CFA for determination.

9.  For these reasons, we refuse to grant leave to appeal to the CFA and dismiss the Applicant’s Notice of Motion.